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are grateful for this funding. CTR acknowledges funding from the 
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government, with funds from the European Recovery Program of the 
German Ministry for Economics and Technology.  
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All authors have written in their personal capacity, and none of 
the views expressed here represents those of any government or 
institution. The organisation, substance and editing of the project 
results, including this book and its various conclusions, critiques and 
recommendations, are entirely independent.  
 
Daniel S. Hamilton, Washington, D.C. 
Jacques Pelkmans, Brussels 
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RULES, NORMS 
AND STANDARDS 
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1. RULE-MAKERS OR RULE-
TAKERS? AN INTRODUCTION 
TO TTIP 
DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
AND JACQUES PELKMANS 
1. The transatlantic economy, now and in the future 
Despite the rise of other powers, including many emerging growth 
markets, the United States and Europe remain the fulcrum of the world 
economy, each other’s most important and profitable market and main 
source of ‘onshored’ jobs. The transatlantic economy generates $5.5 
trillion in total commercial sales a year and employs up to 15 million 
workers in mutually ‘onshored’ jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. It is 
the largest and wealthiest market in the world, accounting for over 35% 
of world GDP in terms of purchasing power.1 
No other commercial artery is as integrated. Every day roughly 
$1.7 billion in goods and services crosses the Atlantic, representing 
about one-third of total global trade in goods and more than 40% of 
world trade in services. Ties are particularly thick in foreign direct 
investment, portfolio investment, banking claims, trade and affiliate 
sales in goods and services, mutual R&D investment, patent 
cooperation, technology flows and sales of knowledge-intensive 
services. Together the United States and Europe accounted for 70% of 
the outward stock and 57% of the inward stock of global foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in 2013. Moreover, each partner has built up the great 
majority of that stock in the other’s economy. Mutual investment in the 
North Atlantic space is very large, dwarfs trade and has become 
essential to US and European jobs and prosperity. 
But the primacy of the transatlantic economy should not be taken 
for granted. Due to the rise of emerging markets, the share of global 
                                                          
1 The data cited in this chapter are drawn from Hamilton & Quinlan (2015).  
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trade accounted for by the EU and the US has fallen and China is set to 
overtake both soon to become the single most-important trading power 
in the world. The United States remains by far the largest single 
bilateral export market for the EU, but its share in overall EU exports 
has fallen from about 27% to less than 20%, whereas that of China has 
almost doubled over the last few years. On the import side, the US 
ranks now only third for the EU. In the longer run, the transatlantic 
economy is bound to decrease in relative size in the world economy. 
Extrapolations for 2050 suggest that China will be of an economic size 
equal to transatlantic GDP, and India, Brazil and other rising economies 
are becoming increasingly integrated into the global economy.  
2. TTIP’s rationale: Three drivers 
In short, the world that created the original transatlantic partnership is 
fading fast. Each side of the Atlantic is facing daunting economic 
challenges at home and abroad. In this context, the United States and 
the European Union initiated negotiations on a new Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, known as TTIP, which was born of 
a realisation on each side of the Atlantic that Americans and Europeans 
must work with greater urgency to build a partnership that is more 
effective in generating economic opportunity and confidence at home; 
engaging rising powers; and strengthening and extending basic norms 
and principles guiding the international system.  
A first and prominent driver behind TTIP is a new and common 
recognition among US and European leaders that they need to act more 
urgently to open transatlantic markets in ways that can position each 
partner, and both together, to succeed in a world of diffuse economic 
power and intensified global competition. The addition of four billion 
people to the globalised economy and the rise of other powers, together 
with recent Western economic turmoil, have convinced US and 
European decision-makers that the window of opportunity may be 
closing on their ability to maintain high labour, consumer, health, 
safety and environmental standards and to advance key norms of the 
liberal rules-based order unless they act more effectively together. 
For more than two centuries, either Europeans or Americans, or 
both together, have been accustomed to setting global rules. In the post-
World War II era, the US and the evolving EU, each in its own way, has 
been a steward of the international rules-based order. Yet, with the rise 
of new powers, the resurgence of older powers and the emergence of 
serious challenges at home, Europeans and Americans now face the 
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prospect of becoming rule-takers rather than rule-makers, unless they 
act more effectively together to ensure that high standards prevail.2 
Given these considerations, TTIP’s potential economic value 
extends beyond the transatlantic market itself. Properly constructed, it 
can also be a useful policy initiative to help open global markets. TTIP 
reflects a growing recognition on both sides of the Atlantic that the 
United States and the European Union must invest in new forms of 
transatlantic collaboration to strengthen multilateral rules and lift 
international standards. Given the size and scope of the transatlantic 
economy, standards negotiated by the US and the EU can quickly 
become a benchmark for global models, reducing the likelihood that 
others will impose more stringent, protectionist requirements for either 
products or services, or that lower standards could erode key forms of 
protection for workers, consumers or the environment. Given deep 
transatlantic economic integration, the benefits of such an initiative to 
both parties could be substantial. And given that the transatlantic 
economy remains the fulcrum of the global economy, there could be 
significant positive spillovers to third countries in rules, standards and 
regulatory affairs.  
A second driver is the ongoing evolution in the nature and scope 
of global trade negotiations. Europeans and Americans share an 
interest in extending prosperity through multilateral trade 
liberalisation, yet the primary multilateral trade negotiation, the Doha 
Round, has been at a standstill for some time. Far greater dynamism is 
apparent with regard to preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which 
already govern over 50% of world trade and are likely to shape the 
nature of commercial connections across the Atlantic and around the 
world in coming decades. Mega-regional trade agreements are likely to 
be particularly important -- not only TTIP but also the 12-nation TPP 
(Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the Regional Economic Comprehensive  
Partnership (RECP) involving more than 20 countries in Asia. 
Negotiations to establish a preferential Trade Agreement in Services 
(TISA) currently involve 50 countries accounting for over 68% of global 
trade in services, including the US and the EU. 
These mega-regional arrangements and a number of other ‘deep-
integration’ PTAs seek to go beyond tariff reductions to define new 
structures and modalities for all sorts of non-tariff barriers to trade, 
along with new rules for important trade-related issues such as 
                                                          
2 See Hamilton (2014a). 
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investment and competition, and new concerns e.g. environment, 
climate, labour, food scarcity, animal welfare, privacy standards and 
mounting consumer pressures.3 The EU and Japan, for instance, 
launched negotiations towards a deep free trade agreement that 
includes regulatory issues, and the EU-Canada CETA agreement, 
which also touches on rules, standards and regulatory issues, has been 
successfully negotiated (although at this writing not yet ratified).  
As these initiatives all went forward, it was becoming 
increasingly odd that leading trading partners such as the United States 
and the EU had not advanced their own efforts together. On both sides 
of the Atlantic, more and more voices argued that it was in the 
enlightened self-interest of both parties to undertake an exemplary 
initiative in earnest.  
Moreover, US-EU agreement via TTIP has the potential to 
unblock the WTO Doha negotiations and jumpstart multilateral 
negotiations, just as NAFTA helped jumpstart Doha's predecessor 
negotiation, the Uruguay Round, and US-EU negotiations on an 
Information Technology Agreement also eventually became the basic 
multilateral agreement in this area. Moreover, even a successful Doha 
Round agreement would not address a host of issues that are not part 
of its mandate and yet are critical to the United States, the European 
Union and the global economy. In this regard TTIP can be a pioneering 
effort to extend the multilateral system to new areas and new members. 
Third, global value chains (GVCs), which render a country’s 
exports essentially the product of many intermediate imports 
assembled in many other countries, are revolutionising trade in both 
goods and services, with important implications for the conduct and 
priorities of trade negotiators and for our understanding of the 
transatlantic economy.  
In today's global economy, a good produced in the United States 
and exported to the EU might include components from Mexico or 
China, using raw materials from Canada or Australia or services from 
Turkey or Switzerland. Goods and services are increasingly from 
‘everywhere’, rather than exclusively from ‘somewhere’, as they are 
defined today.4 They are unlikely to be fully “made in Germany”, and 
“made in China” does not necessarily mean “made by China”. 
                                                          
3 See Hamilton (2015) and Herfkens & Michalopoulos (2015).  
4 See remarks by OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría (2013) at the launch of 
the OECD-WTO Database on Trade in Value-Added. 
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This growing process of international fragmentation is changing 
our traditional understanding of the patterns and structure of 
international trade. Traditional measures do not show how supply is 
driven by the final customer or reveal where the creation of value-
added occurs, in terms of wages and profits. They also underplay the 
role of services in overall trade.5 The OECD and the WTO have now 
created tools that are transforming our understanding of trade flows by 
revealing what was hidden before. This new ‘value-added’ approach 
tracks the direct and indirect flows of value-added associated with 
international trade. It shows where value is actually created. Their 
findings lead to some surprising conclusions that reinforce our 
understanding of the dense binding forces of transatlantic integration. 
Take German-US trade as an example. Under traditional 
measures, the United States ranked slightly behind France in 2009 as 
Germany’s major export market and ranked only fourth as an exporter 
to Germany, behind France, the Netherlands and China. But under the 
value-added approach, the United States jumps ahead to be both 
Germany's single most-important export market, accounting for 11% of 
German exports, and also Germany's most important supplier, 
accounting for over 12% of German imports.6 This bilateral trade 
relationship can also be seen as more lucrative than previously 
understood, since Germany exports and imports more to and from the 
United States in value-added terms than in gross terms.  
The value-added lens also shows that US bilateral trade with 
many other EU member states, and with the EU as a whole, is even 
more important than previously understood. In value-added terms, the 
EU exports (and imports) relatively more to (from) the United States 
and relatively less to (and from) China. 
The United States also replaces Germany as Italy’s top trading 
partner when exports are viewed on a value-added basis. This is 
because many of the inputs that Italy provides to other European 
partner countries, particularly Germany, become part of final goods 
that ultimately are exported to the United States. The value-added 
approach gives a similar lift to French-American trade. The United 
States emerges as France's number one trading partner, in terms of both 
                                                          
5 See www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/tradedataday13_e/ 
paul_schreyer_e.pdf.  
6 All data presented here are drawn from the joint OECD/WTO Database on 
Trade in Value-Added (see www.oecd.org/sti/industryandglobalisation 
/TiVA%20Germany.pdf). 
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exports and imports, whereas conventional measures rank it third 
behind Germany and Belgium. 
The value-added approach does not change America's position 
as the main destination for UK exports, but it does reveal that it actually 
received a much higher share of UK exports (21% vs 16%) than when 
trade is evaluated in gross terms during the baseline year of 2009. This 
suggests that, like Italy and France, the UK’s exports to other EU 
countries are at least partly intermediate services and inputs, which are 
then further processed and shipped elsewhere, especially to the United 
States. Moreover, under the value-added approach, the United States 
displaces Germany as the UK’s main supplier. While the EU as a whole 
is a more important trading partner for Britain than the United States, 
more of Britain’s lucrative exports head across the Atlantic than 
previously believed.  
The United States is engaged in a variety of dynamic regional 
value chains with NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico, similar to 
those that EU member states conduct among themselves. Trade within 
NAFTA is extensive. But much of it is composed of intermediate goods 
and services that are processed in Canada or Mexico and re-exported 
to the United States. The final export destination may lie elsewhere, 
with Europe garnering a higher share than previously understood. For 
instance, according to conventional methods, Germany was America's 
6th largest export market in 2009. But according to value-added 
estimates, Germany followed only Canada as the most important 
export market for the United States, ahead of Mexico and China. In 
addition, according to value-added calculations, the US trade deficit 
with China is a quarter lower than estimated under conventional 
measurements, and is redistributed to Japan, Korea, Germany and 
other intermediate input suppliers to China. 
The value-added approach not only underscores the continuing 
importance of the transatlantic economy, it is an important 
consideration as the United States and the EU consider removing tariff 
barriers across the Atlantic. Since many of these barriers are relatively 
low, sceptics wonder about the benefits of going to ’transatlantic zero’. 
But given that many US and EU exports in the end result from many 
different intermediate imports, and that related-party trade, or trade 
among affiliates of the same company, is so important in transatlantic 
commerce, even relatively low tariffs can have multiple knock-on 
effects all down the value chain. As the OECD (2013) notes: “Success in 
international markets today depends as much on the capacity to import 
world class inputs as on the capacity to export. Protection measures 
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against imports of intermediate products increase costs of production 
and reduce a country’s ability to compete in export markets: tariffs and 
other barriers on imports are a tax on exports.” Moreover, given the 
size of the transatlantic economy, even small changes can have big 
effect. 
Another policy implication of the value-added approach has to 
do with services. Traditional trade figures suggest that services account 
for less than one-quarter of global trade. But these new data highlight 
that services are not just exported through trade in services, they are 
integral to manufacturing trade as well. Transport equipment, electrical 
equipment and food products are manufacturing industries with 
significant services content. For the EU economy as a whole, 55% of the 
value of all gross exports originates in the services sector. The figure for 
the United States is 56% – roughly the same. For many EU member 
states, including the UK, the percentage is even higher; on average, 60% 
of the value of UK gross exports is comprised of value-added 
originating from the services sector. And the high value content of 
Britain's services-sector exports to the United States make them more 
valuable than they may first appear. Germany is perhaps an even more 
surprising example. While Germany tends to specialise in 
manufacturing industries, its exports of manufacturing goods 
incorporate significant shares of services value-added – over 40% in 
food, textile products and transport vehicles. In fact, fully half of the 
value of gross German exports represents services value-added.  
In sum, companies and countries keen on improving their 
manufacturing performance increasingly are pressed to improve their 
services performance as well. Manufacturing produces for the services 
sector, and the services sector contributes to manufacturing. The two 
are increasingly intertwined; the supposed trade-off between 
manufacturing and services is a false choice. Liberalisation of services 
trade would not only allow for more-efficient and higher-quality 
services, it would enhance the competitiveness of manufacturing firms 
as well.  
This is of direct importance to the transatlantic economy. The 
United States and the EU are the world's most important services 
economies, and each other's most important and profitable services 
markets. In the current policy environment, freeing the transatlantic 
services economy through TTIP could be the single-most important 
external initiative either side could take to spur growth and create jobs 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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3. Why TTIP is different  
Given this background and these aims and drivers, TTIP is not just 
another free trade agreement. According to Pascal Lamy, former 
Director-General of the World Trade Organization, “TTIP is the first 
show of the new world of trade”.7 Partly for this reason, TTIP 
negotiations have been accompanied by a swirl of confusion and 
controversy manifested in debates in the public domain, particularly 
but not only in parts of Europe, about their content and ultimate goals. 
Let us first note why TTIP is different and then set out exactly the 
structure of the TTIP negotiations.  
TTIP is certainly intended to reduce traditional barriers to 
transatlantic trade. While average transatlantic tariffs are relatively 
low, at about 3-4% on average, with many tariffs at zero, tariffs remain 
quite high for some specific products in such categories as agriculture, 
textiles and apparel, and footwear. So there is room for barriers to come 
down. In addition, since the volume of US-EU trade is so huge, 
eliminating even relatively low tariffs could boost trade significantly. 
A report by the European think tank ECIPE estimated that a 
transatlantic zero-tariff agreement could boost US and EU goods 
exports each by 17% – about five times more than expected under the 
US-Korea free trade deal ratified in 2011.8 Moreover, since a large 
percentage of transatlantic trade is intra-firm, or trade in parts and 
components within the firm or value-chain, even small tariffs add to 
the cost of production and result in higher prices for consumers on both 
sides of the ocean. The more intense the intra-industry trade 
component of trade between two parties, like the one that characterises 
US-EU commerce, the greater the effects and benefits of lower tariffs. 
Freer transatlantic trade without tariffs and with lower technical 
barriers could translate into millions of new jobs in the United States 
and Europe and improve both earnings and competitiveness for many 
companies, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
Trade in goods, however, accounts for only about 20% of 
transatlantic commerce. Even greater gains could be had if TTIP opens 
the transatlantic services economy, where most jobs could be created; 
ensures an open rules-based order for investment; tackles technical and 
other non-tariff barriers and regulatory differences; and repositions the 
United States and the EU to respond more effectively to greater global 
competition. These dimensions are central to the TTIP negotiations and 
                                                          
7 See Lamy (2015). 
8 See Erixon & Bauer (2010) and also Berden et al. (2009). 
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explain why TTIP is more than just another free trade agreement. 
TTIP's potential and its promise is to go beyond traditional trade 
arrangements to forge understandings regarding mutual investment, 
open services markets, non-tariff and regulatory barriers, basic ground 
rules of the international economic order and new agreements in areas 
not yet covered by multilateral regimes. All of these elements make 
TTIP a next-generation negotiation that breaks the mould of traditional 
trade agreements. At the heart of the ongoing talks is the question 
whether and in which areas the two major democratic actors in the 
global economy can address costly frictions generated by their deep 
commercial integration by aligning regulations and other instruments 
and setting benchmarks for high-quality global norms and rules.  
At its core, TTIP is about far more than trade. It is about creating 
a more strategic, dynamic and holistic US-EU relationship that is more 
confident, more effective at engaging third countries and addressing 
regional and global challenges, and better able to strengthen the ground 
rules of the international order. TTIP can potentially serve as a symbolic 
and practical assertion of Western renewal, vigour and commitment, 
not only to each other but to high rules-based standards and core 
principles of international order. It is an initiative that can be assertive 
without being aggressive. It challenges fashionable notions about a 
‘weakened west’. In this sense, TTIP is poised to be the major political, 
strategic and economic driver of the transatlantic relationship over the 
course of this decade. 
4. What is TTIP? Structure and substance 
There are many reasons why TTIP debates leave much to be desired. 
Many discussions zoom in on only one or two aspects, and even then 
often on the basis of assertions in the (social) media rather than as a 
result of careful study of the actual documents and/or serious analysis. 
The present volume should be a considerable help for the reader 
genuinely interested in the subject.  
However, it is useful to simply depict what TTIP is all about and 
how the negotiations are structured. Figure 1.1 provides an elementary 
introduction to the substance of TTIP. Apart from a general set of 
principles and the basic rationale (in the so-called ‘chapeau’ of a future 
treaty, see top right), there are three lines of negotiation:  market access, 
regulatory cooperation and ‘rules’. The core of TTIP is the middle 
column (regulatory cooperation) with the addition of public 
procurement and services (from the left column) as well as GIs 
(geographical indications) and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
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from the right hand column. The present volume deals with all these 
core subjects, including several sectors specified at the bottom of the 
middle column, but also a few services sectors.  
Figure 1.1 What is TTIP all about? 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration. 
In addition to opening transatlantic markets, each of TTIP’s three 
pillars has the potential either to strengthen and expand multilateral 
rules (WTO-plus) or to generate standards and norms in new areas 
beyond the current system (WTO-extra). 
TTIP's market-access pillar, for instance, could potentially result 
in clearer, more straightforward and transparent rules-of-origin 
arrangements that could serve as the basis for future preferential rules 
of origin. Clear, simple and aligned rules of origin would facilitate 
global trade and thus serve as a common public good.9  
                                                          
9 For more on the impact of TTIP on emerging powers and the international 
system, see Hamilton (2014b).  
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TTIP's second pillar could pioneer new ways for countries to 
ensure high standards for consumers, workers, companies and the 
environment while sustaining the benefits of an open global economy. 
New consultative mechanisms among regulatory agencies, including 
as part of TTIP's ’living agreement’ provisions, could eliminate 
redundant regulations, identify more efficient procedures and avoid 
conflicts that create unnecessary costs for companies and consumers, 
while ensuring high standards that can prevail not only across the 
Atlantic but around the world. Mutual recognition of essentially 
equivalent norms and regulatory coherence across the transatlantic 
space not only promises economic benefits at home but could form the 
core of broader international norms and standards. 
The standards being negotiated as part of TTIP's third pillar are 
intended to be more rigorous than comparable rules found in the WTO. 
Agreement on such issues as intellectual property, services, 
discriminatory industrial policies or state-owned enterprises could 
strengthen the normative underpinnings of the multilateral system by 
creating benchmarks for possible future multilateral liberalisation 
under the WTO. US-EU agreement on such principles, and agreement 
to act together to advance such norms globally, could not only take the 
international trading system further but establish broader political 
principles regarding the rule of law, human rights, labour, 
environmental and consumer standards.  
The idea of an ambitious transatlantic economic agreement is of 
course not new; yet over the past two decades such efforts have 
foundered on a range of US-EU differences. Remaining transatlantic 
tariff barriers, especially in agriculture, often reflect the most politically 
difficult cases. Some of the most intense transatlantic disagreements 
have arisen over differences in regulatory policy. Issues such as food 
safety or environmental standards have strong public constituencies 
and are often extremely sensitive in the domestic political arena. To 
complicate matters further, responsibility for regulation is split in the 
EU between European and national levels, and in the United States 
among federal, state and even local governments as well as a range of 
independent regulatory agencies. Investment barriers, especially in 
terms of infrastructure and transport-sector ownership, could be very 
difficult to change. Critics charge that a transatlantic agreement could 
well subvert the multilateral economic system.  
In short, the issues can be tough and complex. TTIP could very 
well fail to achieve its potential.  
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The potential payoff for jobs and growth, however, is so high that 
the United States and the EU have committed themselves to overcome 
past differences and to forge new types of transatlantic mechanisms to 
manage future disputes while generating new economic opportunities.  
5. The contribution of this book to the TTIP debate 
This volume is intended to cut through the caricatures swirling around 
TTIP and to illuminate the broad range of complex issues that are being 
addressed in the TTIP negotiations. We have brought European and 
American scholars and experts together to explain both the economic 
and broader geopolitical context of TTIP, and to explore the challenges 
and consequences of US-EU negotiations across numerous sensitive 
areas, ranging from food safety and public procurement to economic 
and regulatory assessments of technical barriers to trade, automotive, 
chemicals, energy, services, investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms and regulatory cooperation. We believe their insights can 
also help decision-makers understand how the United States and the 
European Union can remain rule-makers rather than rule-takers in a 
globalising world in which their relative influence is waning. 
As our work will show, much of the more extreme criticisms of 
TTIP are either not or at best partially justified. The authors and editors 
are motivated to show how solid analysis and serious fact-finding can 
contribute to a better appreciation of TTIP's potential while also 
offering a more detached assessment of risks and challenges.  
The book is divided into two parts.  
Part I. Rules, norms and standards  
The first substantive section looks at cross-cutting issues of rules, norms 
and standards. Peter Chase and Jacques Pelkmans explain why TTIP 
differs from previous US-EU efforts at economic and regulatory 
cooperation, and the opportunities inherent in ‘turbo-charging’ 
regulatory cooperation. They identify the many levels of international 
regulatory cooperation and provide a detailed annex on what the two 
parties have accomplished in this area since 1995. They argue that TTIP 
regulatory cooperation will be significant, but not ambitious, while 
political and legal limits on cooperation in both the EU and the United 
States should minimise many concerns. TTIP must accept these political 
and legal constraints, build trust and confidence among counterpart 
regulators so each comes to believe that their transatlantic partner can 
help them do their work better, and provide tools to help regulators on 
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both sides make informed decisions while retaining their regulatory 
autonomy and accountability to their politicians and citizens. In so 
doing, TTIP should, over the longer term, provide both the economic 
and regulatory benefits that the two sides envisage.  
Michelle Egan joins Jacques Pelkmans to explain why technical 
barriers to trade (TBTs) are TTIP’s ‘hard core’ and why they are so 
difficult to address effectively. Outside of heavily regulated sectors 
such as chemicals, automobiles or medicines (which have separate 
chapters in TTIP), TBTs can be caused by divergent (voluntary) 
standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment. Indeed, in 
all three areas the United States and the EU have long experienced 
frictions or indeed, at times, considerable trading costs. However, the 
authors reject what they believe to be an unproductive ‘stand-off’ 
between US and EU negotiators on standardisation and suggest that 
the two parties clarify the enormous economic ‘installed base’ of 
prominent US standards in the world economy and build a solution 
from there. As for technical regulation, partly due to ‘referred’ 
standards (in US law) and partly due to independent agencies’ 
preferences, the prospect of converging regulation (via harmonisation) 
is often dim, but equivalence (given similar levels of regulatory 
protection) could be an option.   
Koen Berden and Joseph Francois provide an authoritative 
overview of all important empirical studies on non-tariff barriers and 
offer a methodology to quantify non-tariff measures (mostly, TBTs) so 
as to estimate the potential benefits that may be derived from TTIP. 
They urge policy-makers to dive deeply into sector-specific elements of 
non-tariff measures (as they differ greatly) and focus on those sectors 
where the largest potential gains can be made, such as in agriculture, 
chemicals, automobiles, steel, textiles and insurance services. 
Investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms goes to the heart 
of TTIP's role as a regulatory pace-setter, and yet have been among the 
most controversial and least understood areas under negotiation. In 
that spirit, we present two contrasting approaches to the issue. Lauge 
Poulsen, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Jason Yackee present a cost-benefit 
analysis of the inclusion of investment protection provisions, including 
investor-state arbitration, in an investment chapter in TTIP. They argue 
that there is little evidence to suggest that investor-state arbitration will 
provide the EU with meaningful benefits, such as increased foreign 
investment from the United States, and may impose non-trivial costs in 
the form of litigation expenses and reduced policy space. They 
conclude that the case for including investor-state arbitration in TTIP is 
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weak. Freya Baetens offers a point-by-point response in her own 
chapter, and then argues that an investment chapter in TTIP, including, 
ISDS offers an unprecedented opportunity to incorporate key public 
policy objectives and protect states’ right to regulate.  
TTIP’s potential impact on levels of consumer protection has also 
been an issue that has been subjected to great heat yet little light; 
Stephen Woolcock, Barbara Holzer and Petros Kusmu examine these 
concerns by studying existing approaches to regulatory cooperation 
and presenting three short case studies. They find that regulatory 
powers on both sides of the Atlantic are unlikely to be significantly 
affected by TTIP, but suggest that European and American legislators 
will need to ensure that their priorities shape the TTIP regulatory 
cooperation agenda and not the other way around.   
Much analysis and debate has focused on TTIP's potential 
economic impact. There has been relatively little exploration of its 
geostrategic implications. TTIP, however, is not just another trade 
agreement. It is about creating a more strategic, dynamic and holistic 
US-EU relationship that is more confident, more effective at engaging 
third countries and addressing regional and global challenges, and 
better able to strengthen the ground rules of the international order. 
Steven Blockmans and Daniel S. Hamilton explore TTIP’s broader 
geopolitical ramifications to round out the first section of the book.  
Part II. Sectoral issues 
In Part II, European and American experts join together to examine 
TTIP's potential impact on key sectors of the transatlantic economy.  
Tim Josling and Stefan Tangermann explore the possibilities and 
pitfalls of greater openness in transatlantic agricultural commerce and 
agro-food, which historically has been one of the most contentious 
issues faced by US and EU negotiators. They argue that progress in this 
area will largely be determined by the level of ambition in the 
negotiations as a whole. If ambitions are modest, a low-level agreement 
could include some limited commitments on agricultural market access 
and food regulations. Bolder ambitions would imply removing some 
long-standing irritants in the area of agricultural policy and food 
regulations: this is where the economic gains are likely to be significant 
and the spill-overs useful. They argue that it is worthwhile making the 
effort to secure a constructive and imaginative agreement on 
agriculture and food regulations in the TTIP, and offer a fairly detailed 
list of potential sub-deals that could be achieved.  
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Stephen Woolcock and Jean Heilman Grier look at TTIP's 
implication for public procurement markets across the North Atlantic 
in great detail. They propose ways the two sides can use TTIP 
negotiations to expand their current commitments as well as develop a 
longer-term approach by making TTIP a ‘living agreement’.  
Patrick Messerlin examines the transatlantic services economy, 
with original ideas on how to realise economic gains. He argues that 
substantial gains are only likely to come from deep discussions of 
regulatory issues, and that solutions cannot be found in the negotiating 
techniques normally used for goods. He suggests that a better approach 
should be based on mutual recognition and equivalence of regulations 
enforced in the services concerned, preceded by a mutual evaluation to 
grant such equivalence – all measures to be carried out by the 
regulatory bodies concerned, not by trade negotiators. 
Andrea Renda and Christopher S. Yoo study TTIP’s digital 
dimension in six different aspects. They explore the current 
divergences between the two legal systems on key digital issues and 
discuss possible scenarios, from a basic, minimal agreement limited to 
e-labelling and e-accessibility measures to more ambitious scenarios on 
network neutrality, competition rules, privacy and interoperability 
measures. 
Donald Elliott and Jacques Pelkmans look at the why and how of 
greater TTIP ambition in chemicals, and find that the negotiators could 
approach it differently with better long-run results. They argue that the 
talks have focused too much on the differences in the two ‘systems’, 
rather than on the actual levels of health and environmental protection 
for substances regulated by both the US and the EU. They critique the 
two systems, advocate significant improvement of market access where 
equivalence of health and environmental objectives is agreed and 
propose to lower the costs for companies selling in both markets by 
allowing them to opt into the other party’s more stringent rules, 
thereby avoiding duplication while racing-to-the-top.  
Paolo Natali, Christian Egenhofer and Gergely Molnar look at 
TTIP and energy, mainly gas, an area that has been subjected to 
relatively limited analysis. The US shale revolution, growing 
interconnectedness of energy markets (recently proven by the 
disappearance of the ‘Asian gas premium’) and the EU’s quest to 
diversify its energy supplies set favourable conditions to reinforce 
energy relations between the EU and the United States. The question is 
whether there is sufficient political will to tighten relations in a strategic 
area with implications for national security and sovereignty. 
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Finally, Caroline Freund and Sarah Oliver look at the automotive 
industry, a major employer on both sides of the Atlantic, by evaluating 
the equivalence of US and EU regulations and deriving the potential 
economic gains that may accrue by aligning such regulations. They 
estimate that the removal of regulatory differences in autos could 
increase trade by 20% or more, an effect only slightly smaller than the 
effect of EU accession on Europe’s auto trade. The large economic gains 
from regulatory harmonisation imply that TTIP has the potential to 
improve productivity while lowering prices and enhancing variety for 
consumers.  
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2. THIS TIME IT’S DIFFERENT:  
TURBO-CHARGING REGULATORY 
COOPERATION 
PETER CHASE AND JACQUES PELKMANS 
1. Introduction 
When in June 2013 Presidents Barroso, Obama and Van Rompuy 
formally called for the launch of negotiations toward a “comprehensive 
and ambitious” Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the United States and the European Union, the regulatory part 
of the agreement was widely heralded as being the most novel and the 
most important for generating economic growth.  
Two years and nine rounds of negotiation later, TTIP’s 
regulatory component is one of the more contentious parts of the 
agreement. This is attributable both to persistent differences in 
emphasis between the negotiators and to concerns that regulatory 
cooperation could lead to a lowering – or, for that matter, an unjustified 
raising – of consumer, worker, prudential and environmental 
standards.1 
In contrast, the authors believe that regulatory cooperation 
between the United States and the European Union is primarily about 
enhancing the ability of EU and US regulators to protect their citizens; 
positive economic gains are a secondary, if important, result. This 
chapter starts by presenting a framework to understanding regulatory 
cooperation in general, and briefly discusses developments in US and 
EU regulatory cooperation since 1995, before presenting, in sections 3 
and 4, how TTIP can ‘turbo-charge’ this by enshrining good regulatory 
principles and practices, and by introducing new tools to deepen the 
                                                          
1 Note that ‘standards’ here refer to regulatory objectives (e.g. about health, 
safety, etc.), which the debate has sometimes informally called ‘level of 
protection’.  
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relationship between transatlantic regulators. Sections 5 and 6 compare 
this proposal with regulatory provisions in previous US and EU trade 
agreements, as well as with those the EU Commission has 
recommended for TTIP. 
The central thesis throughout this chapter is that regulatory 
cooperation between the United States and the European Union should 
be about helping regulators become more efficient and effective in 
achieving their goals, and not primarily about removing or reducing 
‘non-tariff barriers to trade’.2 While TTIP can help ensure that 
regulators are better informed about the consequences of their 
decisions for the transatlantic partner, it must also recognise that 
changes to regulation must go through our respective domestic 
decision-making procedures, that the regulators are, and will remain, 
under political oversight, and that they must retain their autonomy to 
make decisions appropriate to their jurisdictions, even if those 
decisions create divergences. This understanding addresses public 
concerns about transatlantic regulatory cooperation even as, we 
believe, TTIP will motivate the regulators to do more of it, with all the 
benefits that this might bring. 
2. Regulatory cooperation: What it is and what the EU 
and US have achieved so far 
2.1 Introducing international regulatory cooperation 
As a bilateral agreement between two governments that will provide 
for some regulatory cooperation, TTIP represents merely one form of 
international regulatory cooperation (IRC), and must be understood in 
that context.  
Governments have engaged in various forms of regulatory 
cooperation for decades, in everything from informal memoranda of 
understanding to full international treaties. International regulatory 
cooperation is pursued bilaterally (e.g. Regulatory Cooperation 
Councils between the US and Mexico and the US and Canada), 
multilaterally (the OECD MAD programme on the acceptance of 
                                                          
2 This chapter focuses on the regulatory cooperation as a general matter, rather 
than on such regulatory issues that are traditionally covered in trade 
agreements -- sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, technical barriers to trade 
such as standards and conformity assessment, etc., although these will of 
course also be incorporated in TTIP. For SPS and agri-food in TTIP, see Josling 
& Tangermann (2014); for the TBT chapter in TTIP, see Pelkmans (2015b). 
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chemical data), in global quasi-hierarchies that provide regulatory 
‘models’ and strong incentives for voluntary implementation (e.g. 
financial regulation in the G-20 and the Financial Stability Board) and 
internationally (as treaties such as the Montreal Ozone Protocol, and in 
such international organizations as APEC, OECD, WTO (especially the 
SPS and TBT agreements), UNECE (on selected ICT standards, like 
Bluetooth, and car regulation), and ICAO (on safety in aviation and on 
minimum environmental requirements). International regulatory 
cooperation also happens in private international organisations such as 
ISO (on technical standards) and ILAC (on laboratory accreditation 
with recognition of conformity assessment results based on strict 
ILAC/ISO standards). International organisations for regulators have 
also emerged, such as the International Medical Devices Regulatory 
Forum, which focuses on global standards as well as a harmonised 
format of product-registration submissions, and, in medicines, the 
PIC/S (on common rules for inspections3) and the International 
Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) of technical aspects of marketing 
approval of medicines, which has issued some 50 guidelines. 
This selective list shows that international regulatory 
cooperation has grown in importance and variety, at different levels 
and with a range of instruments. The OECD (2013) has done an 
extensive stock-taking of these various forms of IRC, and has mapped 
eleven distinct forms. 
A convenient summary of the OECD mapping is depicted in 
Figure 2.1, which distinguishes not 11 but 12 mechanisms and presents 
international regulatory cooperation as a ‘ladder’ of increasing 
ambition, from non-binding and very loose mechanisms at the bottom 
to stringent, binding, and demanding ones at the top.  
The bottom four rungs of the ladder show ‘soft’ - that is non-
binding – IRCs, which can degenerate into a ‘talk-shop’ if left on their 
own. With respect to Step 2, principles of ‘good regulatory practice’ 
have been developed in the OECD 2012 Recommendations on 
Regulatory Policy and Governance (and accepted by both the US and 
the EU). Recognition of international standards (Step 3) is in the WTO 
TBT Agreement, but this obligation is not ‘hard’ or easily enforceable 
given the long-standing discord between the US and the EU about the 
definition of an international standard. The EU is of the view that 
‘international standards’ are written and promulgated by established 
international bodies (like ISO and IEC) while the US believes the 
                                                          
3 See www.picscheme.org  
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Agreement has a much broader application.  The economic meaning of 
Step 3 can be rendered much more powerful if done in conjunction with 
Step 4, which requires the explicit consideration of international effects 
when drafting a domestic regulation which might affect trade. 
Depending on the stringency of the agreed obligations, and without 
undermining each party’s autonomous ‘right to regulate,’ Step 4 can go 
quite far. 
Figure 2.1 The ladder of international regulatory cooperation 
 
Note: IRC = International Regulatory Cooperation. 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on OECD (2013). 
Trans-governmental networks of experts and regulators (Step 5) 
have become important too, both in EU/US relations and embedded in 
broader country participation. The International Competition 
Network, for example, goes beyond the EU and US but has been 
strongly influenced by the two parties. This is also true in the Bank for 
International Settlement’s Basel Committee on banking supervision, 
which has a wider membership but remains dominated by the EU and 
the US. Regulators in medicines and medical devices have also 
developed multilateral or global forums, based in part on initial US-EU 
bilateral cooperation. This suggests that Step 5 may work bilaterally 
sometimes, but with global markets and global value chains), the 
bilateral context could become a stumbling block or be seen as 
insufficient.  
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The same may well apply to Step 6 on international 
organisations. In general, EU-US cooperation is essential to regulatory 
cooperation in these multilateral forums because work in large 
international organisations is frequently shallow and soft, hampered by 
the resistance of some members and/or a divergence in underlying 
policy objectives. And where IRC in such organisations is successful, it 
can take years, if not decades, of prudent approximation. A good 
example of long-winding but eventually successful IRC is the binding 
OECD MAD agreement on mutual acceptance of chemical safety test 
data, which took decades.  
In Step 7, mutual recognition of conformity assessment, the EU 
and the US took the lead in the early 1990s, but several other countries 
caught up on the basis of the EU-US model, the experiences and lessons 
of which are summarized in Box 2.1 below. Mutual Recognition 
Agreement (MRAs) on conformity assessment do not affect or put in 
question any aspect of either party’s regulatory regime. Even so, MRAs 
on conformity assessment are more demanding in that they are also 
treaties, hence ‘hard’ law. Equivalence agreements are another option 
mentioned in the WTO TBT Agreement and the 1998 US-EU Veterinary 
Equivalence Agreement has been partially successful (see Josling & 
Tangermann, 2014, for an assessment).  
Step 8 (regulatory partnerships) is ill-defined. The partnerships 
may amount to an ambition greater than MRAs (hence, Step 8 on the 
IRC ladder) but that is far from certain. Thus, Canada–US regulatory 
cooperation (with a Council to that effect) is not binding and 
characterised more by the ambitions and methods of Steps 4 and 5. 
Such voluntarism may still yield results, though, especially as 
cooperating regulators build trust in each other and confidence in the 
partners’ rules and enforcement ability. For regulatory partnerships to 
be as strong and effective as Step 8 would suggest, one would need to 
specify in much greater detail what regulatory principles, 
opportunities, disciplines, and cooperative obligations the parties 
subscribe to in a treaty or other legally-binding agreement. .  
The other steps in the IRC ladder go even farther. Step 9 is about 
narrow treaties that bind countries in a specific area or sector. A leading 
and successful example is the Montreal Convention on protecting the 
ozone layer by forbidding or restricting F-gases. Other similar 
conventions are less successful because they have been drafted in far 
more circumspect language and with exceptions, carve-outs and other 
exclusions, or, like UNFCCC, form no more than a general framework 
for very long-term cooperation (here, on mitigating climate change).  
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Step 10 on mutual recognition more broadly is even more 
ambitious. At this level, mutual recognition agreements can stipulate 
that when the objectives and enforcement of safety, health, 
environment, investor/saver and consumer protection (SHEIC) risk 
regulation are ‘equivalent’, home rules of the exporting countries are 
regarded as sufficient guarantee for allowing market access into the 
importing country.4 Thus, here, the equivalence does not refer to a case-
by-case examination of product types by the importing country, in the 
framework of an ‘equivalence agreement’ (Step 7), but refers to policy 
objectives. This goes much further and has fairly radical implications.  
One huge misunderstanding about mutual recognition is that it 
might lead to less or less ambitious regulation, once the rules of the 
exporting country are determined ‘sufficient’. This misunderstanding 
is based on the famous quote from the 1979 Cassis-de-Dijon case,5 but 
that quote assumes equivalence of objectives first. In this sense, mutual 
recognition is about overcoming different technical specifications that 
reach an equivalent regulatory objective – the latter refers to the market 
failure that matters and is addressed by that objective; the instruments 
or technical details are not decisive and should not be (in other words, 
they may differ).  
Steps 11 and 12 are not expected to apply to TTIP as a rule. One 
should consider Step 11 as far more stringent, perhaps even somewhat 
centralising, than Step 8 (regulatory partnerships). For instance, the 
Australia-New Zealand ‘Trans-Tasman’ Mutual Recognition 
Agreement builds on mutual recognition but this is occasionally 
combined with common rules and, in food, with a common 
enforcement agency. Step 12 proposes harmonisation as a regular 
element of economic regionalism. TTIP is not meant to assume such 
ambitions and it is almost certainly not even desirable as a rule. But 
there are isolated instances of harmonisation between the US and the 
                                                          
4 Extensive analyses of mutual recognition can be found in Pelkmans (2007) and 
(2012) based on the EU; the practice of MR in Trans-Tasman MRA is analysed 
in Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2015a, Annex C).  
5 EU member states must allow ‘a product lawfully produced and marketed in 
another member state into their own market’. Case C-120/78. As formulated, 
this is the pure origin principle. However, one must read this in conjunction 
with the logic of the derogations for member states, which are ‘justified’ if 
certain regulatory objectives will not be fulfilled. However, the mutual 
recognition logic consists of establishing whether the objectives of another 
member state are equivalent (even when not identical) in providing regulatory 
protection; if so, the origin principle prevails and imports cannot be blocked. 
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EU which, perhaps surprisingly, have emerged from international 
organisations (Step 6) and/or specific agreements. One example is far-
reaching harmonisation of maritime safety rules in the IMO. As a result, 
the EU and the US have concluded a separate MRA in 2004 on 49 types 
of maritime equipment, which works well.  
The OECD (2013) study and Figure 2.1 underscore that 
negotiators and regulators have to think in terms of many different 
forms for international regulatory cooperation. The spectrum 
comprises many options, and each option has stringent and less 
stringent variants. And although one might be correct in suspecting 
that ‘soft’ steps near the bottom of the ladder tend to be less effective, 
this is not always the case. For instance, regulators are loath to bind 
themselves in treaties and hence might opt for the lower steps in their 
cooperation. But as shown in medicines and medical devices, the 
voluntary follow-up in national regulatory regimes of what has been 
agreed in such sectorial regulatory forums has been active, and many 
countries adopt such guidelines or allow acceptance of single-form 
submissions. Regulatory cooperation in TTIP can benefit from these 
insights as well.  
An important conclusion of the sophisticated mapping in the 
OECD international regulatory cooperation study is that despite “…the 
growing trend in regulatory cooperation, IRC is not based on a clear 
understanding of benefits, costs and success factors of the various IRC 
options” (OECD, 2013, p. 75). This warning must be kept in mind for 
regulatory cooperation as we look briefly at the history of US-EU 
regulatory cooperation, and lay out how it could be developed in TTIP. 
It should be clear in any event that TTIP can be based on, or linked to, 
many such international initiatives or regimes, or, indeed, it might 
assume a longer-run process of enhancing the ambitions of such IRC by 
setting more ambitious TTIP objectives as a leading example. 
2.2 Recent US-EU regulatory cooperation:  
A bird’s eye view 
While US regulators have been working with their counterparts in 
major EU member states for many years, cooperation with EU-level 
counterparts began with the Joint Statement on Regulatory 
Cooperation at the end of 1997,6 followed a year later by the 
                                                          
6 “Regulatory Cooperation: Facilitating Trade while Promoting Consumer 
Protection,” Joint Statement released in conjunction with the US-EU Summit in 
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‘Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the European Community 
and the United States of America.’7  
As described in Box 2.1 below, these first agreements were 
generally limited in scope, applying mainly to recognition of certain 
laboratories being able to test whether locally-produced products in six 
sectors (in the 1998 MRA) met the regulatory requirements of the other 
party.  
Box 2.1 The 1998 US-EU MRAs and lessons drawn 
As one of their first full forays into bilateral regulatory cooperation, the 
US and EU concluded a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on 
conformity assessment in 1998. The MRA has a general set of principles, 
rules, and procedures in a ‘chapeau’ or ‘umbrella,’ with six distinct 
annexes in the sectors: telecoms equipment, electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMC) of equipment and appliances, electrical safety of 
goods (including machinery), pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMP), medical devices, and recreational craft. Consistent with 
the practices in Step 7 above, this MRA had the limited objective of 
allowing designated Conformity Assessment Bodies from each party to 
certify that products in these sectors met the regulatory requirements of 
the other party. As such, it reflected a conscious choice not to engage in 
any regulatory change but to focus solely on reducing transaction costs 
for market access. The economic gains from such limited MRAs tend to 
be relatively small, unless the costs of conformity assessment amount to 
a considerable surcharge on the export price. After carefully reviewing 
the experience with the MRA, Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2015b) find: 
1. Despite great initial efforts, only three of the six sector MRAs 
are operational: telecoms equipment, electro-magnetic compatibility, 
and recreational craft. In terms of trade values, the three MRAs that 
work cover only one-fifth of the bilateral trade originally foreseen under 
all six sectoral MRAs. In the other three – pharmaceuticals, medical 
devices, and electrical equipment – the initial trade policy focus was 
probably unsuitable for what was seen by US regulators as a loss of 
control of properly serving their regulatory objectives. Regulators 
should therefore play a major role in designing regulatory cooperation, 
even in the case of MRAs, whilst trade policy may generate collateral 
benefits but cannot be decisive.  
                                                          
Washington, D.C., 5 December 1997 (www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/ 
Summit9712/regulst.htm). 
7 See 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_111718.pdf.  
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2. MRAs are easier in markets which are less heavily regulated, 
but ironically, in these cases they are also less needed because 
alternatives to MRAs (in particular, suppliers’ declarations of 
conformity, or SDoCs) can serve as a low-cost and swift solution. When 
SDoCs are not permitted, alternatives such as subcontracting may 
nevertheless be used by market players. Thus, in particular, large US and 
EU exporters with a steady customer base (or as part of a value chain) in 
the EU and US have a great interest in durable relationships with trusted 
CABs. The practical working of the MRA will then be significant only 
for new entrants or occasional exporters or in cases of overload. New 
entrants may well be SMEs, so for them and possibly the emergence of 
‘new’ competition, the MRA would still fulfil a useful function.  
3. MRAs in heavily regulated markets require a considerable 
degree of convergence in desired levels of protection as well as a gradual 
build-up of trust and confidence between the regulators. This did not 
work at first for medicines and medical devices. There are also 
indications that at the time, in these two sectors, the EU internal market 
rules and supervision still left something to be desired. Simultaneously, 
at world level, cautious attempts were initiated to come to greater 
harmonisation for pharmaceuticals and medical devices 8 in some 
respects, such as similar data and shorter time-to-market, in which the 
EU and the US played a leading role. These alternative IRC tracks have 
meanwhile become quite successful, thereby more or less obviating the 
1998 MRA provisions. 
4. In electrical goods safety, the third sector that failed (the MRA 
was suspended by the EU in 2003), the EU attempted in 2008 to convince 
OSHA (the US regulator for occupational health and safety) to accept 
SDoCs from EU producers. SDoCs are a form of self-certification 
customary in the EU ‘New Approach’ to reducing regulatory barriers. 
After a two-year investigation, OSHA concluded that the empirical 
evidence about equivalent or better-risk reduction in the EU was 
insufficient. This experience underscores that regulators will only enter 
into agreements with their counterparts where hard evidence exists that 
both the rules and the enforcement of those rules demonstrate that the 
counterpart’s approach delivers similar regulatory outcomes. 
Source: Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2015b). 
                                                          
8 The Global Harmonisation Task Force for medical devices, active since the 
mid-1990s, and the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements of Pharmaceuticals for Human use (ICH), founded in 1989. For 
more detail, see Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2015b). 
26  CHASE & PELKMANS 
 
These efforts were heavily backed by industry, and in particular 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which the US and EU had 
helped create with the 1995 ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’, in part to 
encourage more direct business engagement and advice in transatlantic 
trade matters. (Transatlantic Dialogues for consumers, labour, and the 
environment were established a few years later.) At this time TABD 
was also strongly encouraging great regulatory cooperation in 
automotive safety. This failed when the US regulator (the National 
Highway Transport Safety Agency, NHTSA) undertook extensive 
studies about certain specific auto safety features (e.g., on standards for 
side door crash resistance) which demonstrated that EU vehicles were 
less safe than their American counterparts. This experience again 
underscores some of the lessons learned in the earlier MRAs – that 
regulators cannot and will not lower safety standards just to promote 
trade, and that they depend on hard evidence, rather than political 
good will. 
Despite setbacks, more substantive cooperation began to take off 
with the first US-EU ‘Regulatory Cooperation Roadmap’ in 2002, which 
was successively expanded from six sectors to sixteen over the next 
three years. An important component to this was a consensus in 2002 
on good regulatory practices, which helped strengthen the cooperation 
and which also helped spur greater dialogue between the US Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the Commission’s 
Secretariat General, which also oversees better regulation in the EU. 
This experience eventually helped in the establishment of the US-EU 
High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (HLRCF) in 2005 to further 
promote best practices in such cooperation.  
By 2007, when the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) was 
founded, transatlantic regulatory cooperation was booming. For 
example, at that time the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
informally estimated that its officers were having over 1,000 
substantive contacts a year with their European counterparts in DG 
SANCO, the European Medicines Agency (EMEA), and the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA).  
Annex 1 provides a detailed summary list of all the US-EU 
regulatory cooperation initiatives we have been able to identify since 
the first agreement on regulatory principles in 1997. This growing 
cooperation has had a number of significant results, both broadly as 
with the 2008 report comparing US and EU approaches to import safe 
TURBO-CHARGING REGULATORY COOPERATION  27 
 
products,9 and in individual sectors, from the November 2007 
FDA/EMEA decision to accept a single application for orphan drugs,10 
to the 2008 US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) decision 
to accept the EU’s international accounting standards as equivalent for 
US capital markets purposes.11 One of the most ambitious examples 
was the conclusion in 2009 of the US-EU Bilateral Aviation Safety 
Agreement,12 under which the FAA and the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) agreed to accept one another’s air-worthiness 
certifications for Boeing and Airbus airplanes, even though an 
aeroplane is arguably the most regulated product on the market and 
even amidst an intense WTO trade dispute on the supports both sides 
give to their respective companies. In 2012, the two governments 
concluded other agreements, including mutual recognition of their 
respective approaches to organic produce13 and to container and air 
cargo supply chain security systems,14 as well as joint work in such 
areas as electric vehicle safety and design requirements. 
While the breadth and depth of US-EU regulatory cooperation 
has been growing, it tends to be technical, and thus known only to those 
directly engaged in the sectors concerned. Because of this, many 
outside these areas tend to be sceptical – and at times outright critical – 
of the cooperation. This may underscore the need for a more basic 
understanding of what regulatory cooperation is and should be about 
between the United States and the European Union. 
                                                          
9 See “Toward Enhanced Cooperation between the European Union and United 
States of America on the Safety of (Imported) Products” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/tec_safety_en.pdf). 
10 See EMEA press release, “The European Union and FDA Working Together 
to Create a Single Application for Orphan Designation for Medicines”, 26 
November 2007 (www.emea.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/ 
Press_release/2009/11/WC500011002.pdf). 
11 See www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf  
12 See www.faa.gov/aircraft/repair/media/Safety_Agreement_Between_US_ 
and_EC.pdf  
13 See www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5097063  
14 See www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/2013-02-08-050000/ 
eu-us-fully-implement-mutual-recognition-decision  
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3. Basic principles and motivation for TTIP regulatory 
cooperation 
The primary role of governments in modern societies is to protect their 
citizens – from foreign aggression and domestic crime, of course, but 
also from abusive labour practices, unhealthy environments, and 
unsafe products and services.  
This last function is the most relevant aspect when it comes to 
trade across borders. But here it needs to be emphasised that the job of 
regulators is to pre-empt or prevent any market exchange which has 
unacceptable adverse effects on consumers or workers, or the 
environment. Regulators want to prevent unsafe products and services 
from getting into the domestic market whether those products or 
services are produced at home or abroad.15 
The level of safety that a regulator demands is primarily a 
function of the political system and income levels in a society.  
 Politically, in countries with little or no input from citizens, the 
desired levels of safety will reflect the preferences of government 
officials; in an autocratic dictatorship, the preference of the ruler. 
In democratic societies, however, with a transparent and rules-
based approach to governance, the level of safety demanded in 
regulation will in general reflect the risk preferences of the voters 
as expressed in elections. In this sense, democracy is not just a 
‘value’, but has a very real operational significance with respect 
to regulation.  
 Economically, increasing levels of protection costs money, and 
governments need to balance these costs with the benefits in 
terms of safety that regulation can bring. In a democratic society 
where the levels of protection will reflect the polity at large, the 
degree of safety demanded will therefore tend to be a function of 
income – the higher the level of income, the less important the 
additional costs of risk mitigation and the higher the level of 
protection demanded. This is a wholly domestic affair – 
democratic governments will regulate to the risk preference 
                                                          
15 Governments may of course also regulate international trade to minimise the 
economic risks of competition from foreign firms, otherwise known as 
protectionism. That aspect of risk mitigation is not considered here, as both the 
US and the EU nominally eschew it. 
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demanded by their voters even in the absence of imports from 
another jurisdiction. 
This somewhat theoretical discussion is directly relevant to the 
issue of regulatory cooperation in TTIP. As democratic societies with 
comparable levels of income and wealth and transparent and politically 
accountable16 regulatory systems, the United States and the European 
Union have in general identified the same sorts of goods and services 
as posing risks to their citizens (and voters), and strive for the same 
level of safety in those areas—that is, their regulatory objectives and 
outcomes are generally similar.  
This general observation is based on both impressions and 
empirical studies. Impressionistically, over 25 million people travel 
each way between the United States and Europe each year, staying in 
hotels, eating local foods, renting cars, buying products, and otherwise 
engaging in daily activities; they do not seem to perceive any difference 
in the level of safety provided. More academically, a 2010 study 
published by Resources for the Future (RFF), based on 20 case studies 
and 3,000 observations of risk-reducing regulatory decisions in the US 
and EU, found that overall risk stringency is about the same, with the 
differences largely due to non-safety related issues.17 
It is precisely this political and economic foundation that 
permits, and indeed encourages, a truly ambitious level of regulatory 
cooperation in TTIP. US and EU legislators and regulators have 
traditionally determined the level of safety they desire based on 
domestic costs and benefits. The US and EU economies are so tightly 
integrated, however, that these inward-looking approaches are 
insufficient, missing both the costs and the benefits of the transatlantic 
implications of these domestic choices. The EU and the US have the 
largest trading relationship in the world, with over $1 trillion in two-
way trade in goods and services each year. Further, US firms have 
invested over $2.3 trillion in the EU, while EU firms have invested some 
$1.7 trillion in the US. These investments together generate nearly $5 
                                                          
16 In the United States, Congress actively oversees the activities of US regulatory 
agencies. In the European Union, the Council, representing the elected 
governments of the 28 member states, ‘co-decides’ the level of safety in 
regulation with the directly elected European Parliament, while member state 
governments and parliaments will be the ‘first responders’ to failures in market 
surveillance and enforcement. For an authoritative and detailed exposition of 
the US and EU regulatory system, see Parker & Alemanno (2014). 
17 See Wiener et al. (2010).  
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trillion in sales each year. Nearly half of all trade is intra-industry and 
intra-firm. When legislators and regulators on either side make 
decisions without considering this integration, even if they are 
separately trying to achieve the same level of safety, they may do so in 
ways that require products and services to be designed and produced 
differently to be sold in each market.  
This raises costs to producers, at times to the point where they 
cannot profitably supply a product or service to the other side of the 
Atlantic. This is particularly so for smaller firms, many of which only 
know that the regulatory requirements and standards are different, and 
don’t have the ability to research or re-tool to meet them. But it also 
affects large firms – the cost of crashing over a hundred custom-made 
models to meet different safety, testing, and certification requirements 
in automobiles, for instance, run to hundreds of millions of euros. This 
makes it almost impossible for smaller French and Italian car 
manufacturers to sell into the US market. The same can happen for 
medicines, especially for rare illnesses. And this, of course, raises costs 
to consumers, who may be wholly denied products and services that 
they wanted or needed.  
One of the most politically interesting examples was the pressure 
put on the FDA in the 1980s and 1990s to fast-track approval of HIV 
medicines that had been working effectively in Europe for years. And 
both societies as a whole lose the gains in productivity that would come 
from more companies competing in their markets, and the advantages 
of synergy and global competitiveness that firms working on both sides 
of the Atlantic could have if they did not face these ‘unnecessary’ 
regulatory divergences: ‘unnecessary’ in the sense that the intended 
levels of safety are similar (see also Box 2.2).  
The disadvantages of insufficient consideration of the 
transatlantic costs and benefits of greater regulatory compatibility 
between the United States and the European Union are, however, only 
one part of problem. Potentially more important is the adverse impact 
on the regulators themselves, and their ability to achieve their goal of 
keeping their citizens safe. Regulators devote their resources to ensure 
that rules are being observed for the products and services being sold 
in their market. The enormous volumes of transatlantic trade require a 
correspondingly large amount of resources to police. At the same time, 
globalisation has also greatly increased trade with many other partners. 
With ever-increasing volumes of imports from other - potentially more 
risky - jurisdictions, sophisticated and ever-lengthening supply chains, 
and ever-decreasing budgets, the regulators are in danger of being 
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stretched too thinly to do their job. If, however, they have evidence 
demonstrating that their transatlantic counterparts are able to enforce 
levels of protection similar to their own, they can develop a partnership 
with that counterpart regulator, allowing them to focus their 
enforcement resources on higher-risk problems. Indeed, it was 
precisely this broader gain from international regulatory cooperation 
that motivated President Obama to issue Executive Order 13609,18 
encouraging US regulators to be more active in this area, especially 
with places like the EU, which share US regulatory values.  
Box 2.2 Potential economic gains from regulatory cooperation in TTIP 
In the sense of our discussion above, many of the gains from regulatory 
cooperation cannot be easily measured. However, a number of empirical 
economic simulation studies on TTIP have been published in 2013 and 
2014; two – Francois et al. (2013) for the Commission Impact Assessment, 
and Fontagne et al. (2013) - explicitly study TTIP regulatory cooperation 
in detail. These two studies, both of which are based on a broader 
ECORYS study from 2009, attempt to estimate the costs of regulatory 
differences as a percentage of export invoice costs (the so-called ‘tariff 
equivalent’ of technical barriers to trade, or TBTs). The studies estimate 
these TBT tariff equivalents between the US and the EU to range from 
15-72%, depending on the sector. Such percentages are a large multiple 
of US and EU nominal tariffs on industrial goods and many agricultural 
products. Francois et al. estimate that no less than 56% of TTIP’s 
economic gains arise from an assumed 50% cost reduction of TBTs (their 
ambitious scenario). Even with the difficulty of properly estimating the 
benefits of TBT reduction (see Pelkmans et al., 2014) as well as the 
limitations of even the best econometric models, the reduction of TBT 
costs through regulatory cooperation is obviously important to the 
overall economic gains of TTIP.  
The ability for enhanced transatlantic regulatory cooperation to 
increase the efficiency and therefore the effectiveness of US and EU 
regulators is one of the most misunderstood benefits of TTIP, even by 
some of the regulators themselves. Given their political accountability 
at home, whether to Congress, the European Parliament or the EU 
member states, their ability to cooperate with a foreign counterpart is 
directly proportional to the level of trust and confidence that they have 
                                                          
18 See www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/eo_13609/ 
eo13609_05012012.pdf  
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in that counterpart. And that comes only with time and experience. In 
this sense, the US and the EU are now better positioned for an 
ambitious approach to regulatory cooperation in TTIP, as the US and 
EU regulatory systems have improved, and as regulatory cooperation 
has grown over the past 15 years.  
4. Turbo-charging regulatory cooperation in TTIP19 
The most important question now is how TTIP can build upon the 
experiences US and EU regulators have had over the past 15 years in 
collaborating with one another, given the broader political, economic, 
consumer, and regulatory benefits of greater transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation.  
4.1 General considerations 
As discussed above, the single most important consideration is 
understanding that regulatory cooperation can only work if the 
regulators on both sides have the full trust and confidence of one 
another, that the levels of protection are similar, and that the 
enforcement of those regulatory requirements is effective. While TTIP 
aims to enhance regulatory collaboration and compatibility, regulators 
in the end must make decisions that reflect the political will of their 
electorate. 
A second critical consideration is a clear delimitation of the scope 
of regulatory cooperation under TTIP. Regulatory cooperation in TTIP 
should focus on laws and regulations that directly apply to goods and 
services traded between the two parties. Laws and regulations that go 
to wholly domestic matters, such as those on working hours, wage 
levels, air pollution standards, etc., should be outside the scope of any 
general disciplines on regulatory cooperation, even though those 
measures may have an indirect effect on trade 
A third consideration which also affects the scope is that the 
obligations on regulatory cooperation in TTIP should apply to the EU 
Commission and the US Executive branch and independent agencies, 
not the respective legislatures (Congress in the United States, the 
                                                          
19 The comments in this section are jointly drafted but reflect the first author’s 
experiences in transatlantic regulatory cooperation as well as his work in the 
US Chamber; see, for instance, www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/ 
regulatory_coherence_regulatory_cooperation_-chamber_ttip_paper_-
_final_3-02.pdf, February 2015. 
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Council and European Parliament in the EU). This third consideration 
is elaborated upon below. 
With these three considerations in mind, the regulatory part of 
TTIP (here, not counting SPS and TBTs, see before) should have three 
essential components:  
 agreement on principles and best practices in domestic 
regulation (sometimes referred to as ‘regulatory coherence’),  
 general (or ‘horizontal’) provisions governing regulatory 
cooperation and 
 sectoral annexes reflecting agreements that have been, and will 
be, agreed between counterpart US and EU regulators, both 
during and after the TTIP treaty negotiations. 
This structure, and in particular the use of sectoral annexes, is 
essential to the acceptance and functioning of transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation in the context of the TTIP negotiations. It is essential, firstly 
because it recognises pragmatically that trust and confidence between 
counterpart sectoral regulators is the core of regulatory cooperation; 
secondly because it guarantees, for citizens and politicians alike, that 
the regulators themselves (rather than trade negotiators) are in charge 
of the details of the cooperation for which they are politically 
accountable; and thirdly because it allows the regulatory part of TTIP 
to be a ‘living’ agreement, with the inclusion of additional regulator-to-
regulator agreements even after the TTIP is concluded, as additional 
experience, trust, and confidence are gained between the counterpart 
agencies. 
The remainder of this section will focus on the regulatory 
coherence and cooperation aspects of TTIP, as well as the sectoral 
annexes, since these are the most novel aspects of the regulatory part of 
the agreement.  
4.2 Regulatory coherence 
The opening section of a TTIP regulatory chapter must lay out the 
principles and practices that are the foundation on which the trust and 
confidence of regulators are to be built – a common understanding of 
what constitutes a strong, democratically accountable regulatory 
system. This should not be difficult to draft: the US and EU have twice 
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issued joint statements on this (200220 and 201121), focusing in particular 
on the need for transparency, stakeholder participation, and 
accountability in rule-making, as well as the need for quality impact 
assessments, evidence-based decision-making and the like, as 
described in Box 2.3 below.  
Box 2.3 US-EU consensus on regulatory principles and practices 
The US and the EU have been developing a consensus on regulatory 
principles and practices since the late 1990s. In fact, its origin may be 
traced back to the 1995 recommendation of the OECD Council on 
Improving the Quality of Government Regulation. In addition to the 
1997 US-EU guidelines on regulatory cooperation, the three main 
expressions of this consensus include the joint statements of 2002 and 
2011 noted earlier and, more recently, the 2012 recommendation of the 
OECD Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance.22 The 2011 
‘Common Understanding’ demonstrates that the two partners have 
already developed regulatory principles that are very similar, if not the 
same. The Understanding reaffirms their shared commitment to good 
regulation, and is based on EU and US documents that already guide 
domestic regulatory policy. When regulation is to be developed, it 
should be evidence-based (with impact assessment or equivalents), 
include an analysis of relevant alternatives, evaluate the effectiveness of 
existing regulation, and apply approaches that minimise the burden 
while aiming for simplicity. The regulatory process should be 
transparent and should solicit, evaluate, and respond to input from all 
stakeholders. 
Further, the 2011 Common Understanding says explicitly that 
“regulatory measures should aim to avoid unnecessarily divergent or 
duplicative requirements between the US and the EU, when 
appropriate”. Moreover, the US and the EU “should also explore a 
process to exchange regulatory information of the Unified Agenda and 
Work Programme, respectively, … and have a fixed agenda item at the 
High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum” with a view to seeing 
whether the two parties can work together on areas both are 
considering. The Understanding also encourages new regulatory 
                                                          
20 See www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/2002-
guidelines-on-reg-coop-and-transparency.pdf, April 2002 
21 See www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/common-
understanding-on-regulatory-principles-and-best-practices.pdf, 8 June 2011. 
22 See www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf. Note that between 
the US and the EU, the starting point is still the 2011 Common Understanding. 
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cooperation measures, and obliges both to flag upcoming regulatory 
proposals likely to have international trade and investment effects, 
and/or publishing an Annual Notice to solicit public comments.  
The 2002 guidelines are more detailed but otherwise very similar. 
They begin with seven steps which “will help minimise and resolve 
trade frictions and facilitate trade.” None of these seven steps are 
surprising or controversial, and are presumably often, if not always, in 
the domestic public interest, too. Among other things, they include the 
commitment to “pursue… harmoni[s]ed, equivalent or compatible 
solutions…. and to minimize… or eliminate unnecessary divergence in 
regulations” through dialogue at all phases of the regulation 
development process. Transparency is strongly emphasised, as is the 
need for adequate time to provide meaningful comments, and their 
reasonable consideration, on draft proposals. These should be 
performance-oriented and cost effective, and hence have fewer adverse 
effects. These and other suggestions are by now well accepted 
throughout the OECD. 
The issue being addressed in the TTIP negotiations now is how 
precisely the two sides think these principles and practices should be 
implemented, and indeed how to go beyond the 2011 Common 
Understanding. The United States, which has emphasised the 
importance of the concepts of transparency, participation, and 
accountability, argues in particular that the Commission should 
publish draft legislation and regulation (‘implementing measures’ and 
‘delegated acts’ under the EU’s ‘comitology’ procedures) on the 
internet for comment from all stakeholders, and that it should then 
summarise and respond to the substantive comments and evidence 
provided through that process when it finalises the proposal.  
These ideas are less straightforward than they seem in the EU 
context. When it comes to legislative proposals, publication of a draft 
for comment prior to adoption of a proposal by the College of 
Commissioners is a sensitive issue for the Commission, as it is seen as 
undermining one of the central powers of the Commission under the 
EU treaties – the right to initiate legislation. The Commission is 
concerned that the member states in the Council and Members of the 
European Parliament would be among the most active participants in 
the public consultations about the drafts, which would essentially 
eliminate its right to initiate legislation. It therefore balks at making 
such a radical constitutional change in the context of a trade 
negotiation.  
36  CHASE & PELKMANS 
 
But it should be stressed that the idea of providing an 
opportunity to comment on draft legislation is not just a request of the 
US government, but one made by many European stakeholders as well, 
both in the business sector, in civil society, and by a 2009 broad Task 
Force of an EU think-tank.23 As such, changes that might come about 
here can and should happen independently of TTIP, and be consistent 
with the Commission’s own efforts to improve its domestic regulatory 
processes. And indeed, First Vice-President Timmermans and the 
Secretariat General of the Commission are now considering responses 
to the June 2014 request for comments on guidelines on the use of 
stakeholder input in the legislative and regulatory process.24 
There are a number of ways input on legislative proposals could 
be handled without endangering the right of initiative. Publishing a 
draft after the initial inter-services consultation might be one approach; 
at this point, the serious politics (and thus the sensitivities) in the 
Commission have not yet begun. An alternative might be to stay with 
the current system and publish legislative proposals after adoption by 
the College - after all, these are proposals that must go through the 
legislative process in the Council and European Parliament. The 
Commission could accept comments on the proposals for, say, 60 days; 
these comments would be published on the Commission website, and 
the Commission’s analysis and response to them could then be made 
available to the Council and Parliament upon formal presentation of 
                                                          
23 See, e.g., the many responses to the request of the Commission’s Secretariat 
General on 1 July 2014 for comments on draft guidelines concerning impact 
assessments and stakeholder consultation, which can be found respectively at 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/consultation_2014/contributions 
/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/planned_ia/ 
consultation_2014/contributions/index_en.htm. For the Task Force report, see 
a CEPS book on reforms of EU regulation and policy-making (Renda, 2009, p. 
xii and pp. 36-37, as ‘idea no. 13’).  
24 As this chapter was being prepared for publication, the Commission adopted 
“Better Regulation for Better Results – An EU Agenda” (COM(2015) 215 of 19 
May 2015, which includes an open eight-week comment period on Commission 
legislative proposals after the College adopts them; comments will be provided 
to the European Parliament and Council. The Commission will also introduce 
a four-week comment period on delegated acts and implementing measures. 
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the proposals to those institutions (see footnote 24 acknowledging this 
idea). 
In the case of such regulatory measures as delegated acts and 
implementing measures, where the Commission has considerably 
more authority over the proposal, the idea of publishing drafts for 
notice and comment should be far less controversial, as acknowledged 
in the new Better Regulation package of the Commission. However, 
these two types of technical implementation refer to a massive quantity 
of acts/measures, many of which are actually of little importance, so 
there may well be a practical issue of overload.25  
The EU too has demands of the United States when it comes to 
regulatory coherence. The legislative process in the United States 
appears more chaotic to Europeans than that in the EU, with literally 
thousands of bills being offered each Congress. Many of these are never 
acted on, yet can form the basis for amendments of a significant nature 
that (in the Senate at least) can often come to the floor for a vote with 
little or no notice, never mind an opportunity to comment. (That said, 
US legislation tends to be much more general in nature than it does in 
the EU, so that the effects on traded products and services are more 
likely to come later in the process, when legislation is implemented 
during the regulatory phase.)  
Under the US Constitution, the executive branch has no control 
over the legislative process, just as the EU Commission has no control 
over the Council or the European Parliament. Nor will any of those 
political bodies surrender in a trade agreement their autonomy to 
legislate. This is why the third key consideration noted in section 3 
above is necessary, and one of the first things both sides need to do in 
TTIP is to recognise that they can only demand some semblance of 
coherence between the Executive and the Commission, acknowledging 
that the political and legislative process outside those two bodies is 
necessarily a bit messy on both sides.26 
                                                          
25 In COM (2015) 215 (ibid., p. 50), the Commission writes that delegated acts 
can be commented on by stakeholders, but does not refer to, say, a selection of 
them. This is not the case for the other category where only ‘important 
implementing acts’ which are ‘subject to Committee opinion’ will be made 
public for comments.  
26 But legislation could still be TTIP-relevant, if the administrations on both 
sides can take on commitments and attempt to convince Congress and 
EP/Council to incorporate them. Also, the legal dichotomy between legislation 
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Even so, the Europeans could ask the US executive branch to take 
steps to make the US legislative process less confusing for its largest 
trading partner. Proposed bills are only serious if they are brought to 
the relevant Congressional committee for a hearing and mark-up. At 
this stage, the Executive branch is almost always requested to testify. If 
it is, and if the proposal would affect a product or service traded 
between the US and EU, TTIP could oblige the Administration to alert 
the EU of the hearing, and provide a copy of the Administration’s 
testimony as a courtesy. In addition, if and when legislation is to be 
voted on, the Executive branch often issues a statement of the 
administration’s position. This too could be provided to the EU if the 
bill affects a product or service that the EU exports to the US. In both 
instances, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible 
for coordinating the Administration’s agreed position on the 
legislation, and should be the point of contact for these efforts to 
enhance transparency.27 
In contrast, by law under the Administrative Procedures Act, the 
US regulatory process is already generally open for participation by 
any stakeholder, including those in Europe. Proposed rules are 
published well in advance; all comments must be received and 
published, and must be responded to by the regulatory agency in 
adopting its final rule. Violations of these procedures can – and 
frequently are – brought before administrative court, which can – and 
frequently does – require the agency to undertake additional 
evaluation before a rule is implemented. The system is not perfect28 (no 
system is), but it is generally open, transparent, and accountable. 
In addition, for the US side to truly provide coherence, it must 
recognize that TTIP must also cover the activities of US ‘independent’ 
regulatory agencies. These agencies, generally known as Commissions 
(Federal Communications Commission, etc.), are outside the Executive 
branch and answer to both Congress and the President. Although such 
Commissions do not and legally cannot come under OMB, and so will 
                                                          
and administration is not always followed in practice. Thus, recent Acts like the 
Jobs Act, the Affordable Care Act, and a recent one on cybersecurity were 
drafted by the administration and (mostly) taken over by Congress.  
27 In fact, this procedural courtesy is already often practiced with respect to the 
European Commission, and the OMB already de facto coordinates.  
28 See, e.g. statement of Michelle Sager, Director, Strategic Issues, Government 
Accountability Office, to the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 11 March 2014 (www.gao.gov/assets/670/661540.pdf).  
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need to be treated differently in some respects, the legislation that 
implements TTIP can provide Congressional assent to bring them into 
the scope of transatlantic regulatory cooperation. This is particularly 
important in the context of financial services regulation. 
The EU too must assure institutional coherence by fully 
including its autonomous agencies (the European Chemicals Agency, 
the European Food Safety Authority, the European Banking Authority 
and the like) in TTIP, for while these are, strictly, not rule-making 
bodies (but often risk assessors), they are instrumental and increasingly 
influential in the rule-making process and/or as supervisors. Legally, 
the EU might not follow our advice to include these agencies fully, as 
they are not independent regulators, but we advocate the strongest 
possible involvement, without affecting ultimate regulatory 
responsibility.  
4.3 Regulatory cooperation 
While the regulatory coherence part of TTIP should help improve both 
sides’ understanding of and trust and confidence in the domestic rule-
making procedures of the other side, the regulatory cooperation part 
should establish obligations that apply generally to all regulatory 
agencies on both sides to ensure that their decisions are informed about 
the impact of proposals on the transatlantic partner. And, as noted 
above, it should also include annexes that reflect regulator-to-regulator 
agreements in specific product and service areas. 
Again, it’s important to re-emphasise here the three 
considerations spelled out in section 3 above: the need to explicitly 
affirm regulator autonomy, primarily through the use of the annexes; 
the focus on regulations that directly affect products and services that 
are or could be traded between the United States and the EU; and the 
application of these regulatory cooperation commitments to the 
Executive branch and independent agencies in the United States, and 
the Commission and relevant autonomous agencies or advisory bodies 
in the EU. 
Within this scope, the horizontal regulatory cooperation 
provisions of TTIP should: 
 establish the explicit goal of making US and EU regulatory 
regimes increasingly compatible,  
 provide the necessary tools to regulators to achieve this goal and 
 create an institutional framework to oversee and guide this 
process. 
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The goal should be simple, and unbounded by time. It provides 
a direction to the ongoing regulatory cooperation process, but should 
not mandate that that goal must be achieved in all instances (it won’t). 
Further, it cannot be subject to a timetable, in the recognition that 
building trust and confidence between counterpart regulators takes 
time, and indeed can be quickly lost. TTIP will set the trajectory for 
greater and deeper collaboration, but it will not reach an end-point, for 
among other things, laws and regulations in our society are and should 
be dynamic (in contrast, for instance, with the static tariff levels that are 
a normal subject of trade talks).  
The ‘tools’ that should apply to all sectors falling within the 
specified scope should both inform the individual sectorial agreements 
and the regulatory processes of each side. Among other things, they 
should explicitly provide regulators on either side the legal authority 
to enter into agreements with their transatlantic counterpart, consistent 
with their existing legislative authority and on the understanding that 
such agreements will be subject to political oversight on either side. It 
should also affirm that all regulator-to-regulator agreements under 
TTIP can be suspended immediately, should something happen that 
leads a regulator on one side to lose confidence in the other, and that 
the agreements can be unilaterally terminated within a specified period 
of time, should the trust and confidence not be restored following 
consultation. 
But more specifically, the general disciplines should ensure that 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic are better informed about the 
costs and benefits of their domestic regulation as it affects the other 
party, and the trade in goods and services between them. This applies 
to both proposed new regulation, and to existing regulatory provisions 
affecting products and services. In both cases the objective is to inform 
decisions, not to determine them. While better informed of the 
transatlantic consequences, the regulator will in the end make the 
choice appropriate for its jurisdiction.  
For new regulations that will a) have a significant cost of 
compliance to the economy and b) affect a product or service in which 
there is a significant amount29 of transatlantic trade, TTIP should 
                                                          
29 What is meant by a ‘significant’ amount of trade could be defined in the 
agreement, for example, if a regulation would affect a product or service where 
there is $100 million or more of trade. This level could even be sliding (from, 
say $500 million to $50 million) over a period of time to allow regulators to 
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mandate that regulators include a regulatory compatibility assessment 
(RCA) in the impact assessment process they would normally 
undertake in any event. While the details and methodology of this 
would need to be spelled out in more detail, the RCA would, in any 
case: a) require the regulator to contact its transatlantic counterpart, b) 
ascertain whether the product or service is regulated on the other side 
of the ocean, c) determine whether the counterpart had a similar or 
different definition of the problem the regulation is meant to address, 
d) assess whether the proposed approach is compatible with that of the 
counterpart and e) evaluate the costs and benefits of adopting a non-
compatible approach. As this impact assessment is to be made available 
for public comment, all stakeholders would be able to see and provide 
new evidence related to the RCA. Again, a non-compatible approach 
that would affect trade between the two parties could be adopted, but 
the decision would be informed by an evaluation of the consequences 
for transatlantic trade. 
For existing regulations, TTIP could establish a regulatory 
equivalence assessment (REA) process. Under this process, interested 
parties could send a petition to the relevant regulator stating that the 
levels of safety, or the required tests or manufacturing processes, for a 
specified product or service (or groups of products or services) achieve 
the same regulatory outcomes on both sides of the Atlantic. The petition 
should be accompanied by evidence supporting the contention of 
equivalence. The regulator receiving the petition would share it with 
his or her counterpart, and both would publish the petition and the 
evidence provided for public notice and comment. The two would then 
review the responses, and hold hearings on them. They would then 
write a joint or separate report in response to the petition, including 
what, if any, follow-on steps they would propose. Again, there would 
be no requirement that any specific result comes from this. 
The RCA and REA procedures would be applicable to all 
regulated sectors, including, for instance, financial services. But, as 
noted above, they would not jeopardise a regulator’s autonomy, only 
ensure better informed regulatory decisions. If agreements for 
enhanced regulatory cooperation emerge from the process, those 
agreements (after going through the appropriate domestic approval 
process) could then be reflected in the relevant TTIP sectoral annex. 
                                                          
grow accustomed to the process. Indeed, it might be worthwhile to have 
different values of ‘significance’ for different sectors. 
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Arguably, regulators on both sides are already meant to consider 
the trade implications of their proposed regulations, and additional 
transparency, participation and accountability would help provide 
information about these impacts. Further, regulators on both sides 
probably already could receive and consider petitions asserting 
equivalence. But enshrining these procedures as obligations under 
TTIP would ensure that they are followed, and that there is increased 
consultation between the regulatory agencies. It would also give 
grounds for one party to complain if it had reason to believe that a 
regulatory agency on the other side did not undertake the required 
consultation steps. 
The regulatory cooperation section should also establish an 
institutional mechanism to oversee the regulatory cooperation process. 
This could be the existing US-EU High Level Regulatory Cooperation 
Forum (HLRCF)30 established in 2005, although it would make sense in 
the context of the increased requirements in TTIP to enhance it. In the 
Executive Order on international regulatory cooperation, mentioned 
above, President Obama recommended the establishment of regulatory 
cooperation councils (RCCs) with certain partners. The US currently 
has RCCs with Canada31 and Mexico.32 These RCCs meet once or twice 
a year, bringing together select regulatory agencies to develop work 
plans for regulatory cooperation, report on progress to date, discuss 
best practices and other such steps. They have no law-making 
capability as regulatory agencies on both sides must go through their 
domestic decision-making procedures to change any rules. This would 
be true as well for whatever oversight body TTIP creates. In addition to 
helping set the regulatory cooperation agenda and ensuring public 
reports, the oversight body would review experience, identify best 
practices among regulators, help resolve misunderstandings, expand 
and update the RCA and REA methodologies, and the like. 
In contrast to the HLRCF, which is fairly ad hoc in its 
participation, TTIP should identify the bodies which should 
participate. Ideally it would be co-chaired by the two bodies which 
oversee the regulatory activities of the two governments, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the US Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), and the European Commission 
                                                          
30 See www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_europe. 
31 See www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_north_america#canada. See also 
OECD (2013b) for a report on how it works in actual practice.  
32 See www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_north_america#mexico.  
TURBO-CHARGING REGULATORY COOPERATION  43 
 
Secretariat General. All relevant agencies, including those dealing with 
risk assessment or regulation directly, should participate. 
The RCC name, while legally significant in the US context, has 
slightly different political connotations in the EU, where ‘Councils’ are 
ministerial-level bodies that make law. This may be one reason why 
some in Europe distrust the idea. Another name should be chosen for 
the oversight body in TTIP to avoid this misperception. Indeed, the EU 
first draft on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP speaks of a ‘body’.  
4.4 The sectoral annexes 
Structurally, one of the most important components of the regulatory 
cooperation part of TTIP is a set of sectorial annexes, for it is this 
structure which most clearly demonstrates that regulators are in the 
lead on regulatory cooperation, not trade negotiators. It is the former 
who are responsible for implementing the laws governing the level of 
safety of the products and services they regulate, and which are thus 
politically accountable to the relevant political oversight committees of 
Congress, the European Parliament and Council, and the national 
governments and parliaments. And it is this structure which clearly 
demonstrates to the legislative bodies, and to the public, that the 
desired levels of safety cannot be arbitrarily reduced (or increased) 
because of TTIP. 
Indeed, in both the US and EU, changes in the level of regulatory 
protection would undoubtedly require legislative or at least regulatory 
measures. In the US, any such change would be subject to the 
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act, and thus subject to 
legal challenge, should the public notice and comment process not be 
followed. Similar requirements exist on the EU side. 
In this sense, TTIP can only occasionally be expected to bring 
about changes in underlying law; rather, it is a way to build bridges 
between two regulatory regimes. And bridges can only be built if the 
two sides are relatively close to one another. If the regulatory outcomes 
demanded by the two sides are far apart, then, at the very least, spans 
will need to be constructed to bring them closer together before 
anything further can be accomplished. 
The annexes should be kept simple, but should encourage results 
in TTIP: each should have a heading reflecting the class of regulated 
products or services being referred to (autos, pharmaceuticals, medical 
devices, cosmetics, toys, apparel, banking, insurance, etc.); each should 
list the relevant regulatory agencies on both sides and perhaps points 
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of contact in them; and each should reflect agreements that have been 
reached between the relevant regulators. One annex, for instance, could 
be on large civil aircraft: the Federal Aviation Administration and the 
European Aviation Safety Agency would be listed as the regulators, 
and the 2009 Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement, mentioned above, 
should be linked on it.  
As this example highlights, the annexes should include existing 
agreements between counterpart US and EU regulators (such as on 
organic produce and supply chain security systems), any additional 
ones agreed during the TTIP negotiations, and any that may be agreed 
subsequent to agreement on TTIP. In other words, concrete results in 
regulator-to-regulator exchanges should find their way into the 
annexes, so that they are anchored in TTIP, now or later.  
It is this last part, i.e. the ability to add new regulator-to-
regulator agreements in the annexes, that makes TTIP a ‘living’ 
agreement. As described previously, over the past decade and a half, 
many of our regulatory agencies have reached agreements with one 
another; they didn’t need TTIP to do this. But TTIP, with its horizontal 
obligations for such things as the RCA and the REA, will provide 
direction to that cooperation and ‘turbo-charge’ it, without 
undermining our respective regulatory processes.  
And this ‘living’ agreement both recognises that such regulator-
to-regulator agreements can only come where regulators have trust and 
confidence in one another, and that such trust and confidence takes 
time to build. TTIP as a trade agreement should not and need not be 
delayed as that process unfolds. 
Annex 1 to this report provides an illustrative list of existing US-
EU regulatory agreements in over 20 different sectors, on which these 
annexes should be built. 
5. Comparing regulatory cooperation chapters in 
three FTAs 
In order to get an idea of the ambition, nature, and level of intensity of 
bilateral regulatory cooperation between the US and of the EU so far, it 
might seem instructive to compare the regulatory chapters of recent 
bilateral trade agreements concluded by the parties. However, this is 
only partly true. Because no published information of any substantive 
detail is available about TPP (the Asia-Pacific FTA of 12 parties 
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including the US),33 the only recent FTA concluded by the US is 
KORUS, the Korea-US FTA. The EU has concluded three recent FTAs, 
with Korea (KOREU in 2010), Singapore, and CETA. The latter two are 
still being legally scrubbed prior to signature and subsequent 
ratification. In the present section, some comparative remarks will be 
made about KOREU and SINGEU, on the one hand, and KORUS on the 
other. The relevant chapters in these three FTAs are all about 
transparency, only one aspect of regulatory coherence. What there is 
about regulatory cooperation is linked to sectors or may arise from 
general clauses for future initiatives of the ministerial-level body 
governing the FTA. No specific regulatory cooperation framework or 
chapter is included. This is different in CETA (see section 6).  
KOREU34 does not include a chapter entitled ‘Regulatory 
Cooperation’. Instead, chapter 12 is entitled ‘Transparency’. There is a 
possibility that this is caused by the simultaneity of the negotiations on 
KORUS and KOREU. It has often been suggested that KORUS served 
as a lead example for KOREU, and indeed the structure and substance 
of the two agreements are quite similar, and KORUS also has a chapter 
(21) called ‘Transparency’. The substance of chapter 12 of KOREU goes 
some modest distance towards what one would expect from a chapter 
on horizontal regulatory cooperation, knowing that sectorial and other 
specific regulatory cooperation is also scattered throughout the treaty 
and annexes. Article 12.2 on objective and scope clarifies that: 
“Recognising the impact which their respective regulatory 
environment may have on trade between them, the Parties shall pursue 
an efficient and predictable regulatory environment for operators, 
especially small ones doing business in their territories.” The chapter 
lays down clarifications and improved arrangements for transparency, 
consultations, and better administration of measures of general 
application. Subsequent articles re-iterate some of the OECD guidelines 
and recommendations referred to in Box 2.3 – most EU member states 
as well as Korea are members of the OECD – such as on timely 
publications, with the opportunity to comment and endeavours to take 
                                                          
33 From Schott, Kotschwar and Muir (2013, p. 13), it appears that regulatory 
coherence texts focus on promoting transparency and streamlining standards, 
certification, and regulatory processes. In any event, the Honolulu APEC 
Ministerial was also the occasion for TPP to release a broad mandate, with 
regulatory coherence as one of the priorities. But no details are available 
beyond these generalities.  
34 OJEU L 127 of 14 May 2011, pp. 6-1450. 
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such comments into account before legislating for the measures. These 
are followed by provisions on mechanisms for enquiries and contact 
points, administrative proceedings, review and appeal, and 
cooperation in promoting regulatory quality. Chapter 14 of the 
provisional text of SINGEU35 on transparency is almost a copy of 
KOREU’s chapter 12. The objective, scope and structure is essentially 
the same, and often textually identical.  
KORUS’s chapter 21 is concerned with transparency. For TTIP 
purposes, it looks rather elementary. Compared to chapter 12 of 
KOREU, it lacks a broader objective on an ‘efficient and predictable 
regulatory environment for operators,’ although one surmises that 
drafters must have had this in mind. Article 21.1 goes into great detail 
about several aspects of publication of laws, regulations, procedures 
and administrative rulings, such as timely publication in advance of 
proposals, providing a reasonable opportunity for stakeholders to 
comment, and a host of details ensuring easy access to information (e.g. 
a single official journal, a comment period of 40 days, setting out the 
rationale, and addressing significant comments). Article 21.2 reiterates 
this for ‘requests’. Article 21.3 insists on administering ‘in a consistent, 
impartial and reasonable manner’, complemented with, again, 
reasonable notice and opportunity. Somewhat similar provisions apply 
(Art. 21.4) to review and appeal. Presumably because of occasional 
informal past campaigns in Korea against certain imported goods, Art. 
21.5 seeks confirmation that that is not standing policy. A detailed anti-
corruption and anti-bribery provision is found in Art. 21.6. In the light 
of recent APEC initiatives on regulatory reform and principles, largely 
overlapping with those of the OECD, one suspects that Chapter 21 of 
KORUS is more a reflection of the past (KORUS was negotiated up to 
2007) than of today.  
Whereas it is often suggested that KORUS is the template of how 
modern FTAs are negotiated by the US, this is clearly not true for the 
transparency chapter, and even less so for the US and the EU together, 
which have moved beyond the KORUS-type provisions in their 
regulatory cooperation during the last few decades. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of transparency for business in TTIP, one might go much 
further still. One example: wouldn’t it be a good idea to facilitate two-
way business for SMEs, by creating a one-stop-shop on both sides, with 
easy access to regulatory requirements, both at the federal (or EU) and 
the sub-central (or member state) levels? Demanding surely for both 
                                                          
35 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961  
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partners, but undoubtedly extremely helpful for SMEs, lowering the 
costs - and perceived costs - of entry.  
6. TTIP’s regulatory cooperation: What CETA and the 
EU TTIP proposal tell us 
Regulatory cooperation is dealt with very differently in CETA. One 
important explanation for this difference in ambition is the existence of 
regulatory cooperation under the Canada-EU Framework on 
Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency, which dates back nearly a 
decade. Chapter 26 of the provisional consolidated text of CETA36 - 
which is about regulatory cooperation - states (in Art. 26.2 sub 5) that 
the chapter replaces the earlier framework, which implies an upgrade. 
Given the parallel histories of regulatory cooperation between the US 
and the EU and Canada and the EU, and the fact that Canada and the 
US have enjoyed a considerable degree of market integration in 
NAFTA for more than two decades, it is reasonable to regard CETA as 
a possible benchmark for a regulatory chapter in TTIP. However, it is 
not sure whether the TTIP negotiators see it that way; in any event, the 
US position on this chapter is as yet unknown. In Table 2.1 we compare 
the CETA chapter with the EU draft proposal on regulatory 
cooperation in TTIP.37 
Table 2.1 shows that CETA and – probably – TTIP are going to 
be very different from recent FTAs in terms of regulatory coherence and 
cooperation. Although there are differences between the two texts, and 
some confusing disparities in structure, the overlap in the substantial 
provisions about regulatory cooperation and coherence is quite large. 
Both also envisage a joint body with a fairly wide and flexible remit 
which enables future cooperation in many ways. It would also facilitate 
the idea and operation of a ‘living agreement’. In the regulatory 
coherence part, the reference to the OECD 2012 recommendations (in 
the EU proposal) re-affirms a common set of principles and practices in 
an explicit and well-codified form which effectively overlaps with what 
CETA Articles 2 and 3 contain. In the EU TTIP text the ‘regulatory 
exchanges’ are to be led by the regulators (Art. 9.4); this is not explicit 
in CETA. On the other hand, one would surmise, at this stage, that the 
TTIP approach as proposed by the EU is more ambitious in terms of 
commitments and procedures than CETA, as the hard core of the CETA 
                                                          
36 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/2014/september/tradoc_1528  
37 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/trade_153120  
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chapter are (19) voluntary cooperative ‘activities’ whereas TTIP 
regulatory cooperation is far more about commitments in law. Still, 
much will depend on the actual functioning of the chapter under each 
treaty. In any event, TTIP already has (tentatively) agreed on as many 
as nine sectorial chapters or annexes, and the EU proposal suggests that 
more might eventually emerge from the ‘living agreement’, whereas in 
CETA it does not look nearly as ambitious when taking the text literally. 
 Table 2.1 Comparing regulatory cooperation in CETA and the EU TTIP 
proposal 
CETA on Specifications in CETA Specifications in EU TTIP 
proposal 
Scope (Art. 1) Development, review, and 
methodological aspects of 
regulatory measures of the 
Parties; reference to WTO 
SPS and TBT, plus GATT 
and GATS ; and to six 
chapters in the draft treaty, 
including environment and 
labour 
Art. 3: applies to regulatory 
acts at central level on goods 
and services; with 
‘significant impact’; and 
regulatory acts concerning 
specific or sectorial 
provisions (to be determined 
later). The type of regulatory 
acts at central level are 
precisely defined in Art. 2, a 
and b for resp. the EU and 
the US] [note, that the first 
EU draft will be completed 
with provisions on 
regulatory acts at sub-central 
level ][reference to WTO 
elsewhere in CETA] 
Principles (Art. 
2) 
Quite detailed. Their 
cooperation is to be open to 
other trading parties; 
should ‘enhance the climate 
for competitiveness and 
innovation, including 
through pursuing 
regulatory compatibility, 
recognition of equivalence 
and convergence’; promote 
regulatory processes that 
....better ... fulfil the 
mandates of regulatory 
bodies... [and] ‘enhanced 
use of best practices’ 
Art. 1.3 : ‘the Parties reaffirm 
their shared commitment to 
good regulatory principles 
and practices, as laid down 
in the OECD 
Recommendation of 22 
March 2012 on Regulatory 
Policy and Governance’ 
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Objectives (Art. 
3) 
Four very detailed 
objectives, i.e. contributing 
to SHIEC objectives (by 
leveraging international 
resources and helping risk 
assessment), building trust 
and deepening mutual 
understanding of 
regulatory governance (in 
seven ways, typical ‘good 
regulatory practices’ items, 
including transparency and 
predictability), facilitating 
bilateral trade and 
investment (e.g. by 
reducing unnecessary 
regulatory differences), and 
contributing to 
competitiveness and 
efficiency of industry (by 
e.g. minimizing 
administrative costs and 
reducing duplicative 
regulatory requirements, 
plus pursuing compatible 
regulatory approaches e.g. 
recognition of equivalence 
or the promotion of 
convergence)  
Art.1.1 comprises four 
objectives:  
a. ‘to reinforce regulatory 
cooperation thereby 
facilitating trade and 
investment…. to stimulate 
growth and jobs while 
pursuing a high level of 
protection..’ in SHEIC but 
also working conditions, 
personal data, cybersecurity, 
cultural diversity or 
preserving financial 
stability; 
b. ‘reduce unnecessarily 
burdensome, duplicative or 
divergent regulatory 
requirements…. by 
promoting … compatibility 
of… EU and US… acts’ 
c. ‘promote an effective, pro-
competitive environment… 
transparent and predictable ‘ 
d. ‘to further… international 
instruments … to strive 
towards consistent 
regulatory outcomes’ 
Regulatory 
cooperation 
activities (Art. 4) 
A very wide and ambitious 
set of provisions on 19 (!) 
regulatory cooperation 
activities, many of those on 
sharing /exchange of 
information on a host of 
areas, examining 
opportunities to minimise 
unnecessary divergences, 
cooperation on developing 
international standards and 
guides, data collection, 
cooperative research 
agendas, conducting post-
implementation reviews, 
reducing adverse trade 
effects by e.g. greater 
In the draft EU proposal, 
many (not all) regulatory 
cooperation activities, as 
they are called in CETA, are 
found in different articles: 
Art. 5 (on early and public 
information on planned acts) 
and Art. 6 (on stakeholder 
consultations) are under a 
subsection ‘transparency’, 
whereas the first (early 
information) is in Art. 26.4 of 
CETA, that is not the case 
for stakeholder participation 
(except for a very open 
clause in Art. 26.8, CETA). 
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convergence, mutual 
recognition, minimising the 
use of trade-distorting 
instruments, and the use of 
international standards, etc.  
Provisions on impact 
assessment (in CETA Art. 
26.4, item 6b) are in Art. 7 in 
the EU proposal. 
Some of what CETA calls 
‘activities’ are the subject of 
‘regulatory exchanges’ in the 
EU proposal (art. 9 and 10), 
the essential difference being 
a greater precision in 
procedures and timing. 
(For the CETA provision on 
post-implementation 
reviews, there is a weak 
counterpart in the EU draft, 
in Art. 7.3c) On the other 
hand, CETA has no explicit 
provision on promoting 
international regulatory 
cooperation, as in Art. 13 of 
the EU draft.) 
Compatibility of 
regulations (Art. 
5) 
‘With a view to enhancing 
convergence and 
compatibility between 
regulatory measures of the 
Parties, each Party shall, 
when appropriate, consider 
the regulatory measures or 
initiatives of the other Party 
on the same or related 
topics…’ 
Compatibility is in Art. 8.1 
as well as in Art. 11, 
following from (in some 
cases) so-called ‘regulatory 
exchanges’, specifying 
mutual recognition of 
equivalence (of regulatory 
acts or outcomes), 
harmonization or 
simplification; goes further 
than CETA via a proposal 
for joint examination. 
Role and 
Composition of 
the Regulatory 
Cooperation 
Forum (Art. 6) 
‘...to facilitate and promote 
regulatory cooperation 
between the Parties’; 
functions: i) a setting for 
discussion of regulatory 
policy issues of mutual 
interest, ii) assist individual 
regulators (identifying 
partners; model 
confidentiality agreements); 
iii) reviews of whether 
regulatory initiatives 
The TTIP Regulatory 
Cooperation Body will have 
seven functions (Art. 14): i) 
Annual Regulatory 
Cooperation Programme; ii) 
monitoring of the 
implementation and 
reporting; iii) technical 
preparation of new or added 
sectoral provisions; iv) 
considering new proposals 
for regulatory cooperation, 
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‘provide potential for 
cooperation’; iv) encourage 
bilateral regulatory 
cooperation activities (as 
the 19 types in Art. 4) and 
review sectorial initiatives. 
The RCF reports to the 
CETA trade Council 
including on compatibility; 
v) preparation of joint 
proposals of international 
regulatory instruments; vi) 
ensuring transparency; vii) 
open clause on relevant 
‘other issue’ 
Further 
cooperation of 
the Parties (Art. 
7)  
Is about monitoring 
forthcoming regulatory 
projects, as well as 
exchange of information on 
a host of issues, e.g. 
standardisation, market 
surveillance, risk 
assessment methods and 
product recalls and early 
warnings. Endorsement of 
other initiatives are 
encouraged too.  
Not explicit but probably 
subsumed in Art. 14; 
presumably, market 
surveillance, risk assessment 
and product recalls may 
require more specific 
provisions 
Consultations 
(Art. 8)  
‘In order to gain non-
governmental perspectives, 
the Parties may jointly or 
separately consult’ all kinds 
of private entities 
Much more detailed and 
forthcoming or encouraging 
on consultation in Art. 15 of 
EU proposal  
Contact points 
(Art. 9) 
Specified for both Parties Not (yet) specified 
 
Of course, the EU text is still incomplete with respect to sub-
central governments. Neither the CETA nor the EU text is very detailed 
with respect to some ‘coherence’ aspects discussed in our section 4 
above. For example, there is not much detail on early information of 
planned drafts for the other party or the public at large. With respect to 
the horizontal aspects of cooperation, nothing even nearly as ambitious 
as Regulatory Compatibility Assessments for new regulations and/or 
Regulatory Equivalence Assessment for existing regulations is referred 
to in either text.  
In the absence of a publicised US text proposal or a revision after 
nine rounds of negotiation, it would be wrong to draw any further 
conclusion at this stage.  
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7. Conclusion: Building bridges and enhancing social 
objectives 
The purpose of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is 
to build on the unique trade and investment-based US-EU economic 
relationship to promote growth and, most importantly, jobs on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  
It will do this in many ways, but one of the key steps will be in 
tackling unnecessary differences in regulation, which create 
unintended obstacles to trade without any corresponding regulatory or 
social benefit. The US and EU can do this, as they are both democratic, 
high-income economies that in general seek similar levels of consumer, 
worker, environmental and prudential safety.  
But TTIP can succeed only if it frames this process correctly. TTIP 
will not be, and perhaps cannot be, the most ambitious form of 
regulatory cooperation, as seen in some treaties focused on discrete 
issues. But it can, and probably will, be more than either side has done 
in any previous trade agreement. Done properly, regulatory coherence 
and cooperation under TTIP will enhance regulatory efficiency and 
effectiveness, increasing consumer safety even as it improves the 
competitiveness of US and EU firms. TTIP should help ensure that 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic agree on the principles and 
practices that make for a robust, evidence-based and transparent 
regulatory system, as confidence in each other’s domestic systems is a 
prerequisite for cooperation.  
It should set the clear goal for our regulators of improving 
regulatory compatibility, while reaffirming their autonomy and their 
accountability to their political oversight bodies and their citizens. It 
should give them tools such as the Regulatory Compatibility 
Assessments and the Regulatory Equivalence Assessments, to ensure 
informed decision-making without trying to predetermine the 
outcomes. And it should recognise that regulatory cooperation can 
succeed only where there is trust and confidence between the 
regulators, and that TTIP must be patient enough and flexible enough 
with a living agreement, to allow for this trust and confidence to be 
built on sufficiently strong foundations. 
For only with these foundations will TTIP be able to build a 
bridge between the US and the EU, one that is safe, that meets the needs 
and concerns of our politicians and our citizens, while at the same time 
fostering economic growth and job creation. 
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Annex 1. 20 Years of US-EU Regulatory Cooperation 
Regulators in the United States and the European Union (as opposed to 
individual EU member states) have been collaborating since the 1995 US-EU 
“New Transatlantic Agenda” declaration. While there are a number of agency-
to-agency agreements, much of the early work was captured in the general 
reports on progress under the Regulatory Cooperation Roadmaps (starting in 
2002), to the High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (established 2005) 
and ultimately the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), created in 2007. A 
review of these general reports, listed in the first section below, gives a good 
overview of progress in the many sectors covered. 
Issue/Agencies Description 
General 
(All) 
US-EU Joint Statement on Regulatory 
Cooperation (Dec. 1997) 
US-EU MRA Agreement (December, 1998) 
Guidelines for use of the MRAs, 2001 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership Report 
(Bonn Summit, June 1999) 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership; 
Commission Overview and Assessment, 
October 2000 
Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and 
Transparency Implementation Roadmap 
(April 2002) 
Regulatory Roadmap – 2004 
Regulatory Roadmap – June 2005 
Joint Report on the Roadmap, June 2006 
Joint Report on the Roadmap, April 2007 
HLRCF Report, April 2008 
Joint Report on Impact Assessments and 
Trade, May 2008 
HLRCF Report, October 2008 
HLRCF Report, July 2009 
HLRCF Report, June 2010 
HLRCF Report, December 2010 
Common Understanding re Regulatory 
Principles and Best Practices, June 2011 
Standards 
US: National Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology (NIST) 
EU and US Extend Scientific Cooperation on 
Measurements and Standards July 2013 (JRC 
news release) 
Building Bridges between the US and EU 
Standards Systems Nov 2011 
Memorandum of Understanding Dec 2010 
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EU: DG Enterprise 
(GROW); Joint Research 
Centres 
US–EU HLRCF Joint Statement on Standards 
in Regulation Dec 2010 
Collaborative Arrangement regarding 
cooperation in the fields of metrology and 
measurement standards Feb 2008 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding 
cooperation on scientific research and 
measurement standards Dec 2007 
Import Product Safety 
US: OIRA 
EU: DG Enterprise 
Implementation of Recommendations Report, 
December 2008 
Safety of Imported Products, April 2008: looks 
at motor vehicle, food, pharmaceutical, 
cosmetic, toy, consumer–use electrical 
equipment sectors 
Agriculture 
US: FDA, USDA, FSIS, 
APHIS 
EU: DG 
SANCO/SANTE, DG 
AGRI 
National Organic Program June 2012: the US 
and EU created an equivalence arrangement 
in regards to organic standards USDA press 
release   
Competent authorities responses of the US to 
recommendations from DG SANCO 2011 
FCA and EFSA information sharing 
agreement July 2007: the two agencies signed 
the first EU–US agreement in the area of 
assessing food safety risk. EFSA Statement  
FDA Statement  
EU-US Safe Food 2005-2007: A program that 
ran for two years in order to contribute to and 
communicate knowledge about food-born 
zoonoses 
Report, 2007: complete Implementation Plan 
under their confidentiality arrangement; 
experts hold joint meeting on nanotechnology 
in food to share perspectives on the issue 
Chemicals 
US: EPA 
EU: DG ENVI, ENT; 
ECHA 
ECHA and EPA statement of Intent Dec 2010: 
The document asserts the agencies intent to 
enhance technical cooperation and share 
information regarding chemical management. 
EPA press release 
US-EU Conference Draft Nanotechnology in 
the Workplace July 2012: Establishing 
standardization OSH principles for 
developing best practices applied to 
nanotechnology work settings  
Pharmaceuticals EC wavier for export of US pharmaceutical 
manufactures June 2013  
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US: FDA 
EU: DG ENT, EMEA 
Update on the implementation of 
recommendations made by Transatlantic 
Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance 
(TATFAR) Feb 2013 
Programme to rationalize international GMP 
inspections Feb 2012 
Enhancing GMP Inspection Cooperation 
between EMA and FDA Dec 2011 
Report on the Pilot EMA-FDA GCP Initiative 
July 2011  
Implementation Report on Transatlantic 
Administration Simplification action plan July 
2011 
Interactions between EMA and FDA June 2011 
Report on the International API inspection 
Pilot May 2011 
EMA-FDA pilot program for parallel 
assessment of Quality by design applications 
March 2011 
Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial 
Resistance Report 2011  
EMEA and FDA statements re non-disclosure 
of confidential information from partner 
agency (September 2010)  
FDA EMEA Administrative Simplification 
Implementation Report Oct 2009 
EMEA-FDA Good Clinical Practice (GCP) 
Initiative Terms of engagement and 
procedures for participating authorities: Sep 
2009 
EMEA-FDA GCP Initiative July 2009 
EMEA-DFA Parallel Scientific Advice July 
2009 
Confidentiality Commitment between the 
FDA and EDQM May 2009 
Update on pilot project to collaborate on 
international GMP inspection activities Jan 
2009 
FDA/EMEA Joint Press Release re 
Cooperation on Medicines, Oct 2008 
Medicines Regulation: Transatlantic 
Administrative Simplification Action Plan 
June 2008 
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Veterinary Medicines 
US: FDA, USDA 
EU: EC, EMEA 
(See also above re medicines and reports on 
TATFAR) 
CVM / EMA Exchange of Experts 2012  
FDA EDQM Confidentiality Commitment, 
May 2009: 
EMEA/Veterinary Medicines and Inspections 
Unit – Parallel Scientific Advice Meetings, 
May 2008 
Implementation Procedures for Veterinary 
Medicinal Products Cluster, May 2008 
Medical Devices 
US: FDA 
EU: DG ENTR – EMEA  
October 2012 EU proposed changes to Medical 
Device laws and allowed US comments  
Statement From the International Medical 
Device Regulators’ Forum October 2011 
Exchange of Letters to facilitate information 
sharing re the safety, quality and efficiency of 
medical devices, July 2007  
Cosmetics 
US: FDA 
EU: DG Enterprise and 
Industry (cosmetics unit), 
ECVAM 
ICCR (International Cooperation on Cosmetic 
Regulation): made up of the US, EU, Japan, 
and Canada  
Meeting reports: 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 
2007  
FDA – DG Enterprise – Related to Cosmetics 
July 2007: Press Release 
Automotive Safety 
US: NHTSA 
EU: DG ENT 
Europe, USA, Japan will harmonise electric 
Vehicle Regulations Nov 2011 
Proposal for two working groups re e-
Vehicles November 2011 
Global Technical Regulations 2004-2011 
Memorandum of Cooperation Automobiles 
June 2008  
Aircraft Safety 
US: FAA, TSA 
EU: DG ENT, EASA 
Cooperation Agreement on Civil Aviation 
Safety, March 2011 
Regulation of Civil Aviation Aircraft 
Marine Equipment 
US: USCG 
EU: DG Energy and 
Transport; European 
Marine Safety Agency  
Memorandum of Understanding regarding 
marine optical radiometry, March 2011  
US-EC Marine Equipment MRA Joint 
Committee, February 2009 
US-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement for 
Conformity Assessment for Marine 
Equipment, June 2001 
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Energy Efficiency, Eco-
Design 
US: DOE, FERC, EPA 
EU: DG EVN, DG ENER, 
DG ENT 
EU – US Energy Council Press statements 
following meetings of the Council  
o December 2012 
o November 2011 
o November 2010 
o Website on the council is here  
EU US Energy Council Working Group on 
Technology, Research, Development and 
Demonstration 2009 
Establishment of EU-US Energy Council, 2009  
EU U.S advance Energy dialogue, March 2008  
Energy Star Agreement renewed, Jan 2013  
Implementing Arrangement for 
Environmental Research and Ecoinformatics, 
Feb 2007:  
Energy star agreement, December 2001 
Working link First Energy Star Agreement – 
November 2001 
Consumer Products, Toy 
Safety 
US: CPSC 
EU: DG SANCO 
China–US – EU trilateral meetings 
o Sep 2008 Joint Press Statement 
o October 2010 Joint Press Statement 
o June 2012 Joint Press Statement  
Roadmap Feb 2010:  
Council grants mandate for the EC Nov 2009:  
EU US HLRCF Report on the Safety of 
Imported Products, Dec 2008  
EU US HLRCF Report on Safety of Imported 
Products May 2008 
Report, 2007  
Guidelines for Information Exchange and on 
Administrative Cooperation on consumer 
product safety Report, 2006 
Toy Safety, January 2010  
Financial 
Regulation/Supervision 
US: Treasury, Federal 
Reserve, SEC, CFTC, 
NAIC, FASB, PA 
EU: DG Market, EBA, 
ESMA, EIOPA 
Derivatives Agreement, July 2013 (Press 
release and text from CFTC) 
SEC and CESR Announcement Nov 2010:  
The SEC abolished reconciliation to GAAP for 
foreign companies using IFRS Nov 2007 
CESR and SEC Protocol to implement work 
plan Sept 2007 
SEC and CESR Work Plan Aug 2006 
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Insurance  
US-EU Dialogue Project Update, April 2013 
EU-US Dialogue Project Report, Dec 2012 
EU-US Dialogue Project: The Way Forward, 
Dec 2012 
Transportation Security 
US : DHS/CBP and TSA, 
FAA, FMC 
EU: DG JHA 
CBP, EU Sign C-TPAT Mutual Recognition 
Decision, May 2012 (Implement this report 
Feb 2013)  
Air Cargo Agreement June 2012. TSA press 
release, EU press release 
US-EU Joint Declaration on Aviation Security, 
January 2010  
Joint Statement, September 2008  
Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the European Union on the Use 
and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to 
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Source: Compiled by Peter Chase. 
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3. TTIP’S HARD CORE: 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
AND STANDARDS 
MICHELLE EGAN 
AND JACQUES PELKMANS 
1. Introduction and structure 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is viewed 
as the single most-important trade deal undertaken by the US and the 
EU. The two partners have undertaken it in response to the changing 
geopolitical environment, resulting from, among other things, the 
stalled Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the rise of Asia 
and Asian regionalism, and the economic slowdown and sovereign 
debt crisis. Although the deal is expected to promote jobs and growth 
and strengthen existing economic ties, the prospect for an ambitious 
preferential trade agreement is also derived from building on earlier 
initiatives and experience to promote trade, regulatory and financial 
cooperation between two economies that are highly interdependent 
(Hamilton, 2014; Pollack & Shaffer, 2001; Egan, 2005).  
The progressive elimination of tariff barriers has shifted 
attention. The import-weighted tariffs have been reduced over time to 
less than 4% (with many tariff lines being zero), so the issue in many 
traditional regional free trade agreements (FTAs) is no longer tariffs, 
but rather technical barriers to trade (TBTs). These barriers consist of 
standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures that have emerged in different administrative bodies and 
standardisation organisations at domestic, regional and international 
levels, often independently from one another, thereby creating 
duplicative costs of compliance (see Box 3.1). Standards are usually 
developed by private standards development organisations (SDOs), to 
avoid redundant variety (e.g. of components), for compatibility, but 
also to ensure the health, safety and quality of products, as well as 
62  EGAN & PELKMANS 
 
processes, production methods and other related technical matters. 
They can define a specific design or performance characteristics, 
determine performance criteria, or provide guidelines and definitions 
(NRC, 1995).  
Standards are formally voluntary when adopted, but can acquire 
legal effect when ‘referenced’ in legislation, or may become dominant 
in the marketplace through widespread acceptance. Conformity 
assessment methods and procedures are used to assess whether a 
particular material, product, or process conforms to a specified 
standard. Conformity assessment bodies, which can be public or 
private entities, include testing, certification and inspection 
organisations. When technical standards are integrated into regulatory 
requirements, they can create or enhance technical barriers to trade, 
due to differences in performance, design, testing, and certification 
measures. Since these requirements are indispensable for entering their 
respective markets, it can lead to extra costs as the imported product 
has to be tested and certified acceptable or safe, or, in other words, meet 
specific safety, health, environment and consumer (SHEC) protection 
objectives.  
TBTs do not concern the level and scope of regulation, i.e. SHEC 
objectives, but rather reduce the costs of given regulatory differences of 
instruments that impact market access. Such differences have become 
a central issue in the ongoing US-EU trade negotiations, so that 
standards and conformity assessment practices on both sides of the 
Atlantic remain one of the greatest challenges in TTIP. Removing or 
reducing the cost of such transatlantic TBTs is likely to result in possibly 
significant economic gains – which may vary by sector – but this does 
not mean that regulatory objectives in terms of levels of SHEC 
protection will diminish, as asserted – without any justification – in 
social and conventional media as well as stakeholder meetings. At issue 
are differences in instruments, methods or testing to meet given, 
specified objectives.  
The chapter proceeds in section 2 to establish the significance of 
TBTs that stem from standards, testing and conformity assessment 
practices for the costs of international trade and the particular 
challenges of resolving them. The prior transatlantic efforts to address 
them are considered in section 3 and the scope of the TTIP TBT 
approach is addressed in section 4. Section 5 outlines the standards 
regimes and their respective legal and policy differences in order to 
illustrate the areas of contention for the ongoing TTIP negotiations. 
Section 6 shows how these regime distinctions impact bilateral trade 
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and section 7 focuses on the current state of negotiations in TTIP. The 
chapter concludes by elucidating the prospects and implications for 
achieving some form of agreement on TBT issues.  
Box 3.1 TBT definitions for understanding TTIP negotiations 
A technical regulation lays down product characteristics or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may 
also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method (Annex 1, TBT Agreement). 
A standard is a document approved by a recognised body that 
provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines, or 
characteristics for products or related processes and production 
methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include 
or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production 
method (Annex 1, TBT Agreement). A technical standard is written by 
standard bodies and is always voluntary, whether in the US, the EU or 
elsewhere. This suggests that standards should not normally be 
regarded as a TBT. Although this is often correct, there are instances 
where different (voluntary) standards amount to barriers (e.g. no 
compatibility, requirements for insurance, etc.), that is, they raise the 
costs of effective market access. Most standards written by standard 
bodies are purely market-driven, for reasons which market players, 
including consumers, are expected to appreciate. The principal reasons 
why standards are advantageous (see Pelkmans & Costello, 1991; 
Swann, 2010; Blind, 2013) include: 
i) well-defined information on measures, weights, or a host of other 
technical ‘codes’ which reduce the costs of information for 
engineers, designers, etc., whilst avoiding confusing differences for 
technicians; 
ii) well-defined codification of certain quality features of goods 
(including intermediate goods, parts, components) – quality can of 
course include aspects of goods serving safety, health of consumers 
or workers, environment and/or consumer protection (and often 
will because markets appreciate it); 
iii) agreed specifications needed for interoperability or compatibility of 
intermediate or final products; and 
iv) agreed ways to reduce clear redundancy of variety in order to 
facilitate economies of scale. 
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Industry spends resources to write standards, because they want 
markets to function better and codify new technologies or production 
solutions, while also allowing variety to ensure competition, innovation 
and coordination across firms, sectors and supply chains.  
An international standard (or guide or recommendation, as the 
World Trade Organization specifies) is widely understood as a standard 
issued by world bodies such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), except in 
ICT where other consortia often play a role. The WTO TBT Committee 
has defined a set of six principles for determining whether a standard is 
‘international’: openness, transparency, impartiality and consensus, 
relevance and effectiveness, coherence and the development dimension 
(see, e.g. USTR (2014), 2014 Report on TBTs, pp. 25-26).  
Conformity assessment procedures are any procedure(s) used, 
directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in 
technical regulations or standards are fulfilled (Annex 1, TBT 
Agreement). 
 
2. The meaning of TBTs for trade 
Unlike conventional trade restraints, such as voluntary export 
restraints, quotas or tariffs, technical barriers to trade (TBT) that include 
conformity assessment procedures are not explicitly designed as trade 
protection measures to restrict market access and shield domestic 
markets from competition (Budetta & Piermartini, 2009). Although they 
are not explicitly discriminatory, as exporters may meet local, national 
or regional technical standards, regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures to achieve market access so that the same rules apply to 
both domestic and foreign products, this tends to impose 
disproportionate costs on foreign producers that have to conform to 
different sets of rules and requirements for different markets. 
Duplicative testing and certification can also constitute a barrier to 
trade, as this increases costs in meeting the administrative 
requirements, as well as testing and certification procedures in the 
importing country, and if different, it places foreign firms at a 
competitive disadvantage in comparison to domestic firms. 
Governments and industries may define specific requirements that 
provide strategic advantages to certain industries or firms.  
Germany has recently imposed additional administrative 
requirements on the sale of pyrotechnic products, as the Federal 
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Institute for Material Research and Testing (BAM) has required an 
additional notification fee, and user amendments, beyond that of the 
EU Pyrotechnics Directive. Since the Directive applies in the 
automotive sector for safety restraints such as airbags and seatbelts, the 
issue has become a technical barrier to trade for other car 
manufacturers, resulting in EU infringement proceedings against 
Germany. In the US, the slow pace of approval for sunscreen 
ingredients by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has led to 
applications pending for 12 years, due to the cumbersome regulatory 
process that has thwarted new European products from accessing the 
market despite their widespread approval and use in Europe and Asia.1  
Companies often have to make design or manufacturing changes 
to sell in both European and American markets, or, especially for SMEs, 
forego market access due to the costs of adaptation, or perform 
redundant and duplicative testing to demonstrate compliance with 
both sets of rules. Differences between toy safety standards, for 
example, cost $3 billion annually despite the relative convergence of 
many of the design and testing specifications, which has led both sides 
together to promote a presumption of equivalence, so that toys 
compliant with either the US or European standard would be 
considered ‘safe’. This would still allow each jurisdiction to determine 
the means to establish conformity to lower the costs of two-way market 
access.2 
TBTs may take many forms in actual practice and many 
variations of such forms, often specific to sectors. If differences are 
slight and procedures light, the costs of TBTs may be small and little 
might be heard about them. However, the typical TBTs long discussed 
in transatlantic regulatory fora and exchanges are costly and influence 
more than marginally the costs of market access. It is exceedingly hard 
to estimate authoritatively the costs of TBTs (see Berden & Francois, 
2015, chapter 4 in this volume), but the TBTs relevant for trade 
negotiations in bilateral FTAs carry costs equivalent to anywhere from 
10% to 80% of the invoice price. This means that, in such sectors, the 
                                                          
1 The Sunscreen Approval Act was signed into law in 2014, amending Chapter 
V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 351 et seq.). The 
Public Access and Sunscreen Coalition (PASS) lobbied hard for the regulatory 
changes during the FDA review process.  
2 Comments Concerning Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Agreement (Docket number USTR-2013-0019) from Toy Industry Association 
and Toy Industries of Europe. 
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full removal of tariffs does little to open up markets because TBTs 
might entail multiple tariffs and thus render market access quite – or 
even very – costly, or, for SMEs, simply impossible.  
The TTIP negotiations are, however, embedded within a larger 
context of recent and concurrent trade negotiations involving the US or 
EU as negotiating partners. Not surprisingly, both sides have exhibited 
a willingness to advance their trade interests through bilateral FTAs 
with the larger goal of promoting trade, market access, investment and 
development. Both sides have separately pushed for stronger market-
opening commitments from third countries as bilateral and regional 
trade agreements have become their preferred trade strategy. To that 
end, the EU has indicated that it will play a leading role in sharing best 
practice and developing global rules and standards as well as 
promoting convergence towards EU or international standards in select 
policy areas (see European Commission, 1996).  
The US has also engaged in a similar strategy to implement WTO 
TBT commitments, supplemented with technical assistance, and sector 
specific provisions (see below) (Lesser, 2007). But what adjustment 
costs are they willing to make when the trade giants are negotiating 
with each other? Whose standards or, more specifically, regulatory 
requirements will prevail? Or indeed, should one necessarily prevail, 
or would ‘equivalence’ be an option to pursue? Should the US and the 
EU renew their efforts to improve and extend their 1998 Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (MRA), which works only for some of the six 
industrial sectors selected? Their differing regulatory policies in some 
specific areas have been the constant target of trade disputes, resulting 
in the US and EU being the most prolific initiators of complaints in the 
WTO (Young).  
3. Prior transatlantic efforts at addressing TBTs  
Over the past 20 years, the US and EU have engaged in a variety of 
efforts to foster transatlantic regulatory cooperation with many pre-
existing dialogues, initiatives and commitments (Barker, 2013; Lester & 
Barbee, 2013). While there are differences between the US and EU that 
matter for TTIP, collaboration has evolved as the product of prior 
efforts at promoting trade and investment cooperation. One has to 
acknowledge that the optimism of the mid-1990s, when it was thought 
that a relatively simple and ‘light’ approach such as an MRA in several 
industrial sectors would be a quick route to lowering the costs of 
EU/US TBTs, was largely mistaken. An MRA aims to accomplish the 
acceptance of all relevant aspects of conformity assessment of the 
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trading partner for the purpose of testing and certifying export goods 
on the requirements of the importing economy. It works for telecom 
equipment and EMC (electromagnetic compatibility of equipment) but 
not for medical devices, GMP in medicines or electrical goods and 
machinery (a huge sector).  
On both sides lessons have been learned about how difficult the 
creation of a New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM), deemed in 1995 to 
be feasible, would be, given the many problems in implementing MRAs 
in providing effective market access. Moreover, it was also better 
realised that MRAs are a rather heavy construction for a relatively 
minor cost advantage: even with a well-functioning MRA, the main 
reason for TBT costs (regulatory differences and requirements) remains 
intact. Consequently, regulatory cooperation since 2002, and more so 
since 2007 in the framework of the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(TEC), has deepened mutual understanding and also helped to develop 
practical forms of regulatory cooperation, without formal obligations, 
linked in cases like medical devices and medicines to global fora of 
regulators.3 Moreover, the TEC has emphasised the pre-emption of 
TBTs in new or emerging product markets or in new technologies (such 
as electric vehicles). The TTIP TBT chapter is meant to decisively move 
beyond this status quo and genuinely address the cost of TBTs.4  
Both sides have struggled to coordinate their administrative 
approaches, with early warning systems,5 mutual recognition 
agreements, exchanges of information, as well as the adoption of broad 
regulatory principles and guidelines.6 The two administrative cultures 
have fundamentally different market and regulatory regimes, which 
has led to many proposals that, unfortunately, have failed to promote 
the expected regulatory coherence (Nicolaïdis & Egan, 2001). 
Nevertheless, in some special instances, there are success stories in 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation, such as the 2009 EU/US 
certification of aircraft agreement, the EU/US Veterinary Agreement 
                                                          
3 For a detailed analysis of MRA implications for TTIP, see Pelkmans & Correia 
de Brito (2015).  
4 On regulatory cooperation, see Chase & Pelkmans (2015).  
5 http://useu.usmission.gov/062199_report_bonn.html. 
6 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/july/tradoc_148030.pdf. 
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(see Josling & Tangermann, chapter 9, in this volume) and the 2012 
agreement on organic farming recognition.7  
The US-EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth 
(HLWG) laid out its goals regarding transatlantic trade barriers, 
emphasising the importance of preventing future barriers to trade as 
well as addressing the current divergences that impede cross-border 
trade (US-EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 2013). 
The report focused on broad goals in addressing technical barriers with 
the inclusion of a ‘TBT plus’ chapter, building on horizontal disciplines 
in the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, including 
establishing an ongoing mechanism for improved dialogue and 
cooperation for addressing bilateral TBT issues, which is not unique to 
the transatlantic free trade negotiations. The HLWG also promotes 
greater openness, transparency, and convergence in regulatory 
approaches and requirements and related standards-development 
processes; reduces redundant and burdensome testing and certification 
requirements; promotes confidence in the respective conformity 
assessment bodies; and enhances cooperation on conformity 
assessment and standardisation issues globally. The goal is to 
strengthen horizontal cooperation among regulators through early 
consultations, impact assessment, upstream cooperation and good 
manufacturing practices to prevent unnecessary costs and delays, and 
to enhance cooperation on standards-related issues.  
In February 2013, both sides announced they would embark on 
an FTA together after a decade of competitive liberalisation in which 
they sought to disseminate new rules in international trade and employ 
free trade negotiations to establish closer economic links with security 
partners or use them to isolate economic competitors by excluding 
them from economic cooperation agreements negotiated with other 
nations. While many observers felt that TTIP would have an easier time 
in soliciting agreement than other recent trade agreements, the reality 
has been more complex. In an FTA, trade negotiations typically seek 
least trade-restrictive rules and procedures, and not the codification of 
existing practices. The legal basis of GATT/WTO rules for regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) (Art. XXIV.5) allows for RTAs as a special 
exception provided a) duties and other trade regulations of commerce 
are reduced on or removed from all trade and b) the RTA does not raise 
the overall protection vis-à-vis other WTO members.  
                                                          
7 See Chase & Pelkmans (2015) for an annex with all US-EU regulatory 
cooperation initiatives since the mid-1990s.  
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While the US and EU have been the main proponents of WTO-
plus commitments in RTAs, with both conditional and promotional 
elements that include incentives, sanction and monitoring, they differ 
on what should be included as part of a gold standard agreement for 
TTIP.8 Though the TBT, SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) and GATT 
Agreements provide a source of discipline regarding technical barriers 
to trade, the multilateral agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) seeks to ensure that technical regulations, standards and 
procedures for assessing conformity do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade. It requires that applicable regulations are 
transparent, justifiable, non-discriminatory and based on international 
standards whenever possible. However, in terms of their respective 
FTA templates, they have varied in terms of their approach. The US 
follows a standard template focused on fairly light WTO-plus 
commitments whereas the EU is more varied, although both have 
included additional issues focusing on governance rather than trade 
(Baldwin, 2015). 
Despite various calls to phase in different elements of the 
agreement, the US has steadfastly focused on a comprehensive 
agreement. However, there have been disagreements within the US 
about the coverage and inclusion of issues in any negotiated agreement, 
providing a stark reminder of the need to address different domestic 
constituencies. Congressional demands have focused on opposition to 
broadening of ‘geographical indications’, on the maintenance of ‘buy 
American’ and ‘buy local’ provisions, and on the improvement in 
biotechnology approval, thereby providing a stark reminder of the 
need to address different domestic constituencies. There is also 
resistance from some regulatory agencies about their inclusion in the 
talks. While the US pushed for the exclusion of financial services at the 
behest of the Treasury and SEC, the FDA has sought to undertake 
regulatory cooperation with the EU outside of the TTIP negotiations 
(Inside U.S. Trade, 18 July 2014 – www.insidetrade.com). In the EU, 
there has been concern over the impact of TTIP on food and safety 
issues and medicinal products. Therefore, the EU is keen to negotiate 
                                                          
8 For example, the US did not want the inclusion of competition policy and so 
instead promoted the idea of the International Competition Network (ICN), 
which was accepted but differed from the initial EU preference to include 
competition and binding principles, e.g. most favoured nation (MFN), cartels 
and other non-binding principles such as vertical restraints.  
70  EGAN & PELKMANS 
 
both a healthcare and SPS chapter as well as addressing regulatory 
cooperation on medical devices.  
4. TBTs in TTIP: What sectors and why? 
TBTs addressed in TTIP are not confined solely to the TBT chapter; they 
are dealt with in four different contexts:  
i) the TBT chapter as is traditionally the case in most FTAs;  
ii) issues of food safety and animal and plant health (which are 
dealt with separately in a SPS chapter, based on the WTO SPS 
Agreement);  
iii) the sectoral sub-chapters or annexes (as proposed in TTIP on 
chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices, ICT, 
pharmaceuticals, textiles, and automotive);  
iv) a chapter on horizontal regulatory cooperation in TTIP, with a 
view to future questions in a ‘living agreement’, which is a 
continuous process of addressing regulatory barriers to enhance 
cooperation. 
The economic gains from any agreement have received 
significant attention. The headline figures are of annual GDP gains of 
€119 billion for the EU and €95 billion for the US derived from two key 
economic studies on EU/US trade liberalisation commissioned by the 
European Commission.9 The economic study by Francois et al. (2013)10 
for the Commission Impact Assessment of TTIP deals with all these 
segments of TBTs, though measuring the costs of TBTs with some 
degree of reliability is exceedingly difficult. Francois et al. (2013) is 
based on ECORYS estimates of ‘tariff equivalents’ of TBTs, i.e. 
regarding the TBT costs as equivalent to an import tariff. These costs 
(in percent of the invoice price, like a tariff) are no less than 21% (EU 
                                                          
9 See Berden & Francois (2015) for an overview; the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC) conducted a confidential investigation on the potential 
economic effects of providing duty-free treatment for US imports from the EU, 
pursuant to Section 131 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2151) and Section 
2104(b)(2) of the Trade Act of 2002 (19 U.S.C. 3804(b)(2)) which it submitted to 
the USTR in September 2013.  
10 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/ 
tradoc_150737.pdf; see also Pelkmans et al. (2014) for a non-technical 
explanatory study for the INTA Committee on the Francois (or CEPR) report, 
underlying model and alternatives estimates. 
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TBTs for US exports) and 25% (US TBTs for EU exports) on average, 
with peaks for agro-food (respectively, 57% and 73%), and fairly high 
TBTs for automotive (25% and 27%), chemicals (14% and 19%), 
electrical machinery (13% and 15%), other transport equipment (19% 
and 19%) and metals and metal products (12% and 17%). All these TBT 
costs are much higher than transatlantic tariffs. By contrast, Fontagné 
et al. (2013), using a different technique in which the average TBT costs 
for manufacturing are much higher, with costs amounting to 43% (EU 
TBTs) and 32% (US TBTs), suggest that the reports result in robust 
findings on the economic benefits of addressing TBTs.11 
In addition, strictly regulated sectors such as medicines, 
automotive, chemicals and cosmetics do not fall under the TBT chapter. 
In the EU, none of these sectors fall under the New Approach (New 
Legislative Framework), thus voluntary standards are not used for the 
simple reason that regulation is highly specific and intrusive while 
conformity assessment typically relies on pre-market type approval 
and inspections. However, in engineering (including machinery), there 
is a preponderant reliance on the ‘new legislative framework’ that 
allows compliance with European standards to provide a presumption 
of conformity in the European internal market.  
In the US, Congress appears keen to promote third-party 
verification, having mandated or authorised its use in recent legislation 
including the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act, which strengthened 
authority to regulate imported food by recognising accreditation 
bodies to accredit third-party auditors to certify foreign food facilities 
and imports. In some areas, Congress has directed federal agencies to 
develop a third-party programme; in others, regulatory agencies have 
developed programmes under existing statutory authority. In medical 
devices, there is mandatory pre-market notification (unlike in the EU) 
and inspection of facilities, whereas cosmetic products do not require 
preapproval, with some exceptions in terms of colour additives by the 
FDA. Besides these four sectors with specific annexes, there are of 
course other sectors and specific goods that may encounter TBTs when 
trying to access the US or EU market. Thus the TBT chapter attempts to 
organise a framework to address existing TBTs as well as pre-empt new 
ones. TTIP also contains a horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter 
                                                          
11 Berden & Francois (2015) suggest several reasons why Fontagné et al. (2013) 
might show an upward bias. 
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aimed at providing greater regulatory coherence and joint governance 
on issues pertaining to TBTs.12  
The goal is to promote common principles and good regulatory 
practices, providing for mutual exchange of information through notice 
and comment procedures, which can involve stakeholders, and 
discipline both governments to take account of the trade and 
investment effects of future regulations. A Regulatory Cooperation 
Body would be established to identify common priorities, negotiate 
follow-up draft agreements for discussion and adoption in the 
respective EU and US legislative and regulatory processes, and 
implement regulatory provisions of agreement in both goods and 
services.13 
5. Understanding US and EU standards and related 
regulatory regimes  
The US and EU have each developed a set of procedures and policies 
to regulate goods and processes that have resulted in different technical 
standards and conformity assessment procedures that can be viewed 
as potentially significant barriers to trade (Pelkmans, 2015). As long as 
regulation is not linked to standards, the goals are fundamentally 
similar in that standards reflect market needs and are not simply about 
techniques or engineering but about improving the functioning of 
markets (see Box 3.1). However, owing to differences in their origins 
and development, both sides use private standards in their existing 
legislation as a means to demonstrate conformity with mandated laws 
and statutory requirements. In Europe, national governments have 
established close ties with private standards bodies, often providing 
public funding for specified ‘public’ assignments, resulting in a system 
that recognises a singular standards body (per country), which may be 
autonomous under private law, as a private or non-profit, independent 
                                                          
12 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153120.pdf; 
see also Chase & Pelkmans (2015). 
13 Though not the focus of this chapter, there have been widespread efforts at 
regulatory coordination, not just across sectors, such as marine safety 
equipment or consumer products in terms of safety recalls, but also efforts 
between OMB-OIRA and the Secretariat General of the European Commission 
to address methodological issues, i.e. related to good regulatory practice, such 
as impact assessment, stakeholder consultation, etc., in order to improve the 
understanding of each other’s regulatory systems and practices.  
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or public agency regulated by government statutes (Egan, 2005; 
Bremer, 2015).14  
These national standards bodies are then part of a Europe-wide 
network that creates European standards through CEN, CENELEC and 
ETSI. In the US, the government took a more informal approach 
towards collaboration with standards bodies, and the result has been 
multiple standards development organisations (SDOs), creating a 
highly decentralised and fragmented system. Though some 200-plus 
are accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), an 
umbrella organisation that brings together standards bodies, 
conformity assessment bodies, companies and government agencies, 
there are other SDOs, consortia and fora outside of ANSI, which can 
also develop their own standards. Although ANSI is a member of 
ISO/IEC and provides a platform for promulgating standards, there 
are no officially recognised standards bodies. Standards are developed 
primarily in the private sector, predominantly by a handful of 
independent standards bodies that are autonomous and do not receive 
government funding.  
Although ANSI is often viewed as the coordinating umbrella for 
US professional and trade associations engaged in standards-setting, it 
does not develop its own standards. Nor does it determine which 
standards should be developed but performs coordination and 
accreditation among the various bodies. Thus many prominent 
standards are developed by a fairly limited number of independent 
bodies in the US, including ASME (American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), ASTM 
(American Society for Testing and Materials) and IEEE (Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers) – perhaps a dozen or at most two 
dozen in all, which also have a recognised status in many markets in 
the world. In addition, there are many small or highly specialised 
sectoral bodies, sometimes even competing on standards. It is 
estimated that there are 600 standards bodies in the US with more than 
100,000 private standards currently in use (Bremer, 2015: 28). The US 
International Trade Administration (ITA) has defended this system as 
providing “technological innovation”, with proponents arguing that it 
is “open and accessible” (International Trade Administration, 2009: 2). 
                                                          
14 Note that the EU countries with public agencies for standardisation are 
typically former communist countries – the West/North European 
standardisation tradition is strictly private (industry).  
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Both the US and EU use private technical standards in their 
regulations to support government mandates. Both have established 
procedures for the public use of private standardisation: the US policy 
is set out in a statute15 and executive order,16 and the EU’s is outlined 
in an annual programme on European standardisation and delineated 
in a European regulation (No. 1025/2012). What occurs in both the 
European and American contexts is that standards are incorporated 
into regulations by reference, so that ‘law-making’ is not limited to 
public institutions. Incorporation by reference is the practice of 
codifying material published elsewhere by referring to it in the text of 
a regulation (Bremer, 2014). In the US, there is no obligation to have a 
single standard and any standard may be referenced, if the correct 
procedure for incorporation by reference is followed. Although this has 
resulted in more than 360 organisations providing voluntary standards 
for 26 federal agencies, 10 SDOs provide the majority of standards 
incorporated into public law (Bremer, 2015; NIST, 2013). In fact, federal, 
state and local agencies have to justify the development of 
“government unique standards” when a private consensus-based 
standard is available (Mendelson, 2013).17 In terms of the possible 
misapplication of legal standards, in the US, the antitrust agencies act 
as enforcement bodies in ways similar to other business review bodies 
but not as adjudicators of the legality of standards development activity 
itself.18 Thus, even if, as has happened, standard-setting provides 
commercial advantages for participants over competitors, 
congressional limitations and court decisions have prevailed, allowing 
private standards to be incorporated into public law (Sagers, 2004; 
Strauss, 2013).  
In Europe, there is an obligation to eliminate all conflicting 
standards (CEN & CENELEC, 2013). The standards developed by the 
three European standards bodies are valid in all the EEA countries plus 
Turkey and Switzerland, and once adopted, member states must 
                                                          
15 See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), 
Pub. L. No. 104‐113, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 775 (1996)  
16 Office of Management and Budget Executive Office of the President, OMB 
Circular No A- 119. 
17 NIST notes that since the passage of the NCAA Act only 53 government 
unique standards have been proposed with voluntary consensus standards 
providing solutions for government legislative mandates.  
18 HR House Report 108-125, Part 1, 108th Congress, Standards Development 
Organization Advancement Act, 2003. 
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withdraw any existing national standard that overlaps or might 
compete with it. The European Standards Organizations, CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI provide the standards to meet “essential 
requirements” (mainly, the technical expressions of SHEC objectives 
from specific EU directives or regulations) based on a contractual 
agreement with the European Commission through General 
Guidelines for Cooperation that provides specific designation to ESOs 
as monopoly providers. However, the so-called ‘mandates’ or 
‘requests’ of the European Commission to CEN/CENELEC are full of 
obligations about verifying all relevant standards in the world, 
connecting with bodies outside the EU where this would be promising, 
involving non-EU expertise where relevant, etc. Although the 
European standards remain voluntary (unless they are US ‘referred 
standards’, which become compulsory), once ‘harmonised European 
standards’ have been accepted as fulfilling the ‘essential requirements’ 
and published by the European Commission, they give a ‘presumption 
of conformity’ with the relevant essential SHEC requirements, and thus 
free movement inside the single market.  
In fact, free movement is granted to all goods having a CE mark 
– a symbol indicating conformity with EU technical laws – whether 
based on a harmonised standard or not. But the harmonised standard 
greatly facilitates conformity owing to the full access it allows to 28 
countries in the EU single market, which is much appreciated by 
manufacturers. Note that EU member states do not have regulatory 
autonomy in areas where EU regulation has been enacted; again, in the 
US, the states often have regulatory discretion despite federal risk 
regulation, based on referred standards. It should be understood that 
such a European harmonised standard remains voluntary and a 
manufacturer is free to use another standard or present its own 
(innovative) solution to abide with the ‘essential requirements’ 
(basically, SHEC objectives), but in the latter case, the manufacturer has 
to go through third-party certification by a Notified Body (a recognised 
conformity assessment body).  
This is critical in terms of good regulatory practices because what 
matters is that the SHEC objectives (essential requirements) are met 
properly, but the instruments or innovative other solutions of doing so 
are at best secondary, and hence should not be prescribed or restricted 
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unnecessarily.19 The European Commission has set out broad operating 
principles that encompass “transparency, openness, consensus, 
independence of vested interests, and efficiency” through national 
representation. It has pushed the European standards bodies to be as 
inclusive as possible to ensure wide-ranging participation in technical 
committees with multiple stakeholders (in particular, SMEs, consumers 
and labour unions).  
Many US government agencies use technical standards created 
by different American SDOs, and do not give preference to any specific 
standards bodies, in contrast to their European counterparts that 
require the adoption of European or internationally agreed standards. 
Federal law and executive policy have long required agencies to use 
available voluntary consensus standards instead of creating so-called 
‘government unique’ standards solely to serve regulatory purposes. 
Currently, there are over 10,000 citations of standards in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. Over 80% of these references are private sector 
standards and more than 3,900 are government unique standards that 
have been replaced by private-sector standards.20 These standards are 
rarely the result of government mandates, although this may change as 
a result of the changes proposed to the OMB Circular A-119, to allow 
agencies to solicit standards from qualified SDOs. 21 
While the US is deeply committed to private standards 
development, and although private standards outnumber public 
standards, the number incorporated into public law is relatively small. 
However, it was the dissatisfaction with the closed nature of standard-
setting in the 1960s and 1970s that led to the expansion of federal 
consumer and safety protection through the creation of OHSA and 
CPSC, which pushed the private standards development bodies into 
reforms towards a voluntary consensus-based process built on the 
principles of transparency, due process, openness and the promise that 
                                                          
19 This system is based on Reg. 2008/765, Decision 768/2008 and Reg. 
1025/2012 (the latter on European standardisation). See also the ‘Blue book’ 
issued by DG Grow (Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs) of the European Commission. 
20 It should be noted that the government unique standards issue hardly plays 
a role in Europe, except in network industries (which used to be state-owned 
and not subject to competition, e.g. rail or telecoms infrastructure). 
21 According to a former USTR official, who granted the authors an interview. 
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standards would be agreed by consensus.22 These changes allowed the 
federal government to use such voluntary standards in their federal 
regulations. Yet this masks the scope of private standards that are not 
incorporated by reference, and the degree to which statutory 
requirements allow government agencies ranging from transportation, 
energy, consumer protection, federal emergency management and 
homeland security, to participate in private standards development.23  
Europeans have expressed concern when a designated private 
standard subsequently becomes part of US law; European suppliers 
find that few alternative methods or innovative solutions can be used 
or demonstrated to serve equally well the designated public policy 
objectives, unless alternative standards are specified in the regulation. 
Because multiple standards (may) exist, US regulators or federal 
government agencies choose the most suitable existing standard. This 
implies that, for an EU company, this system of ‘incorporation by 
reference’ risks creating many TBTs for EU exporters, the more so as 
few US standards are ISO/IEC standards anyway, and more than one 
referred standard may be encountered at different (US) levels of 
government. There are also concerns that once a standard has been 
incorporated by reference in agency rule-making, these can force the 
private sector to lag behind, as the vast majority of incorporated 
standards were adopted prior to the new rules outlined in the 
NTTAA.24 Recognising that private standards can evolve, and thus that 
referred standards need updating, the US is trying to avoid continual 
notice, rule and comment efforts, by updating standards through 
statutory improvements. Agencies differ in approaches to updating 
standards referenced in their regulations. While OSHA issues de 
minimis violations to manage updated standards by regulated entities, 
the Coast Guard allows “equivalence” for an updated standard, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency updates final rule-making to 
incorporate changes proposed by SDOs (Bremer, 2013).  
                                                          
22 Allied Tube & Conduit Corporation v. Indian Head, Inc., and American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp. 
23 See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA); 
federal agencies participated in 552 SDOs according to NIST’s latest report 
(2013). 
24 Several authors in criticising the incorporation by reference to standards 
indicate that many predate 1996 when the NTTAA was signed. This has been 
difficult to verify.  
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The intersection of public law and private standards has 
generated debates in the US about transparency and copyright issues 
resulting in tension between the public right to access the law and 
private intellectual property rights. The Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHSMA), asserting their copyright 
restrictions, refused to allow access to Congress, which then compelled 
PHSMA by statute to ensure that all its IBR standards were freely 
available online beginning in 2013. They were then revised, due to 
intense lobbying efforts about the revenue implications for SDOs. Due 
to the pressure for transparency, changes in administrative procedures 
have meant that US agencies must ensure the reasonable availability of 
incorporated materials and also summaries of those materials when 
standards are incorporated by reference (Strauss, 2013; Bremer, 2013). 
6. How the US and EU standards systems impact 
trade  
Europe’s standards bodies have worked closely with the international 
standards bodies, the ISO and the IEC, based on the Vienna and 
Dresden Agreements which offer a framework for writing new 
ISO/IEC standards together with European ones, with the same 
(European) experts, in addition to experts from the rest of the world 
(including, often, US experts). Over time, this has gradually cumulated 
in no less than 72% of CENELEC standards being identical to IEC ones, 
and some 31% of CEN standards being identical to ISO ones. As long 
as standards – by definition voluntary – are not linked to regulations, 
European exporters and investors can live with the US landscape in 
which many standards – at least, from the dozen or so leading 
prestigious bodies – are well-known and often have a worldwide 
reputation through use in the marketplace. However, the US rarely 
adopts either fully or partially ISO or IEC standards, which can create 
disadvantages in electronic and electrical goods, including machinery, 
where safety and compatibility issues have been addressed 
internationally for decades.  
However, a longstanding complaint, mainly from US companies 
but nowadays also from the combined EU and US ICT business sector 
(see DigitalEurope & (US) ITI, 2015), is that EU member state 
governments do not (always) recognise global ICT standards in their 
public procurement. Indeed, until changes were introduced to EU 
Regulation 1025/2012, governments were obliged to refer only to 
European standards and – since many global ICT standards are not 
formally ISO/IEC (or European) standards but developed (rapidly) in 
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consortia or special ICT fora – numerous well-accepted ICT standards 
could not be listed in public procurement. Furthermore, because the 
sector is fast-moving, with continual innovation, industry preferred 
using alternative institutional frameworks rather than the designated 
European standards bodies.  
In the US, the argument has traditionally been that as a 
technological leader, its standards were often those used in industrial 
production. However, the result has been that in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), the US government has only referenced a limited 
number of ISO, IEC and ITU standards. Currently, of the 397 total 
international standards, the US references 172 from ISO, 156 from IEC, 
25 combined ISO/IEC, 37 from ITU and seven from other bodies.25 
Some US standards promulgated by well-known US engineering 
societies, such as ASTM (which alone has written some 12,000 
standards!), are de facto world standards, e.g. for aircraft, computers, 
power grids, cars, etc., and, in these cases, multinational businesses 
(including many EU companies) are used to living with two standards.  
Usually, two reasons are given for US reluctance to adopt 
international, i.e. ISO and IEC, standards. The first is that historically, 
the Europeans have had many votes (when voting together) and the US 
has only one single vote, creating a permanent fear of being outvoted, 
especially in the first decades of the ISO. This argument has weakened 
a great deal because ISO/IEC membership is now worldwide and the 
EU cannot dominate such an international organisation.26 In fact, ANSI 
has whether ISO/IEC standardisation is still subject to block voting by 
CEN/CENELEC members and found that it is no longer the case. 
Second, it is asserted that ISO/IEC standards are often too much of a 
compromise, and US bodies feel they ought to deviate for quality 
reasons, or promulgate their own. Much more important, it is also 
difficult and very costly to alter engineering traditions built on familiar 
standards. The issue of adjustment costs and enormous structural 
change in designs, production lines, materials, etc., for literally 
thousands of companies (and not just US multinationals but local ones 
in numerous countries) would seem to be the root of EU/US friction in 
the debate over the use of ‘international standards’. 
                                                          
25 Two under American National Standards Institute, two under European 
Standards, two under International Civil Aviation Organization and one under 
International Maritime Organization. 
26 IEC has 60 members and 23 associate members; ISO has 163 members. 
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The key US standard bodies with an international reputation see 
their standards used by many companies all over the world. For some 
of these bodies, their standards are used in local production or in 
segments of global value chains in more than 100 countries, by 
thousands of multinationals and SMEs. Even in Europe, there are a 
large number of ‘American’ standards in use in markets simply because 
they are of high quality and usually highly specialised, although they 
need not always be related to regulation. In the economics of technical 
standards, this property is called the ‘installed base’, having (a) 
enormous ‘sunk costs’ and (b) formidable ‘switching costs’, that is, 
immense adjustment costs when changing to alternative standards 
(say, IEC/ISO standards).27 It is first of all crucial that this property and 
its economic consequences are spelled out far more clearly in the TBT 
debate in TTIP. Expecting US standards bodies to adjust and radically 
rewrite their (many) standards, if markets have long embraced them, 
will be pointless if there is no sense of whether ISO or IEC standards 
are in fact superior. The degree to which many of these American 
standards are de facto global standards or, alternatively, compete with 
similar IEC/ISO standards is not known or analysed authoritatively. 
To the extent they are truly global, there would be very large 
adjustment costs for (US and other) companies or value-chains when 
switching would become the norm. These are exceptionally difficult 
issues to address. 
It is counterproductive for the TTIP negotiators to keep on 
talking in abstract generalisations about what exactly an ‘international 
standard’ is and is not, without publicly recognising fully the economic 
and market issues underlying the positioning and without seeking a 
constructive long-term way out of this gigantic ‘installed base’ issue. 
Nevertheless, it is and remains true that the very idea of 
standardisation is to do away with multiple specifications, as long as 
this can be justified, because a single high quality technical standard 
will, more often than not, be of formidable long-term economic benefit. 
Following the ‘one standard, one test, valid everywhere’ which was 
advocated by the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) more than 
20 years ago, at long last some longer-term and credible forms of 
accommodation must be found and, if possible, begin to be recognised 
in TTIP regarding TBTs.  
                                                          
27 In the economics of network standards, the examples are typically different, 
say, a rail infrastructure network or high-voltage transmission system, having 
very high sunk costs. The economic idea is the same. 
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Sometimes standards bodies also act as conformity assessors, 
mixing up the two functions and risking conflicts of interest. 
Conformity assessment may present the largest and least understood 
obstacle to trade. The many NTB notifications in the WTO seems to 
suggest it, in spite of the TBT Code Agreement encouraging the 
acceptance of conformity assessment procedures, provided that they 
conform with equivalent technical regulations or standards equivalent 
to their own procedures. However, there are differences between the 
US and the EU with respect to conformity assessment, in particular 
when components or final products have to demonstrate conformance 
with a prescriptive regulation (often based on ‘referred standards’). 
While the EU uses supplier declaration of conformity (SDoC), the 
US is more likely to use third-party testing, inspection and market 
surveillance as a prerequisite for market access, so that mutual 
recognition is difficult given the different forms of conformity 
assessment. Of concern in Europe is that conformity with EU essential 
SHEC requirements are not tested or certified in the US; rather, once a 
standard is referred to (presumably because it serves one or more SHEC 
objectives), it is to be followed and no alternative method or solution is 
accepted (unless already in the regulation). However, accrediting 
certification bodies is challenging, even more so if the agency is a 
foreign body, as agencies cannot perform the same kind of oversight 
that would take place in a domestic context. In the EU, under many 
directives, alternative solutions can be certified by a Notified Body as 
long as the relevant SHEC objectives are served.  
In the US, much of the US risk regulation is in fact managed by 
independent federal regulators such as OSHA (protection of workers 
in the workplace), the Federal Communications Commission (safety 
and health aspects of telecoms equipment, etc.), the Consumer 
Protection Safety Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (many 
aspects including chemicals), the FDA (medicines and medical devices, 
as well as food law), the Federal Aviation Administration (aircraft 
certification), the US Coast Guard (boat and maritime safety), among 
others.28 Many firms in the US are reluctant to use third-party 
inspection. Although inspection might satisfy regulatory requirements 
                                                          
28 The FDA established the AP Program, allowing manufacturers of Class II and 
III (medium- and high-risk) devices to contract with an AP to conduct a third-
party inspection, in lieu of an FDA inspection, using the Quality System 
regulation and other device requirements in the FD&C Act. 
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in multiple jurisdictions, there has been a low rate of participation in 
some areas regulated by the FDA, whereas the FCC has found that 
third-party certification has become the norm.29 
The practical aspects of conformity assessment depend then on 
federal agencies, and the degree to which private accreditation bodies 
can be recognised directly by federal agencies, either through a 
designated domestic programme or by an international organisation, 
such as the IAF (for accreditation of certification bodies) or ILAC (for 
accreditation of laboratories), can determine the degree to which 
conformity assessment creates TBTs. There have been longstanding 
frictions in conformity assessment, with options including mutual 
recognition agreements, unilateral recognition of another country’s 
conformity results, and acceptance of supplier declaration of 
conformity. For the EU, problems with OSHA, due to its policy of 
assigning Nationally Recognised Testing Laboratories (NRTLs) for 
mandatory third-party certification of electrical goods including 
machinery, a stronghold of EU exporters, have generated trade 
frictions.30  
At first, for all practical purposes, UL was the only NRTL and EU 
exporters long felt that UL abused its de facto monopoly by higher 
prices and unjustified complications.31 Nowadays, a dozen NRTLs 
have been recognised, but UL does not accept certification of 
components and parts of other NRTLs (hence, testing is duplicative). 
Moreover, some 30 US states have enacted provisions singling out UL 
as the mandatory conformity assessment body, which strengthens UL’s 
dominant position and creates delays and unjustified rigidity. 
Fortunately, there are reforms emerging in the US with a view to 
improving such conformity rules and practices. While both Circular A-
119 and OSHA’s policy with respect to NRTLs are under review, NIST 
                                                          
29 www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Third-Party-Programs-
Report_Final.pdf, p. 58. Examples of third-party testing FDA inspection for 
medical device production facilities, medical devices, and FCC TBC program. 
30 Note that, in the EU, the regime is ‘light’: conformity assessment is based on 
SDoC (self-declaration), in turn based on a technical file demonstrating 
compliance, which must be shown on request of the authorities.  
31 Explained in detail in Orgalime (2011 and 2012). The latter provides a number 
of details about excessive pricing (compared to other NRTLs, and also due to 
unnecessarily cumbersome procedural requirements). EU stakeholders hold 
that the US Department of Justice should have long ago acted against UL on 
the basis of antitrust law.  
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and OMB are revising their guidelines on conformity assessment 
(Federal Register 19357, 30 March 2012). TTIP is a good opportunity to 
remove these frictions and costly TBTs, especially for the electrical and 
machinery sector.  
Both the US and EU have accredited conformity assessment 
bodies on the basis of ISO standards for laboratory accreditation relying 
on private third-party programmes for conformity assessment (ILAF 
and IAF), which results in recognition of results.32 Moreover, the 1998 
MRA between the US and the EU in six sectors (telecoms equipment, 
EMC, electrical goods, medicines GMP, medical devices and 
recreational crafts33) was expected to focus purely on conformity 
assessment issues, without ever touching on domestic regulation or 
standards at all. The results of this MRA were mixed, if not 
disappointing, but much has been learned from this seemingly modest 
exercise. While MRAs were widely touted in the late 1990s, they merely 
accept certification of designated third-party assessment, and hence are 
much more limited than the TTIP TBT debate. While duplicative testing 
is expected to be done away with, this will not address the underlying 
differences in rules/standards, which are normally the main costs of 
TBTs.  
7. State of play within TTIP negotiations  
While differences in product standards can constitute barriers to trade, 
they also reflect differences in perceptions of health and safety, 
environmental requirements and preferences that have mobilised 
opposition on both sides of the Atlantic, as public opinion and civil 
society have questioned proposals across many sectors and issues.34 
Though the EU has published a proposal on technical barriers to trade 
that it made public in January 2015, the US has been less transparent 
and public in promoting its objectives in the negotiations. The EU 
proposal on technical barriers focuses on addressing the burdens 
                                                          
32 See, e.g. International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation, www.ilac.org/; 
see Pelkmans & Correia de Brito, (2015).  
33 GMP = good manufacturing practices, an OECD standard for factories; EMC 
= electro-magnetic compatibility, preventing interference between different 
pieces of electric/electronic equipment. 
34 As an example of this view, see Chemnitz (2014). The U.S. Chamber initially 
wanted the trade negotiations to focus on tariffs, which in their view would 
realise significant immediate gains.  
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created by divergent technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment.35 The EU proposal would also include the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade in the agreement. In 
addition, the proposed TBT chapter focuses on greater regulatory 
cooperation between both public and private organisations in areas of 
accreditation, standards and conformity assessment, and promotes 
global harmonisation within existing international bodies not defined 
in the text and a single certificate of approval, authorisation or 
acceptance of conformity to foster mutual equivalence. The TBT 
chapter as proposed by EU negotiators is much more ambitious than 
the US template for such FTA-type negotiations, namely, the KORUS.  
The US has stated that its trade priorities are to go beyond the 
existing WTO TBT commitment, increase the transparency and 
openness of the decision-making process regarding European 
standards and technical regulations, ensure that US bodies are 
permitted to test and certify products sold in Europe without the need 
for duplicative conformity assessment, and promote the recognition in 
Europe of internationally accepted standards that are used by US 
exporters and producers. The US also wants to establish an ongoing 
mechanism to discuss TBT concerns. In May 2015, the US tabled a new 
proposal on technical barriers to trade, and both sides have worked on 
an agreement on a ‘consolidated text’ on horizontal regulatory 
cooperation. The EU has pushed for a mechanism to promote strategic 
engagement with each other to prevent future regulatory differences 
that could create barriers to transatlantic trade. This seems to have 
much in common with an EU notification system for national draft laws 
in non-harmonised areas of goods regulation, in which regulations and 
standards are notified, and may be subject to a ‘standstill measure’ if 
the EU wishes to pursue regulatory action.36 The process is aimed at ex-
ante prevention in terms of trade barriers, having achieved significant 
success by covering both public and private sector activities (Correia de 
Brito & Pelkmans, 2012).  
                                                          
35 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153025.pdf. 
36 In fact, it is tougher: any notification automatically leads to a three-month 
standstill, which, by committee decision, can be extended to four (routine), six 
or 12 months (depending on the feared TBTs). All of these merely to iron out 
the problems with the member state in question. If, however, the possible TBT 
is so serious and/or might be imitated by EU countries, the standstill becomes 
18 months for an EU proposal to be made and adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament. 
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The US, by contrast, has focused on “good regulatory practices”, 
which in reality is the promotion of their own notice rule and comment 
procedures that it believes will promote more transparency and reduce 
regulatory divergences if there are opportunities to comment on early 
draft proposals. Though pushing the notion in the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA) for a public comment period has been a 
consistent proposal from the US side, the process provides for public 
feedback after significant inter- and intra-agency reviews of the 
proposed regulation. However, the US also uses negotiated rule-
making under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, where 
interested parties are asked to develop a proposal that the agency can 
then use as a basis for a more widely accepted regulatory proposal, 
although this approach is not often used. The US process requires a 
rule-making record so that if legally challenged there is a record of 
agency deliberations, and hence the US has pushed for a similar means 
to provide more visible public comments on European rule-making 
before it becomes adopted into law. Europeans have pushed for 
transparency in terms of the negotiating texts, having released a 
significant number on various topics, but without the US positions, the 
state of the talks is difficult to assess. 
American trade officials might argue that their attention has been 
on securing the so-called ‘fast track’, i.e. the Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA), intended to send a credible signal that any subsequent trade 
deal will receive a singular vote in Congress without amendments. The 
passage of the H.R. 1295 Trade Preferences Extension Act, in which the 
US Administration fought hard to overcome the strident opposition 
within their own party, will provide significant momentum for trade 
talks, although the US is also pushing forward with negotiations on the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trade in International Services 
Agreement (TISA), the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), and 
the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), all in addition to TTIP. As 
a result, the US focus on concluding TPP has meant that the past six 
months of transatlantic negotiations have focused on technical issues, 
in terms of regulatory cooperation across specific sectors, leaving some 
of the more controversial issues off the table (Inside U.S. Trade, 30 
January 2015 – www.insidetrade.com).  
Given the paucity of official documents on US proposals, an 
evaluation of current suggestions from different interest groups may 
provide some insights into the efforts of addressing TBTs. The Business 
Coalition for Transatlantic Trade is focusing on regulatory cooperation 
aimed at providing input on TBTs and developing new regulatory 
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coherence and coherence efforts. This business group also supports the 
adoption of specific sectoral annexes in any agreement. Equally 
important, it has emphasised the importance of a common definition of 
‘international standards’ by referencing WTO TBT Committee 
decisions, as well as referencing equivalence standards that could be 
applied within the EU ‘new approach’ directives. It has also requested 
more open and direct participation in standard-setting – all goals that 
reflect US trade objectives.37  
Yet in other sectors, there is the emergence of transatlantic 
alliances between industry associations that have voiced common 
positions in addressing trade barriers. In the case of the automobile, 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, trade associations submitted joint 
proposals to address regulatory barriers to trade.38 Part of this is due to 
integrated supply chains, intra-firm investment and trade patterns that 
push these associations to seek to reduce trade barriers.39 While these 
associations have focused on addressing barriers to trade, they have 
eschewed harmonisation by pushing for the promotion of mutual 
equivalence in terms of inspections and the exchange of information for 
regulatory approvals to avoid making costly adjustments and choosing 
one standard over another (Egan & Nicola, 2015). There are some 
associations that have pushed for transatlantic harmonisation, with the 
pesticides associations wanting agreement on the US standard, and the 
automotive partners also wanting harmonisation through the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe Working Group on Global Technical 
Regulations (GTRs).40  
                                                          
37 http://www.transatlantictrade.org/issues/regulatory-cooperation/. 
38 Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Committee (APIC) / European Fine 
Chemicals Group (EFCG) / Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates 
(SOCMA); European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), the 
American Automotive Policy Council (AAPC) and the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers (Auto Alliance); European Chemicals Industry Council (CEFIC) 
/ American Chemistry Council (ACC) and Motor and Equipment 
Manufacturers Association/ European Association of Automotive Suppliers 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (Pharma) / European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA). See Young 
(2015). 
39 Young (2015). 
40 European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), the American 
Automotive Policy Council (AAPC) and the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers (Auto Alliance). 
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However, the opposition to the agreement on both sides has 
come from different civil society groups, focusing on agriculture and 
investor disputer settlement, rather than domestic oriented firms, and 
labour groups such as the AFL-CIO and ETUC (European Trade 
Unions Confederation). The latter have also coordinated their views in 
stakeholder meetings in which they have indicated that trade 
agreement could be beneficial, provided that it maintains high levels of 
worker protection that are not constituted as barriers to trade.41  
The USTR continues to solicit feedback, drawing on expertise in 
industry and trade associations, standards bodies, professional and 
academic communities. Some of the debates are not new, as the US 
pushes its view that transparency does not require a flat obligation to 
use international standards. The TBT Code provides for notification if 
international standards are not used. For American trade negotiators, 
the issue is one of access to European standard-setting. Regional 
standards are neither international standards nor ‘open to all’ 
participants. As such, standard-setting in Europe does not (have to) 
follow trade principles of non-discrimination and national treatment. 
The goal is to ensure that there is no preferential treatment given to 
European standards bodies but fair and equal treatment to American 
standards bodies, with the option of being recognised in some way. 
For Americans, any entity can be recognised as providing 
standards, whether it is a trade association, consortium, industry-based 
or local government, and they want to apply the same principle to 
European standardisation. They view European standards as a tool of 
industry policy, and want more flexibility, noting that consortia in the 
ICT sector have evolved and reformed to increase flexibility, which is 
something that the Europeans have had to belatedly recognise, given 
their competitive disadvantage in the ICT sector. For Americans, 
competition within established bodies might create innovation. While 
recognising that the initial idea of European standardisation has been 
beneficial in addressing internal barriers to trade, the goal of a unified 
transatlantic market cannot emerge if the relationship between 
European standards and New Approach Directives remains exclusive. 
However, there is no such thing as a TTIP goal of a ‘unified transatlantic 
market’ in any of the TTIP official documents.  
In terms of concrete efforts, the European standards bodies 
(SDOs) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) have 
                                                          
41 www.aflcio.org/content/download/132421/3553131/AFL-CIO+TTIP+ 
Report_6+%282%29.pdf. 
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indicated that they plan on building upon their informal contacts to 
generate a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which is not widely 
supported by other trade associations and standards bodies in the US 
that do not want codification of existing practices. However, making 
progress toward bridging the differences between the US and Europe 
on what constitutes an international standard based on a set of rules 
approved in the WTO by the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
will be challenging. The US has repeatedly indicated that the global 
relevance of the standard is not which organisation developed the 
standard, or where it was developed, but its usage in the global 
marketplace (Froman, 2013). The number of ‘international standards’ 
in the formal sense incorporated by reference in the US is 397, primarily 
from the ISO, IEC and ITU.42 The US believes that international 
standards can be developed by any SDO that adheres to WTO TBT 
principles. For the US, this multiple path approach means that 
standards can be agreed upon by international organisations such as 
the ISO and IEC or through direct participation in SDOs such as the IEE 
and ASTM or through consortia such as the IGRS. This difference in 
what constitutes an international standard is nothing new according to 
US participants but does constitute a lingering difficulty in promoting 
a memorandum of understanding or intent between the two sides that 
have been in discussions since 2013.  
Although increasing cooperation on standards-setting and 
international accreditation arrangements is the overall goal, the issue is 
not specific to the transatlantic relationship, as similar discussions have 
emerged in recently approved negotiations for a non-binding 
memorandum of intent concerning standards and conformity 
assessment between the US and Brazil on this same issue, in which 
Brazil is much closer to the EU position on international standards and 
also relies on government agencies to conduct conformity assessment. 
European standards bodies have come under criticism as US officials 
have argued that the EU promotes its standards as part of trade 
agreements, aggressively pushing its ‘market power’, so that its 
standards are frequently adopted in other markets. 
The US has consistently stated in trade talks that there should be 
openness and transparency in terms of standard-setting. This is an 
implicit criticism of the structure of European standard-setting in 
which European SDOs receive formal ‘mandates’ to adopt European 
                                                          
42 Data from Regulatory Standards Incorporated by Reference (R-SIBR) 
Database. 
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wide standards in turn strengthened by a framework for regulatory 
cooperation with the ISO and IEC that often leads to the uploading or 
acceptance of European standards at the international level. With more 
than 65% of US exports subject to one or more New Approach 
Directives, US companies are anxious to address the inconsistencies in 
regulatory approval. The annual trade barrier report noted, “U.S. 
persons are not able to participate directly and effectively in the 
development of regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures in the EU. In particular, some institutional arrangements in 
the EU appear to either accord exclusive rights to, or effectively favour, 
EU entities in the development and implementation of such measures. 
Further, there appears to be no effective mechanisms to ensure 
accountability to non-EU interests in the adoption and implementation 
of measures” (USTR, 2014). It is useful to put such remarks in 
perspective: many experts from US companies do in fact participate in 
writing European standards at the national level in the EU as well as 
with the ISO and IEC (sometimes with a US expert even serving as 
chair!).  
Despite a surge in US SME exports to the EU from $67 billion in 
2010 to $76 billion in 2011, the US International Trade Commission was 
asked to survey SMEs across the US as part of its evaluation of the TTIP 
negotiations.43 It found significant problems in relation to standards, 
regulations and conformity assessment, and expressed concern that the 
lack of national treatment of certification bodies, costly compliance 
with European standards, and regulatory differences between the US 
and EU made it disproportionately difficult for SMEs to access the 
European market.44 Most of the suggestions focused on harmonisation 
or mutual recognition, arguing that in a range of sectors from 
automotive to toy safety, the standards are functionally equivalent, 
with the same regulatory objectives but different methods to achieve 
them, e.g. vehicle emissions EPA certification and Euro VI vehicle 
certification. Many trade associations suggested that the mutual 
equivalence of conformity assessment to allow domestic testing in the 
US be accepted in Europe.  
This preference begs the question why MRAs in various sectors 
are not pursued by the US or, alternatively, why the 1998 MRA is not 
modernised via today’s global accreditation quality networks. Some 
                                                          
43 www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4455.pdf. 
44 Ibid. 
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SMEs even suggested that firms should incorporate components that 
already have the CE symbol to ease compliance problems, or seek 
government support or financial assistance from public certification or 
testing facilities.45 In the TTIP negotiation, a recurrent critique put 
forward by the US administration is that while European SDOs are 
centralised, the procedural requirements concerning certification are 
highly decentralised, with substantial variation in consistency between 
and little control over the quality of the accreditation bodies in EU 
member states, which makes US approval difficult. However, one 
should distinguish the EU situation after 2008: Reg. 765/2008 and its 
follow-up, with the new European system of accreditation, much 
improved the level and consistency of accreditation and the quality of 
conformity assessment bodies.  
A similar study by DG Trade on the impact of TTIP on SMEs 
found that 28% of the exports to the US were from SMEs, totalling €77 
billion.46 The study found that compliance with food and safety 
regulations and technical regulations for goods acted as barriers to 
market access and exports, making TBT and SPS issues the most cited 
factor in terms of trade barriers.47 Across sectors, SMEs cited barriers to 
pharmaceuticals, chemical, and plastic and rubber products, and firms 
in both the pharmaceutical and medical devices sectors advocated for 
good manufacturing practice so that they could reduce conformity 
assessment costs. Their concerns may be warranted regarding 
pharmaceuticals, as companies are concerned that the FDA review 
process is almost twice as long as that of its European counterpart, the 
European Medicines Agency (Holtzman, 2012).48 For chemical firms, 
conformity assessment along with the labelling requirements that do 
not follow UN standards impose higher costs on European exporters.  
8. Conclusion  
On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a widespread recognition that 
TBTs arising from different standards, testing and conformity 
assessment practices can impede trade and raise market entry barriers. 
                                                          
45 www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4455.pdf.  
46 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153348.pdf. 
47 Ibid., p. 15. 
48 Starting in 2014, with the passing of the Affordable Care Act, a 2.3% medical 
excise tax was imposed on all sales of devices, regardless of country of origin, 
which may shift medical device manufacturers to new markets.  
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Though technical standards are developed by private SDOs through a 
voluntary consensus process, once they become part of statutory 
requirements, the result can create trade impediments, as the public 
law obligations differ. The different procedural requirements have 
created difficulties in negotiating regulatory cooperation, as ‘reference 
to standards’ and ‘incorporation by reference’ have different market 
and regulatory effects. In the past, governments on both sides have 
chosen a variety of tools to reduce or eliminate TBTs, with varying 
success. The goal is to ensure that standards-setting processes are 
transparent and inclusive, and that the resulting standards do not have 
anti-competitive effects that impede the prospect of alternative means 
to meet regulatory requirements for market access. 
 Conformity assessment (whether in-house labs or third-party 
testing) must demonstrate its competence to meet specific legal and 
standards-based requirements. But this will require accreditation of 
conformity assessment bodies so that their mutual acceptance (or 
national treatment and non-discrimination) will avoid duplicative 
testing, certification and other measures. After the long and complex 
process of a trade negotiation, most governments realise that the task is 
not complete when a trade agreement has been signed and ratified.  
Rather, new challenges must be addressed in order to 
successfully implement an FTA, which has led to greater emphasis on 
the institutional framework to address perceived problems as well as 
future issues in a so-called ‘living agreement’. There are previous FTA 
examples with provisions for regulatory cooperation, technical 
committees and regulatory councils. However, the according of 
national treatment to conformity assessment bodies, based on modern 
global accreditation principles and networks,49 would build on the 
strong example set out in the CETA agreement. The TBT Agreement 
indicates that conformity assessment procedures should not be more 
trade restrictive than necessary, and should determine merely whether 
regulatory objectives are similar. It follows that the relevant products 
should not be subject to additional product approval – this principle 
should be central to the TTIP, as they often only differ in their origin. 
In the case of standards, the mandatory versus voluntary status in 
public law when incorporated into legislation is difficult to change. 
However, greater transparency, access and non-discrimination in 
                                                          
49 In chapter 27 of the CETA Agreement, an MRA Protocol is elaborated in 
many sectors, based on accreditation. 
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standards (or mutual recognition based on specified SHEC objectives) 
would facilitate market access.  
Finally, TTIP negotiators have to transcend the pointless stand-
off over the definition of an ‘international standard’; explain in market 
and economic terms the underlying issues (e.g. widespread use of US 
standards in numerous markets around the world and in global value 
chains)); stimulate exploration of the extent of this market-driven 
‘installed base’ problem for thousands of firms all over the world (and 
not only for the relevant dozen of leading US SDOs); and constructively 
seek longer-term answers in a ‘living agreement’.  
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4. QUANTIFYING NON-TARIFF 
MEASURES FOR TTIP 
KOEN BERDEN AND JOSEPH FRANCOIS 
1. Introduction 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is not like 
any other free trade agreement negotiated or signed into existence 
(Fontagné et al., 2013; Berden et al., 2009). The communicated objectives 
of TTIP make it clear that its goals include but go beyond traditional 
market-access elements such as goods and services trade and customs 
duties, and rules. It is envisaged that TTIP will concentrate in particular 
on the areas of ‘regulatory cooperation’ and ‘rules’.  
Traditional economic (ex-ante) impact analyses used to focus on 
tariffs, quotas and subsidies (and increasingly also on barriers to 
services trade) as the main trade policy instruments. With an enlarged 
scope of trade agreements, like TTIP, which include regulatory 
cooperation, these analyses were no longer sufficient to estimate the 
potential impact of TTIP – or any TTIP-like agreement. The main 
challenge that needed to be addressed in order to be able to quantify 
the potential economic effects was how to quantify economically the area 
of regulatory differences – in this case between the European Union and 
the United States.1 
Several studies have looked at the potential economic effects of 
TTIP, ranging from Berden et al. (2009) to Fontagné et al. (2013), 
Francois et al. (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2013). These studies have 
been compared by Pelkmans et al. (2014) in their comparative work for 
the European Parliament. All of these studies focus on the likely 
macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of TTIP. For that they take as 
                                                          
1 The comprehensive approach to include regulatory cooperation and rules in 
trade agreements has first been used in the EU-Canada CETA negotiations and 
is currently also used by the EU – in parallel with the TTIP negotiations – in the 
EU-Japan FTA negotiations and the negotiations over the renewal of the EU-
Mexico FTA. 
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input for their methodological approaches different ways to quantify 
economically regulatory differences, or non-tariff measures (NTMs) as 
they are also called. NTMs – as opposed to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) – 
are compatible with the WTO charter. The term NTM is therefore often 
used as the collective name for regulatory differences or barriers that 
include technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS) measures. 
In this chapter, we will first identify the methods that have been 
employed to quantify NTMs (section 2). We then compare some of the 
most important methods and analyse their differences and look at what 
they mean for the TTIP negotiations (section 3). We start with a short 
literature review of past approaches to measuring the costs of non-tariff 
measures (NTMs). We then look in more detail at four seminal studies 
to quantify NTMs over the past several years: Dean et al. (2009), Berden 
et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013) and Egger et al. (2015). These four 
studies contain cornerstone elements on how to approach NTMs – and 
these studies thus serve as the basis for most of the quantitative 
research into the realm of ‘regulatory cooperation’. 
We find several similarities in the approaches taken. For 
example, all studies find that trade costs caused by NTMs matter 
significantly and significantly more than remaining tariff barriers. Also 
the studies find significant variation of NTMs across sectors and a few 
sectors where NTMs are particularly high (e.g. processed foods). 
Differences between the approaches (and thus in results) come from a 
difference in basic approach (i.e. price- or quantity-based), differences 
in the data sources used for NTMs (e.g. business survey, UNCTAD 
TRAINS, past FTA data), econometric specifications (e.g. general 
equilibrium versus partial equilibrium), and levels of country and 
sector disaggregation and coverage.  
Because all studies conclude that NTMs matter, policy-makers 
are right to focus on ‘regulatory cooperation’ in TTIP. Given the 
significant differences in NTMs across sectors, policy-makers should 
dive deep into sector-specific elements of NTMs and focus on those 
sectors where the largest potential gains can be made (i.e. where NTMs 
are highest, such as in agriculture, automobiles, steel, textiles and 
insurance services).  
An area identified for further research is the fact that unlike trade 
taxes (i.e. tariffs), regulatory barriers to trade are not generally targeted 
at trade as the primary policy objective, but rather stem from other 
strategic policy concerns like consumer safety and/or social and 
environmental protection. This element should be further investigated. 
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2. Review of NTM quantification methods 
In the past 20 years, we have witnessed two important trends regarding 
both multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. The first is a relative 
shift in focus of trade negotiations from tariff reductions to the removal 
of NTMs. For surveys of earlier work, see Deardorff & Stern (1998) and 
Ferrantino (2006). The second is an increase in the depth of trade 
agreements being negotiated (see for example Dür et al., 2014, and 
Egger et al., 2015). Because of these shifts, the importance of quantifying 
the impact of NTMs has increased significantly over the past 10 years, 
and more research into this specific field has been carried out.  
There are two basic avenues one can follow in order to estimate 
in a systematic way the economic and trade effects of NTMs: quantity- 
and price-based approaches. Quantity-based approaches (or actually 
value-based approaches as indicated by Ferrantino, 2009) use gravity 
equations to estimate by how much the presence of an NTM reduces 
trade flows compared to potential trade. This allows for the estimation 
of an ad valorem equivalent (AVE) or trade cost equivalent (TCE), 
essentially a ‘fictitious’ import tariff, that – if real – would reduce 
imports by exactly the height of the NTM. Earlier work was done by 
Baldwin (1975), and Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1975), but also others have 
since looked at this: Leamer (1988), Trefler (1993), Kee et al. (2008, 2009), 
Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013), Francois et al. (2013) and 
Egger et al. (2015). The approaches based on price compare the prices 
in the importing country with prices of comparable products in free 
markets, i.e. without distortions. Using detailed price data, a distinction 
can be made between the impact of NTMs and the impact of local 
distribution costs in raising the price. Through an instrumental 
variables approach to incorporate the endogeneity of NTMs, the height 
of NTMs can be estimated. The ‘price gap’ or tariff equivalent is then 
the difference between the price of imports (higher because of the 
NTM) and the lower world price (in the absence of the NTM). Among 
those using a price-based approach are Bradford (2003, 2005), 
Ferrantino (2006), and Dean et al. (2009).  
The debate between those proposing price-based approaches 
(Ferrantino, 2006; Dean et al., 2009) and those favouring quantity-based 
approaches (Fontagné et al., 2013) is ongoing. According to Ferrantino 
(2006, p. 20 and Annex 2): “There are several reasons for preferring 
price gaps to quantity gaps in most cases. First, price gaps measure the 
difference between two observed values, a distorted (NTM-ridden) 
price and a non-distorted price. Quantity or value gaps measure the 
difference between an observed (distorted) value and an estimated 
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(‘normal’) value of trade, and are thus influenced by the quality of the 
estimated value, which is subject to the various uncertainties 
surrounding econometric specifications.” Fontagné et al. (2013), on the 
other hand, argue that although price-based approaches allow for a 
direct estimation of NTMs – in contrast to the more indirect quantity-
based approaches – “largely due to data issues, quantity-based 
approaches prove more convenient for large-scale analyses such as the 
one [eds: economic impact assessment of TTIP] conducted here” 
(Fontagné et al., 2013, p. 8). 
Apart from a methodological discussion between price- and 
quantity-based approaches, we need to be careful here for another 
reason: unlike trade taxes, regulatory barriers to trade are not generally 
targeted at trade as the primary policy objective. Rather, we are talking 
about regulatory approaches to issues such as consumer safety, the 
stability of financial markets, and environmental protection from – for 
example – dangerous chemicals. In this case, higher costs (identified by 
regressions, for example) most certainly reflect the balance between 
costs of regulation (including trade costs) and benefits linked to the 
primary policy objective. This point, while acknowledged in passing, is 
not given full due in quantitative analyses of NTM reductions. Where 
consumers (aka voters) in the US and EU place different values on such 
objectives, we need to be careful not to assume that identified barriers 
are not offset by benefits. 
Tariff equivalents/Trade cost equivalents (TCEs) 
Despite the methodological debate on the differences between price- 
and quantity-based approaches, authors from either strand agree that 
the ultimate goal of the quantification exercise is to yield tariff 
equivalents (or synonymously, ad valorem equivalents or trade cost 
equivalents). A TCE is in essence the aggregate height of the differences 
in regulatory systems expressed in one number: a ‘tariff equivalent’. 
Expressing the total of differences in regulatory systems (estimated 
through either price- or quantity-based approaches) as one number has 
several major advantages. First of all, a tariff equivalent makes it 
conceptually much easier for readers to get a ballpark idea of the degree 
of regulatory divergence between the EU and US in a specific sector, 
i.e. for US exports to the EU, the difference in regulations adds up to a 
26% TCE in the automotive industry. Second, tariff equivalents make it 
easy to compare tariff rates and regulatory differences (expressed in 
tariff equivalents). Third, a tariff equivalent can be compared across 
sectors, as the measuring unit is the same, i.e. for EU exports to the US, 
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a 73% difference in the food sector is much higher than a 21% difference 
in the chemicals sector. Fourth, the removal of regulatory differences, 
i.e. liberalisation scenarios that are used to estimate the consequence of 
TTIP through regulatory cooperation, can be modelled by lowering 
tariff equivalents in a sector (or multiple sectors) in a partial or general 
equilibrium setting. This ‘lowering of TCEs’ represents any form of 
regulatory cooperation to address regulatory differences.2 Please note 
that this implies that a lowering of a TCE implies a lowering of NTMs, 
which is lowering of the differences between regulatory systems, not 
lowering the levels of protection or lowering of standards (which goes 
back to our earlier point on consumer and environmental protection). 
Fifth, a TCE – being a numerical value – can be inserted into an 
international trade or macro-economic model to look at the effects of 
regulatory cooperation on GDP, firm production, consumer prices, 
wages, jobs, etc., as has been done by Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et 
al. (2013), Francois et al. (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2013). 
In order to do justice to both strands of work to quantify NTMs 
in the remainder of this section, we will cover four different studies: the 
price-based NTM estimation work of Dean et al. (2009) and the 
quantity-based NTM estimation work of Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné 
et al. (2013) and Egger et al. (2014). It needs to be noted that Dean et al. 
(2009) do not focus on measuring the potential economic impact of TTIP 
in particular, while the other three studies aim to do that – and as such 
some model specifications are different (e.g. sector selection). 
While we have stressed regulatory cooperation and reduction of 
differences in the discussion so far, it is not so clear that empirical 
evidence to date actually reflects this. In particular, trade costs may 
follow from differences in approach to the same objective, or from 
differences in the objectives themselves. We discuss this point further 
when we turn to the concept of actionability. At this point, however, 
we wish to stress the risk that we, as economists, may focus too much 
here on cost and not enough on the benefit side of regulations that 
happen to have trade and investment effects. 
                                                          
2 In this chapter we look at the econometric techniques of quantifying the 
economic costs and benefits of NTMs, not at the different ways in which 
regulatory alignment can be achieved. Whether it is better to aim for 
harmonisation of standards, harmonisation of regulations, mutual recognition 
of standards, mutual recognition of regulations or mutual equivalence is 
outside the scope of this chapter, and is covered in chapter 3 of this book.  
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2.1 The Dean et al. (2009) NTM quantification 
methodology (price-based) 
Dean et al. (2009) employ a price-based approach. This means they use 
city-level retail price data to estimate the impact of core NTMs on prices 
and assess their significance. In doing so they base themselves on 
Bradford (2003, 2005) for price data for many products in many 
countries, and on Kee et al. (2008, 2009) for NTM incidence data. They 
go through four distinct steps in their price-based approach. 
The four-step approach: 
I. NTM incidence and retail price data 
II. Price gap 
III. Variable coefficients 
IV. From variable coefficients to sector-specific TCEs 
I. NTM incidence and retail price data 
Dean et al. (2009) needed to collect two types of data for their analysis. 
First, in order to get a better understanding of the extent and types of 
NTMs across countries and products, they draw upon two 
complementary datasets: the UNCTAD TRAINS database and the 
USITC database (Donelly & Manifold, 2005). These data bases 
document EU (from the EU Market Access Database) and US (USTR 
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers – which 
includes information from the WTO Trade Policy Reviews) private-
sector complaints about NTMs. The UNCTAD TRAINS database 
(including WITS) collects data from publicly available sources and 
reports in detail at the tariff line level. The authors used the potentially 
complementary information from the two databases, while at the same 
time there was overlap in the reported NTMs.  This is why Dean et al. 
compare the two datasets and conclude that NTMs appear to be 
widespread, and the two databases partially overlap but also provide 
specific independent information. This is why they used the two 
databases combined. 
In addition to the NTM incidence, Dean et al. (2009) required 
extensive amounts of price data in order to carry out a ‘price gap’ 
analysis. They used city-level retail price data for 47 products from 
around 115 cities from the EIU CityData for 2001. This allowed the 
authors to examine inter- and intra-country price differences, some of 
which can be attributed to NTMs. They found that price differences are 
QUANTIFYING NON-TARIFF MEASURES FOR TTIP  103 
 
both product- and country-specific – again an indication for the 
widespread nature of NTMs. 
II. Price gap 
Dean et al. (2009) also employed the data from Step I in a differentiated 
product model. This model takes into account different varieties, in 
particular a distinction between imported and domestic varieties. This 
approach matters because a big challenge for the price-based approach 
is product differentiation: “The model captures the fact that the retail 
price in a particular location will likely be an average of the retail prices 
of all the imported and domestic varieties sold locally, and that these 
products are likely to be differentiated by source” (Dean et al., 2009, p. 
4).  
Then, using the EIU CityData for 2001, they observe price 
differences – in deviation from purchasing power parity (PPP). This 
they define as the Price Gap or ‘PG’ – the dependent variable. 
III. Variable coefficients 
In order to capture the NTM effect (NTM rent of country i, Qi), the retail 
price gap between the home country and foreign country (𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑖∗) is 
regressed on local distribution margins (μ), transport costs (D), and 
specific tariffs (T). The authors also correct for endogeneity of NTMs by 
adding two interaction terms – one with country income and one with 
tariffs. This is depicted in equation (1) as: 
𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽(𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖∗) − 𝛾(𝐷𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖∗) − 𝛿(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖∗) + 𝜎0(𝑄𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖∗) +
𝜎1(𝑄𝑖?̃?𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖∗?̃?𝑖∗) + 𝜎2(𝑄𝑖?̃?𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖∗?̃?𝑖∗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑖∗ (1) 
where 𝜎0 is the average price premium due to NTMs. This is the 
coefficient that is the core of the chapter: a regression analysis 
coefficient to single out the additional price effect of NTMs by country 
and sector. If this coefficient is statistically significant and positive, we 
can conclude that the NTM effect is one that increases the price gap. 
The coefficient information is presented in column (A) of Table 4.1 
below. Dean et al. (2009) do this for 65 countries. In Table 4.1, we only 
report findings for the EU and US – as this chapter focuses on the 
quantification of NTMs in the area of TTIP, hence on the EU and US. 
 
  
104  BERDEN & FRANCOIS 
 
IV. From variable coefficients to country-specific, sector-specific TCEs 
Step III above (Variable Coefficients) yields country-specific, sector-
specific regression coefficients for the NTM effect. The variable 
coefficient of the NTM effect can be changed into trade cost estimates 
(tariff equivalents) as follows: 
 TCE = 100 𝑥 (𝑒𝜀 − 1) (2) 
where ε is the NTM effect regression coefficient. The TCE (in 
percent) is the estimated increase in prices in a country, per sector, as a 
consequence of NTMs. This information is presented in column (B) of 
Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 Country estimates NTM coefficients and NTM TCEs  
Country and Sector NTM effect 
regression coefficients 
(A) 
NTM TCEs (%) 
(B) 
EU (average 18 EU 
member states) 
  
- Fruits/vegetables   48.2 
- Bovine meat  68.2 
- Processed food  35.6 
- Apparel  46.3 
United States   
- Fruits/vegetables  0.47 60.6 
- Bovine meat 0.59 80.0 
- Processed food 0.30 34.6 
- Apparel 0.20 22.6 
Data source: Dean et al. (2009). 
Final results 
The Dean et al. (2009) study leads to some interesting findings. First, 
they find for 65 countries and four sectors TCEs through direct NTM 
price-based estimation (above we report only for the EU and US 
because these NTMs are relevant for the TTIP negotiations). Second, 
they find that NTMs complement tariffs – in some sectors the presence 
of a tariff reduces the price effect of the NTM. Third, in some sectors 
there is a correlation between the restrictiveness of NTMs with country 
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income (some positive, some negative).3 Fourth, the level of NTMs 
displays some significant sector- and country-variation. Finally, they 
find that NTMs matter significantly in explaining trade restrictiveness 
in the sectors examined. 
2.2 The Berden et al. (2009) NTM quantification 
methodology (quantity-based) 
In order to quantify NTMs, the Berden et al. (2009) study develops five 
distinct steps in line with the quantity-based approaches to quantifying 
NTMs. This basic quantification work has been used to quantify the 
potential effects of TTIP (combined with CGE analysis) by Berden et al. 
(2009), Francois et al. (2013), and Capaldo (2014). The five steps take the 
reader from grass-roots views on regulatory divergences by firms that 
do business across the Atlantic to an estimate of trade cost equivalents 
(TCE) involved for EU-US and US-EU trade at sectoral level.  
The five-step approach 
The five steps to go from survey results on transatlantic regulatory 
barriers to TCE are the following: 
I. Business survey to get bilateral NTM survey numbers 
II. From NTM survey numbers to NTM index 
III. From NTM index to gravity regression variable coefficient 
IV. From variable coefficient to transatlantic, EU and NAFTA4 
TCEs 
V. From transatlantic, EU and NAFTA TCEs to sector specific 
TCEs 
I. Business survey to get bilateral NTM survey numbers 
Is it more difficult to trade between France and the US for a French 
exporter than to trade between France and Spain? Or between Poland 
and Italy, Poland and India and Poland and the US? Or for a US 
exporter to export to Mexico or to Germany? In light of the definition 
of an NTM, the costs for a French producer to produce and sell inside 
                                                          
3 It seems logical to us that, where regulatory barriers reflect income sensitive 
demand for higher consumer protection (as in food products and consumer 
goods), we would see such a positive correlation. 
4 NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement. 
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France are not zero, because regulatory differences, e.g. to protect food 
safety or the safety of a car we drive in, lead to various costs.  
The business survey then collected two types of data. First, firms 
were asked to indicate on a scale from 0 to 100 how restrictive each of 
their export markets was (compared to their home market as a 
benchmark).5 The 5,500 data points from both large firms and SMEs 
that were the result of this survey allowed Berden et al. to generate 
exporter-importer specific survey numbers of NTMs with a country-
pair specific NTM variable between 0 and 100. These survey numbers 
were – for statistical reasons – then aggregated into specific exporter 
destination NTM values, averaging the indicated NTM for each 
country. This information is presented in column (A) of Table 4.2. 
Second, firms were asked to list the main (sector-specific) barriers that 
they ran into when exporting. The lists of barriers were prioritised 
based on the firm survey responses, discussions with (sector) experts 
and literature information. The lists of barriers were also used to look 
at whether barriers involved economic rents and/or costs and the 
degree to which each of the barriers would be ‘actionable’ or not. The 
concept of actionability contains the sub-concepts of ‘technical 
actionability’ and ‘political actionability’. For example, the electricity 
systems in the EU and US differ (220 volts a.c. vs. 110 volts) – which 
would require such an investment that this difference is deemed 
‘technically non-actionable’. In some sectors, e.g. aerospace, national 
security concerns imply that some regulatory differences are ‘politically 
non-actionable’.  
The additional survey information on costs-rents and on 
actionability are significant, because this information allows us to be 
more accurate in our estimations: they reduce the scope for TTIP impact 
to only those regulatory differences that can logically be addressed, i.e. 
are ‘actionable’. And they give a better insight into the redistribution 
effects of TTIP from producers to consumers or vice versa 
(redistribution of economic rents) and the cost effects of TTIP (costs). 
Both the degrees of actionability and costs-rents differ per sector and 
for EU exports to the US and US exports to the EU (bi-directional). 
 
 
                                                          
5 Whereby a value of ‘0’ presents a completely open and ‘free trade’ 
environment and a value of ‘100’ a completely closed environment. A scale 
from 0 to 100 was chosen to allow for enough variation in the survey responses.   
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II. From NTM survey numbers to NTM index 
The NTM survey numbers (Step I) are transformed into an NTM index 
in log scale conforming to OECD best practice:  
 Trade/investment level of restrictiveness = 
 ln (1 + 0.01 * NTM survey value) (3) 
This is done so that the coefficients on the index can be 
interpreted as elasticities with respect to changes in the level of 
restriction across the index. Shifting the origin is done to handle zero 
values in the original data. This information is presented in column (B) 
of Table 4.2. 
III. From NTM index to gravity regression dummy-variable 
coefficients 
The way to measure the impact of trade agreements, in this case TTIP, 
on trade and investment is through employing the gravity equation 
(Tinbergen, 1962; Linneman, 1966; Aitken, 1973). The gravity equation 
derives its name from Newton’s law of gravitation. In international 
trade this has come to mean that the trade flow of goods (services) from 
one country to the other is related to the economic sizes of the two 
countries and the physical distance between them. In addition various 
control variables are added, e.g. dummies for sharing a common border 
or speaking a common language, as are policy-based trade costs, e.g. 
tariffs, or NTMs.  
The gravity equation has a remarkable explanatory power and 
as such has become the work horse in looking at the impact of trade 
agreements (Sapir, 1981; Bergstrand & Egger, 2007; Berden et al., 2009). 
In Berden et al., three different dummies have been defined to capture 
the potential effect of the TTIP agreement. These three dummies – when 
interacted with the NTM index constructed in Step II – capture effects 
that, when added up, yield the total effect of NTM reductions because 
of TTIP. First an EU dummy is defined that has a value ‘1’ if both 
countries in the bilateral trade pair are members of the EU and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. This dummy captures the intra-EU preferential treatment 
given to other EU members compared to external partners.  
This means that a reduction in non-EU NTMs, e.g. EU-US 
through TTIP, will make the US more and other EU members relatively 
less attractive and thus divert trade and investment away from 
European partners to – for example, in the case of TTIP – the US. 
Second, a NAFTA dummy is constructed that has a value ‘1’ if both 
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countries in the bilateral trade pair are members of NAFTA and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. As with the EU, this dummy captures the intra-NAFTA 
preferential treatment given to other NAFTA members compared to 
external partners. This means that a reduction in non-NAFTA NTMs, 
e.g. EU-US through TTIP, will make the EU more and other NAFTA 
members relatively less attractive and thus divert trade and investment 
away from NAFTA partners to – for example, in the case of TTIP – the 
EU. Finally, the authors define a transatlantic dummy, i.e. a dummy 
that has a value ‘1’ if there is a transatlantic pair and ‘0’ if this is not the 
case. The transatlantic dummy measures the increase in transatlantic 
trade and investment in case of a once percent decrease in the NTM 
index. For service sectors, the business survey did not yield sufficient 
numbers of responses and therefore the OECD FDI restrictiveness 
indicators have been used instead. 
IV. From variable coefficient to transatlantic, EU and NAFTA trade 
cost equivalents (TCE) 
Step III yields – overall and sector level – regression coefficients for the 
EU dummies, NAFTA dummies and transatlantic dummies for trading 
block membership. These are variables with a bi-directional dimension 
(exporter and importer). The coefficients on the EU, NAFTA and 
transatlantic dummy variables can be changed into trade cost estimates 
as follows: 
 TCE = 100 𝑥 (𝑒𝜀 − 1) (4) 
where ε is the gravity regression coefficient. The TCE (in %) is the 
estimated increase in trade costs as a consequence of NTMs (regulatory 
differences) in the EU, NAFTA and transatlantic market place. This 
information is presented in columns (C), (D) and (E) of Table 4.2. 
V. From transatlantic, EU and NAFTA TCEs to sector specific TCEs 
Having calculated in Step IV the TCE values (%) for the intra-EU 
preference margins (EU dummy), intra-NAFTA preference margins 
(NAFTA dummy) and transatlantic offset margins (transatlantic 
dummy), it is possible to derive the total NTM effects for the EU and 
US of TTIP. For the EU the total NTM effect is the intra-EU preference 
margin minus the transatlantic offset margin. For the US, the total NTM 
effect of TTIP is the intra-NAFTA preference margin minus the same 
transatlantic offset margin. That is, it is assumed that the preferential 
intra-EU and intra-NAFTA treatment is extended across the Atlantic. 
This information is presented in columns (F) and (G) of Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 From NTM values to trade cost equivalents for trade flows (Steps I to V) 
Sector NTM values 
(Step I) 
(A) 
NTM index 
(Step II) 
(B) 
Intra-EU 
preference 
margin  
(Steps III-IV) 
(C) 
Intra-NAFTA 
preference 
margin 
(Steps III-IV) 
(D) 
Transatlantic 
offset margin 
(Steps III-IV) 
(E) 
Net NTM 
effect EU to 
US (Step V) 
(F) 
Net NTM 
effect US to 
EU (Step V) 
(G) 
 EU to US US to EU EU to US US to EU    EU to US US to EU 
Aerospace & space 56.0 55.1 0.44 0.44 18.8 19.1 0.0 19.1 18.8 
Automotive 34.8 31.6 0.30 0.27 16.3 17.6 -9.2 26.8 25.5 
Chemicals 45.8 53.2 0.38 0.43 23.9 21.0 0.0 21.0 23.9 
Communication services 44.6 27.0 0.37 0.24    1.7 11.7 
Electronics 30.8 20.0 0.27 0.18   -6.5 6.5 6.5 
Cosmetics 48.3 52.2 0.39 0.42 34.6 32.4 0.0 32.4 34.6 
Financial services 29.7 21.3 0.26 0.19    31.7 11.3 
Insurance services 29.5 39.3 0.26 0.33    19.1 10.8 
Food & beverages 45.5 33.6 0.38 0.29 56.8 73.3 0.0 73.3 56.8 
OICE 37.9 32.3 0.32 0.28 8.9 12.7 -10.2 22.9 19.1 
Pharmaceuticals 23.8 44.7 0.21 0.37 24.0 18.2 8.7 9.5 15.3 
Transport services 39.9 17.6 0.34 0.16      
Biotechnology 46.1 50.2 0.38 0.41      
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Sector NTM values 
(Step I) 
(A) 
NTM index 
(Step II) 
(B) 
Intra-EU 
preference 
margin  
(Steps III-IV) 
(C) 
Intra-NAFTA 
preference 
margin 
(Steps III-IV) 
(D) 
Transatlantic 
offset margin 
(Steps III-IV) 
(E) 
Net NTM 
effect EU to 
US (Step V) 
(F) 
Net NTM 
effect US to 
EU (Step V) 
(G) 
ICT 20.0 19.3 0.18 0.18    3.9 14.9 
Construction services 45.0 37.3 0.37 0.32    2.5 4.6 
Machinery 50.9 36.5 0.41 0.31      
Medical equipment 49.3 44.5 0.40 0.37      
Other business services 42.2 20.0 0.35 0.18    3.9 14.9 
Personal, recreational 
services 
35.8 35.4 0.31 0.30    2.5 4.4 
Steel 35.5 24.0 0.30 0.22 11.9 17.0 0.0 17.0 11.9 
Textiles 35.6 48.9 0.30 0.40 11.0 8.5 -8.2 16.7 19.2 
Wood & paper products 30.0 47.1 0.26 0.39 11.3 7.7 0.0 7.7 11.3 
Travel services 35.6 17.6 0.30 0.16      
Total average 38.1 35.2 0.33 0.30 21.8 22.8 -2.3 17.7 17.5 
Data source: Berden et al. (2009). 
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Final results 
The Berden et al. (2009) study reaches some interesting conclusions and 
yields specific insights. First of all, the study has been able to generate 
bi-directional, i.e. EU-US and US-EU, TCEs at sector level for 18 
different sectors. Since agriculture was not in the scope of the study, no 
results have been reported for agriculture. Second, the study shows that 
there is significant NTM-level variation across sectors and depending 
on the direction of the trade flow. Third, combining the NTM approach 
with OECD FDI restrictiveness indexes, the study also finds NTM 
levels for service sectors. Fourth, because an NTM index is used, the 
study was able to employ a friction-variable approach1 to determine the 
effect of NTMs per se, staying away from the problem that residual 
approaches suffer from: measurement errors or omitted variables lead 
directly to errors in the estimated NTM levels. They find that NTMs 
matter more than tariffs in creating barriers to trade and that the level 
of restrictiveness varies significantly. 
2.3 The Fontagné et al. (2013) NTM quantification 
methodology 
Fontagné et al. (2013) come up with estimates of NTMs for goods and 
services. For goods, they base themselves on Kee et al. (2009), while for 
services they draw from Fontagné et al. (2011). This section summarises 
the approaches by Kee et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. (2011).   
I. Quantifying NTMs for goods – Kee et al. (2009) 
Kee et al. (2009) go through three steps: they define three types of 
restrictiveness indicators, they describe the approach to estimate ad 
valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs at tariff line level, which is 
equivalent to the trade restrictiveness indexes (TCEs).   
                                                          
1 A friction-variable approach is one where the specific variable – in this case 
the ‘NTM index’ – is used as an independent variable on the right-hand side – 
and as such has a coefficient to be measured. The friction variable approach is 
set against the ‘residual’ approach, whereby it is assumed that the regression 
(with all its control variables) captures everything, except for the NTM effect 
which is the residual. This means that any effect not captured by the regression 
equation ends up in the residual – and as such in the level of NTMs. The 
residual approach is clearly considered inferior to the friction-variable 
approach because of the risk of mis-estimation (especially over-estimation), 
which is why the latter approach has been chosen in Berden et al. (2009). 
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Tariff and NTM data 
The main sources that Kee et al. (2009) use for tariff data come from the 
WTO’s Integrated Database and UNCTADs TRAINS. In addition, the 
MAcMap database is used for specific tariffs as well as for data on 
unilateral, bilateral and regional preferences. The main source for core 
NTM data (see below) is the UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. NTMs are 
price control measures, quantity restrictions, monopolistic measures 
and technical regulations. In addition, the authors use the WTO’s Trade 
Policy Reviews and the EU’s Standard’s Database (Shepherd, 2004). 
The agricultural domestic support is obtained from the WTO members’ 
notifications (see Hoekman et al., 2004, for a discussion on this 
variable). 
TRI, OTRI and MA-OTRI restrictiveness indicators 
Kee et al. (2009) start by arguing that in order to measure TCEs 
properly, in line with Anderson & Neary (1992), two aggregation 
problems need to be addressed: the aggregation of different forms and 
types of trade policies and the aggregation across different goods that 
have different degrees of economic importance. Anderson & Neary 
(1994, 1996) find that “one single indicator cannot provide a measure of trade 
distortions a country imposes on itself while simultaneously capturing trade 
distortions imposed on its trading partners” (Kee et al., 2009, p. 173). In line 
with Anderson & Neary, Kee et al. define the Trade Restrictiveness 
Index (TRI) – domestic welfare effect of domestic trade policies; the 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) – effect of domestic trade 
policies on domestic imports; and the Market Access-Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) – effect of domestic trade policies on 
domestic exports. 
AVE equivalents of NTMs at tariff line level and trade restrictiveness 
Kee et al.’s theoretical foundation comes from Leamer (1990) with an 
‘n-good n-factor’ general equilibrium model. The import value of a 
good is regressed on exogenous world prices, tariff line dummies, 
country characteristics, economic size, a dummy for islands and a 
measure for distance to world markets as well as three variables that 
are the focus of the analysis: a dummy indicating the presence of a core 
NTM, a variable measuring the degree of agricultural domestic 
support, and ad valorem tariffs for that good. Various corrections are 
applied to this basic regression to correct for – for example – tariff 
endogeneity and lack of time variation. In its essence, Kee et al. (2009) 
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estimate the impact of core NTMs and agricultural domestic support 
on imports at tariff line level. 
In order to make the estimated core NTM variable comparable to 
ad valorem tariffs, the quantity impact needs to be transformed into 
price-equivalents: 
 𝐴𝑉𝐸 =
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑑
𝜕 𝑁𝑇𝑀
 (5) 
The AVEs are calculated in each country at the tariff line level. 
The AVE is positive when the NTM is binding and ‘zero’ when the 
NTM is not binding. In Table 4.3 below, the main empirical results of 
Kee et al. (2009) for NTM TCEs are reported for the EU and US. 
II. Quantifying NTMs for services – Fontagné et al. (2011) 
In addition to the estimates for NTMs in goods by Kee et al. (2009), 
Fontagné et al. (2013) base themselves on Fontagné et al. (2011) 
regarding services NTM estimates. They use a quantity-based 
approach using gravity, while addressing specific services-related 
problems along the way. For example, in services – as opposed to goods 
– non-discriminatory market access is not influenced by the presence of 
tariffs but rather by NTMs, e.g. regulatory divergences. Also, 
measuring cross-border trade in services implies an analysis of only 
one of the four modes, mode 1.  
Services trade data 
Fontagné et al. (2011) use the GTAP database as the main source for 
services trade data, providing them with bilateral trade in services for 
14 services sectors (in 2004): construction, communication, trade, 
finance, other services (education, health, defence, public services), 
business, transport (air, water, other), insurance, recreational services, 
dwelling, water, and energy – reducing this to seven sectors through 
some aggregations. The authors use IMF data on GDP and Producer 
Price Indexes and population data from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. For trade in services the authors use the 
OECD data because of better country coverage and annual frequency. 
This implies that they miss some countries but still 89% of all global 
services trade is covered. 
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Tariff equivalents of NTMs for services 
It is regulatory differences, i.e. NTMs, that constitute barriers to trade 
in services. Because we cannot observe directly the individual 
regulations (in a quantity-based approach to quantifying NTMs), 
through gravity, Fontagné et al. (2011) compare actual trade with the 
theoretical situation of free trade in services without any trade costs 
associated. This yields a ratio that represents the deviation of actual 
imports of services of a country compared to its potential free trade 
imports. Because the free trade imports can also not be directly seen, 
Fontagné et al. (2011) define a benchmark country as the ‘free trader’ 
and calculate everything else compared to this benchmark. This allows 
Fontagné et al. (2011) to estimate the tariff equivalent – under the 
assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution (something that is 
most likely not the case as is suggested by Francois et al., 2009). The 
TCEs that Fontagné et al. (2013) find are reported below in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Country estimates NTM coefficients and NTM TCEs 
Country and Sector NTM TCEs EU (%) 
(A) 
NTM TCEs US (%) 
(B) 
Agriculture 48.2 51.3 
Manufacturing 42.8 32.3 
Services* 32.0 47.3 
- Communication 38.6 36.9 
- Construction 53.2 95.4 
- Financial services 51.2 51.3 
- Insurance services 44.9 43.7 
- Business services 32.6 42.3 
- Other services 39.1 8.8 
- Trade 48.0 61.5 
- Transport 29.1 17.5 
- Water 65.3 98.4 
* For services, we report the unweighted average of EU member states from 
Fontagné et al. (2011) as the EU results. 
Data sources: Kee et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. (2011). 
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Final results 
The Fontagné et al. (2013) study reaches some interesting conclusions. 
First of all, they combine the import elasticity and TCE for goods 
estimates of Kee et al. (2009) with the services NTM estimates of 
Fontagné et al. (2011) to get NTM estimates across agriculture, industry 
and services. Second, the results from Kee et al. (2009) results are based 
on an elaborate dataset and they use different trade restrictiveness 
indicators. They find NTMs at tariff line level using an approach that 
comes close – but is not exactly equal – to a price-based approach.  
2.4 The Egger et al. (2015) NTM quantification 
methodology 
Egger et al. (2015 forthcoming) focus on the quantification of NTMs 
while taking into account the depth of free trade agreements (Dür et al., 
2014). They then use the estimated TCEs of NTMs in a CGE model to 
look at the potential effects of TTIP. The focus of this section is on the 
first part of their work: estimating the TCEs of NTMs. Like the other 
authors, Egger et al. (2015) recognise that the challenge in quantifying 
the effects of deep agreements is that most of the elements under 
negotiation cannot be directly measured quantitatively, something that 
is possible with tariffs.2 Egger et al. (2015) go through two steps to get 
to TCEs: first, they estimate levels of NTMs through a gravity model 
using historical evidence from (depth of) FTAs and then they take those 
estimates to turn them into ad valorem TCEs.  
Three-step approach 
I. FTA data 
II. Estimations of NTMs 
III. Calculating TCEs 
I. FTA data 
In order to get estimates of NTMs, Egger et al. (2015) look at evidence 
from past FTAs. The EU has engaged for decades in reducing NTMs in 
its internal market project; many (bilateral) FTAs have been signed over 
the past decade and the depth of these FTAs has increased over time. 
Through the DESTA – Design of Trade Agreements – database, a solid 
                                                          
2 Tariffs allow us to more easily measure the difference between domestic prices 
and the world price, deriving the price wedge that then can be analysed 
straightforwardly with existing models and methods.  
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measure for the depth of trade agreements has become available. The 
DESTA data is used as a variable in the gravity analysis of Step II. 
II. Estimations of NTMs 
Egger et al. (2015) specify a gravity equation, modelling bilateral trade 
flows as a function of country-specific fixed effects, bilateral control 
variables, e.g. geography, culture, history, a measure of political 
distance (polity),3 tariff margins by country-pair (within or outside 
FTAs). Egger & Larch (2011) have shown that the NTM effect of FTAs 
corresponds to the combined effect of FTAs conditional on tariffs and 
the depth of FTAs. This is important, because it means that the NTM 
effect of FTAs can be estimated as ‘beyond tariff reductions’. The 
gravity regressions are run for each sector separately for two reasons: 
first, to allow for trade elasticities to vary across sectors as evidenced 
by Broda & Weinstein (2006) and Egger et al. (2012); second, to allow 
NTMs to vary across sectors as was shown by Cadot & Malouche (2012) 
and Berden et al. (2009). 
In order to estimate the importance of NTMs, the authors include 
two variables: a dummy indicator for intra-EU relationships and an 
integer-value DESTA variable (ranging from 0 to 7) that indicates the 
depth of non-EU FTAs based on Dür et al. (2014). Egger et al. (2015) 
estimate a separate parameter for EU membership because it allows 
them to single out the EU internal market effects compared to other 
FTAs – since EU membership and the EU internal market clearly go 
beyond liberalisation policies in other FTAs. The results of this gravity 
estimation are presented below in Table 4.4 for goods (Columns (A) 
and (B)) and in Table 4.5 for services.  
For NTMs in services – as already alluded to in the previous 
section by Fontagné et al. (2013) –  various other issues matter (see also 
Francois & Hoekman, 2010, for a general discussion). Egger et al. (2015) 
do not estimate these NTMs themselves but rather work with estimates 
of trade restrictions in services from the World Bank (Borchert et al., 
2014), AVEs for trade barriers in services based on the World Bank data 
(Jafari & Tarr, 2015), and assessments of GATS bindings and how these 
                                                          
3 Egger et al. (2015) also include a measure of political distance based on 
measures from the political science literature. They use the Quality of 
Governance expert survey dataset (Teorell et al., 2011), in particular the 
pairwise similarity of polity, reflecting evidence that homophily is important 
in explaining direct (economic and) political linkages (De Benedictis & Tajoli, 
2011). 
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compare to PTA services commitments from the WTO (Roy, 2011 
database, updated 2013).  
III. Calculating TCEs 
The estimates obtained under Step II for the coefficients for FTA depth 
(DESTA) and the EU membership dummy are taken by Egger et al. 
(2014) to derive potential changes in ad valorem trade costs along the 
same lines as Berden et al. (2009):  
 TCE = 100 𝑥 (𝑒𝜀 − 1) (6) 
The results of the TCE equivalents for goods are presented below 
in Table 4.4 and for services in Table 4.5. Both in Columns (C) and (D) 
NTM TCE values are reported. Column (C) shows the results when the 
gravity regression is run with the EU dummy as a benchmark, i.e. the 
NTM effect compared to the EU because it is the deepest FTA we know 
of today. Column (D) shows the NTM TCE estimates when the gravity 
regression is run with the DESTA variable (for depth of FTAs), 
comparing the existing NTMs to an average depth of an FTA as the 
benchmark.  
Table 4.4 Gravity results and TCE equivalents (%) for goods (EU 
membership and FTA depth) 
Sector Gravity 
coefficients 
EU IM 
(A) 
Gravity 
coefficients 
FTA depth 
(B) 
NTM TCE 
(%) EU 
dummy 
(C) 
NTM TCE 
(%) FTA 
depth 
(D) 
Goods 0.575 0.087 12.9 13.7 
Primary food 1.610 0.150 25.2 15.8 
Energy -0.001 0.169 -0.01 16.1 
Processed food 1.499 0.158 48.4 33.8 
Beverages & tobacco 1.498 0.215 41.8 42.0 
Petrochemicals 0.270 0.173 7.9 24.2 
Chemicals & pharma 0.889 0.110 20.6 29.1 
Metals 1.268 0.086 38.5 16.7 
Motor vehicles 1.299 0.184 19.5 19.3 
Electrical machinery 0.631 0.009 19.4 1.8 
Other machinery 0.133 0.071 1.6 6.2 
Other goods 0.468 0.043 5.7 3.6 
Data source: Egger et al. (2015). 
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Table 4.5 Gravity results and TCE equivalents (%) for services (EU 
membership and FTA depth) 
Services AVEs of current policies (%) 
 EU US 
Services 12.8 12.9 
Construction*   
Air transport 25.0 11.0 
Maritime transport 1.7 13.0 
Other transport 29.7 0.0 
Distribution 1.4 0.0 
Communications  1.1 3.5 
Banking 1.5 17.0 
Insurance 6.6 17.0 
Professional and business  35.4 42.0 
Personal, recreational   
Public services   
* Construction is taken from Berden et al. (2009). 
Data source: Egger et al. (2015). 
Final results 
Egger et al. (2015) employ a new approach to estimating the height of 
NTMs through a quantity-based approach framework. For goods, they 
do not employ detailed NTM data – either from existing databases or a 
business survey – but they look at (the depths of) past FTAs, with the 
EU Internal Market project singled out in particular and use the 
evidence from the past to look at NTM potential. For services, they 
build on the work done by Borchert et al. (2014) on trade restrictions in 
services and Jafari & Tarr (2015) on ad valorem tariff equivalents for 
trade barriers in services. They find that NTMs pose significant trade 
restrictions, but more in goods than in services. This could be explained 
in part by the fact that for services, only modes 1 and 2 and to an 
indirect extent mode 3 are captured, and that services have a much 
larger non-tradable share. They also find that compared to the EU 
benchmark this effect is (on average) larger than compared to the FTA 
depth. This is the case because the EU dummy captures the deepest 
FTA there is, while the FTA depth is an average of the depth of the 
FTAs (which is less deep than the EU post-WWII project). 
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3. Analysing and summarising the results 
“Give me a one-handed economist”, US President Harry Truman told 
the press, frustrated by his economic advisors who kept on saying “on 
the one hand … on the other hand …”. Reading this chapter thus far, 
you may have similar feelings. Indeed, there are many differences 
between the studies carried out, but let’s start out this section with some 
important similarities across the studies, followed by the differences. 
3.1 A systematic comparison of empirical studies 
Similarities in approaches 
The first important similarity is the fact that all the studies – although 
to slightly differing degrees – find that TCEs of NTMs are significant 
and of a higher order of magnitude than tariff barriers today. The 
second important similarity is that those studies that could look at a 
more disaggregate level find that the variation of TCEs across sectors is 
significant: trade barriers and regulatory divergences differ 
significantly across sectors. The third important similarity is that they 
all agree that summarising NTMs in terms of TCEs or tariff equivalents 
is the best way to incorporate the multi-dimensional and complex issue 
of regulatory cooperation into a manageable variable to work with 
further, at least at the moment. In other words, the approach is certainly 
not ideal, but is the best we have given the state of the art in terms of 
data availability and applicable methodologies. This caveat is an 
important one. We can expect improvements as better data and 
methods become available. 
Differences in approaches 
As highlighted in the chapter so far, there are many different ways to 
approach the issue of quantifying regulatory cooperation/NTMs. In 
order to structure these differences, we categorise them into the 
following components, which we then use to compare the studies in 
Table 4.6 below: basic approach to quantifying NTMs: quantity- or 
price-based; data sources to start measuring NTMs; econometric 
specifications; level of disaggregation and coverage of service sector 
NTMs.  
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Basic approach to quantifying NTMs: quantity- or price-based approaches 
– row (A) in Table 4.6 
In line with the two main strands in the literature one of the differences 
between the recent studies is that one uses the price-based approach 
(Dean et al., 2009), which means they use detailed price data to estimate 
the impact of core NTMs on prices and assess their significance. From 
there they can estimate TCEs of the NTMs. The other authors use the 
quantity-based approaches (Berden et al., 2009; Fontagné et al., 2013; 
Egger et al., 2015). They use gravity equations to estimate by how much 
the presence of an NTM reduces trade flows compared to potential 
trade. This then allows for the estimation of a tariff equivalent or TCE. 
Data sources to start measuring NTMs – row (B) in Table 4.6 
The most pronounced difference between the covered approaches is the 
set of input data used (in combination with the econometrics). Dean et 
al. (2009) focus on detailed price data to create the dependent variable 
– the price gap. They have price data for 47 products which they can 
aggregate into four agricultural sub-sectors. The authors also employ 
the UNCTAD TRAINS and USITC databases for NTM incidence – to 
measure the share of NTMs in explaining this gap. They use both 
datasets combined because – though they overlap in part – they also 
contain distinct information and are partially complementary. Berden 
et al. (2009) conducted a large business survey with 5,500 responses to 
create a bilateral import-export NTM index that – together with data 
from GTAP (2007) – was inserted into a gravity equation to estimate the 
statistical and economic significance of NTMs for the dependent 
variable, trade and investments in goods. For services – as the business 
survey responses were too few, they used the OECD FDI restrictiveness 
indicators. The survey also yielded information on specific barriers, 
how important they were according to firms and an assessment of 
whether the individual barriers would affect costs or economic rent (or 
a combination of both).  Fontagné et al. (2013) base themselves on 
Fontagné et al. (2011) for services NTM estimates – using the GTAP 
database (2004) – and on Kee et al. (2009) for goods NTM estimates – 
who use the UNCTAD TRAINS database for NTM information 
supplemented by MAcMaps and WTO Trade Policy Reviews as well as 
WTO notifications. Finally, Egger et al. (2015) use a combination of 
GTAP (2011) data and data from past FTAs – by means of an EU 
dummy and the DESTA variable to measure the depth of FTAs. DESTA 
have a value between 0 and 7 whereby 7 is the deepest form of a trade 
agreement. Recently, trade agreements have increased in depth. 
QUANTIFYING NON-TARIFF MEASURES FOR TTIP  121 
 
Econometric specifications – row (C) in Table 4.6 
The detailed econometric specifications differ between the studies. 
Most distinct is the approach by Dean et al. (2009) since they carry out 
a regression analysis with retail price gaps as the dependent variable 
and tariffs and NTMs – adjusted for differences in local distribution 
mark-ups, transport costs and specific tariffs. The other three studies all 
use the gravity equation and the same dependent variable – but the 
gravity equations are not specified in the same way. In Berden et al. 
(2009) the gravity equation contains the NTM index on the right-hand 
side, allowing the authors to measure the contribution of NTMs to the 
trade gap (and thus indirectly the price gap). Egger et al. (2015) employ 
the gravity equation with an EU dummy and the DESTA variable for 
depth of FTAs on the right-hand side as two independent variables. 
They also add a variable called ‘polity’ to correct for political distance. 
Finally, Fontagné et al. (2013) – using Kee et al. (2009) for goods NTM 
estimation – use the gravity equation but run it per sector, employing a 
partial equilibrium and not a general equilibrium approach. For 
services, they rely on Fontagné et al. (2011), whereby a gravity equation 
is used. 
Level of sector disaggregation – row (D) in Table 4.6 
The level of disaggregation differs across the studies. Dean et al. (2009) 
focus on four agricultural sub-sectors – at a high degree of 
disaggregation, but for only a small part of the economy. It is clear that 
the large amount of data needed for the price-based approach limits the 
scope in terms of the number of sectors that can be studied. Fontagné 
et al. (2013) explore a limited number of goods sectors, but a 
comparable number of service sectors to Berden et al. (2009) and Egger 
et al. (2015). In terms of goods sector disaggregation Berden et al. (2009) 
and Egger et al. (2015) use the GTAP database (2007 and 2011) to reach 
the highest level of disaggregation covering the entire economy. 
Coverage of service sectors – row (E) in Table 4.6 
Dean et al. (2009), using detailed price data, focus on four agricultural 
sectors but do not look at service sectors. Berden et al. (2009), using the 
business survey, cover nine service sectors that are also in GTAP (2007). 
Fontagné et al. (2013) cover the same nine service sectors but use the 
GTAP (2004) database. Finally, Egger et al. (2015) use the broadest 
service sector coverage available in GTAP (2011), looking at NTMs in 
11 sectors. 
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Table 4.6 Structured comparison of different approaches to quantifying NTMs 
Components Dean et al. (2009) Berden et al. (2009) Fontagné et al. (2013) Egger et al. (2015) 
Basis approach to 
quantifying NTMs (A) 
Price-based approach Quantity-based 
approach 
Quantity-based 
approach 
Quantity-based 
approach 
Data sources to start 
measuring NTMs (B) 
UNCTAD TRAINS 
and USITC for NTM 
incidence + retail 
price data for 47 
products EIU City 
data 2001 
Business survey (5,500 
responses), OECD FDI 
restrictiveness 
indicators, GTAP 2007 
pre-release 
UNCTAD TRAINS, 
MAcMaps, WTO TPR, 
WTO member 
notifications, GTAP 
2004 
EU dummy and FTA 
depth dummy (past 
FTA results); GTAP 
2011 
Econometric 
specifications (C) 
Regression analysis 
with retail price gap 
as dependent variable 
and tariffs and NTMs 
(and other control 
variables) as 
independent 
variables 
Friction variable gravity 
analysis with goods & 
services trade (and 
investment) as 
dependent variable and 
NTMs (and control 
variables) as 
independent variables 
For goods NTMs 
estimation use the 
gravity equation but 
run it per sector – 
employing a partial 
equilibrium and not a 
general equilibrium 
approach. For services 
NTMs a gravity 
equation is used 
Gravity analysis with 
goods & services trade 
as dependent variable 
and EU/FTA depth 
variables (and control 
variables) as 
independent variables 
Level of 
disaggregation (D) 
Fruits & vegetables, 
bovine meat, 
processed food, 
apparel 
Aerospace & space, 
automotive, chemicals, 
communication, 
electronics, cosmetics, 
financial, insurance, 
Agriculture, 
manufacturing, 
services – 
communication, 
construction, financial, 
Overall goods, primary 
food, energy, processed 
food, beverages & 
tobacco, petrochemicals, 
chemicals & pharma, 
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Components Dean et al. (2009) Berden et al. (2009) Fontagné et al. (2013) Egger et al. (2015) 
food & beverages, 
OICE, pharmaceuticals, 
transport, 
biotechnology, ICT, 
construction, 
machinery, medical 
equipment, other 
business services, 
personal & recreational, 
steel, textiles, wood & 
paper, travel  
insurance, business, 
other services, trade, 
transport, water 
metals, motor vehicles, 
electrical machinery, 
other machinery, other 
goods, overall services, 
air transport, maritime 
transport, other 
transport, distribution, 
communications, 
banking, insurance, 
professional and 
business services, 
personal, recreational, 
public services 
Coverage of services 
sectors (E) 
No Yes, 9 sectors Yes, 9 sectors Yes, 11 sectors 
Country coverage (F) 60 countries EU, US and other 
countries combined into 
ROW 
Goods: 78 countries 
Services: 65 countries  
12 regions 
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Country coverage – row (F) in Table 4.6 
The three GTAP-based studies (Fontagné et al., 2013; Berden et al., 2009; 
and Egger et al., 2015) cover the entire world economically, but 
aggregate countries into relevant groups. Berden et al. (2009), focusing 
on TTIP, aggregate all GTAP countries into the EU, US and Rest of 
World (ROW). Egger et al. (2015) – also focusing on TTIP – define the 
EU, US, EFTA, Turkey, Other Europe, Mediterranean, Japan, China, 
TPP countries, Other Asia, Other middle-income, and low-income 
countries. Fontagné et al. (2013) specify 78 countries for goods trade 
and 65 for services trade. Finally, Dean et al. (2009) cover 60 countries. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches 
Each of the covered approaches has its merits and challenges. And in 
light of the complex discussion of how to quantify NTMs it is important 
to at least summarise some of the main strengths and weaknesses of 
each of the approaches in order to aid policy-makers in deciding what 
model they deem best-suited to the policy questions at hand. In Table 
4.7 below, we present a short summary of the main strengths and 
weaknesses per approach.  
Table 4.7 Summary of main strengths and weaknesses of NTM 
quantification approaches 
Study Strengths Weaknesses 
Dean et al. 
(2009) 
 The direct estimation of 
the contribution of 
NTMs on the price gap  
 The direct link at 
product level (if price 
data available) to 
NTMs that could 
explain the price gap 
 The treatment of NTMs 
as endogenous and in 
combination with 
tariffs and income 
(through interaction 
terms) 
 The careful assessment 
of both the UNCTAD 
TRAINS database and 
USITC database and 
 The large amounts of 
price data needed for 
all products affected by 
large-scale FTA effects 
is not available – so not 
suitable to large-scale 
FTA policy questions 
 NTM incidence is 
needed to distinguish 
NTMs from other 
factors that influence 
the price gap – how to 
measure the presence 
of NTMs? 
 Some of the TCEs 
attributed to NTMs 
could represent price 
premia because of 
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Study Strengths Weaknesses 
combining the 
(partially 
complementary) 
information available in 
each of these datasets 
product differentiation, 
not because of the 
existence of NTMs 
Berden et 
al. (2009) 
 The use of a business 
survey that leads to the 
construction of an NTM 
index (values 0-100) 
that allows for a friction 
variable gravity 
regression approach 
 The combination of 
business survey and 
OECD FDI 
restrictiveness indexes 
to yield bi-directional 
and sector-specific 
NTM estimates 
 The characterisation of 
NTMs into cost and/or 
economic rent inducing 
– very important for 
estimating welfare 
impacts of NTMs 
 Information on actual 
barriers faced while 
exporting to the EU/US 
by small and large 
firms 
 Indirect estimation of 
the price gap: first the 
quantity gap, then with 
price elasticities the 
price gap – adding risk 
of the quality of the 
estimation 
 The explained trade 
gap cannot be directly 
linked to NTMs at 
product level 
 The risk of a biased 
business survey 
(checked 
econometrically and no 
bias found) 
 The concept of 
‘actionability’ in order 
to divide NTMs into 
those that can 
potentially be 
addressed and those 
that cannot/are not 
likely to be addressed 
limits the potential of 
regulatory cooperation, 
but is empirical only 
Fontagné 
et al. (2013) 
 The estimation work of 
Kee et al. is grounded 
in theory (Anderson & 
Neary) 
 The method of Kee et 
al. allows for estimation 
of bootstrap standard 
errors for the TCEs that 
take into account 
sampling and 
 Indirect estimation of 
the price gap: first the 
quantity gap, then with 
price elasticities the 
price gap – adding risk 
of the quality of the 
estimation 
 In addition to the 
above, any mis-
estimation of transport 
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Study Strengths Weaknesses 
estimation errors 
(indicating whether the 
quality of the 
estimation is a risk) 
 Kee et al. use very 
detailed NTM 
incidence data at tariff 
line level using detailed 
import elasticities – 
coming closer to 
product-level barriers 
costs also affects the 
NTM impact (Dean et 
al.); 
 The explained trade 
gap cannot be directly 
linked to NTMs at 
product level (even 
though Kee et al. are 
close) 
 The partial equilibrium 
approach chosen by 
Kee et al. may lead to a 
bias (overestimation) of 
NTMs – direct impact, 
no income effects and 
no substitution effects 
possible 
 Kee et al. depend on 
ability of Heckscher-
Ohlin model 
specification to explain 
trade flows 
Egger et al. 
(2015) 
 The approach to 
estimate potential 
NTMs based on a very 
large amount of 
information from past 
FTAs 
 The use of DESTA as a 
variable in the gravity 
equation to insert a 
measure of the depth of 
FTAs 
 The careful treatment 
of political variables 
(‘polity’) and sensitivity 
analysis to take the 
Berden et al. concept of 
actionability to a new 
(tested) level 
 Indirect estimation of 
the price gap: first the 
quantity gap, then with 
price elasticities the 
price gap – adding risk 
of the quality of the 
estimation 
 The explained trade 
gap cannot be directly 
linked to NTMs at 
product level 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
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3.2 Juxtaposing the four approaches 
Comparison of study results, policy recommendations and 
relevance for TTIP negotiations 
The four studies covered in detail in this chapter have been used to 
various degrees to look at the potential effects of TTIP. It is important 
to note that in order to measure the potential effects of TTIP, 
quantifying the level of NTMs is only one – and the first – 
methodological step. In order to come up with economic estimates of a 
potential TTIP agreement, four methodological steps need to be taken: 
1) Quantification of NTMs as explained in this chapter 
2) Combining the quantified NTM estimates with tariff line 
information 
3) Developing liberalisation scenarios that could be the result of 
the TTIP negotiations 
4) Employing a macro/trade model (partial or general 
equilibrium) to look at the macro-economic effects 
Figure 4.1 NTM quantification work used in different TTIP impact studies 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration. 
Link between NTM quantification and TTIP impact studies 
Many studies have in recent years worked through these four steps in 
order to quantify the potential effects of TTIP. And these studies have 
shown different results of a potential TTIP agreement because of 
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different choices made in any of these four steps: different estimations 
of NTMs (the topic of this chapter), different tariff line data depending 
on what year the study was carried out, different liberalisation 
scenarios, i.e. anticipated levels of ambition, and different 
macro/international trade models to look at the final welfare effects. In 
Figure 4.1, we show what NTM estimation work has been used in some 
of the main studies carried out to estimate the potential impact of TTIP. 
Comparison of NTM estimation results and link to policy-making 
In Table 4.8 we present the summary of estimated NTM results per 
study and per sector (or aggregate thereof). This is in essence a meta-
results table for the most important NTM estimates carried out so far, 
focusing on the EU and US from the TTIP perspective. From this table 
some interesting conclusions can be drawn.  
First of all, it becomes clear from all studies that NTMs matter 
significantly in terms of their effect on international trade. The studies 
confirm that NTMs matter more than tariffs (2.2% for the US and 3.3% 
for the EU on average, according to Fontagné et al., 2013). This result 
matters for policy-makers because it suggests they should focus their 
attention relatively more on regulatory cooperation than on tariffs 
when negotiating new free trade agreements, as that is the area where 
potential barriers are highest. In fact, Egger et al. (2015) show that this 
is indeed what policy-makers are doing in recent trade agreements – 
stemming from the fact that the depth of FTAs negotiated and under 
negotiation has increased significantly in recent years. 
Second, when we look across sectors, there appears to be a 
significant degree of variation between NTMs at sector level and 
depending on the direction of EU-US trade. For example, in processed 
foods, the NTMs found are much higher than in electrical machinery 
(electronics), and in general manufacturing goods NTMs are found to 
be higher than services NTMs (with the exception of Fontagné et al., 
2013). This result implies that policy-makers should drill down into 
NTMs at sector level. They could focus first on those sectors where the 
differences are significant (and thus the scope for reduction is larger) 
based on as broad a range of studies as possible.  
Third, in some sectors the studies show strikingly similar results. 
For example, when comparing the results of both the price-based and 
quantity-based approaches for processed foods, we find that the results 
are quite comparable across all studies. Furthermore, in some sectors 
like agriculture, automotive, steel, textiles, and insurance services – 
though level estimates vary – all studies find significant levels of NTMs. 
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Finally, when comparing estimated service sector NTM levels – though 
the height of NTMs differs – all studies that looked at services NTMs 
find that financial services, insurance services and maritime transport 
services are much more restrictive in the US than in the EU. Policy-
makers can take note of the reported sectors and trends found across 
the studies as cross-validated, and treat them as ‘more likely to be 
accurate’ (as compared to those sectors or results where divergences in 
findings are high – see next point).  
Fourth, the studies show some important differences in results. 
Dean et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. (2013) find on average much 
higher levels of barriers from NTMs than Berden et al. (2009) and Egger 
et al. (2015). It is not easy to compare the studies because they use 
different levels of sector aggregations, e.g. Fontagné et al. (2013), only 
use report aggregate manufacturing results, not sector-specific ones. 
However, when we attempt to analyse where the differences in results 
come from, we find that the answer lies in part in what sectors are 
estimated and in what data and methodological approaches are used.  
 First, when turning to what sectors have been estimated, we note 
that Berden et al. (2009) do not include estimations on the 
agricultural sector. Dean et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. (2013) 
find high agricultural barriers – which explains in part why on 
average for all sectors the Berden et al. (2009) study finds lower 
NTMs, i.e. agricultural barriers are not included. So if policy-
makers want to focus on the NTM levels in agriculture, they 
should turn to one of the other three studies. 
 Second, we find that Dean et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. (2013) 
– based on Kee et al. (2013) for manufacturing sectors – both use 
the UNCTAD TRAINS database, which collects NTMs and gives 
them a value ‘1’ if present and ‘0’ if absent. Berden et al. (2009) 
rely on the business survey results while Egger et al. (2015) use 
past FTAs as the benchmark (EU and FTA depth) – which do not 
have a binary nature. We believe that an important driver of the 
results is the binary nature of the NTMs in the UNCTAD 
TRAINS database versus the scaled variables of the Berden et al. 
business survey and FTA depth variable in Egger et al. Because 
the presence of any NTM is given a value ‘1’ it is possible to 
overestimate NTMs using UNCTAD TRAINS. There are large 
data limitations to measure the incidence, impact, nature and 
importance of NTMs. All approaches are approximations that 
could help policy-makers focus on ‘the biggest bang for the buck’ 
– especially if the studies cross-validate each other’s results. 
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 Third, it is important to note that Kee et al. (2009) themselves 
indicated that – as already outlined by Anderson (1998) – 
employing a partial equilibrium assumption on the estimation 
approach “may lead to overestimating the degree of trade 
restrictiveness as the potential for substitution across markets is frozen 
in our setup…” (Kee et al., 2009, p. 196). Since Fontagné et al. 
(2013) take the results for NTM estimations in goods from Kee, 
this estimation bias may also be present in their work. For policy-
makers it is therefore important to realise that the Fontagné et al. 
(2013) results could be biased upwards. 
 Fourth, Dean et al. (2009) use the price-based approach where 
they directly estimate the price gap and estimate the share of the 
price gap that can be attributed to NTMs, corrected for various 
factors. They however acknowledge that any measurement error 
in any of the control variables, e.g. transport costs, could lead to 
mismeasurement of the NTM variable (Q) as the residual 
variable that is measured. This implies that if any control 
variable is under-valued or if there is any effect that is not 
captured by the control variables, the potential NTM effect 
increases, thus possibly overestimating the impact of NTMs. For 
policy-makers it is therefore important to realise that the 
Fontagné et al. (2013) results could be biased upwards. 
 Fifth, especially in services, the differences in NTM estimates 
between Berden et al. and Egger et al. on the one hand and 
Fontagné et al. on the other are large. This cannot be attributed 
to the GTAP database, because both Berden and Fontagné use 
the same GTAP 2007 version. Instead, we believe the different 
results stem from the fact that Kee et al. (2009) use a partial 
equilibrium approach to estimating NTMs, taken subsequently 
by Fontagné, combined with the use of the UNCTAD TRAINS 
dummy variable. For policy-makers, this means that NTMs are 
high, but maybe not as high as presented by Fontagné. 
Finally, the price-based approaches require very large amounts 
of data at product level to work. If policy-makers are looking to 
estimate NTMs for specific products, and if price data are available in 
sufficient quantities, then the price-based approach is a very useful one 
to use. However, for estimating the impact of – for example – TTIP 
requires measuring the impact on tens of thousands of products in 
many sectors. For such an exercise price data are not available. Hence, 
using price-based approaches for all encompassing trade agreement 
impacts is not recommended. 
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Table 4.8 Summary of NTM quantification results per study 
Sector NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Dean et al. 
(2009) 
NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Berden et al. 
(2009) 
NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Fontagné et al. 
(2013)  
NTM TCE estimates 
by Egger et al. (2015) 
– EU dummy 
(goods)/current 
policy (services) 
NTM TCE estimates 
by Egger et al. (2015) 
– FTA depth 
(goods)/current 
policy (services) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
 EU US EU to 
US 
US to 
EU 
EU US EU US EU US 
All goods       12.9 12.9 13.7 13.7 
Agriculture     48.2 51.3 25.2 25.2 15.8 15.8 
 - Bovine meat 68.2 80.0          
 - Fruits & vegetables 48.2 60.6         
Manufacturing     42.8 32.3     
- Aerospace & space   19.1 18.8       
- Automotive   26.8 25.5   19.5 19.5 19.3 19.3 
- Beverages & tobacco       41.8 41.8 42.0 42.0 
- Biotechnology           
- Chemicals   21.0 23.9   20.6 20.6 29.1 29.1 
- Cosmetics   32.4 34.6       
- Electronics (electrical 
machinery) 
  6.5 6.5   19.4 19.4 1.8 1.8 
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Sector NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Dean et al. 
(2009) 
NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Berden et al. 
(2009) 
NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Fontagné et al. 
(2013)  
NTM TCE estimates 
by Egger et al. (2015) 
– EU dummy 
(goods)/current 
policy (services) 
NTM TCE estimates 
by Egger et al. (2015) 
– FTA depth 
(goods)/current 
policy (services) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
 EU US EU to 
US 
US to 
EU 
EU US EU US EU US 
- Energy       -0.01 -0.01 16.1 16.1 
- Machinery       1.6 1.6 6.2 6.2 
- Medical equipment           
- Office, Info & comm equip.   22.9 19.1       
- Other goods       5.7 5.7 3.6 3.6 
- Petrochemicals       7.9 7.9 24.2 24.2 
- Pharmaceuticals   9.5 15.3   20.6 20.6 29.1 29.1 
- Processed food 35.6 34.6 73.3 56.8   48.4 48.4 33.8 33.8 
- Steel (metals)   17.0 11.9   38.5 38.5 16.7 16.7 
- Textiles 46.3 22.6 16.7 19.2       
- Wood & paper products   7.7 11.3       
Services   8.5 8.9 32.0 47.3 12.8 12.9 12.8 12.9 
- Air transport services       25.0 11.0 25.0 11.0 
- Communication services   1.7 11.7 38.6 36.9 1.1 3.5 1.1 3.5 
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Sector NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Dean et al. 
(2009) 
NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Berden et al. 
(2009) 
NTM TCE 
estimates by 
Fontagné et al. 
(2013)  
NTM TCE estimates 
by Egger et al. (2015) 
– EU dummy 
(goods)/current 
policy (services) 
NTM TCE estimates 
by Egger et al. (2015) 
– FTA depth 
(goods)/current 
policy (services) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
 EU US EU to 
US 
US to 
EU 
EU US EU US EU US 
- Construction services   2.5 4.6 53.2 95.4 4.6 2.5 4.6 2.5 
- Distribution       1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 
- Financial services (banking)   31.7 11.3 51.2 51.3 1.5 17.0 1.5 17.0 
- ICT   3.9 14.9       
- Insurance services   19.1 10.8 44.9 43.7 6.6 17.0 6.6 17.0 
- Maritime transport services     65.3 98.4 1.7 13.0 1.7 13.0 
- Other business services   3.9 14.9 32.6 42.3 35.4 42.0 35.4 42.0 
- Other transport services       29.7 0.0 29.7 0.0 
- Pers., recreational services   2.5 4.4       
- Trade     48.0 61.5     
- Transport services     29.1 17.5     
- Travel services           
Total average 49.6 49.5 17.7 17.5 41.0 42.2 17.0 18.7 16.4 18.1 
Data sources: Dean et al. (2009), Berden et al. (2009), Kee et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2011) and Egger et al. (2015).
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5. TRANSATLANTIC INVESTMENT 
TREATY PROTECTION  
LAUGE POULSEN, JONATHAN BONNITCHA 
AND JASON YACKEE* 
1. Introduction  
This chapter presents an informal cost-benefit analysis of including 
investment protection provisions, including investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS), in the TTIP. Our analysis is conducted from the 
perspective of the EU, although it covers many of the same issues that 
would also be relevant in a cost-benefit analysis conducted from the 
perspective of the US.  
Provisions on investment protection, if included in TTIP, will be 
important. Almost one-third of all outward FDI stock from 28 member 
states of the EU will be covered by the agreement and almost 40% of all 
FDI coming from outside of EU28 (Table 5.1). These figures dwarf those 
of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA), the first EU-negotiated agreement with significant investment 
protection provisions and ISDS. For the US, the shares are even greater: 
50% of US outward stock will be covered by TTIP and almost 62% of 
total US inward stock (Hamilton & Quinlan, 2014, Table 7). Assessing 
the implications of an investment protection chapter is therefore 
crucial.  
                                                          
* The discussion in this chapter closely follows a series of reports that we were 
commissioned to produce for the UK Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) (see www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/260380/bis-13-1284-costs-and-benefits-of-an-
eu-usa-investment-protection-treaty.pdf). Our conclusions in those reports, 
and here, should not be taken as necessarily representing the views of BIS or 
the UK government. We are grateful to the BIS for permission to reproduce 
parts of the report. 
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Table 5.1 FDI stock coverage of free trade agreements, 2012 
(€ bn, unless otherwise specified) 
 Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment 
Partnership 
Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade 
Agreement 
EU outward FDI 
stock to… 
2,182 
340 
% of EU total 32% 5% 
EU outward FDI 
stock from… 
2,026 
188 
% of EU total 39% 4% 
Source: Authors’own computations. 
Scarce availability of data makes a rigorous cost-benefit analysis 
unfeasible, so we rely on our reading of the best and most relevant 
evidence. Note also, that although an investment chapter could 
liberalise foreign direct investment (FDI) entry regimes in both the EU 
and US by requiring pre-establishment national treatment in most 
sectors, this is not covered in our analysis. The extent to which TTIP 
would provide liberalisation over and above what the parties would 
offer is uncertain at this point, and our ability to calculate the net 
predicted costs and benefits to the EU of marginal changes in openness 
to FDI across numerous sectors is limited. (On the other hand, it should 
be noted that the US and the majority of EU member states already 
provide pre-establishment national treatment in most economic sectors 
and for most activities as a matter of domestic law). Our analysis thus 
examines only the inclusion of post-establishment investment protection 
provisions in the TTIP and takes no account of possible investment 
liberalisation.  
The analysis proceeds on the assumption that these post-
establishment investment protections would be enforceable through 
ISDS. A cost-benefit assessment of a treaty that did not contain ISDS 
would look very different. Most of the potential benefits – for example, 
its theoretical ability to promote investment by offering reliable legal 
protection against certain political risks to investors – stem from 
investors’ ability to enforce their rights under the treaty through ISDS. 
Similarly, most of the potential economic and political costs associated 
with the risk of claims stem from investors’ ability to enforce their 
rights under the treaty through ISDS.  
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ISDS is controversial. In the public hearing organised by the 
European Commission, more than 145,000 European citizens agreed 
with non-governmental organisations that investment arbitration 
should not be included in TTIP (European Commission, 2015a). This 
meant that 97% of responses were overtly negative and there were only 
60 companies that thought the issue was important enough to warrant 
separate replies apart from submissions from their industrial 
organisations. Among these 60 firms, two were tobacco companies – 
including Phillip Morris – and then there were a number of small firms 
as well, many of which did not express strong support for ISDS. The 
results made European Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström 
conclude: “The consultation clearly shows that there is a huge 
scepticism against the ISDS instrument.”1 
Among academics, as well, the merits of ISDS are disputed. It is 
easy to find respectable academics arguing that it is something close to 
an unmitigated good, and others, just as respectable, arguing the 
opposite. For this particular agreement, our conclusions can be simply 
summarised: ISDS, considered by itself, is unlikely to provide the EU 
or its member states with significant benefits; moreover, the benefits 
that ISDS may provide are unlikely to outweigh the associated costs. 
The inclusion of ISDS in TTIP is, in our view, largely unjustified by the 
available evidence. Whether the inclusion of ISDS would be a prudent 
concession on the part of the EU in order to assume some greater benefit 
in another part of the overall agreement would depend on the scale of 
the concession offered in return for the inclusion of ISDS, and an 
assessment of whether there were any less costly ways to secure those 
additional concessions.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. After considering the likely 
investment-protection-related provisions in a TTIP investment chapter, 
we provide an overview of expected benefits and costs. We focus on 
both economic and political dimensions of the investment protection 
chapter and conclude by briefly offering a set of policy 
recommendations.  
                                                          
1 ”Public backlash threatens EU trade deal with the US”, Financial Times, 13 
January 2015. 
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2. Treaty provisions: The likely content of the “I” in 
the TTIP  
Since the beginning of its bilateral investment treaty (BIT) programme 
in the early 1980s, the US has negotiated these treaties on the basis of a 
detailed model text. Investment chapters in US FTAs generally follow 
the same model. Historically, the US has not been willing to deviate 
considerably from its model treaty (Vandevelde, 2009, p. 108). This 
means that successful investment treaty negotiations with the US 
typically resulted in agreements almost exactly mirroring the US 
template. One notable exception is the investment chapter of the US-
Australia FTA, which generally follows the US model BIT except that it 
does not provide consent to investor-state dispute settlement. 
The US has relatively few BITs in place with EU member states 
and no BITs in place with the EU’s most powerful and developed 
members. The US-EU member state BITs include the following: 
Bulgaria (1992), Czech Republic (1991), Estonia (1994), Latvia (1995), 
Lithuania (1998), Poland (1990), Romania (1992), Slovakia (1991) and 
Croatia (1996). All of these BITs contain comprehensive dispute 
settlement and pre- and post-establishment national treatment, as well 
as other provisions common to the US model. 
The US released its most recent model BIT in 2012, which is the 
intended basis for all current and future US BIT negotiations 
(Vandevelde, 2009, p. 108).2 Given the US negotiating position in the 
past, it is very likely that Washington will insist that its 2012 model text 
provides the starting point for negotiations in the TTIP. In Europe, 
however, it is not entirely clear which direction the EU is going to take 
at this point given what Maupin accurately refers to as “the confusing 
range of objectives set forth by the Council, the Parliament, and the 
Commission.” (Maupin, 2013, p. 196; see also Reinisch, 2013). For the 
purpose of this chapter, we assume that the EU could accept the 2012 
US model, or something close to it, as a starting point for negotiations. 
This assessment is based on our understanding that the proposed 
investment chapter in the CETA reflects a US-style (or NAFTA) 
approach to investment protection. We therefore assume for the 
                                                          
2 The 2012 US model BIT can be found at www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/188371.pdf. 
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purposes of this chapter that the text of TTIP investment provisions 
would follow the CETA/2012 US model BIT approach.3  
The US model BIT is considerably more detailed and more 
comprehensive than the existing BITs typical of EU member states. 
Unlike EU member state BITs, US BITs mandate national treatment 
(NT) and most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment at both the pre-
establishment and post-establishment phases. With the exception of 
Canadian and Japanese BITs, the BITs of most other countries do not 
address pre-establishment rights. The US model can thus be seen as 
requiring the liberalisation of inward FDI policy in addition to 
investment protection. The US model BIT also includes typical post-
establishment provisions, such as guarantees of the international 
“minimum standard of treatment” (Art. 5), full compensation for 
expropriation (Art. 6), and the right to free transfer of capital (Art. 7). 
Finally, the US model contains comprehensive investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) (Sec. B), which unlike the simple ISDS provisions in 
many European BITs, specifies required ISDS procedures in significant 
detail, including mandatory “transparency” of arbitral proceedings 
(Art. 29). 
The comprehensive nature of the US model is evident in other 
provisions that go beyond the traditional core of favourable standards 
of treatment backed up by access to ISDS. For example, the US model 
bans many types of ‘performance requirements’, beyond what is 
already prohibited under the WTO TRIMs agreement (Art. 8). It also 
encourages the implementation a US-style ‘notice and comment’ 
system for the development and promulgation of investment-related 
administrative regulations (Art. 11). And it contains provisions 
concerning the host state’s right to implement treaty-consistent 
measures to protect the environment (Art. 12) and the desirability of 
not weakening domestic labour laws in order to attract investment (Art. 
                                                          
3 It is likely that the TTIP investment chapter will include a most-favoured 
nation MFN clause. Unlike the MFN clauses of other investment treaties, the 
MFN clause of the US 2012 model BIT does not apply to dispute settlement. 
Also, US BIT practice contains some examples of treaty-based limitations on the 
applicability of MFN clauses. For example, some US BITs include sectoral or 
subject matter exceptions to MFN treatment in an annex. The US has also 
sometimes excluded from its MFN clause treaty provisions in earlier BITs 
ensuring that the MFN clause only applies to more favourable treatment 
provided in later BITs. Our analysis is based on the assumption that the MFN 
provision of the TTIP would be drafted to exclude the application of MFN to 
early treaties.  
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13). These latter two articles are largely hortatory, however. The US 
model is also notable for its inclusion of various explanatory footnotes 
and annexes that attempt to clarify the meaning of otherwise vague or 
ambiguous treaty text. For example, the “minimum standard of 
treatment” is defined as equivalent to the “customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens” (Annex A). 
Finally, the US model contains a number of exceptions designed 
to enhance the host state’s policy space. For example, Article 18 
provides a self-judging ‘essential security’ exception that allows the 
host state to apply otherwise treaty-inconsistent measures “that it 
considers necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to 
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or 
the protection of its own essential security interests.” The self-judging 
nature of the essential security exception (“that it considers necessary”) 
means that the host state’s invocation and application of the exception 
will be difficult or perhaps impossible for an investor to challenge in 
arbitration.4 Article 20 of the US model provides another exception, for 
prudential measures designed to ensure the “integrity and stability of 
the financial system”. Crucially, the investor’s right to challenge state 
decisions taken under this exception is subject to numerous important 
limitations drafted into the article’s text. Moreover, the US model limits 
the ability of investors to challenge ‘taxation measures’ as treaty-
inconsistent (Art. 21). 
A key question for the cost-benefit assessment, of course, is 
whether the chapter will be backed up by comprehensive ISDS. While 
the US did agree to remove ISDS from the investment chapter of its 2004 
PTIA with Australia – at Australia’s request – several stakeholders in 
the EU and the US desire comprehensive ISDS.5 For our purposes, we 
assume that if negotiations are concluded, the investment protection 
chapter will indeed include comprehensive ISDS. Our assessment is 
conducted on this basis.  
                                                          
4 For an overview of these so-called ‘non-precluded measures’, see Burke-White 
& von Staden, 2008.  
5 The US-Australia FTA, in addition to not including ISDS, also does include the 
various exceptions discussed above: essential security (Art. 22.2), taxation (Art. 
22.3) and prudential regulation of financial services (Art. 13.10). 
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3. Potential benefits of ISDS 
3.1 Promotion of US investment in the EU  
The main potential economic benefit of an EU-US investment chapter 
lies in its theoretical ability to promote additional inbound investment 
to the EU by providing US investors with valuable international legal 
protections that they currently do not enjoy. In other words, is an EU-
US investment chapter likely to increase the volume of US FDI in the 
EU? In our view, there is little convincing empirical evidence that 
investment treaties containing ISDS actually promote FDI in any 
significant way.  
First of the all, the types of risks an investment protection chapter 
would cover are not generally considered present in most EU member 
states. This is clear from the US government’s official “Investment 
Climate Statements”, summarised below in Table 5.2. Even in what 
would typically be considered the most ‘risky’ investment destinations 
in Eastern Europe, the US government considers foreign investments 
there generally safe from expropriation and post-establishment 
discrimination, and advertises it as such to potential American 
investors. 
Table 5.2 Summary of US Investment Climate Statements 2014 for 28 EU 
member states 
 Post-
establishment 
discrimination 
Expropriation Courts 
Austria No concerns No concerns No concerns 
Belgium No concerns No concerns No concerns 
Bulgaria 
Concerns about 
frequent changes 
in regulatory 
framework, but 
no significant 
concerns about 
discrimination 
No concerns, 
except for 
intellectual 
property 
rights 
Some concerns about 
corruption and 
nepotism and serious 
concerns about 
efficiency 
But while slow and 
bureaucratic, courts do 
resolve investment 
disputes and Bulgaria is 
seen as having effective 
means of enforcing 
property and 
contractual rights 
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Croatia 
Some concerns 
about 
transparency and 
efficiency, but no 
specific concerns 
about 
discrimination 
None except 
for a potential 
concern that 
Ministry of 
Justice 
oversees 
expropriation 
complaints 
over real 
property 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Cyprus No concerns No concerns 
Some concerns about 
speed of court 
proceedings, but no 
concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Czech 
Republic 
A few concerns 
about corruption 
in procurement 
practices 
No concerns 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Denmark No concerns No concerns No concerns 
Estonia No concerns No concerns 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Finland No concerns No concerns No concerns 
France 
A few concerns 
about publicly 
held firms 
No concerns No concerns 
Germany No concerns No concerns No concerns 
Greece No concerns 
No concerns, 
except for 
intellectual 
property 
rights 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings and 
some foreign firms 
complain about bias 
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Overall, however, no 
concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Hungary 
Some concerns 
about 
transparency and 
efficiency, but no 
specific concerns 
about 
discrimination 
Concerns 
over IPRs and 
compensation 
expressed by 
a few non-US 
firms, but 
later settled in 
court 
Some concerns about 
independence of courts, 
but no concerns about 
the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Ireland 
No concerns 
apart from 
transparency of 
government 
tenders 
No concerns No concerns 
Italy 
A few concerns 
about 
advantages to 
parastatal firms 
in procurement 
decisions 
No concerns, 
except for 
IPRs 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Latvia No concerns No concerns 
Some concerns about 
speed of lower court 
proceedings, but no 
concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Lithuania No concerns No concerns No concerns 
Luxembourg Not available Not available Not available 
Malta No concerns No concerns 
Some concerns about 
speed of court 
proceedings, but no 
concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
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Netherlands No concerns No concerns No concerns 
Poland No concerns No concerns 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Portugal No concerns No concerns 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Romania 
Significant 
concerns about 
transparency and 
predictability in 
regulatory 
framework, but 
no significant 
concerns about 
discrimination 
No concerns, 
except for 
IPRs and 
some 
outstanding 
disputes from 
Communist 
era 
Serious concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
Slovakia No concerns 
Some 
expropriation 
cases but no 
significant 
concerns 
about state’s 
commitment 
to provide 
full 
compensation 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
court proceedings, but 
no concerns about 
independence of courts 
Slovenia No concerns No concerns 
Some concerns about 
efficiency and speed of 
proceedings about 
private property 
expropriated by 
Socialist Yugoslav 
government, but no 
concerns about 
independence of courts 
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Spain 
Some concerns 
about 
advantages to 
SOEs 
No concerns 
Some concerns about 
speed of court 
proceedings, but no 
concerns about 
independence of courts 
or the enforcement of 
property and 
contractual rights 
Sweden No concerns No concerns No concerns 
UK No concerns No concerns No concerns 
Source: Compiled by authors based on US investment climate statements 
(www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/index.htm). 
A recent survey of Chinese investors in the EU by the EU 
Chamber of Commerce in China supports the conclusions that we draw 
from the US Investment Climate Statements. That survey reports that 
Chinese investors view the EU as a “safe and stable place to invest, with 
a transparent and predictable legal environment…. Chinese companies 
are confident about the long-term prospects of their investments there, 
which were contrasted with regions such as Africa and Southeast 
Asia.”6 While the report includes some complaints by Chinese investors 
about certain difficulties encountered in operating in the EU, those 
complaints seemed to concern issues that are not typically dealt with in 
investment treaties, such as inflexibility of labour laws, difficulties in 
obtaining visas and work permits, and high costs and taxes.7  
Our sense that many EU member states are already viewed as 
attractive places for US investors, despite, in many cases, the lack of a 
US BIT, is further confirmed by quantitative indicators of the 
investment climate. For example, the Investment Profile index 
published by the PRS Group in its International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) rates countries on a 12-point scale as to the favourability of their 
investment climates. Indexes such as this suffer from a number of 
methodological problems (Yackee, 2014), but it is nonetheless 
interesting to note that EU member states tend to rate very well. The 
average ICRG Investment Profile index score for EU member states in 
2011 (the last year for which we have data) was 10.14 (where a higher 
rating means a more favourable investment climate), only Portugal and 
Greece fall below a rating of 8.0 (see Figure 5.1, below). In contrast, the 
world average ICRG Investment Profile rating for 2011 was 7.56. 
                                                          
6 European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (2013).  
7 Ibid., p. 33. 
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There are a few exceptions to the generally high quality of EU 
domestic legal systems, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where US 
Investment Climate Statements indicate that serious concerns persist 
about procurement practices, intellectual property rights protection 
and inefficient courts. In the case of Bulgaria, the courts are also seen as 
subject to political influence – a relevant factor to consider for 
investment disputes against the government.  However, the US already 
has BITs with Romania and Bulgaria. Thus, including investment 
protection provisions in TTIP would not result in a significant change 
to the status quo for US investors considering investing in Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
Figure 5.1 2011 ICRG Investment Profile Index, EU member states 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration. 
Moreover, even in Bulgaria and Romania, existing US BITs do 
not appear to have helped promote investment. A 2012 study found 
that past US treaties with investment protection clauses rarely had a 
tangible impact on US outward investment – even in far more risky 
jurisdictions than European economies (Table 5.3).8 For those treaties 
                                                          
8 Econometric analyses of the impact of investment treaties often suffer from an 
absence of high-quality investment data and the problem of reverse causality: 
Do investment treaties cause investment flows, or is it the other way around? 
Investigating American agreements only allows the authors to use more 
complete investment data than panel-type studies, as American FDI flows are 
more readily available. Also, to account for the endogeneity of the relationship 
between FDI and investment treaties, the authors analyse the impact of each 
investment treaty in isolation with one or more lagged dependent variables. 
This further prevents questionable assumptions of homogeneity of effects 
across different countries, as is otherwise standard in panel data studies.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
A
u
st
ri
a
B
el
g
iu
m
B
u
lg
ar
ia
C
ro
at
ia
C
y
p
ru
s
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
li
c
D
en
m
ar
k
E
st
o
n
ia
F
in
la
n
d
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
H
u
n
g
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Ir
el
an
d
It
al
y
L
at
v
ia
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
M
al
ta
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
N
o
rw
ay
P
o
la
n
d
P
o
rt
u
g
al
R
o
m
an
ia
S
lo
v
ak
ia
S
lo
v
en
ia
S
p
ai
n
S
w
ed
en
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
TRANSATLANTIC INVESTMENT TREATY PROTECTION  151 
 
that have had a measurable impact, it has been only marginal. 
Crucially, not a single investment treaty with a developed country – 
including Canada, Australia, Israel and Singapore – has had an impact 
on US investment outflows. Nor is there evidence that BITs with 
Eastern European members of the EU were effective in promoting 
American investment. 
Table 5.3 Estimation of investment effects of US BITs and PTIAs* 
 Sustained 
positive effect 
on US FDI 
(increase in net 
US inflows/yr) 
No sustained effect on 
US FDI 
Insufficient 
data 
BITs 
Bangladesh ($28 
million) 
Honduras ($83 
million) 
Trinidad & 
Tobago  
($254 million)  
Turkey ($155 
million) 
Albania, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Rep. of 
Congo, DR Congo, 
Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Estonia, Georgia, 
Grenada, Jamaica, Latvia, 
Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Panama, 
Poland, Romania, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka, 
Tunisia and Uruguay 
Armenia, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz 
Republic, 
Lithuania, 
Moldova, 
Serbia, 
Slovakia 
and 
Ukraine 
PTIAs 
Morocco ($72 
million) 
Australia, Bahrain, 
Canada, Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Israel, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nicaragua and 
Singapore 
Jordan 
* Preferential trade and investment agreements. 
Notes: Analyses regressed each country’s net FDI inflows from the US on a one-
year lag of net FDI inflows, a one-period pulse for the first full year after the 
agreement entered into effect and a dummy variable taking the value of one in 
each year the agreement has been in effect. Further details explained in the 
source. EU member states in bold. 
Source: Adapted from Peinhardt & Allee (2012).  
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Figure 5.2 Response from general counsel within American multinational 
corporations about awareness and importance of BITs 
    
   
   
Notes: Histogram reports responses from in-house legal counsel in major 
American multinationals to: i) To your knowledge, how regularly does your 
company actively consider investing in foreign (non-US) operations, 
businesses, joint ventures, or other projects? ii) How familiar are lawyers in 
your office with the basic provisions of BITs? iii) How familiar are non-lawyer 
senior executives in your corporation with the basic provisions of BITs? iv) In 
your view, how effective are international treaties like BITs at protecting 
foreign investments from expropriation by a foreign government? v) In your 
view, how effective are international treaties like BITs at protecting foreign 
investments from adverse regulatory change in the foreign country? vi) How 
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important is the presence or absence of a BIT to your company’s typical 
decision to invest in a foreign country? For the first question, 1 indicates ‘Never 
or rarely’ and 5 indicates ‘Frequently’. For the next two questions, 1 indicates 
‘Not at all familiar’ and 5 indicates ‘Very familiar.’ For questions four and five, 
1 indicates ‘Not at all effective’ and 5 indicates ‘Very effective’. For the last 
question, 1 indicates ‘Not at all important’ and 5 indicates ‘Very important’.  
Source: Yackee (2010). 
These ‘negative’ findings are supported by feedback from 
American investors themselves. In 2010, a survey of in-house legal 
counsel in the 100 largest American multinationals showed that not 
only did many find BITs less effective to protect against expropriation 
and adverse regulatory change than commonly assumed, hardly any 
saw the treaties to be critical to their companies’ investment decisions 
(Figure 5.2). This survey concerned the US BIT programme, which 
consists almost exclusively of treaties with developing and transition 
economies. In our view, this is a strong indication that US investors are 
highly unlikely to factor the availability of ISDS with EU countries into 
their investment decisions.  
This is important, as investment protection treaties have 
arguably been more likely to be considered by US firms compared to 
European firms (Poulsen, 2010). Apart from their legally binding 
liberalisation provisions, the inclusive and open debates in Washington 
on investment protection treaties following the very public investment 
claims under NAFTA (see below) has led to a greater awareness of the 
treaties among US multinationals. This contrasts with Europe, where 
BITs have hardly ever been politicised until recently. Yet, irrespective 
of the greater awareness of investment treaties in the US, they do not 
appear to have played a considerable role in promoting American 
investment abroad.  
Finally, it is worth highlighting that most public political risk 
insurance agencies in Europe do not find investment treaties important 
for pricing of availability of insurance even in otherwise risky 
jurisdictions (Poulsen, 2010). The same is the case for the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). So even if ISDS in the TTIP 
could hypothetically have an impact on the transaction costs of foreign 
investment via the provision and pricing of insurance, this does not 
seem likely either.  
In sum, we find it unlikely that investment protection provisions 
in the TTIP would have a tangible impact on the amount of US 
investment flowing to the EU. 
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3.2 Protecting EU investment in the US 
A couple of very large European companies like Repsol and Total have 
told the European Commission that they are in favour of strong ISDS 
protections in TTIP and so have a number of European industrial 
organisations.9 This, of course, is not surprising. A comprehensive 
investment protection chapter would add yet another layer of 
protection to European investors operating or seeking to operate in the 
US – without the investors having to pay for such protections 
themselves (as they would when taking up political risk insurance for 
instance). But the proper question is not whether some firms or 
industrial groups would like TTIP to include strong investment 
protections but rather whether the treaty would mitigate significant 
concerns actually experienced by European investors in the US. We 
find this unlikely as well.  
To our knowledge, there are very few aspects of the US 
investment climate that concern EU investors. EU investors in the US 
have no restrictions on repatriation of profits, dividends, interest or 
royalties. And with respect to discrimination, it is true that ‘buy 
American’ provisions in the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act raised concerns about discrimination against foreign 
investors. However, despite these provisions foreign firms commonly 
receive national treatment in the US with respect to local, state and 
federal government fiscal or financial incentives.10 More generally, 
there are hardly any discriminatory measures against foreign investors 
after establishment. Exceptions from national treatment are clearly set 
out in the OECD’s National Treatment Instrument and both local, state, 
and federal level deviations from treatment proscribed by investment 
treaties are set out in the non-conforming measures annexes of recent 
US BITs and FTAs.11 
                                                          
9 European Commission, “Online public consultation on investment protection 
and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership Agreement”, Brussels, 13.1.2015, SWD(2015) 3. After 
reading an initial draft of this chapter, a representative from Repsol (a Spanish 
firm) responded that strong investment protections in TTIP were necessary to 
protect against political risks in southern Europe, yet it is our understanding 
that there are no plans to have the chapter protect intra-European investment 
flows.  
10 See e.g. the United States report on its investment regime to APEC (APEC, 
2011). 
11 Available at: www.ustr.gov. 
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With respect to discrimination when it comes to M&As or 
takeovers, the administration, via the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), has become increasingly 
politicised in recent years when reviewing security implications of such 
transactions. CFIUS decisions are unlikely to be challengeable in 
investment arbitration, however, given the likely national security 
exception in an EU-US investment chapter. This means that even if EU 
investors are concerned about the politicisation of CFIUS – which we 
do not have evidence to sustain – an EU-US investment treaty is 
unlikely to provide them with any other recourse than is currently 
available. It is also important to note that while acquisitions by EU 
investors account for the largest share of notices to CFIUS (60% in 2011), 
few of these result in legally binding mitigation measures. Rather, 
actual restrictions have primarily been targeted at sovereign-owned or 
-controlled investments, particularly from China (see e.g. Fagan, 2010). 
With respect to expropriation, property rights are protected 
under the US Constitution, constitutions of individual states, as well as 
federal, state, and local laws. As in BITs, US ‘takings’ jurisprudence 
addresses both direct and indirect forms of expropriation and provides 
for compensation at fair market value at the time of the ‘taking’. 
Enforcement of contracts is not a problem either. Due to the efficiency 
of the US judicial system in enforcing contracts, the US ranked 6th in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 2013 report on this indicator.  
Finally, US courts are characterised by both high quality and a 
high level of independence. In its arguments in favour of including 
ISDS in TTIP, the European Commission, in a statement dated 27 
January 2014, suggested that there is nonetheless evidence that US 
courts are biased against foreign investors. The Commission presented 
a small number of examples, which we quote at length: 
In the US there have been occasions where investors found 
reasons to complain. The Commission can cite two well-
known examples of denial of justice, which were eventually 
defeated in investment arbitration for jurisdictional grounds, 
Loewen v United States (an investor involved in a contractual 
dispute worth $5m was ordered to pay damages of $500m 
before he could appeal) and Mondev v United States (an 
investor could not sue the Boston Redevelopment Authority 
because of an immunity clause). An example of expropriation 
without compensation is the Havana Club case: Pernod 
Ricard, a French investor, has been prevented from using one 
of its trademarks for over 10 years. The EU has also 
successfully challenged this in a WTO dispute settlement 
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case; however, the US has yet to bring itself into compliance 
with the WTO. One of the first WTO cases brought by the EU 
against the US (the Helms-Burton) case, concerned 
restrictions placed by the US on investors from the EU, on 
account of investments they had made in Cuba.12 
In our view, these examples of questionable conduct by the US 
government are not persuasive evidence of the need for ISDS to protect 
EU investors in the US. Both the Havana Club and the Helms-Burton 
cases involve the unique circumstances of US restrictions on business 
with Cuba. Moreover, the Havana Club case can be read as illustrating 
the strong US commitment to protecting property rights, and not the 
opposite, as the Commission statement suggests. Pernod Ricard 
acquired the trademarks from the Cuban government, which had taken 
(expropriated) the marks from the previous Cuban owners, the 
Arachabala family. From Washington’s viewpoint, US law served to 
discourage expropriation by preventing the expropriating government 
(Cuba) from seizing and then selling intellectual property. Understood 
in this way, the case is hardly a useful indicator of US disregard for 
property rights. 
Nor are the Loewen or Mondev cases particularly relevant. It is 
true that Loewen is widely regarded by international investment law 
experts as being very poorly reasoned, and perhaps objectively 
‘incorrect’. The case involved a state-court trial of a contract dispute 
between a large Canadian funeral home operator and a much smaller 
Mississippi funeral home operator. A Mississippi jury awarded the 
Mississippi plaintiff $500 million, most of which entailed punitive 
damages for allegedly unsavoury business practices. Many observers 
of the case may view the facts as illustrating something approaching a 
‘denial of justice’. On the other hand, the Commission mischaracterises 
the case in describing it as involving a “court order to pay damages of 
$500 million before [the defendant] could appeal”. In fact, the court 
order was to post a performance bond of 125% of the jury award 
(which, as indicated, included punitive damages for allegedly 
egregious behaviour on Loewen’s part) in order to pursue an appeal, 
as was the law in Mississippi. Loewen refused to post the bond, 
declined to appeal to the United States Supreme Court, and settled the 
case for a fraction of the jury award. The NAFTA Tribunal declined to 
                                                          
12 Answer by Karel de Gucht on behalf of the Commission to Parliamentary 
Question NO/E-013215/13, 27 January 2014.  
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reach the merits of the case, and the United States was never found to 
have committed a denial of justice.  
There are aspects of the underlying trial in Loewen that are 
admittedly disturbing, especially to European eyes unused to the sight 
of trial by jury, or of outsized punitive damage awards. On the other 
hand, it is remarkable that there are thousands of foreign investment 
projects in the United States and there have been hundreds of cases in 
US courts involving foreign investors, and yet Loewen – a case which 
the foreign investor lost in ISDS – is only one of two concrete examples 
of ‘bias’ in the US court system that the Commission can identify. Think 
what one may of Loewen, but it is a stretch to view the case as illustrating 
widespread anti-investor bias in the US justice system. Indeed, given 
the tremendous amount of FDI in the US, the lack of other examples 
would seem to illustrate the very high quality of the US justice system, 
and not the opposite. 
Mondev is an equally problematic example. There, a Canadian 
real estate company sought to overturn a Massachusetts State Supreme 
Court decision in its contract dispute with a local government entity 
over a failed commercial redevelopment project. The Tribunal found 
that the state court’s decisions were perfectly acceptable as a matter of 
international investment law. The Canadian plaintiff also challenged a 
state law that limited immunity in tort – not contract – to the local 
government actors. The Tribunal firmly rejected this challenge as well, 
upholding the grant of immunity as consistent with international 
investment law. Neither Massachusetts law nor Massachusetts courts 
violated plaintiff’s international law rights.  
In short, both Loewen and Mondev are exceptional cases; 
furthermore, they are cases in which the investor lost in ISDS, Loewen 
due to a lack of jurisdiction and Mondev on the merits. They are not 
evidence of systematic, serious flaws in the US judicial system’s 
treatment of foreign investment.  
While the high quality of the US judicial system (and US laws) 
concerning foreign investors is beyond debate, we have heard concerns 
from some European parties that without ISDS, EU investors will not 
be able to enforce their TTIP rights in US courts. This argument is not 
particularly convincing. It makes sense only insofar as there is an 
underlying justification for including enforceable investment 
protection provisions in TTIP. Our analysis in this chapter suggests that 
such a justification is lacking.  
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Even assuming, for the purposes of argument, that there were a 
coherent policy rationale for ensuring that TTIP provides EU investors 
in the US with a set of enforceable investment protections that go 
beyond what they would otherwise be entitled to under US law, the 
inclusion of ISDS in TTIP would be unnecessary. It is true that, under 
the US Supreme Court’s Medellin case law (which raises a number of 
subtleties regarding so-called ‘non-self-executing treaties’ that we do 
not delve into here), some US treaties may indeed be difficult or 
impossible for private parties to enforce in US court. However, access 
to US courts can be assured either by clearly indicating in TTIP that the 
US considers the treaty to be ‘self-executing’, or by having the US pass 
appropriate implementing legislation. In other words, if one believed 
that was a problem of domestic-court enforceability of TTIP rights in 
the US, the appropriate response by the EU would be to insist in its 
negotiations that the US pass implementing legislation securing a right 
to access US courts for certain TTIP violations, not to include ISDS in 
TTIP.  
3.3 The possibility of investment diversion and treaty-
shopping  
Related to our discussion of the potential of a TTIP investment chapter 
to promote FDI into the EU is the possibility that the investment chapter 
may in many cases simply divert US investment from one EU member 
state to another. For example, an investment chapter might, in theory, 
make western European states that currently lack a BIT with the US 
more attractive as destinations for US foreign investment by increasing 
the level of investor protection above the status quo. So, for example, 
we might imagine that an EU-US investment chapter would make the 
UK (or France or Germany) marginally more attractive to US investors 
because the chapter would give US investors considering investing in 
those countries international legal rights that they currently do not 
enjoy. On the other hand, an investment chapter would probably not 
change the status quo vis-à-vis those EU member states that already 
have a BIT with the US. For those states, an investment chapter would 
be largely redundant with the protection that US investors in those 
states already enjoy. Conceivably, the differential impact of an 
investment chapter on, say, Bulgaria (as an EU member state that has a 
BIT with the US) and the UK (which does not have a US BIT) may even 
divert some investment away from the former to the latter, as the EU-
US investment chapter would eliminate any international investment 
law ‘advantage’ that Bulgaria currently enjoys over the UK. 
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However, in assessing the likelihood of diversion effects, it is 
important to note our analysis above, which suggests that the presence 
or absence of an investment treaty is unlikely to play a significant role 
in the location decisions of US investors, especially as to those EU 
member states that enjoy strong rule-of-law traditions and institutions. 
This observation implies that, even if an EU-US investment treaty alters 
the relative strength of investment protections available to US investors 
in various states within the EU, this legal change is unlikely to induce 
significant diversion effects.  
Our conclusion here is also influenced by the possibility that US 
investors may currently be able to structure their EU investments in 
ways that provide BIT protections even where the ultimate EU 
destination for the investment does not have a BIT with the EU – a 
phenomenon called ‘treaty shopping’. For example, if US investors in, 
say, Germany (which does not have a BIT with the US) route their 
investment via an intermediary incorporated in a third state that does 
have a BIT with Germany, the investment may be entitled to the 
protection of the Germany-third state investment treaty. Germany, like 
the UK, France, and many other EU member states, has an extensive 
network of BITs, most of which contain ISDS. If US investors in EU 
member states like Germany currently structure their investments in 
such a way as to gain BIT coverage, then an EU-US investment chapter 
is likely to have little impact on the amount or location on inbound 
investments to the EU. This is because, again, an EU-US investment 
chapter will likely be redundant with international legal protections 
that the US investor already enjoys, or that the US investor can enjoy 
through appropriate corporate structuring. 
We are not aware of any evidence that US investors in the major 
EU member states actually do (frequently or otherwise) structure their 
investments via third states for the purpose of accessing the protection 
of existing investment treaties. This is not surprising because, as we 
explained above, evidence suggests that neither US investors in the EU 
nor EU investors in the US have expressed significant concerns about 
the sort of risks against which an investment treaty might protect, nor 
do they seem to particularly value the protections that ISDS may offer. 
Nevertheless, in cases where investors have specific concerns about 
future government measures, it is conceivable that they could structure 
the investment with investment treaty implications in mind. For 
example, in the dispute between Philip Morris Asia v Australia, the 
Australian government has argued that the Philip Morris group 
structured its investment in Australia so as to bring its trademarks 
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within the coverage of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT.13 Insofar as there 
is a possibility to structure investment between the US and EU member 
states so as to bring it under the protection of existing investment 
treaties, this would have implications for our estimation of both the 
costs and the benefits of a US-EU investment protection chapter, as 
ISDS in TTIP would be redundant with what US investors can already 
obtain via restructuring. 
Just as US investors might use corporate structuring to take 
advantage of existing third-state BITs when investing in the EU, so too 
might EU investors seeking to invest in the US also attempt to gain BIT 
coverage by routing their investments through any of the 40-some 
states which currently have a BIT with the US. However, EU investors 
would face two challenges. The first is that the US has included ‘denial 
of benefits’ provisions in a number of its investment treaties and FTA 
investment chapters. According to a commentary on the 2012 US model 
BIT, the main purpose of denial of benefits provisions is to provide 
“safeguards against the problem of treaty shopping through the 
creation of ‘sham’ enterprises.” (Caplan & Sharpe, 2013, p. 812). For 
example, NAFTA Article 1113(2) allows the United States (and the 
other Parties to NAFTA) to: 
deny the benefits [of NAFTA’s investment chapter] to an 
investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such Party 
and to investments of such investors if investors of a non-
Party own or control the enterprise and the enterprise has no 
substantial business activities in the territory of the Party 
under whose law it is constituted or organized.  
The term “substantial business activities” is not further defined. 
Equivalent denial of benefits provisions are included in the 2012 and 
2004 US model BITs (Art. 17 in both cases), and in other non-NAFTA 
free trade agreements, including the United States-Central America-
Dominican Republic FTA (CAFTA, Art. 10.12).14 
A second difficulty is that the US lacks investment treaties with 
states such as the Netherlands, Cayman Island and the Virgin Islands, 
                                                          
13 Philip Morris Asia v Australia, Australia’s Response to the Notice of 
Arbitration, 21 December 2011 [4]-[6]. 
14 CAFTA’s denial of benefits provision was, in fact, recently successfully 
invoked by El Salvador to defeat jurisdiction in a claim filed by a US-based 
holding company that, in the Tribunal’s view, was only a “passive actor” in the 
US. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12) 
(Decision on Jurisdiction). 
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which are likely to be attractive for tax reasons. This is an important 
consideration as tax planning plays a far greater role in corporate 
structuring than concerns related to investment treaties.  
In sum, US investors in the EU may currently be able to obtain 
investment treaty coverage of their investments even in the absence of 
an investment treaty between the US and the EU host state. If this is the 
case, ISDS in TTIP will prove largely redundant with the coverage US 
investors can already enjoy, if they wish. On the other hand, US 
investment treaty practice makes it more difficult for EU investors in 
the US to engage in such ‘treaty shopping’ under existing 
arrangements. If, contrary to our analysis in this section, the availability 
of investment treaty protection were a decisive factor for EU investors 
considering investing in the US, then the difficulties associated with 
‘treaty shopping’ under existing US treaties would mean that ISDS in 
TTIP would prove a greater benefit to such EU investors. 
3.4 De-politicisation of transatlantic investment disputes 
One potential benefit of investment arbitration is if it ‘de-politicises’ 
investment disputes. One version of this claim is that investment 
arbitration reduces the role of the home state in the resolution of 
specific conflicts between foreign investors and their host states 
(Shihata, 1986). This has also been used as a core argument against 
relying on inter-state dispute resolution in the investment protection 
chapter. Yet, in our view, concerns about politicisation of transatlantic 
investment disputes are often exaggerated. 
First of all, it is rarely clear what exactly is meant by de-
politicization of investment disputes (Paparinskis, 2012). While the 
involvement of home states in a dispute is one type of politicization, it 
is not the only one. Few would argue that the Phillip Morris claim 
against Australia is not politicised, for instance, and the same could be 
said of Vattenfall’s claims against Germany. More broadly, the 
controversial nature of investment arbitration to resolve public law 
disputes has brought about considerable political controversy in 
Europe – potentially at the expense of broader foreign policy agendas, 
such as a swift negotiation of TTIP.  
Secondly, while the de-politicisation thesis is widely shared 
amongst lawyers, it has never been subject to any rigorous empirical 
testing. Moreover, we are aware of no evidence to suggest that 
investment disputes across the Atlantic have spilled over into broader 
diplomatic conflicts. In the case of the Netherlands, interviews with 
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diplomatic officials indicate that this has never happened – despite the 
large bilateral investment flows between the two countries (Tietje & 
Baetens, 2014, pp. 69-72).  
Third, an investment chapter in TTIP is unlikely to provide 
meaningful access to ISDS for the kinds of investment disputes that are 
most likely to raise political sensitivities. As mentioned above, an EU-
US investment chapter is almost certain to include a self-judging 
national security exception similar to Article 17 of the 2012 model US 
BIT. In that case, decisions by the US government to block acquisitions 
by European investors on national security grounds may be essentially 
unreviewable in arbitration, leaving diplomatic protection as the 
investor’s only option to challenge the denial of permission to invest. 
Finally, and with respect to US pressure on European states, the 
US Department of State formally maintains a restrictive policy toward 
diplomatic espousal of investment claims, requiring, for instance, full 
exhaustion of local remedies.15 And while the US executive has 
historically been drawn into investment disputes in numerous 
developing countries,16 the high quality of the US-EU political 
relationship combined with Europe’s favourable investment climate 
makes us expect that incidences of strong US pressure on European 
states on behalf of US investors are rare. Diplomatic representations are 
bound to take place, but the type of politicisation of investment 
disputes seen in the mid-20th century between Western and 
developing states is highly unlikely. Transatlantic investment flows 
have flourished for decades without significant politicisation of the 
dispute settlement process. 
3.5 Impact on future negotiations with third parties  
A final potential benefit of including ISDS in the TTIP is if it increases 
the bargaining power of both the US and the EU in future negotiations 
with countries such as China. Although difficult to assess ex ante, we 
urge caution about the plausibility of this scenario.  
First of all, with respect to China, Beijing has adopted investment 
treaties for decades and the Chinese leadership has developed a 
somewhat distinct investment treaty practice tailored to its perception 
of China’s national interest (Gallagher & Shan, 2009). China has 
indicated considerable interest in an investment treaty with the EU – 
                                                          
15 www.state.gov/s/l/c7344.htm. 
16 Maurer (2013). 
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also before knowing the outcome of the TTIP negotiations – and has not 
expressed concerns about extending ISDS to post-establishment 
provisions. China also recently signed an investment treaty with 
Australia that included ISDS. This was despite the fact that Australia 
had previously refrained from enshrining ISDS provisions into its 
preferential trade and investment agreement (PTIA) with the United 
States. As noted by Berger & Poulsen (2015, p. 2), “Beijing was thereby 
not deterred from including investment arbitration in an agreement 
with a developed country, which had previously refused to include 
similar provisions in a treaty with the US. This seems to be the final nail 
in the coffin for the already implausible argument that China’s support 
of ISDS depends on the nature of investment protection agreements 
among developed countries.” 
Secondly, both European countries and the United States have 
refrained from signing BITs with developed countries for decades, but 
that has not prevented them from expanding their already widespread 
BIT networks with developing countries. Similarly, although OECD 
countries failed to agree to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
in the 1990s among themselves, this didn’t prevent OECD countries 
from continuing to sign BITs with developing countries. The reason is 
simple: the main purpose of ISDS is to act as a substitute for poor 
judicial systems, so it is not clear why it should be seen as illegitimate 
to exclude ISDS in agreements where there are for the most part 
developed legal systems on both sides.  
This was the argument used by Australia and the US for not 
including ISDS in their 2005 agreement and the logic behind the 
European Parliament’s 2013 vote to clarify that future EU investment 
agreements should include ISDS “[i]n the cases where it is justifiable”.17 
Similarly, Commissioner De Gucht implied that the EU would not 
necessarily push for ISDS if parties had well-developed legal systems, 
like the United States: “[o]bviously you need [ISDS] when it is an 
agreement with a third country that does not have a properly-
functioning judicial system, where one can have doubts about the rule 
of law.”18 The United States is not such a country and nor are any of the 
                                                          
17 See Committee Report tabled for Plenary, 1st Reading/Single Reading, 26 
March 2013 (www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id= 
1255871&t=d&l=en).  
18 See Remarks of Commissioner De Gucht, EUR. PARL. DEB. (339), 22 May 
2013) (www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference= 
20130522&secondRef=ITEM-019&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0124).  
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EU member states that do not currently have BITs with the United 
States, so we find it unlikely that investment protection provisions in 
the TTIP would have a tangible impact on the extent to which third 
parties will agree to ISDS with the US and/or the EU.  
4. Potential costs 
4.1 Risk of claims and adverse awards  
The primary cost to the EU of ISDS-backed investment protection is the 
increased risk of successful investment treaty claims against the EU or 
its member states. In estimating the scale of this cost, the first step is to 
assess the size of US investment stocks in the EU, as the likelihood of 
claims against the EU can be expected to increase roughly in proportion 
with the size of the investment stock in the EU covered by the treaty. 
As mentioned initially, the EU possesses a very large stock of US-origin 
investment. 
This is important. An often-heard argument in European debates 
about TTIP is that since (western) EU member states have been subject 
to only a few claims after having signed hundreds of BITs for decades, 
there is no reason to expect that the number of claims should rise 
significantly after TTIP. But this argument is based on a comparison 
between BITs signed with (mostly) insignificant sources of FDI and a 
potential future treaty signed with a very significant source of inward 
investment. Take the case of Germany, for instance, which has signed 
more than 150 BITs – the vast majority with developing countries. In 
2011, 3% of FDI stock in Germany came from developing countries, 9% 
came from the United States.19 Similar patterns emerge when looking 
at other western EU member states. In France, 4% of its 2011 FDI stock 
came from developing countries and 10% from the United States. In 
Sweden, 2% came from developing countries, 7% from the United 
States. And in the United Kingdom, 28% of inward FDI stock came from 
the United States, 8% from developing countries. 
Two further issues relate to the type of US investments in the EU: 
their size and sectoral composition. These issues are relevant because 
investment treaty claims involving investors in certain sectors and of 
certain sizes have been more common. Given the tremendous quantity 
                                                          
19 The following calculations are based on UNCTAD’s FDI statistics 
(http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-
Bilateral.aspx). Note that bilateral FDI statistics are subject to considerable 
measurement error.  
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of US investment in the EU, there are undoubtedly a great number of 
investment projects that are of sufficient size to make the economics of 
an investment treaty claim (i.e. ratio of legal costs to potential award) 
viable in theory. With respect to the distribution of sector-specific 
investment, US companies have made significant investments across 
virtually all sectors of the EU economy.20 
A different consideration concerns the culture and practice of 
dispute resolution among US investors in the EU. For example, 
American investors appear to be especially litigious. Accordingly, the 
British government warns UK investors operating in the US:  
Americans are, in general, inclined to start litigation or to 
threaten it – probably more so than the British. It is not just 
American lawyers that exhibit this tendency, but also 
American business people. Americans often sue or threaten 
suit as a strategic device to obtain some sort of amicable 
settlement (e.g., a money payment, a new contract, an 
agreement by the other side to abandon its claim). The great 
majority of commercial litigation started is never decided by 
the court or an arbitration panel. It is settled by the parties 
after the legal proceeding has begun; sometimes, the threat of 
legal action is sufficient to bring about a settlement. (UKTI, 
2013, p. 32). 
This also seems relevant in the context of investment treaty 
arbitration. A 2007 empirical analysis of the 83 investment treaty 
disputes that were known at the time to have resulted in awards found 
that 32 of those cases – over 38% – involved an investor from the United 
States (Franck, 2007, p. 28). The second-most-frequent nationalities 
were Canada and Italy, with just six cases each. In the absence of a 
theoretical model for predicting baseline expectations for investor 
participation in investment treaty arbitration, it is difficult to draw any 
definitive conclusions from these figures. For example, the US is a 
major source of outward FDI, and for that reason it may not be entirely 
unexpected that many investment treaty claims would involve US 
investors. On the other hand, the high proportion of claims by US 
investors may be seen as striking, given the relatively low number of 
US investment treaties in force (approximately 40, plus investment 
chapters in US FTAs, such as NAFTA). Unfortunately, Franck’s data do 
not control for such things as the amount of FDI from the home country, 
so it is impossible to say whether the level of US investor claims is 
                                                          
20 See US Bureau of Economic Analysis data (www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2013/ 
07%20July/0713_direct_investment_positions.pdf). 
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objectively “high”. Franck’s data also show that investors won 
damages in 38.5% of claims that were finally resolved in an award 
(Franck, 2007, p. 49 & p. 58). Franck’s data do not break out these 
statistics by the home state of the investor, so we are not able to say 
whether US investors win more often, or win more, than other 
investors. 
Canada’s experience under NAFTA Chapter 11 is relevant here, 
as Canada is a developed country with a strong rule-of-law tradition – 
just like most EU member states. As of February 2015, Canada had been 
the target of 35 NAFTA investment-chapter claims, all but one brought 
by US investors.21 If anything we would expect that EU member states 
would be more prone to US claims than Canada, as Canada hosts less 
than 8% of US outward FDI stock, whereas the EU hosts more than 50% 
(UNCTAD, 2014, Table II.7). Table 5.4 shows all known Chapter 11 
notices of intent filed by US investors against Canada. The table lists 
the claimant’s name, the minimum amount of damages sought (as 
indicated in the notice of intent), the year the notice of intent was filed, 
a short description of the dispute and the dispute’s outcome. 
Table 5.4 illustrates the breadth of Canadian government actions 
that US investors have challenged: electricity regulation, changes in tax 
laws, the revocation or denial of various licenses, export bans on 
hazardous materials, health care regulations, patent decisions and 
more. The table also shows that a significant proportion of notices of 
intent are eventually withdrawn or become inactive (14/35). 
Unfortunately, the Canadian government does not indicate the reason 
for withdrawal or inactivity. We think it likely that many withdrawn or 
inactive notices of intent are withdrawn or become inactive because the 
investor realises that the claim has little chance of success, or that 
proceeding with arbitration will be too costly.  
However, we have no hard evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Eleven notices of intent have proceeded to arbitration and led to an 
award or a formal settlement. Of those eleven, only five have resulted 
in payments to the investor. In total, it appears that Canada has paid 
investors approximately CDN 156 million, with the bulk of that total 
consisting of a CDN 130 million settlement in AbitibiBowater. (Damages 
are still pending in the recent award in Mobil Investments). Eight 
disputes are on-going. US investors appear to have become more active 
in filing Chapter 11 notices of intent in recent years, with nine notices 
                                                          
21 See www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada.htm. By “claims” we mean that 
a notice of intent to file a Chapter 11 claim was filed by the investor. 
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filed since 2010. Those nine notices together claim a minimum of over 
$3 billion in damages, including a claim for $1.5 billion in the Detroit 
International Bridge Co. case. However, it is probably safe to say that 
those damage claims are exaggerated and intended by the investors to 
increase pressure on Canada to settle in the investors’ favour.  
Table 5.4 Claims against Canada by US investors pursuant to NAFTA 
chapter 11 
  
Claimant(s) 
Minimum 
damages 
sought 
Year 
notice 
intent  
Dispute 
description 
Outcome 
1 
Signa S.A. de 
C.V. 
CDN 50 
million 
1996 
Drug patent 
decision 
Withdrawn 
2 Ethyl Corp. 
USD 201 
million 
1997 
Import ban on 
gasoline 
additive 
Settled; 
investor paid 
approx. CDN 
20 million 
3 
Pope & Talbot 
Inc. 
USD 30 
million 
1998 
Softwood 
lumber 
Partial award 
for investor, 
USD 408 
thousand 
4 S.D. Meyers Inc. 
USD 10 
million 
1998 
Export ban for 
PCB waste 
Award for 
investor, CDN 
6 million 
5 
Sun Belt Water, 
Inc. 
NA 1998 
Denial of license 
for water export  
Inactive 
6 
Ketcham 
Investments, 
Inc. and Tysa 
Investments 
CDN 30 
million 
2000 
Softwood 
lumber 
Withdrawn 
7 
United Postal 
Service of 
America, Inc. 
USD 100 
million 
2000 
Anti-
competitive 
practices of 
Canadian postal 
service 
Investor 
claims 
rejected on 
merits 
8 Chemtura Corp. 
USD 100 
million 
2001 
Regulation of 
crop pesticide 
Investor claim 
rejected on 
merits 
9 
Trammel Crow 
Co. 
USD 32 
million 
2001 
Abuse of postal 
service 
procurement 
process 
Withdrawn 
10 Albert Connolly NA 2004 
Forfeiture of 
mining claim 
site 
Inactive 
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11 
Contractual 
Obligation 
Prod. LLC et al. 
USD 20 
million 
2005 
Denial of 
television 
programming 
subsidy 
Inactive 
12 
Peter Nikola 
Pesic 
NA 2005 NA Withdrawn 
13 
GL Farms LLC 
and Carl Adams 
USD 78 
million 
2006 
Milk export 
programme 
Inactive 
14 
Merrill & Ring 
Forestry LP 
USD 25 
million 
2006 
Export controls 
on logs 
Investor 
claims 
rejected on 
merits 
15 V.G. Gallo 
USD 355 
million 
2006 
Expropriation of 
landfill 
Investor 
claims 
dismissed for 
lack of 
jurisdiction 
16 
Gottlieb 
Investors Group 
USD 6.5 
million 
2007 
Change in tax 
laws 
Inactive 
17 
Mobil 
Investments Inc. 
& Murphy Oil 
Corp. 
USD 50 
million 
2007 
Imposition of 
performance 
requirements 
Award in 
investor's 
favour; 
compensation 
TBD 
18 
Centurion 
Health Corp. 
USD 155 
million 
2008 
Restrictions on 
private health 
care 
Investor claim 
terminated by 
tribunal 
19 Clayton Bilcon 
USD 188 
million 
2008 
Environmental 
assessment of 
quarry project 
Pending 
20 David Bishop 
USD 1 
million 
2008 
Revocation of 
license for 
wilderness 
outfitter 
Inactive 
21 
Dow 
AgroSciences 
LLC 
USD 2 
million 
2008 
Ban on lawn 
pesticides 
Settled with 
no compensa-
tion paid 
22 
Georgia Basin 
L.P. 
USD 5 
million 
2008 
Export controls 
on logs 
Inactive 
23 
Janet Marie 
Broussard Shiell 
et al. 
USD 21 
million 
2008 
Fraudulent 
bankruptcy 
proceedings 
Inactive 
24 
William Jay 
Greiner and 
Malbaie River 
Outfitters Inc. 
USD 5 
million 
2008 
Revocation of 
license for 
wilderness 
outfitter 
Withdrawn 
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25 
AbitibiBowater 
Inc. 
CDN 300 
million 
2009 
Termination of 
water and 
timber rights 
Settled; 
investor paid 
CDN 130 
million 
26 
Christopher and 
Nancy Lacich 
USD 1.2 
thousand 
2009 
Change in tax 
laws 
Withdrawn 
27 
Detroit 
International 
Bridge Co. 
USD 1.5 
billion 
2010 
Regulation of 
toll bridge 
Pending 
28 John R. Andre 
CDN 4 
million 
2010 
Emergency 
caribou hunting 
restrictions 
Inactive 
29 
Mesa Power 
Group LLC 
CDN 775 
million 
2011 
Renewable 
energy 
regulation 
Pending 
30 
St. Mary’s 
VCNA, LLC 
USD 275 
million 
2011 
Denial of license 
for quarry 
Settled with 
no compensa-
tion paid 
31 Eli Lilly & Co. 
CDN 100 
million 
2012 
Invalidation of 
pharmaceutical 
patent 
Pending 
32 
Lone Pine 
Resources Inc. 
CDN 250 
million 
2012 
Revocation of 
mine permit 
Pending 
33 
Mercer 
International 
Inc. 
CDN 250 
million 
2012 
Electricity 
generation 
Pending 
34 
Windstream 
Energy LLC 
CDN 475 
million 
2012 
Renewable 
energy 
regulation 
Pending 
35 J.M. Longyear $12 million 2014 Forestry taxes Pending 
Notes: “Minimum damages sought” are taken from Notices of Intent and do not 
include pro forma requests for costs, interest and the like; actual amounts 
claimed in arbitration may be higher. Where “US” or “CDN” is not listed, the 
Notice of Intent is ambiguous as to whether the investor is requesting monetary 
relief expressed in US or Canadian dollars. Last updated 4 February 2015. 
Sources: Compiled by authors from information on the website of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/disp-diff/NAFTA.aspx) and NAFTAClaims.com.  
We think that it is fair to say that Canada has a relatively 
successful record in defending itself against investor-state claims, at 
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least in the sense of avoiding frequent and/or large adverse awards.22 
This contrasts with the experiences of some developing countries, such 
as Argentina and Ecuador, which have seen very large adverse awards 
as a result of investor-state arbitration initiated by US investors 
(Gallagher & Shrestha, 2011, Table 1). 
If an EU-US investment chapter provided US investors with 
more generous rights than they would otherwise have under the laws 
of European states, the risk of investor lawsuits and adverse arbitral 
awards would rise, perhaps considerably. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to offer a general survey of the legal regimes of all EU member 
states. Instead, we provide an illustrative case study, using the UK as 
an example. It is probably fair to say that the UK has a legal regime that, 
both in terms of substantive content and implementation by local 
courts, is among the best in the EU at protecting the property rights of 
both domestic and foreign investors. We nonetheless find some 
meaningful risk of adverse awards for the UK; that risk will necessarily 
be higher for member states that do not have as high-quality legal regimes as 
does the UK. In other words, we expect that an analysis of all EU member 
states would indicate that, on average, the risk of adverse awards is 
higher than we estimate that risk to be for the UK considered alone. 
4.2 The UK as an example of the risk of adverse awards 
In general, our view is that an EU-US investment chapter is unlikely to 
grant US investors in the UK significantly greater rights than they would 
otherwise have under UK law. As we explain below, however, an EU-
US investment treaty may provide opportunities or incentives for 
investors to bring claims that they would not bring under UK domestic 
law. The content of international investment law remains contested and 
uncertain, and it is possible that an ISDS tribunal formed under an EU-
US investment chapter would grant a US investor significant damages 
for conduct that would not normally be actionable under UK domestic 
law. 
We say that an EU-US investment chapter would not grant US 
investors in the UK significantly greater rights than they currently enjoy 
because most successful investment treaty claims concern 
circumstances that would clearly be inconsistent with UK law, such as 
the unilateral abrogation of contracts by government authorities, or 
serious procedural failures in administrative or judicial processes. 
                                                          
22 While Canada, as indicated, has lost a small number of investor-state 
arbitrations, the US has never lost an investment treaty arbitration.  
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While in some cases investment tribunals have interpreted investment 
treaty text in ways that go beyond the protections contained in UK law 
– for example, on the question of ‘legitimate expectations’ or the 
granting of regulatory permits and licenses (Poulsen, Bonnitcha & 
Yackee, 2013) – we believe that an EU-US investment chapter is likely 
to contain relatively restrictive formulations of the minimum standard 
of treatment, regulatory expropriation and other standards that have, 
when drafted without qualification, been interpreted more 
expansively. Since the well-known Methanex NAFTA Chapter 11 
arbitration, in which a Canadian investor unsuccessfully challenged a 
California environmental regulation, the US has appeared to be 
particularly concerned with protecting its right to change the legal or 
regulatory regime in non-discriminatory ways (Caplan & Sharpe, 2013, 
p. 756). We see that sensitivity in the various explanatory footnotes and 
annexed text in the 2012 US model BIT that, for example, limit the fair 
and equitable treatment standard to the customary international law 
standard for the treatment of aliens,23 or that reaffirm that “except in 
rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulations that are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives…do not 
constitute indirect expropriation”,24 or that clarify that whether a 
regulatory grant of permission to engage in an activity is not a covered 
“investment” if the grant of authority does not also “create any rights 
protected under domestic law”.25  
On the other hand, and despite such attempts to narrow and 
clarify the protections provided by the US model BIT, there remains 
significant debate and uncertainty as to the content of such terms as 
“fair and equitable treatment”.26 That lingering uncertainty leaves open 
the possibility that an arbitral tribunal might interpret the language of 
an EU-US investment chapter expansively, despite the addition to the 
treaty text of cautionary footnotes and annexed clarifications. In turn, 
continued uncertainty as to the content of international investment law 
means that investors may have an incentive to bring ‘long-shot’ claims 
against the UK, in particular where the investor has suffered large 
damages. In some cases, a long-shot claim may result in an arbitral 
                                                          
23 2012 US model BIT, Annex A. 
24 2012 US model BIT, Annex B. 
25 2012 US model BIT, Art. 1 footnote 2. 
26 Kläger (2011, pp. 87-88) (discussing the failure of the US model BIT’s 
clarifications on the meaning of “fair and equitable treatment” to actually 
clarify the meaning of the phrase). 
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interpretation and application of treaty text that goes beyond UK 
domestic law.  
For example, the tribunal in the recent case of Occidental v. 
Ecuador II read into the fair and equitable treatment provision of the 
US-Ecuador BIT an obligation on the state to treat the investor 
“proportionately” when the state exercises a contract-based right to 
terminate its commercial relationship with the investor upon the 
investor’s breach of the contract.27 While the principle of 
proportionality has some operation as a ground of review in the 
administrative law of the UK, English contract law does not require an 
innocent party to exercise a right to terminate a contract 
proportionately. If one party breaches a contract and if that breach 
creates a right to terminate, the innocent party is entitled to exercise 
that right to terminate at its discretion.28 While there are other 
complexities in Occidental II that may bear on how the case would be 
resolved if it had been litigated under the English law of contract, we 
think a dispute akin to Occidental II may well be decided differently if 
it were litigated under English law. As such, the case provides a helpful 
illustration of the point that apparently restrictive concepts such as the 
minimum standard of treatment required by customary international 
law are sometimes interpreted by arbitral tribunals in ways that can 
grant foreign investors more generous rights than would be recognised 
under UK law. 
The EU appears to have recognised that vague investment treaty 
terms like “fair and equitable treatment” give ISDS tribunals a great 
deal of leeway to rule against host states if they wish.29 The Commission 
has proposed that EU investment agreements “will set out precisely 
what elements are covered and thus prohibited” under the fair and 
equitable standard. The Commission proposes that the fair and 
equitable treatment would be defined as covering issues such as 
“manifest arbitrariness, abusive treatment (coercion, duress or 
harassment), or failure to respect the fundamental principles of due 
process”.30 While we agree that the standard formulation of fair and 
                                                          
27 Occidental v Ecuador II, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012 
[383]. 
28 Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 per Lord Hoffmann. 
29 See the EU Commission Fact Sheet, “Investment Protection and Investor-to-
State Dispute Settlement in EU agreements”, November 2013 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf) 
30 Ibid. 
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equitable treatment could certainly be improved to make its content 
more certain (and to make tribunal holdings more predictable ex ante), 
the Commission’s proposed clarifications would still leave tribunals 
significant discretion to interpret such terms as “arbitrariness” or 
“duress” expansively. This is especially so as the current draft suggests 
that the application of such principles should take into account 
“legitimate expectations” of the investor that are based on “specific 
representations” made by officials of the host state. 
Despite the potential of expansive interpretations of uncertain 
treaty text, an EU-US investment chapter would still probably by design 
confer greater rights on US investors that they would be entitled to 
under UK law, at least in certain areas. The general rule in the UK is 
that legislation passed by Parliament cannot be challenged in the 
courts. This is relevant also when considering political costs, as noted 
below, as investment tribunals authorised to override acts of 
Parliament is politically sensitive. Moreover, while the actions of the 
executive can be challenged in UK courts, pecuniary remedies are only 
rarely awarded in such cases (Craig, 2012). In both respects, the position 
under an EU-US investment treaty would differ from the position 
under UK law. 
Overall, our view is that the UK faces meaningful risk that US 
investors will seek to invoke an EU-US investment chapter’s ISDS 
provisions to bring claims against the UK government, and that EU 
member states with weaker legal systems will face even greater risk. 
This assessment is primarily due to i) the large amount of US 
investment in the UK, and in the EU more generally; ii) the fact that US 
investors appear to have been relatively aggressive in bringing actions 
against other states, including Canada, under investment protection 
instruments that are likely to be very similar to an EU-US investment 
chapter; and iii) the continued uncertainty over the proper meaning of 
key concepts in international investment law, such as ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’. In particular, investors can be expected to bring 
some number of ‘long-shot’ claims against the UK, some of which the 
UK may lose. 
Moreover, so long as the investor has some chance of success, the 
mere act of filing an arbitral claim may give the US investor leverage 
against the UK government in terms of encouraging the UK 
government to settle the case, even if only to avoid litigation costs and 
any possible damage to the UK’s reputation as a welcoming 
environment for foreign investment. This is an important point. For 
example, in the well-known Ethyl NAFTA litigation, Canada settled the 
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case by agreeing to pay the US investor $13 million. Thus, while we do 
not expect the UK to incur many high-value awards in favour of US 
investors, this does not mean the UK will not incur considerable 
litigation-related costs under an EU-US investment chapter. These 
include the costs of more favourable settlements than would otherwise 
be agreed, as well as fees to lawyers and tribunals. The latter are 
expected to average at approximately $4 million per claim per party, as 
discussed below. We view it as virtually certain that such costs under 
an EU-US investment chapter will be higher than under the status quo, 
as we assume that currently the vast bulk of existing US investment in 
the UK is not covered by an investment treaty. In contrast, under an 
EU-US investment chapter, all US investment in the UK would be 
covered. 
Our analysis, as applied to other EU member states, would 
obviously depend on whether investments in those other member 
states are already covered by a US investment treaty and on the quality 
of the domestic legal system. But the UK illustration is important, as we 
expect that some EU member states will have legal systems that are of 
generally lower quality than that of the UK and, as such, at greater risk 
of adverse awards. 
4.3 Legal costs  
We expect that the EU and its member states would be able to develop 
a defence capacity of a quality roughly comparable to that of the US 
and Canada, especially given that EU government institutions are 
unlikely to engage in the kinds of mistreatment of US investors that are 
likely to be viewed as clear or egregious violations of international law. 
However, it must be recalled that the EU and its member states are 
likely to incur additional costs (lawyers’ fees; tribunal fees) in 
defending itself against investor lawsuits. Whether the EU itself or a 
particular member state will bear the costs of ISDS litigation will 
depend on EU regulations governing cost allocation (European 
Commission, 2012). We do not discuss intra-EU cost allocation here as 
our focus is on the costs and benefits of ISDS as to the EU and its 
member states considered collectively. More precisely, our analysis 
focuses on the magnitude of legal costs, and the way they are 
distributed between investors (in their capacity as claimants in ISDS 
proceedings) and the EU and the member states (in their capacity as 
respondents). 
A recent OECD scoping paper on ISDS reported the results of a 
survey showing that total “legal and arbitration costs for the parties in 
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recent ISDS cases have averaged over $8 million [or $4 million per 
party] with costs exceeding $30 million in some cases.” (OECD, 2012, p. 
18). These figures are consistent with a briefing by the law firm Allen & 
Overy, which puts average costs at slightly over $4 million per party, 
with minor variations of tribunal costs as between cases under differing 
sets of procedural rules (Hodgson, 2012). Additional costs (such as the 
costs to the government of maintaining an office dedicated to 
investment-treaty defence) would add some amount of ‘overhead’ to 
the per-dispute averages reported in the OECD report. It should also 
be noted that ISDS costs can be significantly higher than the average 
figure mentioned above. For example, in the recent Abaclat decision on 
jurisdiction, the claimants had spent some $27 million on their case to 
date, and Argentina had spent about $12 million (OECD, 2012). These 
costs were solely for a decision addressing jurisdiction but not the 
merits. In our own experience, costs for the respondent states and 
claimants are roughly equivalent on average, albeit with significant 
variation between cases. This impression is broadly consistent with 
available evidence.31  
Moreover, international investment law is currently not 
characterised by reliable a ‘loser pays’ rule as to costs, and “it is widely 
recognised that outcomes on cost shifting in ISDS cases are highly 
uncertain”. (OECD, 2012, p. 21). Even when investors are required to 
pay the costs of the tribunal, considerable legal fees can still be borne 
by the ‘winning’ party. In Plama v Bulgaria, for instance, Bulgaria had 
to spend more than $6 million in legal fees in a case the Bulgarian 
government ‘won’.32  
On the other hand, EU treaty negotiators appear to be 
considering the inclusion of language on cost shifting in TTIP that 
would establish a ‘loser pays’ rule.33 Depending on the specific text (for 
example, is cost shifting allowed only for ‘frivolous’ losing claims or for 
all losing claims?), the provision – if the US agrees to it – may 
significantly reduce litigation costs for the EU and its member states, 
                                                          
31 Between $100,000 and $350,000 higher on average, depending on whether 
outlying cases are excluded from average figures. 
32 Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 
August 2008. 
33 See the European Commission Fact Sheet, “Investment Protection and 
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU agreements”, November 2013 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/ 
november/tradoc_151916.pdf). 
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either by shifting government expenses to the losing investor, or by 
discouraging investors from bringing claims in the first place. But it 
should be realised that a ‘loser pays’ rule will also leave the EU and its 
member states potentially liable for the investors’ legal costs in the event 
that the US investor wins. Whether a ‘loser pays’ rule will result in a 
net benefit or cost to the EU over the status quo of each side pays its 
own costs will depend on assumptions about the distribution of losers 
and winners and the likely magnitude of the costs on each sides. 
In their commissioned study by the Dutch Government, Tietje & 
Baetens (2014, p. 75) suggest that the cost to a host state of defending 
an investor-state arbitration may well be less than the costs of 
defending the same claim if it had been brought in the courts of the host 
state. They rightly point out that the costs of the court proceedings 
themselves (as opposed to the parties’ legal costs) are always borne by 
the state, whereas in arbitration the costs of the tribunal are either 
divided between the parties or borne by the losing party. Nevertheless, 
we have doubts that investor-state arbitration is a more cost-effective 
procedure for resolving disputes, either from the perspective of a host 
state or from the perspective of society as a whole. In our view, it is 
impossible to say whether investor-state arbitration is more cost-
effective than resolving disputes through national court proceedings in 
the absence of significantly more comprehensive evidence than is 
currently available. 
First, EU countries will need to maintain court systems 
regardless of whether they agree to ISDS in TTIP or, indeed, any other 
investment treaty. This has important implications for how the 
avoidable cost of resolving disputes through arbitration rather than 
national courts should be calculated. Regardless of whether ISDS is 
included in investment treaties, all the fixed costs of maintaining a 
court system – for example, those associated with the construction of 
court buildings and the appointment of judges – are already incurred. 
The only institutional costs avoided through arbitration are the variable 
costs incurred in relation to the particular dispute in question – for 
example, the value of the time that judges and other court officials 
would have spent on the case had it been resolved in court. 
Second, the parties’ legal and witness costs (party costs) 
constitute the vast majority of the costs associated with investment 
treaty arbitration (Hodgson, 2014). Average tribunal costs were 
$746,000 – less than 10% of the total costs of the proceedings. While we 
are not aware of any equivalent data in relation to the costs of national 
court proceedings (which may, in any case, vary significantly by 
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country), the data we have for arbitration suggest that any assessment 
of the relative costs of arbitration and national court proceedings must 
take into account any differences between party costs in the different 
types of proceedings.  
Third, there are reasons to think that party costs associated with 
domestic litigation will generally be lower than those associated with 
litigating the same dispute through investor-state arbitration. This is 
because most European countries have well-developed systems of 
administrative, corporate and contract law. In contrast, arbitration 
under investment treaties involves the application of vague and 
imprecise standards, such as the obligation to provide ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’. Lack of clarity in the applicable law is likely to 
increase the range of factual and legal questions at issue in a dispute, 
which would tend to increase party costs. 
To give an example, a challenge to Australia’s tobacco plain-
packaging laws, brought by Japan Tobacco International, proceeded to 
final judgment in Australia’s highest court in less than a year from the 
initiation of the claim. In contrast, by the time of this publication it has 
taken more than three years for the challenge to Australia’s tobacco 
plain-packaging laws brought to investor-state arbitration by Philip 
Morris to reach a hearing on preliminary objections. While this example 
is not necessarily representative, it illustrates the need for further 
evidence about the average party costs of comparable investor-state 
disputes that are litigated in national courts. 
Fourth, Tietje & Baetens (2014, p. 75) suggest that arbitral 
proceedings are more likely to conclude with a complete and final 
resolution of a dispute, reducing the costs of subsequent proceedings. 
We think better evidence is needed before such a claim can be made. 
Whilst it is normally possible to appeal the decisions of a national court 
of first instance, it is also possible to challenge the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals. As Tietje & Baetens note, the decisions of ICSID 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) tribunals 
are subject to annulment proceedings under the ICSID Convention. The 
decisions of non-ICSID tribunals are also subject to challenge in the 
form of set-aside and recognition proceedings in national courts. In the 
past, many investor-state arbitral decisions have been the subject of 
expensive and protracted proceedings in national courts. For example, 
the award in BG v Argentina was the subject of further proceedings in 
both the US Court of Appeals and the US Supreme Court. Any overall 
comparison of the costs of proceedings would need to consider the full 
range of possibilities for further litigation following the decisions of 
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both arbitral tribunals and courts of first instance, the costs of such 
further proceedings, and the frequency with which these procedural 
options are pursued. 
All in all, we are less than convinced about the claim of Tietje & 
Baetens that comparable domestic court/law proceedings involve 
lower costs for the host state than investment arbitration. The claim is 
impossible to test without comparable data. But given our comments 
above, there are reasons to expect that it is in fact the other way around.  
4.4 Risk of reduced policy space  
The inclusion of ISDS-backed investment protections in the TTIP would 
impose costs on the EU to the extent that it prevents the EU and its 
member states from regulating in the public interest. This potential cost 
encompasses both the effect of TTIP on legislative decision-making (e.g. 
if the existence of ISDS-backed investment protections dissuaded a 
state from enacting new tobacco control laws) and the effect of TTIP on 
executive decision-making (e.g. if the existence of ISDS-backed 
investment protections dissuaded a regulatory agency from shutting 
down a foreign-owned hazardous waste facility on account of the 
investor’s failure to comply with environmental conditions attached to 
its operating permit). We use the term ‘policy space’ to refer to this 
potential cost.  
Assessing the extent of this cost raises two initial conceptual 
difficulties. The first of these stems from the fact that the EU itself and 
the EU member states are already bound by their own systems of law. 
Insofar as the TTIP ’constrains’ the EU and its member states from 
adopting or applying policy measures that are, in any event, prohibited 
by other laws, no ‘policy space’ is lost. A useful first approximation is 
the principle that investment treaties only restrict a state’s policy space 
insofar as they prohibit the EU and the member states state from acting 
in a way that would otherwise be permissible. Therefore, any 
assessment of political costs associated with TTIP must begin with a 
close legal analysis of the provisions of the TTIP in light of comparable 
provisions of EU law,34 and the law of the member states. However, this 
is only a starting point for the analysis. Constitutional principles aside, 
national laws are subject to regular change, whereas the terms of TTIP 
would be exceedingly difficult to amend.  
                                                          
34 For an example of such an exercise focusing specifically on EU law, see 
Kleinheisterkamp (2012). 
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A second conceptual issue concerns valuation of the ‘cost’ that 
the additional restrictions imposed by an investment treaty would 
place on the member state’s policy space. One of the most contentious 
issues in existing legal and academic debates about investment treaties 
is whether the constraints they impose on the exercise of government 
powers should be understood as ‘costs’ or, rather, as standards of ’good 
governance’ that it would be in the interest of every state to meet, even 
in the absence of investment treaties (Bonnitcha, 2014, sec. 2.4.3). This 
debate raises complex and contested questions about the manner and 
extent in which governments should intervene in their economies. In 
this chapter we do not propose an overarching theory of desirable and 
undesirable forms of government regulation. All the member states of 
the EU are democracies. We suggest that, in a democracy, the 
appropriate benchmark for valuing the cost associated with any 
restriction on policy space is the government of the day’s own 
assessment of the public interest. Accordingly, the impact of TTIP’s 
investment protection provisions on EU policy space can be 
understood as the extent to which the treaty prevents the EU and the 
EU member states from adopting or applying policies that the relevant 
government would have preferred to apply in the absence of the treaty. 
Assessing the likely size of this cost raises many of the same 
issues that were considered in our assessment of the likely economic 
cost of adverse arbitral awards under TTIP. Given the sheer size of the 
stock of US investment in the EU, the likelihood of disputes between 
US investors and the EU and its member states is high. The composition 
of US investment in the EU is also potentially relevant because 
investments in particular sectors have proven more likely to result in 
investment treaty disputes in the past. We note that there are 
substantial stocks of US investment spread across almost every sector 
of the EU economy, including sectors that have proven particularly 
prone to investment treaty claims in the past.  
In reconciling our assessment of the political costs associated 
with lost policy space under an EU-US investment treaty and our 
assessment of the economic costs associated with adverse arbitral 
awards, it is important to acknowledge the risk of double-counting the 
same costs. If the EU and the EU member states fully comply with their 
obligations under TTIP, they would not incur any economic costs as a 
result of adverse arbitral awards. However, they may refrain from 
regulating in ways that they would otherwise regard as desirable. In 
contrast, if the EU and the EU member states ignore the risk of claims 
under TTIP, they will not suffer from any reduction in policy space in 
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practice. They would, instead, expose themselves to the risk of economic 
costs associated with adverse arbitral awards. In practice, we think the 
risk of ISDS is likely to affect the behaviour of EU member states in a 
way that falls somewhere between these two extreme scenarios.  
There are other ways in which the treaty could affect EU policy 
space. We have noted the size of US outward FDI stocks in the EU and 
the fact that US investors seem particularly likely to rely on their legal 
rights as a bargaining tool. If TTIP did include ISDS, we expect that the 
EU and its member states would be regularly faced with US investors 
opposing new policies on the grounds of the treaty. This opposition 
could be expressed either through lobbying, through submissions to 
government inquiries or by initiating arbitration proceedings under the 
treaty. To the extent that these activities encouraged EU decision-
makers to modify or abandon preferred measures, it would count as a 
political cost of the treaty. In assessing the ability of US investors to 
persuade the EU or its member states to modify or abandon preferred 
policies, two considerations are relevant: the quality of legal advice 
available to the EU and its members states’ decision-makers; and the 
extent to which the EU-US investment treaty grants US investors 
greater rights than they would otherwise have under relevant EU and 
national law.  
We do not have access to any direct measure of the quality of 
legal advice available to EU member states. It may be that there is a 
degree of variation in the internal legal capacity of member states. We 
would expect member states with stronger internal legal capacity to be 
better placed to manage tactical use of threats of litigation by US 
investors, insofar as those threats lack legal foundation.  
On the other hand, the availability of high-quality legal advice 
may make governments of the member states more likely to amend or 
withdraw policies when those policies raise serious risks of non-
compliance with the investment protection provisions of TTIP. A clear 
example of this phenomenon is the recent announcement by New 
Zealand relating to its policy on tobacco plain-packaging. While the 
New Zealand government has made it clear that its preferred policy 
would be to introduce tobacco plain-packaging, in light of legal 
objections raised by tobacco companies it has decided to delay the 
enactment of legislation until after the investment treaty claim 
concerning Australian tobacco plain-packaging, Philip Morris v 
Australia, has been resolved (Turia, 2013; Wilson, 2014). Similarly, in SD 
Myers v Canada the Canadian government revoked a ban on hazardous 
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waste exports to the US after a US investor initiated arbitration.35 The 
Canadian government judged – correctly as it turned out – that it was 
likely that the measure would be found to be inconsistent with NAFTA. 
A third example of this potential political cost associated with 
investment treaties is the case of Ethyl v Canada, a claim brought by a 
US investor under NAFTA. It seems that this claim played at least some 
role in encouraging the Canadian government to abandon the 
environmental measure that was the subject of the dispute (Tienhaara, 
2009). The settlement agreement required the payment of damages (as 
noted above) and the withdrawal of the measure, thereby entailing 
both economic and political costs to Canada.36 In short, in 
circumstances where a foreign investor opposes a preferred 
government policy on the basis of an investment treaty, and where that 
policy is at serious risk of non-compliance with the investment treaty, 
developed states comparable to the EU member states have amended, 
delayed or withdrawn preferred policies. 
In this light, the second question – the extent to which TTIP 
would grant US investors in the EU more generous legal rights than 
they would otherwise have under relevant EU and national laws – 
assumes particular importance. In earlier sections of this chapter we 
observed that an EU-US investment treaty would likely follow the US 
model BIT in including text that limits and clarifies the substantive 
protections provided by the treaty. These clarifications redress some of 
the most obvious ways in which an EU-US investment chapter could 
confer greater rights on US investors that are otherwise available under 
the law of some EU member states – notably, some of the broader 
interpretations of the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’ adopted by 
earlier arbitral tribunals. Nevertheless, in our section on Economic 
Costs, we identified particular ways in which an EU-US investment 
treaty would still grant US investors legal rights that they would not 
otherwise have in particular member states, referring to the example of 
the UK. For example, this could strengthen the bargaining position of 
US investors in negotiations to settle contractual disputes with the EU 
member states. 
                                                          
35 SD Myers v Canada Partial Award, 13 November 2000. 
36 There are some complications in assessing the extent of political cost implied 
by the events surrounding the Ethyl case, as the abandoned measure, in its 
original form, was also ruled inconsistent with Canadian law.  
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4.5 Risk of controversial claims 
Another potential political cost concerns the possibility that high 
profile claims against EU member states may provoke controversy 
within domestic political systems. Disputes resolved through investor-
state arbitration may be the subject of public controversy especially if 
the investor’s claims or the arbitral tribunal’s decision are seen as 
threatening the government’s policy space in sensitive areas.  
The evaluation of this potential cost should of course be handled 
with great caution. In a democratic society, the fact that a policy, 
judicial decision or – in the present circumstances – a claim before an 
arbitral tribunal becomes the subject of popular debate and controversy 
should not be understood as constituting a cost in itself. Disagreement 
about public affairs is a normal and healthy incident in democratic 
government. Nevertheless, if the controversy around a specific claim 
against a party triggers widespread opposition to treaties and 
international cooperation in general, then in extreme cases this backlash 
could limit the ability of the government of the day to pursue preferred 
policies on the international plane.  
US investors have brought controversial claims against other 
developed countries arising from: banking regulation (Genin v Estonia); 
domestic ownership and domestic content requirements on media 
organisations (CME v Czech Republic); regulation of the trans-boundary 
movement of hazardous waste (SD Myers v Canada); regulation of 
national monopolies (UPS v Canada); the ability of private health 
providers to operate alongside a host state’s public health system 
(Howard and Centurion Health v Canada); the phasing out of carcinogenic 
pesticides (Chemtura v Canada); invalidation of patent rights (Eli Lilli v 
Canada); and plain-packaging regulation (Philip Morris v Australia, via 
Hong Kong BIT). While the majority of these claims were resolved in 
favour of respondent governments, the fact that US investors are 
known to frequently bring controversial claims is important, as a 
particularly sensitive case can provoke a broader political backlash. EU 
investors, as well, have brought numerous highly controversial claims 
arising from, for instance, affirmative action policies (Foresti et al. v 
South Africa); reactions to financial crises (Marfin v Cyprus & Postova 
banka and Istrokapital v Greece); and the phase-out of nuclear energy 
(Vattenfall v Germany).  
The US government itself has realised that sensitive claims can 
result in a political backlash. When a Canadian company, Loewen, filed 
a NAFTA claim concerning its treatment by a Mississippi state court, 
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one of the arbitrators was told informally by the US Department of 
Justice that “if we lose this case, we could lose NAFTA”.37 Similarly, if 
a US investor seeks to override an act of one or more European 
parliaments, or files a claim concerning sensitive areas of public 
regulation, such as environmental or public health regulation, this 
could potentially provoke a political response with systemic 
consequences for the ability of the EU to support investor-state 
arbitration in agreements where it is more necessary than in the TTIP. 
Perhaps an even-greater risk is the possibility that controversy about 
investor-state claims could reduce the level of political support within 
the EU for international economic cooperation on matters where the 
potential benefits are much greater – for example, trade liberalisation.  
5. Conclusion 
Based on our analysis, we conclude that including an investment 
protection chapter in TTIP that is accompanied by ISDS is unlikely to 
generate significant economic or political benefits for the EU. Our 
analysis also suggests that the inclusion of such provisions would lead 
to significant economic and political costs for the EU. While it is 
important not to exaggerate the scale of potential costs, our overall 
assessment is that the costs are highly likely to exceed any potential 
benefit to the EU. Accordingly, we would suggest that unless ISDS is 
accompanied by considerable concessions by the United States so as to 
offset ISDS-related costs, it would be prudent for the EU to consider 
alternatives.  
One of the authors has previously recommended a number of 
pragmatic proposals – such as relying on inter-state dispute settlement 
or, at a minimum, restricting recourse to investment arbitration 
through a significant local litigation requirement and a comprehensive 
state ‘filter’ of claims (Kleinheisterkamp & Poulsen, 2014). If such 
proposals fail to attain support, another option would be to simply 
exclude investment protections from the agreement. The economic 
benefits of a transatlantic free trade agreement could be considerable 
for the EU, as outlined elsewhere in this volume, but hardly any of 
those benefits are likely to accrue from the investment protection 
chapter. Excluding such a chapter may thereby be politically prudent if 
it prevents further opposition to the TTIP based on a set of rules which 
are not necessary to protect American investment in Europe or 
European investment in the United States.  
                                                          
37 See the discussion in Schneiderman (2010).  
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6. TRANSATLANTIC INVESTMENT 
TREATY PROTECTION –  
A RESPONSE TO POULSEN, 
BONNITCHA & YACKEE 
FREYA BAETENS* 
1. Introduction 
A number of preliminary comments apply to the Poulsen, Bonnitcha & 
Yackee chapter as a whole: firstly, while its focus on investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) is valid, it is important to keep in mind that 
there is more to the investment chapter in TTIP than solely its dispute 
settlement clause. As such, it would be productive for future work to 
address how the bulk of the investment chapter, namely its substantive 
standards, could be improved upon. Secondly, the authors chose not to 
cover pre-establishment national treatment – a regrettable exclusion, as 
this might well be included in the final text of the agreement, following 
the US approach in its other investment treaties. Furthermore, the 
authors’ assumption that post-establishment investment protection 
will be enforceable by way of ISDS is not necessarily correct, in light of 
the ongoing debate of the issue, and as such it would have been 
interesting to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of investment protection 
in TTIP without an ISDS clause, if only to assess whether this is a viable 
option. 
                                                          
* This chapter is intended as a response to the thought-provoking ideas 
presented in chapter 5 by Lauge Paulson, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Jason Webb 
Yackee, focusing on some of their findings that are open to discussion and 
structuring the arguments made below along the lines of their chapter. As such, 
the present chapter does not intend to raise any new topics in this debate but 
serves only as a response to the original chapter. 
The author would like to express her gratitude to Sophie Starrenburg for her 
assistance in preparing this chapter. 
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2. Treaty provisions: The likely content of the ‘I’ in 
‘TTIP’ 
Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee offer an overview of US practice in 
negotiating investment treaties, for example drawing attention to the 
prudential measures taken to ensure its ability to regulate the finance 
sector, but also including references to safeguard domestic labour laws 
and the environment in order to preserve the host-state’s policy space. 
Another pertinent example is the manner in which the ‘minimum 
standard of treatment’ is defined in Annex A of the US model BIT as 
“the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens”. However, one aspect of this practice – relevant when it comes 
to assessing the legitimacy and desirability of such treaties – is not 
mentioned, namely the fact that the US has been among the first states 
to include provisions concerning an ISDS appeals mechanism in several 
investment agreements (Annex 10-H of the US-Chile FTA, Annex 10-F 
of CAFTA, and the 2012 US model BIT). Admittedly, none of these 
proposals has yet materialised, but the foundation stones have been 
laid, making clear that the US is open to creating such a mechanism. 
One further aspect of US practice – the transparency of ISDS 
proceedings as for example adopted in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes – 
is only cursorily mentioned. However, this increased level of 
transparency might prove vital in the future, as “justice should not only 
be done: it must also be seen to be done”, and this will contribute to the 
legitimacy of the entire ISDS process. 
3. Potential benefits of ISDS 
Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee note that the benefits of TTIP could 
materialise in two possible ways: firstly, by promoting US investment 
in the EU; and secondly, by protecting EU investment in the US.  
3.1 Protection of US investment in the EU 
On the question of whether TTIP – or any other investment agreement 
– will promote US investment in the EU, the authors argue that past 
practice has shown that investment treaties with investment protection 
chapters have negligibly (or not at all) affected investment flows. As 
such, TTIP would not provide much benefit to the EU in terms of higher 
investment rates by the US, as the region is already considered ‘safe’ 
from the perspective of US investors. However, this argument is made 
on the basis of limited empirical evidence, and such evidence often cuts 
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both ways: for every study that claims that there is a significant 
economic benefit that can be gained by the inclusion of an investment 
chapter,1 another can be found that says that this is not the case.2 
In any event, just because there may be no impressive increase in 
FDI as a result of the conclusion of a BIT, this does not mean that BITs 
are valueless. They may not be a direct gateway to massively increased 
investment rates, but rather a tool that is considered by a given 
company as part of its investment strategy. Ultimately, a company’s 
decision to invest in a country will be based upon a range of factors 
about the country or region in which they are seeking to invest, of 
which the availability of ISDS is one, serving as a “confidence and 
credibility-inspiring signal”.3 
There are several other aspects of this discussion that merit 
further mention. Firstly, Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee argue that the types 
of risks an investment protection chapter would cover are generally not 
considered present in most EU member states. However, one type of 
risk that is certainly present in several EU member states relates to the 
possibility of not being granted a fair trial before a domestic court. 
According to a recent country ranking of ‘judicial independence’ 
performed by the World Economic Forum,4 some EU countries are 
among the best in the world (Finland and Denmark are in the top five), 
but others perform rather poorly (Slovakia ranks at 130 out of 140, 
Bulgaria at 126) – at place 30, the US is still below countries with which 
ISDS is planned to be concluded, such as Canada (place 9) or Singapore 
(at 20), or with which it can be expected to be concluded, such as 
Uruguay (at 21) or Saudi Arabia (at 26). The extensive jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights shows that some EU member 
states such as Italy, France and Germany have repeatedly violated 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights through their 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Sauvant & Sachs (2009); UNCTAD (1998), Banga (2003), Tobin & Rose-
Ackerman (2006), Salacuse & Sullivan (2005), Neumayer & Spess (2005), Aisbett 
(2007) and Busse et al. (2008).  
2 See e.g. Hallward-Driemaier (2003), Tobin & Rose-Ackerman (2003) and 
Gallagher & Birch (2006). 
3 Interview with Eric Neumayer, Kevin P. Gallagher and Horchani Ferhat at 
www.iisd.org/itn/2009/04/30/do-bilateral-investment-treaties-lead-to-
more-foreign-investment/; 
4 See http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-
2015/rankings/ 
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inability to provide a hearing and/or a decision within a ‘reasonable 
time’.5 This also shows why investors may prefer international 
arbitration: in the large majority of cases, a final decision will be 
rendered much sooner than if such disputes were to be decided 
through the domestic court system. 
Secondly, the authors mostly focus on whether US or Chinese 
investors consider the EU a safe place to invest, but do not address 
whether the converse is true. 
Thirdly, Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee rely upon a 2010 survey of 
legal counsel within the 100 largest American multinationals in order 
to underscore their argument that investment treaties have little impact 
on investment flows, given that the majority of counsel stated that these 
treaties did not play a (critical) role in their decisions to invest abroad. 
However, the ISDS system is not employed to a great extent by the large 
multinationals, but rather by middle-sized or smaller ones. An OECD 
survey concluded that 22% of all ISDS claims are brought by 
individuals or “very small corporations”.6 Medium and large 
multinational companies account for 50% of the claims, and the rest of 
the cases (28%) were brought by investors about which there is little 
public information. The fact that larger companies do not rely as 
frequently upon ISDS as one might expect due to their relative size, is 
arguably because the largest companies have other means of leverage, 
                                                          
5 See, e.g. landmark cases: H. v. France, 24 October 1989, Series A no. 162-A; X. 
v. France, 31 March 1992, Series A no. 234-C; Caloc v. France, no. 33951/96, ECHR 
2000-IX; Kress v. France [GC] no 39594/98, ECHR 2001-VI; Frydlender v. France, 
[GC] no 30979/96, ECHR 2000-VII; Katte Klitsche de la Grange v. Italy, 24 October 
1994, Series A, no 293-B; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC] no 36813/97, ECHR 2006-
V; Capuano v. Italy, 25 June 1987, Series A no. 119; Bottazzi v. Italy, [GC] no 
34884/97, ECHR 1999-V; Di Pede v. Italy, 26 September 1996, ECHR 1996-IV; 
Vocaturo v. Italy, 24 May 1991, Series A no. 206-C; Cappello v. Italy, 27 February 
1992, Series A no. 230-F; Fisanotti v. Italy, 23 April 1998, ECHR 1998-II; Bock v. 
Germany, 29 March 1989, Series A no. 150; Pammel v. Germany, 1 July 1997, 
ECHR 1997-IV; Probstmeier v. Germany, 1 July 1997, ECHR 1997-IV; Sürmeli v. 
Germany, [GC] no 75529/01, ECHR 2006-VII; Blake v. UK, no 68890/01, 26 
September 2006; Robins v. UK, no. 22410/93, 23 September 1997; H. v. UK, 8 July 
1997, ECHR 1997-VIII. For a more complete overview see European Court of 
Human Rights, Guide to Article 6 – Right to a Fair Trial (2013) p. 51 et seq. 
6 OECD (2012), “Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, Public Consultation Doc, 
p. 16 (www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/ 
50291642.pdf). 
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and thus do not need to resort to the courts in order to achieve their 
goals. 
This author agrees with Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee that, in 
Europe, BITs have not been widely publicised or ‘politicised’ – at least 
not until quite recently. It is important that the public is informed of the 
role that BITs play in the international realm, as the current level of 
knowledge about these instruments – even amongst media and NGOs 
claiming to specialise in this area – is shockingly low. This is dangerous 
because they play such an important role in informing civil society – as 
was evident by their impact on the recent consultation of the European 
Commission. There, many of the replies to the survey circulated by the 
Commission indicated fears that ISDS inclusion in TTIP would place 
too great a limit on states’ policy space. However, the majority of these 
replies “were based on copy-and-paste templates circulated by non-
governmental organisations campaigning against TTIP”,7 much like 
pressing a ‘dislike’ button on Facebook or signing an online petition, 
without the need for any actual knowledge or substantiated 
contribution to the debate. Such tactics are not new; they were applied 
by Philip Morris in order to allege that public opinion was against the 
EU Tobacco Products Directive8 – an example which suggests that mass 
automatic replies ought to be interpreted cautiously. 
3.2 Protection of EU investment in the US 
Turning to the second strand of Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee’s argument 
– whether TTIP will protect EU investment in the US – several 
comments can be made. The authors argue that TTIP is unlikely to 
improve the situation for EU investors in the US, because, in general, 
the protection level of foreign investors in the US is already high, and 
TTIP will not offer much additional protection. In general, it is indeed 
true that there is no evidence of systematic, serious flaws in the US 
system. But do Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee mean to state that domestic 
courts should deal with all private claims in countries where the rule of 
law is strong, to the exclusion of international judicial review?  
Following this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, they 
should in that case also be advocating the abolishment of the various 
regional courts for human rights as the legal systems of the European 
                                                          
7 C. Olivier, “Public Backlash Threatens EU Trade Deal with the US”, Financial 
Times, 13 January 2015. 
8 See e.g. article at: www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jun/07/tobacco-
firm-stealth-marketing-plain-packaging 
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member states and the US already contain strong human rights 
protection. The only difference would be that the European Convention 
on Human Rights for example, does require applicants to exhaust local 
remedies – as a result, there can easily be 10-15 years or more between 
the injury and the remedy. However, an argument could be made for 
allowing a state to first attempt to address a violation in relation to a 
protected investment via its own court system and only if this does not 
result in an appropriate solution within an acceptable time frame (for 
example, two years after bringing a claim), the investor could revert to 
an international tribunal. This option is further discussed below, in the 
Conclusions. 
To state that domestic courts should ‘suffice’ for the handling of 
investment claims overlooks the fact that many domestic courts are not 
allowed – meaning that it is not within their legal scope of jurisdictional 
competence – to apply public international law, such as BITs, directly. 
Moreover, US courts that are in theory allowed to do so have a track 
record of nevertheless not accepting any claims of individuals based on 
any form of international law.9 (Indeed, the same is true in Europe.10 
For example, on 13 January 2015, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Justice held, inter alia, that the NGO Stichting Natuur en Milieu 
was not entitled to invoke the Aarhus Convention of 1998 on access to 
information, public participation, and access to justice in 
environmental matters, in spite of an explicit reference in the EU 
regulation implementing this Convention.11 Importantly, this was 
decided upon at the request of the European Commission, Council and 
Parliament – some members of which are now arguing that investment 
protection standards in international treaties should be enforced by 
domestic and EU courts. Why would private investors be allowed to 
rely upon international treaties before such courts, while NGOs are 
not?) 
Hence stating that “the appropriate response by the EU would 
be to insist in its negotiations that the US pass implementing legislation 
securing a right to access US courts for certain TTIP violations”, as 
                                                          
9 See e.g. Haljan (2014), Wojcik (2013) and Hix (2013). 
10 See Bronckers (2015). 
11 Joined cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P, Council of the European Union and 
European Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network 
Europe, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 January 2015, not yet 
published (Court Reports - general). 
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Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee do, shows a lack of knowledge about US 
negotiation policy and the actual practice of domestic courts. Looking 
at US practice concerning domestic enforcement of individual rights 
under international treaties,12 it is highly unlikely that the US would 
ever agree to pass legislation that would make substantive treaty 
standards domestically enforceable. For example, the US only ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the 
condition that its standards would not be enforceable before US 
courts.13 In practice, if substantive protection for investors is included 
in TTIP, the only option of redress for violations of such standards 
would be through some form of international dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
Another common misconception is that investment arbitration is 
consistently more expensive than national court proceedings; this is not 
necessarily the case. Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee argue that “it is 
impossible to say whether investor-state arbitration is more cost-
effective than resolving disputes through national court proceedings in 
the absence of significantly more comprehensive evidence than is 
currently available”. But they proceed to examine precisely that 
question, making four points. First, EU countries will need to maintain 
court systems regardless of whether they agree to ISDS. That may be 
so, but referring more cases (and in particular, more complex cases 
concerning matters in which domestic judges are not specialised) to 
domestic courts, already overburdened and prone to delays, is not an 
obvious remedy.  
Secondly, it is true that the parties’ legal and witness costs 
constitute the vast majority of costs associated with investment treaty 
arbitration (although tribunal costs are not negligible either). For this 
reason, the ‘loser pays’ principle, whereby the claimant who brings a 
manifestly unfounded claim has to reimburse the state’s legal and 
witness costs, would form a valuable safeguard – one that cannot be 
offered under most domestic court systems (including the US). In 
Chemtura, to take a salutary example, the unsuccessful claimant was 
ordered to pay Canada’s costs, including an allowance for the time 
                                                          
12 See Powell (2001, p. 245); Roth (2001, p. 891); Spiro (1997, p. 567); Kaye (2013, 
p. 95). 
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 
1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978) 999 UNTS 171, ratified by the US 8 June 1992. 
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invested by government officials in preparing Canada’s defence.14 
Other cases in point are ADC v Hungary, Plama v Bulgaria, Europe Cement 
v Turkey, and Gemplus v Mexico.15 
Thirdly, arbitrators who are specialised in the interpretation of 
‘vague and imprecise’ standards should have less trouble deciding the 
factual and legal questions in an investment dispute than local judges 
would have who would be called upon to decide such cases 
(particularly if investment standards would be ‘copied and pasted’ into 
national legislation, as the authors seem to envisage). This is not to say 
that some investment standards such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
or ‘indirect expropriation’ as such would not benefit from the 
incorporation of more clearly defined standards. Additionally, if treaty 
standards would have to be implemented in national legislation, this 
risks exacerbating interpretation problems due to the well-known 
problem of translation differences across the EU.16 The same standard 
in Portuguese, for example, may be interpreted by local courts as 
meaning something different in Latvian – thereby nullifying the 
stability and predictability that a uniform treaty could bring. 
Finally, in the majority of cases, arbitral proceedings offer a 
complete and final resolution of a dispute. Under any ISDS system, 
except the one set up by International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), annulment and appeal are not possible. 
The ICSID system cannot be included in TTIP because the EU, as a 
regional organisation is not, and cannot, be a member of the 
Convention; but even if it were, its annulment procedure is intended to 
be rare and limited to five strictly defined grounds,17 unlike an appeal 
before a national court which reviews the entire case. In most countries, 
even an appeal is not the end of the dispute: there is a possibility to ask 
for a third consideration of the case before a supreme court or court of 
cassation. Furthermore, arbitral awards and national court decisions 
                                                          
14 Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (formerly 
Crompton Corporation v. Government of Canada) 2 August 2010. 
15 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 2 October 2006; Plama Consortium Limited 
v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 27 August 2008; Europe 
Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/2 , 13 August 2009; Gemplus S.A., SLP S.A., Gemplus Industrial S.A. 
de C.V. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/3 16 June 
2010. 
16 See for example, Künnecke (2013, pp. 243-260) and Pozzo (2006). 
17 Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
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alike can subsequently be subjected to review as soon as the claimant 
attempts to enforce them in a different country – so there is no 
difference in this regard. Admittedly, annulment procedures have 
become more frequent in recent years and as the European Commission 
proposal for TTIP is putting forward the inclusion of an appeal 
mechanism, the gap in time and cost is, in this respect, narrowing. 
4. Potential costs 
In their fourth section, Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee posit that the costs 
of the agreement significantly outweigh any possible benefits to the EU 
in general. However, this argument is not systematically supported by 
evidence and appears to be based on a number of challengeable 
extrapolations. Firstly, they argue that the likelihood of claims against 
the EU can be expected to increase roughly in proportion with the size 
of the investment stock in the EU covered by the treaty, but do not 
properly underscore why this would be this case. The authors make a 
number of further claims in their chapter, without specifying how they 
arrived at or calculated them, such as the fact that a great number of 
investment projects are of sufficient size to make the economics of an 
investment claim viable in theory; or that, with respect to sectors, US 
companies have made significant investments across virtually all 
sectors of the EU economy. 
They also state that an investment treaty with the US would be 
disadvantageous given that ‘American’ investors tend to be the most 
litigious. This statement is, however, outdated; in 2013, it was investors 
from the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg and the United States 
that brought the largest number of claims. This also corresponds with 
overall trends throughout the history of ISDS.18 By the end of 2013, US 
investors had brought 125 claims against states, followed by the 
Netherlands (61), the United Kingdom (42) and Germany (39). 
Comparing US investor claims to all EU investor claims helps put this 
hypothesis into perspective – six of the top ten home states for investors 
are member states of the European Union, which have brought a total 
of 225 claims.  
Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee note that there remain several 
important factors that would increase the risk of adverse awards, one 
of which is the fact that certain important terms within investment law 
remain undefined (such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’) and are thus 
capable of being interpreted expansively by an arbitral tribunal in a 
                                                          
18 Tietje & Baetens (2014, p. 26). 
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manner unfavourable to the EU. Whilst this is true, one must pause to 
consider the other alternative: would this situation not be as bad if such 
treaty provisions were to be interpreted by various domestic courts?  
The mere fact that arbitral tribunals have significant discretion to 
interpret the terms of investment law should not be an argument 
against the conclusion of an investment treaty, as this role is also 
performed by domestic judges – interpretation is what adjudicatory 
bodies do for a living. Another option would be through state-to-state 
dispute settlement, i.e. espousal of investors’ claims by their home 
state. However, it was precisely to prevent the problems arising from 
the essentially political and arbitrary character of espousal that ISDS 
procedures as well as human rights adjudicatory bodies were created, 
establishing private standing for injured individuals. 
Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee furthermore argue that the legal costs 
of investment disputes are disproportionately high, even if the 
respondent state ‘wins’ the case. As stated above, several tribunals have 
recently adopted some form of the ‘loser pays’ approach, ordering the 
losing party not only to bear all arbitration costs of an adverse award, 
but also to make a substantial contribution to the winning party’s legal 
fees – in particular when a case concerns a frivolous claim. This 
approach has also been taken in the discussions surrounding the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the 
EU and Canada, where frivolous claims can be terminated at an early 
stage in proceedings, and generally the unsuccessful party is required 
to cover all the costs made in the process of a case.19 Ultimately, even if 
the costs of ISDS are considered too high, there are ways of lowering 
them. One could think of negotiating the fees with the registry office 
and arbitrators, or capping lawyers’ fees and negotiating an hourly rate 
– given that the market for arbitrators and lawyers is sufficiently 
saturated in order to survive a payment cap. 
Two risks are raised as possible political costs of TTIP: i) the risk 
of reduced policy space, and ii) the risk of controversial claims or 
adverse awards. Particularly the first emerged as one of the main 
grounds of concern in the results from the recent consultations on TTIP 
conducted by the European Commission. The results from these 
consultations indicated that one of the most prevalent fears amongst 
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respondents was the perceived negative effects that the inclusion of 
ISDS in TTIP would have on national sovereignty.20 
Essentially, all obligations that a state undertakes, ‘limit’ its 
policy space: promising to do A, may affect how one can do B. Also, 
governments will not infrequently wait with the enactment of new 
legislation until the result of a domestic or EU court case emerges, the 
same as if a state would postpone a certain measure pending the 
outcome of an arbitral award. Investment claims are mostly brought 
against executive decisions made with respect to one particular 
investor or in the context of a particular concession, permission or 
promise granted to an investor, not against legislative acts (with a 
limited number of notorious exceptions). When looking at all ISDS 
disputes, the respondent states have won in approximately 60% of the 
cases.21 In the few cases where claims have been brought against acts of 
legislation, the investor quasi-invariably ended up on the losing side, 
as tribunals recognised and protected the policy space and the right to 
regulate of the respondent state.22 As such, the inclusion of ISDS would 
not threaten or reduce policy space, because most arbitral awards 
would not encroach upon it. 
An example of this was the Vattenfall/Germany arbitration, where 
the government first granted licenses to a coal plant (which resulted in 
the awarding of voluntary damages to the investor) and for a nuclear 
plant (of which the case is still pending), and subsequently retracted 
these licences.23 These cases have not had a measurable impact on 
Germany’s environmental regulations – only on the procedures 
followed with regards to transparency in the decision-making process 
(benefitting not only investors but also other stakeholders), as well as 
the fact that ‘disclaimers’ are now incorporated into any licenses 
granted by the state; such developments could hardly be seen as 
negative. Even if there is an adverse award, one must recall that the 
state will not be forced to make any changes in policy: a tribunal can 
only require a state to pay appropriate damages to the individual 
investor, and investors usually receive much less compensation than 
what they asked of the tribunal (as the authors show). Ultimately, the 
                                                          
20 C. Olivier, “Public Backlash Threatens EU Trade Deal with the US”, Financial 
Times, 13 January 2015. 
21 Tietje & Baetens (2014). 
22 Tietje & Baetens (2014, p. 47). 
23 Tietje & Baetens (2014, p. 103). 
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fear of regulatory chill expected from the inclusion of ISDS, due to 
which states allegedly would refrain from adopting certain legislative, 
executive or administrative acts, has not been empirically (beyond the 
mere anecdotal or purely hypothetical) established.24 In other words, 
there is no scientific ground to assume there would be more regulatory 
chill because of the risk of ISDS cases, than there is based on the 
looming possibility of domestic court cases. 
Furthermore, the apparent widespread fear of ISDS inclusion in 
TTIP might appear more endemic than it actually is, when one takes 
into account that many of the negative responses to the consultations 
that vocalised this fear “were based on copy-and-paste templates 
circulated by non-governmental organisations campaigning against 
TTIP”, as stated above.25 Similarly, with regard to the risk of 
controversial claims, public controversy also surrounds domestic court 
decisions. One would be greatly pressed to prove that the societal 
impact would not be demonstrably greater than a ‘notorious’ case at 
the national level. If fears still remains that ISDS inclusion will limit 
policy space to too great an extent, the stakeholders could opt to include 
“an express general clarification in TTIP and other investment treaties that 
foreign investors should get the same high levels of protection as domestic 
investors receive in domestic law, but not higher levels of protection”.26 They 
could also make explicit statements that the treaty is not to impinge 
upon the good-faith exercise of public policy objectives by the state; 
such statements would need to be taken into account by arbitral 
tribunals in their interpretation of the relevant investment agreement.27 
Another option, would be to restrict ISDS access for the more 
controversial issues which are related to the exercise of public policy 
objectives of the State, such as bona fide environmental measures.28 
Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee posit that it is unlikely that TTIP will 
change much of the already close relations between the EU and the US, 
nor would it, they argue, make it more likely that China and India 
                                                          
24 Tietje & Baetens (2014, p. 48). 
25 C. Olivier, “Public Backlash Threatens EU Trade Deal with the US”, Financial 
Times, 13 January 2015; see also www.vieuws.eu/eutradeinsights/ 
exec-to-struggle-for-way-out-of-controversy-after-release-of-isds-
consultation-results/  
26 Kleinheisterkamp & Poulsen (2014). 
27 Kuijper et al. (2014, p. 42). 
28 Kuijper et al. (2014, p. 87). 
TRANSATLANTIC INVESTMENT TREATY PROTECTION: RESPONSE TO CH 5  199 
 
would enter into an investment treaty with the EU. The US and the EU 
member states have to date concluded many more BITs with 
developing than with developed countries. It is important to keep in 
mind the signal that might be sent out if the EU somehow refuses to 
incorporate ISDS into TTIP, given that “the EU has 1,400 bilateral ISDS 
agreements … Rejecting ISDS completely would open up European 
countries to a charge of double standards in that they are seeking to 
deny US companies the same safeguards that their businesses enjoy”.29 
Apart from being a potentially detrimental starting position in further 
treaty negotiations, this is ultimately sending out a signal of distrust 
and inferiority towards developing states, forming a strong and, in this 
author’s opinion, highly unfortunate reminiscent of certain colonial 
attitudes. 
5. Conclusion 
Four possible alternatives to the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP are 
frequently mentioned. The first would be to opt for state-to-state 
arbitration. However, such an option would hardly be preferable, as it 
will invariably politicise a dispute and blow it far out of proportion, 
potentially influencing the international relations between states as a 
whole. As these cases are not actually located at the inter-state level, 
they should not be framed as disputes between states. In order for such 
cases to proceed to the inter-state level, investors would need to rely 
upon diplomatic protection, which is sporadic, arbitrary in its incidence 
and prone to politicisation, as there is no control over the process or any 
form of remedy for the individual whose claim is espoused. 
Furthermore, the decision whether to espouse a claim is often not taken 
on legal grounds but is rather dependent upon other factors such as the 
relative size of a state and potential need for foreign aid. As such, 
espousal of claims has rightly been superseded by investment 
protection and human rights law.  
A second option would be for the home state to be able to block 
any claims brought by investors. Some of the problems of this second 
approach could be mitigated by allowing the home state to be a third-
party intervener – which is perhaps a route that could still be explored.  
The third option would be to require the exhaustion of local 
remedies before allowing a claim to be brought under ISDS. However, 
the problem with this is that the amount of time and costs required are 
                                                          
29 C. Olivier, “Public Backlash Threatens EU Trade Deal with the US”, Financial 
Times, 13 January 2015. 
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significantly higher for all parties involved. A possible solution to such 
issues would be to rely upon ‘fork-in-the-road’ clauses (where the 
investor has to initiate national court proceedings or international 
arbitration, but not both). Also, one could establish mediation as a 
mandatory precursor or alternative to ISDS proceedings.  
Another possible solution would be to adopt a fixed or elastic 
time period for pursuing local remedies. The latter could be based on a 
“third-party index measuring the potential of domestic courts to 
produce effective solutions to claims of remedies rule”. The more such 
an index would indicate that a domestic court system is ‘reliable’, the 
greater emphasis would be placed upon domestic courts being the first 
port of call, as opposed to other, more internationalised paths to 
dispute resolution.30 Other potential procedural safeguards could 
include protection against frivolous claims, by virtue of offering 
tribunals a way to reject manifestly unfounded claims at a preliminary 
stage or by forcing a frivolous claimant to pay not only its own legal 
costs but all costs of the proceedings and potentially the legal costs of 
the respondent also.  
The fourth, and ultimately most honest option, would be to 
exclude substantive investment provisions from the agreement 
entirely. If TTIP is to include a right, there should also be a remedy for 
violations of that right; if one is to take away the remedy of ISDS, then 
it is better not to grant the right. 
One final issue that was raised during the discussion of the 
original paper at the Brussels Conference in 2014 was the question of 
whether a standing court for investment claims would be preferable 
over an ad hoc method of procedure, as is currently the case. Poulsen 
(presenting the paper) argued in favour of the former and this author 
recognises the merits of such argument – in part because of the aversion 
the term ‘arbitration’ seems to provoke among the general public. 
However, some important problems remain. Crucially, there is no 
single legal instrument giving jurisdiction to a single court, but instead 
there is a network of BITs. As such, to argue in favour of a standing 
court raises the issue of how one could confer competence upon such a 
court – or would the idea be to create a standing court for each and 
every treaty the EU concludes? In the latter case, possibly the TTIP 
Court could serve as a model court for subsequent treaty partners. 
Further potential problems would arise in the appointment of the 
judges to the Court – who is to be appointed, and what would happen 
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if the integrity of a judge is called into question? Such problems could 
be solved by careful treaty drafting. 
However, at present it seems unrealistic to hope for the creation 
of an overarching international investment organisation with a 
separate dispute settlement body, such as the WTO. Both options – a 
standing court or a permanent international organisation – have been 
tried and failed, notably in the case of the Multilateral Investment 
Agreement and the International Trade Organisation, which was to be 
established by the Havana Charter. Ultimately, the issue with ISDS, as 
often becomes clear in heated public discussions, is that certain 
segments of civil society simply do not want ‘foreigners’ to examine the 
legality of state actions – whether this examination is done by a 
standing or ad hoc body could be seen as being of little import, in the 
broader scheme of things. 
Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee distinguish broadly two camps in the 
discussion surrounding ISDS in TTIP: those who see its inclusion as an 
unmitigated good, and those who see it as the exact opposite. But there 
remains a large number of scholars who choose the middle path, 
arguing that the system currently catering to the settlement of 
investment disputes needs to be reformed but that the risks of ISDS 
inclusion are overestimated. The present author would see herself in 
the last category, based on her view that domestic law does sufficiently 
protect investors most of the time and that domestic courts do a good 
job at applying the law in most disputes. As is the case for the European 
and American Conventions on Human Rights and their respective 
courts, investment law and its international enforcement (whether by 
means of arbitration or a new court) should serve only as a safety net, 
to provide a remedy in those cases (no doubt rare but by no means 
unknown) where the domestic system has not been able to provide a 
fair remedy. 
It is necessary that, in the future, investment disputes are 
depoliticised, and that a general international standard of treatment is 
established. Much work remains; one can think of further defining and 
limiting of the scope of application of investment law, so that not all 
and sundry qualifies as an investor; or further definition of the scope of 
the more vague standards of protection, such as fair and equitable 
treatment and indirect expropriation. There is a need to incorporate 
more justifications for state action with regard to environmental, health 
and labour issues; the inclusion of an appeals system within the ISDS 
framework; greater transparency, or a review of the methods to 
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calculate damages. Unfortunately, few of these issues are discussed in 
Poulsen, Bonnitcha & Yackee’s chapter. 
There are many ways in which safeguards could be built into the 
arbitral process, in order to refine the current procedures and make 
them more amenable to those stakeholders currently opposed to ISDS 
inclusion. Firstly, with regards to transparency, one can think for 
example of the publication of information about the dispute at hand; 
whilst final awards are in the large majority of cases already in the 
public domain, further actions can be taken, such as allowing open 
hearings, or making written submissions and evidence publicly 
accessible online (where the information concerned is not classified 
information or confidential business knowledge, as determined by the 
tribunal). Secondly, there should also be an active role given in 
proceedings to other states that are parties to the treaty, as well as third-
party stakeholders, such as NGOs, industry groups, or international 
and regional organisations. Furthermore, it would be desirable to 
establish a code of conduct with clear disclosure rules and methods of 
avoiding conflicts of interests, as well as to create a roster of arbitrators 
ahead of any conflict between states and investors.  
Fourthly, one could perhaps envisage the creation of an appellate 
mechanism, as suggested by the European Commission. It is frequently 
argued that such a mechanism would add to the stability, predictability 
and legitimacy of investment law; whilst the opportunity for appeal 
would add to the duration and cost of proceedings, it is likely that – 
over time – the number of appeals would decrease (as has been the case 
for the WTO Appellate Body), thus offsetting a potential increase in cost 
by the probable increase in stability within investment procedures. If 
such an appeals mechanisms were to prove politically unfeasible, one 
could envision the creation of a treaty committee or an ad hoc procedure 
through which the parties to TTIP could give “authoritative 
interpretations of the provisions of the investment instrument”,31 thus 
ultimately providing for some measure of consistency and perceived 
fairness between cases. Such an option – the establishment of a treaty 
committee that interprets controversial treaty provisions in order to 
provide clarity and consistency – appears to also be currently taken by 
the EU and Canada in the context of the CETA negotiations, with the 
establishment of a Committee on Services and Investment.32 
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In sum, an investment chapter in TTIP offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to reform and improve the system of investment law, in a 
way that gradual renegotiation of individual BITs never would be able 
to achieve. This author hopes that the EU and the US will grasp this 
opportunity to rewrite international investment law by setting an 
important precedent in treaty-drafting, allowing for the incorporation 
of public policy objectives, thereby protecting states’ right to regulate. 
Ultimately, the type of concerted strategy that could result from TTIP 
is likely to be far stronger than the individual country strategy 
necessitated by the present system of over 3,000 international 
investment agreements (IIAs). Perhaps the most important conclusion 
that should emerge from the current discussions – irrespective of 
whether TTIP will actually include an investment chapter – is that that 
there is a need for correct, timely and complete information for law and 
policy-makers as well as the broader public, in relation to international 
investment law and ISDS procedures. 
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7. TTIP AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, BARBARA HOLZER 
AND PETROS KUSMU 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines options for regulatory cooperation within the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and assesses its 
implications for consumer protection. Its goal is to discuss the TTIP’s 
potential opportunities and challenges and to discuss how it might 
affect the regulatory sovereignty of the respective legislatures. While 
the analysis focuses on the impact on EU regulatory sovereignty, the 
findings will also be relevant for the US. Will it contribute to a lowering 
of ‘standards’ and consumer protection rules? What will be the impact 
of the use of methods such as equivalence on regulatory requirements? 
Will the TTIP influence the regulatory or legislative agendas and if so, 
how should the European Parliament ensure that its priorities are 
properly represented? From the European perspective, which will be 
the ‘competent body’ representing the EU in any regulatory 
cooperation body and how can it be ensured that this body reflects 
balanced EU preferences?  
The second section sets the scene by providing a short overview 
of the EU’s past agreements and existing practices in international 
negotiations, and it also looks specifically at past initiatives in 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Against that background, section 
3 then discusses the opportunities and challenges inherent in the TTIP 
negotiations in terms of the general approach to regulatory 
cooperation. This includes a discussion of the approach proposed in the 
European Commission’s Textual Proposal of February 2015. Section 4 
then provides some illustrations of the opportunities and challenges in 
specific sectors, before the final section offers some conclusions. 
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2. Past agreements and existing practice 
Regulatory cooperation in the TTIP builds on several existing 
international agreements, such as the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement in the WTO, numerous past transatlantic attempts to 
promote regulatory cooperation and, more recently, initiatives in 
preferential agreements negotiated by the EU and, to a lesser extent, the 
US. This section sets the scene for the current debate by summarising 
the experience with other relevant agreements. 
2.1 Shaping multilateral rules  
The EU has led the way in raising awareness of the impact of divergent 
regulations as a barrier to trade. The EU’s so-called ‘new approach’ to 
such barriers in the 1980s had a significant impact on international 
agreements in the WTO and the work of the international standards-
making bodies, e.g. ISO, CEN and CENELEC. These EU–shaped 
international agreements are incorporated in virtually all PTAs 
(preferential trading arrangements) and it is expected to be reaffirmed 
in the TTIP.  
The existing international rules take the form of the 1994 TBT 
Agreement, which contains a binding commitment to national 
treatment (non-discrimination) in the application of regulation and 
conformity assessment, ‘best endeavours’ wording on mutual 
recognition and a Code of Good Practice for standard-making bodies. 
As experience within the EU has shown, however, national treatment 
does not remove regulatory barriers/trade costs resulting from 
divergent regulations or standards. The GATT Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, also known as the 
SPS Agreement – covering human, animal and plant life and health – 
seeks to prevent the use of SPS measures that unnecessarily distort 
trade. The SPS Agreement is largely ‘science-based’ but also provides 
for the use of precaution (Art. 5(2) SPS). But the SPS Agreement has not 
prevented transatlantic disputes on GMOs (genetically modified 
organisms) or hormones in beef, etc. Finally, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) provides a framework for commitments on 
national treatment and mutual recognition, but the option of mutual 
recognition has seldom been used.  
2.2 Past transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives 
In addition to being the main actors shaping existing multilateral rules, 
the EU and the US have engaged in numerous bilateral attempts to 
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promote regulatory cooperation. These have taken place within the 
framework of bilateral cooperation established by the Transatlantic 
Declaration of 1990, a largely politically motivated effort to redouble 
transatlantic cooperation at the end of the cold war. In 1995, a renewed 
effort to deepen transatlantic economic relations resulted in a Joint 
Action Plan and the New Transatlantic Agenda Task Force, which had, 
among other things, the aim of promoting regulatory cooperation. This 
resulted in mutual recognition agreements on telecommunications 
equipment, electrical safety, pharmaceutical and medical devices and 
recreational crafts being implemented with varying degrees of 
difficulty (Pelkmans & Correia de Brito, 2015). It is also worth recalling 
that stakeholder dialogues, e.g. the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD), the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) and the 
Transatlantic Environment Dialogue (TAED) were established at this 
time with a view to promoting a common understanding of regulation 
and regulatory policy aims. The Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue was 
also set up to strengthen European Parliament–US Congress contacts.  
The limited success of the New Transatlantic Agenda led to a 
redoubling of efforts in the form of the 1998 Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP), which also had an Action Plan, including regulatory 
cooperation. This led to the adoption of a Veterinary Equivalence 
Agreement and the introduction of an ‘early warning system’ to help 
identify and head-off potential conflicts over regulation. These efforts 
were disappointing, especially the lack of progress on mutual 
recognition, and were not able to head-off trade disputes (European 
Commission, 2000). In an attempt to reframe the transatlantic trade 
agenda in a positive light following a number of high-profile disputes 
– stemming in no small measure from differences in regulation – the 
Positive Economic Agenda was launched in 2002. At this time a number 
of new regulatory dialogues were established, such as the Financial 
Market Regulatory Dialogue between DG Market and the US Treasury 
and Securities and Exchange Commission in 2002 and the Policy 
Dialogue on Borders and Transport Security (PDBTS) to address 
security concerns following 9/11. 
Without dwelling on the past (see Chase & Pelkmans, 2015, for 
an exhaustive list of US-EU regulatory cooperation since 1995), it is 
therefore worth recalling previous efforts at regulatory cooperation 
and learning from them. The broad conclusion is one of rather 
disappointing results due to the difficulty in reconciling the different 
regulatory philosophies, a lack of consistent political support for 
detailed regulatory work and reluctance on the part of legislators to 
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cede any regulatory autonomy. Regulatory requirements in the US and 
the EU result from the respective market structures and well-
established consumer preferences that make regulatory cooperation 
inherently difficult. Where regulatory differences result from diverging 
policy choices, it is fair to assume that the reasons that have prevented 
a closer alignment of regulation in the past will not suddenly disappear 
with the TTIP (Gerstetter, 2014, p. 5). Surmounting the ‘transatlantic 
deadlock’ (Alemanno, 2009, p. 27) will be the main challenge for 
negotiators and regulators on both sides. 
2.3 The EU-Korea FTA 
The EU-Korea agreement reaffirms the parties’ obligations under the 
TBT Agreement and sets out a general aim of joint cooperation in order 
to avoid unnecessary divergence in regulatory approaches (Art 4.3, EU-
Korea FTA). It encourages cooperation between public and private 
standards and conformity assessment bodies. 
The approach to technical regulations is based on intensified 
cooperation. The parties agreed to ensure the notification of the other 
party when a regulatory change is envisaged, allowing the other party 
time to respond and to participate in any formal public consultation. 
This is little more than a requirement to ensure that the TBT 
commitments are effectively implemented, which is not always the 
case. On voluntary standards, the EU-Korea agreement is also not TBT-
plus. On conformity assessment, it simply offers a series of alternatives 
in the form of a) the mutual acceptance of the test results of the other 
party, b) the recognition of the conformity assessment of the other party 
or c) acceptance of suppliers’ declaration of conformity. In two respects 
the EU-Korea agreement is new. It introduces a series of sectoral 
working groups covering, for example, automobiles and parts, 
machinery, chemicals, etc. These working groups report to the Trade 
Committee (on which the EU is represented by the European 
Commission). Secondly, it introduces TBT Coordinators in each party, 
who have the job of finding speedy remedies in cases of unnecessary 
barriers to trade, something that is seen as helping small- and medium-
sized firms in particular. 
With regard to the SPS chapter in the EU-Korea agreement, it 
reaffirms the existing obligations of the parties under the WTO SPS 
Agreement. In line with the practice established first in the EU-Chile 
FTA, it includes detailed procedures on how principles set out in the 
SPS Agreement can be implemented, for example, equivalence or the 
designation of disease- or pest-free regions. Thus, as for TBTs, the 
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agreement really seeks only to implement more fully the existing SPS 
commitments. 
With regard to services, the EU-Korea agreement builds on the 
GATS by encouraging the professional bodies responsible for 
determining qualifications to make recommendations to the Trade 
Committee on mutual recognition. The Trade Committee is then to 
decide on whether to negotiate a mutual recognition agreement that 
would be negotiated by ‘the competent authorities’. A Working Group 
on Mutual Recognition is also established to monitor this aspect of the 
agreement. 
2.4 The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) 
The approach employed in CETA is broadly in line with that in the EU-
Korea agreement, but with a number of innovations. 
On technical regulations (Chapter 6), CETA also reaffirms 
commitments under the TBT agreement, but appears to go further by 
adding a provision according to which a party may request recognition 
of equivalence with the existing regulation of the other party (Art. 4 (4) 
CETA). In other words, the EU can request Canada to accept EU 
regulations as equivalent to Canadian requirements or vice versa. This 
request would be considered by the Committee on Trade in Goods, 
which will make recommendations to the (overarching) Trade 
Committee. In CETA, the parties also agree to apply the (voluntary) 
Code of Good Practice for Standards Making Bodies. 
CETA includes separate protocol (as chapter 27 of the draft 
treaty) on conformity assessment, with an Annex. This strengthens the 
case for mutual recognition of the results of conformity assessment by 
stating that Canada will recognise conformity assessment bodies 
established in the EU if accredited by Canadian authorities or 
designated by an EU member state. The EU in turn agrees to recognise 
third-party conformity assessment in Canada (i.e. in cases where self-
certification by producers is not allowed). The protocol also identifies 
priority sectors. Included is the safeguard that ‘nothing shall be 
interpreted as requiring recognition’ of conformity assessment. 
On SPS, the CETA follows the same approach as the EU-Korea 
FTA by reaffirming obligations under the existing SPS agreement and 
then adding detail provisions on how the SPS agreement should be 
applied.  
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Likewise in services, CETA adopts the approach of encouraging 
professional bodies to initiate the process of negotiating mutual 
recognition agreements by making recommendations to the Committee 
on Trade in Services, which will then make a recommendation to the 
Trade Committee.    
Finally, CETA includes the establishment of a Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum that will have the role of promoting cooperation 
across all sectors. This is perhaps the model for the Regulatory 
Cooperation Body (RCB) proposed by the European Commission for 
TTIP (see discussion below). 
2.5 The general approach to recent PTAs in the US 
This section draws primarily on the KORUS agreement between the US 
and Korea, which is an indication of US preferences in this policy area. 
The US also reaffirms commitments under the TBT agreement in 
Chapter 9 of KORUS. There is an article on joint cooperation (9.4), 
which encourages general mutual understanding and provides for 
sectoral initiatives. On conformity assessments, KORUS is less 
ambitious than the EU–Korea FTA in that the former merely lists a 
range of six mechanisms, including mutual and autonomous 
recognition of conformity assessment, accreditation and supplier 
declarations. If recognition is requested but not granted, the reasons for 
not granting recognition must be given (see Pelkmans & Correia de 
Brito (2015) for a detailed comparison of the TBT chapter in KORUS 
with that of the EU-Korea FTA). There is a reference to the APEC 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment in 
Telecommunications, of which Korea is a member. KORUS broadly 
follows the TBT approach on transparency and urges the use of 
electronic forms of communication. But here, as in the general 
provisions on technical regulations, there is only ‘best endeavour” 
wording for the ‘level directly below that of central government’. In 
other words, state level government in the US is not bound. Analogous 
to the EU-Korea agreement, there is a sectoral committee on regulatory 
requirements for automobiles, which is to work towards joint 
implementation of the regulatory requirements set out by UNECE 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe). Additionally, the 
TBT provisions are to be monitored by a Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade on which USTR represents the US. 
The KORUS provisions on SPS are even briefer than those on 
TBTs. Chapter 8 reaffirms the SPS Agreement and establishes an SPS 
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Committee that should ensure that SPS measures rely on ‘science and 
risk-based assessments.’ (Chapter 8(3)).  
In services, KORUS provides some further ‘best endeavours’ 
wording on transparency and the provision of information. Article 
12(9) provides for the recognition of qualifications either mutually or 
autonomously, but stresses that there is no requirement to recognise. 
3. Opportunities and challenges 
3.1 Opportunities 
3.1.1 Reduced costs and more competitive markets  
For the Parties, industrial transatlantic regulatory cooperation offers 
the opportunity of reducing the waste of complying with competing – 
but equivalent – regulatory requirements. Better regulatory 
cooperation can also enhance market access for EU exporters, especially 
small- and medium-sized companies. This is particularly of interest for 
the leading EU exporters to the US in sectors such as automotive, 
machinery and chemicals in terms of regulatory requirements and to 
US exporters in food and health products and machinery. Strong 
sectors in the EU such as financial services, public transport equipment 
and construction also stand to benefit from increased cooperation in 
services regulation and procurement. All sectors, as well as traders and 
wholesalers, stand to benefit from a reduction in trade costs due to 
border controls and improved trade facilitation. The TTIP therefore 
offers an opportunity to strengthen international competitiveness and 
to create more wealth and jobs in the EU and the US. The scale of the 
welfare and trade gains has been the subject of much debate (Pelkmans 
et al., 2014) but gains from reduced costs due to different but equivalent 
regulation represent the most important economic gains from the TTIP.  
3.1.2 Shaping international trade rules and consumer protection 
levels 
In addition to improving economic growth, the TTIP has been justified 
on the grounds that it will enable the EU and the US to share leadership 
of the international trading system and shape the trade rules 
‘democratically’. Transatlantic trade does account for a significant 
share of world trade. The EU and US are also the most active and 
advanced actors when it comes to addressing regulatory issues in trade 
and investment. On this view, agreeing to common approaches 
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through regulatory cooperation offers the opportunity of setting 
international norms and high levels of consumer protection in this 
respect.   
It should, however, be remembered that the EU and the US have 
been doing this for some time, whether in the form of shaping the 
approach to rules on trade in services in the OECD, WTO and now in 
the TiSA (Trade in Services Agreement) or in the negotiations on 
government procurement in the (GPA) Government Procurement 
Agreement of the WTO. In these fora, the agendas and outcomes have 
been largely shaped by the transatlantic dialogue. In the area of 
technical standards and regulation, this has been much less the case. 
The EU has simultaneously promoted international standards through 
the markets and bodies such as the ISO and IEC. But the success of some 
leading American standards-making bodies selling their technical 
standards internationally has meant that it has eschewed binding 
commitments on standards. Progress on regulatory cooperation in this 
area could therefore have a real impact on shaping international norms. 
Another area is that of rules of origin. Here the EU and the US 
are the main actors in shaping preferential rules of origin, with the 
PanEuro and NAFTA models being the two dominant but different 
models. Regulatory cooperation that could bring about a convergence 
and ideally a simplification of these two models would have significant 
benefits for the rest of the trading system. 
Lastly, the existing system of investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) is subject to reform within the TTIP, hence implying the shaping 
of international trade rules ‘democratically’. In response to the EP’s 
recent resolution, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström 
emphasised that the old system of ISDS should not and cannot be 
reproduced in TTIP, and that the Parliament’s call for a “new system” 
must be heard, and it will be (European Commission, 2015c). 
3.1.3 Increase consumer welfare and levels of safety 
Increased competition, due to progress in regulatory cooperation, 
offers the prospect of lower prices and an increased variety of goods 
and services for consumers (Diels & Thoran, 2014). Regulatory 
cooperation could also bring about improved consumer protection and 
safety. The assumption that the level of consumer protection is basically 
higher or more sophisticated in the EU is not sustainable. In place of 
the EU’s precautionary principle, the US has a stringent civil liability 
system that acts as a means of ensuring high levels of health and safety, 
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via liability insurance requirements or induced regulations. For 
instance, the strong and high level of consumer protection regulations 
on toys and infant and toddler products in the US could greatly 
increase consumer protection and welfare for Europeans in this sector 
(CFA, 2014). Rather than fearing that the EU might trade away their 
precautionary principle approach to regulation, it could be seen as an 
opportunity to learn from each other’s experience, to strengthen 
regulatory collaboration and to provide more transparency on the use 
of the PP.  
An intensified exchange of information offers an opportunity to 
advance consumer policy interests. Intensified exchange of information 
is in line with the existing practice in dealing with regulatory 
divergence and barriers to trade and forms a central element in the 
proposals on regulatory cooperation. Where the TTIP leads to shared 
approaches, those are more likely to be followed around the world, 
meaning a regulatory race to the top rather than a race to the bottom. 
The TTIP negotiations carry the potential to promote the 
interests of consumers. For example, negotiators could expand 
opportunities for consumers and micro-businesses by removing duties 
for personal imports, eliminating excessive pricing of 
telecommunications (i.e. roaming fees) and broaden access by 
consumers to the digital market, for instance, by preventing online 
geographical price discrimination (European Consumer 
Organisation/BEUCBilate, 2015; Renda & Yoo, 2015). However, this 
potential will only be fully tapped if the narrow focus of negotiations is 
extended to a modern and broad comprehension of consumer welfare 
(Diels & Thorun, 2014, p. 48).  
Making regulations more compatible does not mean going for 
the lowest common denominator, but rather seeing where divergence 
is unnecessary and where coordination is beneficial for both economic 
interests and consumer welfare. Therefore, impact assessments for the 
purpose of transatlantic regulatory cooperation must not be limited to 
the impact on trade, but also consider consumers’ interests, such as 
safety, information and sustainable consumption as is the case with the 
holistic approach to impact assessment. The use of impact assessment 
on both sides of the Atlantic also provides scope for the engagement of 
a variety of stakeholders, for example in the common definition of 
concrete tools to measure the impact on consumer safety. 
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3.1.4 Momentum for continued EU reform 
In order to keep pace with international competition, the EU should 
maintain the momentum needed for further domestic reforms as a 
means of boosting its own competitiveness. External pressure in the 
shape of international competition or negotiations with key trading 
partners has always played a role in the development of EU commercial 
policy and the creation of the Single Market. Negotiating TTIP or any 
agreement with a major developed market economy poses more of a 
challenge for the EU than PTAs with smaller, less-developed economies 
or arguably negotiations in the WTO (with the possible exception of 
agriculture). But such negotiations also offer an opportunity to provide 
the additional external driver that may be needed to break domestic 
deadlocks on policy reforms due to entrenched vested interests, 
resulting in breakthroughs that will be beneficial for EU consumers and 
firms as a whole. 
3.2 Challenges 
3.2.1 Making regulatory cooperation a success 
The essential challenge is to make transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
a success and thus tackle the additional (trade) costs resulting from 
different but equivalent regulation, standards or conformity 
assessment in the US and the EU, whilst ensuring there is no 
diminution of consumer safety and protection or environmental policy 
objectives. Inevitably, some sectors will prove to be difficult or near 
impossible for substantial regulatory cooperation to take place due to 
grave and irreconcilable concerns that the public may have. 
Consequently, the EU has been explicit in stating the issues that will be 
exempt from negotiations, such as GMOs and beef-with hormones (see 
Josling & Tangermann, 2014 for more information on agriculture and 
the TTIP) food and data-privacy laws. However, relevant consumer 
protection associations, such as BEUC (European Consumer 
Organisation, 2015) and the TACD (2015), have expressed major 
concerns that this is not enshrined in the European Commission’s 
Textual Proposal document. Furthermore, in order to ensure that 
regulatory cooperation is a success, citizens and consumer advocacy 
groups need increased transparency and involvement, which means 
that the US should follow the EU’s lead in publicising their negotiation 
proposals and increase the public’s involvement (CFA, 2014a; TACD, 
2015; and European Consumer Organisation/BEUC, 2015). 
TTIP AND CONSUMER PROTECTION  217 
 
It is also worth recalling that there have been various previous 
attempts to promote transatlantic regulatory cooperation that have at 
best been only partially successful. With the main economic gains from 
TTIP projected to come from addressing regulatory barriers, the main 
challenge is to tackle them effectively.  
3.2.2 Dealing with differences in regulatory philosophies and 
practice 
Beyond the technical difficulties that are involved with regulatory 
cooperation, one of the greatest challenges facing TTIP will be 
reconciling the different regulatory philosophies, such as the difference 
between the EU’s use of the precautionary principle (PP) and the US 
reliance on science-based risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis and 
cost-effectiveness analysis (‘science-based approach’) (Bergkamp & 
Kogan, 2013, pp. 495-497). The following section will provide a brief 
overview of both philosophies. 
The precautionary principle enables the EU to invoke more 
stringent levels of regulation or standards in cases when a potential 
adverse impact on human health or the environment can take place 
and/or there is scientific uncertainty, such as scientific controversy, 
disagreements or a lack of scientific knowledge (von Schomberg, 2006). 
Prior to drafting legislation, the EU normally drafts Impact 
Assessments as a means of understanding a piece of legislation’s far-
reaching impact (Alemanno, 2014). Even with the European 
Commission’s Delegated and Implementing Acts, Impact Assessments 
are normally conducted when significant economic, environmental or 
social impacts are expected as a result of the act (Alemanno, 2014). It is 
worth noting that part of the EU’s precautionary principle is anchored 
in Art. 191(2) TFEU, which states that environmental policy should be 
based on the precautionary principle. So it cannot be ‘negotiated away’. 
That said, this does not prevent the European Commission from 
entering into an agreement that could potentially nullify some of its 
effects (Bergkamp & Kogan, 2013).  
The US scientific approach to regulation is supported by the 
central role of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) and the Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) that 
agencies are required to produce. Both are simply based on a science-
based cost-benefit analysis (Alemanno & Parker, 2014), which stands in 
contrast to the EU’s more precautionary and holistic examination of the 
potential societal and environmental impacts that a piece of legislation 
may have. In place of the precautionary principle, the US has a stringent 
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civil liability system that acts as a means of ensuring that health and 
safety regulations and product standards are not lax (Bergkamp & 
Kogan, 2013). In multiple cases, the US Supreme Court has ruled that 
the US Office of Safety and Health Administration must have 
demonstrated “significant risk” prior to regulation (Wiener & Rogers, 
2002, p. 318). 
There may be some signs that the US is inching towards a greater 
use of precaution in their regulatory approaches. For instance, 
President Obama made reference to precaution in his statement on a 
deep seabed mining policy and the US House of Representatives 
decided to highlight “scientific inadequacy” in its regulatory decision 
on endangered species (Bergkamp & Kogan, 2013, p. 500). However, it 
would be relatively naïve to believe that the US will significantly alter 
its regulatory philosophy any time soon. 
Differences in regulatory principles in the EU and US have led 
many to be concerned that any attempt at regulatory convergence in 
the TTIP may imply deregulation of European consumer protection. 
The greatest concern is that the science-based approach to risk 
assessment in the US differs from the use of the precautionary principle 
in EU risk assessment. Science-based risk assessment has not always 
been sufficient, as shown in the case of the mad-cow disease epidemic. 
This was an example of science-based risk assessment getting it wrong. 
This and other episodes have influenced thinking in the EU towards 
more scope for the use of precaution, such as in the field of chemicals 
with the introduction of REACH in the EU (Karlsson, 2015). (For a 
detailed discussion of consumer concerns, see Diels & Thorun, 2014 and 
Alemanno, 2014.) However, several studies have demonstrated that, 
with some possible exceptions, the high standards required by both the 
EU and the US will ensure a high level of consumer, health and 
environmental protection (Bergkamp & Kogan, 2013, p. 507). A further 
study by Fabry & Garbasso (2014, p. 4) suggests that differences 
between precaution and science-based risk assessment have been 
overplayed and that differences are more due to a selective application 
of precaution to different risks in different places and times.   
3.2.3 Selecting the best options for regulatory cooperation 
The recent literature on approaches to regulatory cooperation from a 
consumer protection standpoint has identified harmonisation, mutual 
recognition or equivalence and intensified exchange of information as 
options in addressing regulatory divergence.  
TTIP AND CONSUMER PROTECTION  219 
 
Harmonisation 
Harmonisation has been used for voluntary standards but has proven 
difficult or, at best, very time consuming. For consumer protection, the 
issue is whether the common levels of consumer protection represent a 
levelling up or down. The work on this suggests that contrary to fears 
of a ‘race to the bottom’, there is some evidence of a levelling upwards, 
as has been the case within the US where higher levels of consumer 
protection in some states have led to a levelling up in the quality of 
consumer protection in a variety of states: the so-called ‘California 
effect’ (Vogel, 1997).  
Mutual recognition or equivalence 
Mutual recognition in its various forms or equivalence can be 
appropriate when the policy goals are the same but the approach used 
to meet these goals differs. This approach offers the prospect of being 
more effective in reducing the costs of incompatible provisions. It poses 
no threat to consumer protection, provided the goals are indeed 
equivalent. From a consumer perspective, the interest here is to ensure 
that regulatory cooperation is geared towards satisfying consumer 
interests and not unduly focusing on the removal of regulatory barriers 
to trade or increased trade costs. This is, of course, the basis for the ‘new 
approach’ to technical harmonisation and standards within the EU that 
led to the success of the Single Market programme in the 1980s and 
1990s. But in the EU case, it was based on a harmonisation of minimum 
essential requirements as well as a broad approximation of regulatory 
aims.  
Intensified exchange of information 
Considerable opportunities lie in an intensified exchange of 
information and research between European and US regulators. 
Informational coordination on issues of common interest promises not 
only greater but also increased consumer protection through mutual 
learning. However, this free flow of information that benefits 
consumers should never be confused with the flow of commercially 
valuable personal information regulated under data protection and 
privacy frameworks on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, a free flow 
of information is also not necessarily the same as an increased level of 
transparency. 
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In practice, the way in which regulations and standards have 
been dealt with in trade agreements is a little more complicated. Here 
it is helpful to differentiate between several elements.  
Transparency constitutes a fundamental basis of trade 
agreements. In this context, it involves the publication of all regulations 
and testing procedures as the first essential step to the removal of 
barriers to market access. This can be facilitated by the requirement to 
use modern electronic communications and by ensuring there is a 
central focal point to answer any enquiries concerning regulations.  
Technical regulations are defined in the WTO as measures that 
are obligatory and laid down in national or EU legislation. The TBT 
agreement requires national treatment, but this does not, of course, deal 
with the trade costs resulting from differing regulations. The 
alternative approach is mutual recognition of regulations, but there are 
only ‘best endeavours’ wording on mutual recognition in the WTO TBT 
Agreement and most other trade agreements. Standards are defined as 
voluntary measures that may or may not provide a means of showing 
compliance with regulatory requirements. International standards-
making bodies cover goods, e.g. the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO), CENELEC (for electrical equipment) and for 
minimum requirements underlying SPS measures, the Codex 
Alimentarius.  
Both the TBT and SPS agreements make reference to 
international standards. In the former, there are ‘best endeavours’ 
wording only on the use of international standards and a voluntary 
Code of Good Practice on Standards Making. The SPS agreement urges 
the use of Codex regulatory requirements, but only where these are 
appropriate (e.g. too low), thus allowing significant scope to waive the 
requirements. Conformity assessment relates to the process or 
procedure by which compliance with agreed standards or regulations 
are tested. Most trade agreements, including the TBT agreement, 
require national treatment for conformity assessment, so that imported 
products must be tested in the same way as nationally produced 
products. As for technical regulations, this does not address the 
additional costs of complying with unnecessarily complex or different 
conformity assessment measures. So again there is the option of mutual 
recognition or equivalence of conformity assessment. 
Institutional provisions are included in agreements. These 
usually take the form of committees to monitor and promote the 
application of regulatory cooperation. There may also be specific 
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committees, such as in the case of the recent EU–Korea FTA or KORUS 
discussed above.  
The options discussed above have different implications for 
regulatory sovereignty and thus the scrutiny function of the EP and its 
committees. Taking each of these in turn, harmonisation of voluntary 
standards is carried out by standards making bodies, the representation 
in these is through the national standards making bodies and on 
detailed technical work there is strong involvement of private sector 
experts. Agreed international standards are adopted by voting in the 
international bodies in which the European standards-making bodies 
have a very strong presence, which is often still seen in the US as 
skewing the balance against the ‘more industry-led’ approach to 
standards used in the US.   
Mutual recognition can take a number of forms. In the past 
mutual recognition agreements have been based on legislation. If this 
is the case, legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic will retain 
regulatory sovereignty. But, as noted above, the reluctance of the 
regulators and legislators to make changes has been a significant 
impediment in the past. The European Commission and the USTR have 
stated that regulatory cooperation provisions in the TTIP will not imply 
rule-making powers. At this level therefore there would seem to be no 
threat to the regulatory autonomy. The respective legislatures would 
however, have to exercise effective scrutiny.  
The third alternative of intensified exchange of information 
raises few issues for regulatory scrutiny. This option seeks to influence 
the preparatory phase of regulation. Through exchanges of research 
and thinking on the form and stringency of regulation, 
incompatibilities should be reduced from the outset. The proposed 
legislation would then be compatible or more compatible, but the EP 
and US Congress would still retain legislative sovereignty. 
3.2.4 Identifying suitable priorities  
In order to make progress, it has been recognised by negotiators on 
both sides that what is needed is to identify those areas where levels of 
consumer protection are equivalent but the means of achieving them 
differ. In these areas it should be possible to reconcile the procedural 
differences through mutual recognition or acceptance of equivalence, 
subject of course to effective scrutiny to ensure that this does not lead 
to a reduction in consumer protection that would be detrimental to 
consumer/environmental interests. This chapter suggests that this 
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should be possible in sectors such as engineering and automobiles and 
perhaps in aspects of trade facilitation such as supply chain security.  
It will equally be necessary to recognise, as the negotiators 
appear to have done, that there will be some areas in which levels of 
consumer protection diverge so that the more ambitious forms of 
regulatory cooperation such as mutual recognition in its various forms 
are inappropriate. Such sectors appear to be in REACH in the chemical 
sector (see Elliot & Pelkmans, 2015) and probably significant areas of 
food safety. In these areas it will be necessary to recognise that 
regulatory cooperation will have to take the form of less ambitious 
instruments, such as intensified exchange of information or joint 
research on future standards as a means of limiting future divergent 
standards. 
3.2.5 Getting the process right 
The nature of these challenges suggests that regulatory cooperation will 
have to be a continuous process. As has long been recognised in the 
debate on TBTs, the conclusion of an agreement is only the beginning. 
Real progress in removing regulatory barriers requires more or less 
continuous efforts Again, this is a lesson that has been learned in the 
EU’s attempts to reduce such barriers to the cross-border intra-EU 
movement of goods, services and factors of production. A key 
challenge in the TTIP is therefore getting the process right. This means 
ensuring that the framework established to carry the work forward is 
appropriate. In the context of the TTIP this means ensuring that the 
mechanisms, such as the proposed Regulatory Cooperation Body 
(RCB), are effective and transparent. Calls from the TACD (2015) have 
proposed that as a way to boost the effectiveness and transparency of 
the RCB, consumer groups and citizens should be integral to its design 
and that the good practices of meaningful, public and transparent 
consultations should be enshrined in the TTIP. 
Another key challenge in getting the process right is ensuring 
that future attempts to implement new regulations do not become 
overly burdensome – more specifically, costly and time-consuming. It 
is important to note that this may have greater implications for the US 
compared to the EU due to a difference in regulatory systems and 
legislative functions (TACD, 2015; VZBV, 2015). 
In the European Commission’s textual proposal document, it 
states that impact assessments and meaningful consultations are 
required to take place on planned regulatory acts at the central level. 
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Furthermore, each Party is required to inform the other Party about 
proposed regulatory acts (at the central level) that will likely have a 
“significant impact” on “international trade or investment…between 
the parties” (European Commission, 2015a).  
The European Commission’s proposed IA (impact assessment) 
and consultation process may slow down future attempts of 
implementing new regulations and make it more costly for legislators 
complying with regulatory requirements for three reasons. First, the 
European Commission’s proposal for an increased usage of IAs will 
most likely result in a greater administrative workload when 
regulations are being proposed. This is especially true for the US where 
IAs are not as frequently employed as it is in the EU (TACD, 2015). This 
proposal may prove difficult for the administrative departments or 
agencies that are responsible for drafting IA if they are overstretched or 
under-resourced. 
Second, since IAs are not clearly defined in the European 
Commission’s textual proposal, these IAs may be more extensive than 
the IAs that the US normally conducts. More specifically, beyond a cost-
effectiveness analysis (which the US IAs primarily focus on), European 
IAs are more ‘holistic’ in that they will also analyse, for instance, social 
and environmental impacts (Alemanno & Parker, 2014). However, US 
consumer advocacy organisations, such as the CFA, are in favour of IAs 
with a more holistic analysis (CFA, 2014b). 
Third, the European Commission’s interest in binding the US’s 
sub-federal units to the TTIP (i.e. US states) may also magnify the 
potentially burdensome impacts of IAs and consultation (TACD, 2015).  
While some groups, such as the TACD (2015), BEUC (2015) and 
the VZBV (2015), believe that this may cause a “significant slowdown 
and chill on regulatory processes”, these concerns may be over-
exaggerated in that the European Commission’s latest textual proposal 
document outlines that each Party will be charged to determine 
whether a regulatory act will have a “significant impact” (European 
Commission, 2015a). Furthermore, US federal agencies proposing 
“significant” new regulation, already conduct stringent regulatory IAs 
and normally opt for a more consultative process as a means of averting 
potential judicial reviews (Alemanno & Parker, 2014). As for the EU, 
the European Commission conducts at least broad consultations with 
parties impacted by new proposals for delegated acts and publicises the 
consultation process of an implementing act’s proposal (Alemanno & 
Parker, 2014). The European Commission’s May 2015 proposal for 
“Better Regulation(s)” will result in a more frequent use of Impact 
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Assessments in the Commission’s delegating measures (European 
Commission, 2015d).  
In addition to ensuring that regulatory cooperation is a 
continuous process once the TTIP is concluded, negotiators need to 
ensure that future attempts of implementing new regulations are not 
overly burdensome.  
3.2.6 Safeguarding regulatory sovereignty: The case of the EU 
A question of interest to MEPs is whether the proposed process poses 
a challenge for the EU’s regulatory sovereignty. The present analysis 
argues that the European Parliament’s regulatory sovereignty, in terms 
of legislative rule-making authority, is unlikely to be affected by the 
TTIP. In the discussion so far it has become clear that the RCB will have 
no rule-making powers.  
The EU’s proposed approach to the TTIP has been set out in the 
initial European Commission’s Textual Proposal made public on the 
9th February 2015. It should be understood that this is only an 
indication of what might be in the TTIP. The outcome of the 
negotiations is of course unknown at this stage. No US textual proposal 
has been made available for discussion even though regulatory 
cooperation was the subject of discussion in the 9th round of 
negotiations in New York in the week of the 20th April. The EU text 
sets out the general aim of ‘reinforcing regulatory cooperation’ (Art 1) 
without restricting the right to regulate in pursuit of legitimate public 
policy objectives, such as ‘a high level of protection of inter alia: the 
environment; consumers; working conditions; human, animal and 
plant life, health and safety; personal data; cyber security; cultural 
diversity; or preserving financial stability.’ Both the EU and US 
negotiators have repeatedly emphasised that there is no intention to 
restrict the right to regulate levels of consumer protection or any other 
regulations, neither to lower such standards (Fabry & Garbossa, 2014). 
As the US supports this position there is no reason to believe that the 
final outcome will diverge from this position. 
One area of contention is coverage. The EU’s proposed text refers 
to cooperation at the level of central government (Art. 3), although 
there is a note that the scope will be reviewed at a later stage of the 
negotiation. At issue here is whether the US will accept an extension to 
the sub-federal, i.e. state level regulation. In a number of regulatory 
policy areas, the states play an important role. In other trade 
agreements, the US has offered no more than best endeavours for the 
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coverage of sub-federal regulation, so including state level regulation 
in the process will be a challenge for the EU.  
According to the EU proposal, transparency provisions would 
require the parties to provide a list of planned regulations ‘at least once 
a year’. The EU’s proposed approach under regulatory policy 
instruments is that the parties ‘affirm their intention’ to carry out 
impact assessments of planned regulatory acts at the central level (this 
would mean the EU level and the US federal level). In carrying out such 
impact assessments, the parties shall i) consider how the regulation 
relates to relevant international instruments and ii) take account of the 
regulatory approaches of the other party and the impact on 
international trade or investment (including investors) (Art 7). 
In the course of such impact assessment, the parties would be 
required to exchange information and promote the exchange of 
experience. Stakeholders would also have to be given a ‘reasonable 
opportunity’ to provide input through public consultations (Art 6). The 
US and the EU currently use impact assessments, but it will be 
important to assess how this meshes with the EU’s regulatory and 
legislative processes. Impact assessments are widely used in the pre-
legislative phase in the EU and normally take place for delegated or 
implementing measures (Alemanno & Parker, 2014; Alemanno, 2014). 
Regulatory cooperation in the TTIP could therefore result in a greater 
use of impact assessments. 
An Annual Regulatory Cooperation Programme would be 
established to set priorities for regulatory cooperation. This is similar 
to previous transatlantic approaches to regulatory cooperation, but an 
annual programme suggests greater intensity. Since such an approach 
would effectively shape the priorities for the RCB, it would be 
important for the European Parliament to have an input into and 
provide scrutiny of the programme. 
Articles 9 and 10 of the EU textual proposal deal with 
information and regulatory exchanges. These are in line with the well-
established approach used in long-standing trade agreements, such as 
the provisions on TBT or SPS in WTO or preferential agreement already 
concluded by the EU. The EU proposal does, however, include specific 
reference to an obligation to inform the other party of proposed 
regulatory acts that ‘do not originate from the executive branch’. This 
appears to be designed to ensure that rule-making emanating from US 
regulatory agencies is also included, and is necessary given the nature 
of the US system. The regulatory exchanges will take place between 
regulators and competent authorities.  
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In Article 11, the proposal includes the central element of 
promoting regulatory compatibility. This shall apply to areas where 
‘mutual benefits can be realised without compromising the 
achievement of legitimate public policy objectives’ as set out in Art 1. 
The text includes a number of options, namely: 
• ‘mutual recognition of equivalence of regulatory acts, in full or 
in part’ … based on equivalent outcomes as regards the 
fulfilment of the public policy goals pursued by both parties; 
• harmonisation of regulatory acts, or their essential elements 
through the application of existing ‘international instruments’ 
(e.g. international standards); 
• the approximation of rules and procedures on a bilateral basis; 
or 
• simplification of regulatory acts in line with shared principles 
and guidelines. 
This approach seems balanced and would not undermine the 
EP’s regulatory sovereignty provided the RCB has no rule-making 
powers. 
The RCB would be composed of ‘regulators and competent 
authorities’. The expectation must be that the competent body on the 
part of the EU would be the European Commission´s Directorate 
General responsible for the regulatory policy concerned. If this is the 
case, then there can be some assurance that regulatory policy objectives, 
such as consumer interests, would not be less likely to be compromised 
in the interests of ‘trade’ or market access. But this is something the 
European Parliament should monitor.   
The RCB would have the power to create sectoral working 
groups. This seems to be in line with the typical powers granted to 
similar committees in other preferential trade agreements (PTAs). This 
is necessary due to the technical nature of regulation and regulatory 
barriers to competition in markets. The RCB would hold a meeting 
open to the participation of stakeholder ‘at least once a year’, prepared 
with the involvement of the co-chairs of the Civil Society Contact 
Groups. Therefore, formal consultations with civil society are 
envisaged.  
In summary, the EU’s proposals are based on intensified 
exchange of information with a view to reinforcing regulatory 
cooperation. The options offered are fairly simple and include 
equivalence/mutual recognition, harmonisation or ‘simplification’. 
The text includes a safeguard in the sense that it expressly reserves the 
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right to regulate in pursuit of high levels of protection for consumers 
and other legitimate public policy objectives. MEPs will wish to ensure 
that this is the case in the final text and that they have an input in the 
priorities in regulatory cooperation, such as through scrutiny of the 
Annual Regulatory Cooperation Programme. 
The research for this chapter has focused on the case of the EU. 
When it comes to the US, regulators and the US Congress have a solid 
record of defending their regulatory sovereignty. As noted above, there 
is as yet no (published) US textual proposal on the approach to 
regulatory cooperation. If the (unofficial) text for regulatory cohesion 
in the TPP is a model, however, the US approach would appear to pose 
no threat at all to regulatory sovereignty as the emphasis would be on 
promoting coherence within the US (and the EU if this approach were 
used in the TTIP). The role of any joint body to set agendas for 
regulatory cooperation across the Atlantic would therefore be less, so 
there could be no danger that such a body might somehow undermine 
regulatory sovereignty. 
4. Case studies 
4.1 Chemicals 
The area of chemicals entails considerable divergence between US and 
EU legislation and thus marked interest in greater regulatory 
consistency (for more on chemicals, see Elliot & Pelkmans, “Great TTIP 
ambition in chemicals: Why and how”.) The EU’s central piece of 
legislation is the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), which entered into force in 
June 2007, and streamlines the legislative framework on chemicals of 
the EU. Classification and labelling of substances is governed by the so-
called CLP (classification, labelling, and packaging) Regulation. 
Basically, under REACH, producers or importers must register 
chemicals to be put on the market in quantities exceeding a certain 
threshold with the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). As part of the 
registration, they must provide specific information on the properties 
of the chemicals to ECHA. Registrants must also conduct a chemical 
safety assessment. Certain chemicals, included in Annex XIV of the 
Regulation, are subject to pre-marketing authorisation; criteria for 
including substances into the list are defined (Gerstetter, 2014, p. 30). 
In May 2014, the European Commission published a position 
paper for the TTIP negotiations on chemicals, stating that “neither full 
harmonisation nor mutual recognition seems feasible on the basis of the 
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existing framework legislation in the US (Toxic Substances Control Act, 
TSCA) and EU (REACH)” and that proposals for greater consistency 
have to be within the existing legislative framework of the EU. 
Although current EU and US regulations on chemicals differ, there are 
areas where the two systems allow for joint work. The position paper 
outlines four areas for which the European Commission proposes to 
assess possibilities for enhanced cooperation with the US via the TTIP:  
1. Prioritisation of chemicals for assessment and assessment 
methodologies;  
2. Promoting alignment in classification and labelling of chemicals;  
3. New and emerging issues (e.g. endocrine disruptors, 
nanomaterials); and  
4. Enhanced information sharing among regulators while 
protecting Confidential Business Information (CBI) (e.g. on test 
data to reduce animal testing). 
This suggests an intensified exchange of information approach, 
which means in practice that US and EU regulators might agree to work 
together during their assessment through evaluating the same 
substances at the same time and exchanging respective information. 
This bears cost-saving potential for both the companies and the 
regulators, but it would not change the level of protection offered by 
EU law. The EU decision-making process might be concerned by 
decisions emanating from an US-EU regulatory cooperation, for 
instance on the inclusion of substances in any of the Annexes. In such a 
case, the European Commission would formulate a proposal and the 
relevant Committee, composed of member state representatives, would 
be involved. In other decisions under REACH, ECHA itself or the 
competent authorities of member states are involved. Thus, TTIP will 
not change the fundamental decision-making structure of the EU.  
The example of chemicals regulation shows that the scope for 
autonomous decision-making by the European Commission is limited, 
as in major implementing acts a number of actors are involved. The goal 
is to seek opportunities for cooperation between the relevant regulators 
in order to better coordinate certain practices and therefore increase 
efficiencies and reduce costs for authorities and economic units, but 
without lowering any existing consumer protection levels.  
4.2 Automotive sector 
The automotive sector is another industry that could benefit greatly 
from regulatory convergence. (For more on the automotive sector, see 
TTIP AND CONSUMER PROTECTION  229 
 
chapter 15 in this volume by Freund & Oliver). The EU’s automotive 
industry is, after China, the second-largest manufacturer of motor 
vehicles worldwide and it generates millions of jobs – directly and 
indirectly – EU-wide. The US represents by far the largest market for 
EU automobile exporters (followed by China, Russia and Turkey).  
A significant stimulus for transatlantic trade of motor vehicles 
and parts can be created by addressing trade related costs which arise 
from NTBs, such as different product standards or regulations, testing 
methods, classifications and product labelling. The EU and the US have 
different regulations in relation to lights, door-locks, seat belts, steering 
and electric windows. As these regulations assure a similar level of 
safety across the Atlantic, there is a wide range of regulations where 
mutual recognition seems possible (Kolev & Matthes, 2014, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, the processes by which the US and EU establish product 
regulations in the automotive industry have very different paths. 
Contrary to the US system of self-certification, the safety of motor 
vehicles is attested via pre-market government approval in the EU. The 
European vehicle regulations include both EU directives, which must 
be implemented by the member states, and regulations promulgated 
through UNECE with optional implementation by the national 
governments of the member states. Signatories to the UNECE 
Agreement commit to mutual recognition of approvals for vehicle 
components. However, the US did not join the agreement, as it was not 
ready to recognise regulations generated outside the US. What this 
means for manufacturers is that they have to run tests twice in order to 
get cars approved in both markets. Besides safety, there exist main 
differences of regulatory requirements between the US and EU 
concerning fuel economy and emissions requirements (Canis & 
Lattanzio, 2014, p. 5).  
The European Commission’s May 2014 proposal for regulatory 
cooperation on motor vehicles outlines a possible approach to promote 
regulatory compatibility while achieving the levels of health, safety and 
environmental protection that each side deems appropriate. The 
ultimate goal pursued in the TTIP negotiations concerning the 
automobile manufacturers is according to the EU’s position twofold: 
• “Firstly, the recognition of motor vehicles (and their parts and 
components, including tyres) manufactured in compliance with 
the technical requirements of one party as complying with the 
technical requirements of the other. […] 
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• Secondly, a significant strengthening of EU-US cooperation also 
in the framework of UNECE 1998 Agreement, especially on new 
technologies.” 
The first step in the process of mutual recognition of technical 
requirements is the development of a methodological approach 
enabling regulators to assess whether the regulations of one side are 
equivalent (in terms of, for example, safety levels and environmental 
protection). In areas where equivalence of regulatory outcome can be 
confirmed, “the relevant regulations of the other TTIP partner would 
have the same legal effect as compliance with domestic regulations”. 
Regarding the second point, the hope is that the EU-US cooperation in 
the framework of the UNECE 1998 Agreement should lead to the 
adoption of Global Technical Regulations in the near future. 
Strengthening EU-US cooperation is considered essential regarding the 
role of the EU and US as potential regulatory requirement-setters in the 
global automotive industry. The reinforcement of EU-US cooperation 
is already a central element in the field of new technologies such as 
hydrogen and electric vehicles, test-cycle on emissions and advanced 
safety technologies (Kolev & Matthes, 2014, p. 26).  
In the context of future regulatory cooperation, it is important to 
clearly define which measures concern TBTs and redundant 
administrative burdens and which measures are linked to desired 
levels of consumer protection and regulations and should not be 
altered. The EP’s democratic scrutiny over EU regulatory processes will 
be crucial when creating the framework for future cooperation. At the 
same time, it has to be vigilant about a balanced involvement of 
stakeholders such as the European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association (ACEA) and the American Automotive Policy Council 
(AAPC) within the stakeholder consultations included in the 
development of a regulatory proposal.  
In summary, it is of particular interest for the EU to achieve an 
ambitious TTIP incorporating the commitment of the parties to 
promote regulatory convergence without sacrificing vehicle safety or 
environmental performance.  
4.3 ICT 
The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry – 
which is a “combination of manufacturing and services industries that 
capture, transmit and display data and information electronically” 
(OECD, 2012) – is one that can greatly benefit through increased 
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regulatory convergence between the US and the EU. However, a 
sensitive area to consumer protection – data privacy measures – may 
make it particularly challenging for negotiators to bridge the regulatory 
transatlantic divide (for more on the ICT sector, see Renda & Yoo, 2015).  
With the regards to the European Commission’s offensive 
interests in the ICT sector (European Commission, 2015b), regulatory 
cooperation does not seem to be a significant challenge on ICT goods 
(Renda & Yoo, 2015) For instance, efforts in establishing e-labelling 
requirements are expected to have little difficulty in regulatory 
cooperation since the US’s E-LABEL Act was enacted in November 
2014. This measure will especially help SMEs in reducing 
manufacturing costs of digital devices since it gives them the ability to 
not place labels, stickers and etches of regulatory compliance on their 
(electronic) devices by providing the regulatory compliance 
information digitally in the device’s screen and/or software. 
Additionally, issues of e-accessibility – making ICT easier to use by 
people with disabilities – and interoperability – allowing users to 
exchange data between different products easier – do not seem to be 
highly contentious. The same could also be said about the European 
Commission’s objectives in establishing better enforcement regulations 
and common principles for certifying ICT products, especially in the 
realm of cryptography. 
In spite of the EU’s offensive ICT interests, where consumers and 
firms alike will reap large benefits from increased regulatory 
cooperation, a more uncertain aspect of TTIP’s regulatory cooperation 
lies in one of the European Commission’s primary defensive interests – 
ICT services issues relating to the free flow of data – which has large 
implications for consumer protection. 
Recent concerns with data privacy has prompted the EU to adopt 
increasingly stricter data protection measures, resulting in some 
countries adopting data localization efforts – legal requirements that an 
organization containing critical data of EU citizens must be physically 
stored in data servers in their respective country (Lakatos, 2014). 
Stringent data requirements, such as the EU’s 1998 Directive on Data 
Protection, make it challenging for businesses abroad to do provide 
digital goods and services to the EU.  In order to streamline digital trade 
between the EU and US and to ensure that the data of EU citizens were 
highly protected, the US-EU Safe Harbour Agreement was created in 
2000. Consequently, organisations in the US that register to the US-EU 
Safe Harbour programme must provide certain protections, rights and 
assurances to EU citizens that their data is well-protected. 
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However, increased concerns surrounding data privacy in 2013 
prompted the European Commission to review the US-EU Safe 
Harbour Agreement as they proposed a series of reforms to improve 
the security of personal data. While substantial progress has been made 
in negotiating a reformed Safe Harbour agreement, the EU and US have 
also been negotiating a Data Protection Umbrella Agreement to protect 
the personal data transferred between the two countries for law 
enforcement purposes since 2011 (European Commission, 2014).  
Despite the European Commission making it clear that it does 
not want to negotiate on the topic of data privacy in TTIP (European 
Commission, 2013), the US has been keen on including some 
commentary on this in TTIP’s e-commerce chapter as they have tabled 
a proposal to prohibit data localization measures (Lakatos, 2014; 
Järvinen, 2014). The US Trade Representative (USTR) increasingly faces 
pressure from lawmakers that have made multiple attempts in 
Congress to pass legislation that would give the USTR a stronger 
mandate against data localisation efforts in trade agreements 
(Bendrath, 2014). For instance, the “Law Enforcement Access to Data 
Stored Abroad Act”, introduced in February 2015, states, “the (USTR) 
should pursue open data flow policies with foreign nations.” However, 
there is a challenge within the EU as different countries are now 
exceeding the EU’s requirements on data protection by having data 
localization efforts, which may make regulatory convergence all the 
more difficult on this issue.  
In conclusion, it would be of interest to the EU if they could 
negotiate provisions similar to those in CETA, where Parties are 
required to respect the international requirements of relevant 
international organisations they are a part of, in TTIP. This would be of 
great interest to consumer advocacy groups, such as the TACD, that 
demand issues surrounding data flows to not be negotiated with 
(TACD, 2013). In addition to this, it would ideal if such provisions 
could reference the US-EU Safe Harbour agreement and the currently 
negotiated Data Protection Umbrella Agreement. If such provisions 
could be negotiated to protect the personal data of consumers, the EU 
stands to benefit from regulatory cooperation in the ICT sector in the 
TTIP.  
5. Conclusion 
Focusing on the area of consumer protection, this chapter argues that 
regulatory sovereignty of American and European legislators – in terms 
of the legislative, rule-making ability – is unlikely to be affected by the 
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TTIP. The discussion of the European Commission’s recently published 
paper on regulatory cooperation has shown that the provisions are 
procedural and intended to promote, guide, monitor and help facilitate 
regulatory cooperation. There is, of course, as yet no final agreement. 
The EU’s approach to TTIP as set out in the Textual Proposal and the 
existing EU and US approaches to regulatory cooperation in other 
PTAs does not suggest much of a challenge to the present regulatory 
sovereignty. The three options for addressing regulatory divergence – 
harmonisation, mutual recognition and intensified exchange of 
information – have different implications for the scrutiny function of 
the legislators and its committees. Transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation, such as through the proposed Regulatory Cooperation 
Body, will have to identify which areas of regulation are suitable for 
harmonisation, which for mutual recognition/equivalence and which 
for intensified exchange of information. Decisions on this will be taken 
in the RCB, but any action requiring legislative change will be dealt 
with under existing policy-making procedures. The American and 
European legislators should, along with other institutions, ensure that 
the work of the RCB is transparent. The priorities in regulatory 
cooperation that will be set by the Annual Regulatory Cooperation 
Programme should be scrutinised to ensure that they reflect the 
broader consumer priorities. 
A final assessment of the impact of transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation on consumer protection can only be made once the process 
can be observed. Further work will therefore be needed to monitor the 
procedures established and assess whether they are successful in 
making progress on the reducing the costs of different approaches, 
while ensuring that consumer interests are safeguarded.  
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8. TTIP’S BROADER 
GEOSTRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
AND STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
1. Introduction 
Much analysis has been conducted into the potential economic impact 
of TTIP, but little consideration has been given to its political and 
geostrategic implications. This chapter builds on earlier research by the 
lead author and attempts to fill that gap.1 Our research has been guided 
by a number of questions: 
 Will TTIP strengthen or subvert the multilateral rules-based 
order? 
 How might such a partnership affect the broader debate about 
the so-called ‘decline of the West’? 
 Would a transatlantic economic partnership restore a sense of 
common purpose to the US-EU relationship, and in what way?  
 How might TTIP influence the way in which the US and the EU 
engage with other important actors, such as China, and the 
degree to which emerging powers choose to challenge the 
prevailing order, or accommodate themselves to it? 
 What geopolitical dynamics might be unleashed by the 
interaction among TTIP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
various EU bilateral trade negotiations with Asian countries? 
 How might a transatlantic economic partnership affect the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership countries, NAFTA partners Canada and 
Mexico, or NATO-ally Turkey? How might such a partnership 
affect each partner’s respective relations with Russia? 
                                                          
1 See e.g. the contributions to Hamilton (2014), in particular the summary 
chapter by the editor, pp. vii-xxxii. 
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 What might be the consequences of failure to reach a TTIP deal 
or the rejection of that deal by legislators or the general public on 
either side of the Atlantic? 
We set the scene by analysing the strategic considerations that 
define the (perceived) need for transatlantic renewal (section 2), and 
then discuss the geo-economic impact of TTIP on emerging powers 
(section 3) and poorer countries (section 4). We argue that TTIP has the 
potential to be a catalyst for trade liberalisation at the global level 
(section 5). In this context, we address the question of the openness of 
TTIP (section 6) and conclude with remarks on the challenges and 
opportunities that lie ahead (section 7). 
2. The setting 
2.1 The perceived need for transatlantic renewal 
TTIP is not a new idea. Talks of an ambitious transatlantic deal stretch 
back over 20 years. Serious negotiations have never been launched, 
however, primarily because of concern for their potential impact on the 
multilateral trading system. Moreover, some critics have argued that 
such a deal would be “too small,” since transatlantic tariffs and other 
trade barriers have not been that consequential. Others have argued 
that such a deal would be “too big,” encompassing so many issues and 
with such reach into American and European societies that it would 
invite opposition by too many interest groups.2 
Both of these arguments have since waned. First, the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations has been in stalemate for 
years. The recent and unexpected agreement on the so-called ‘Bali 
Package’ at the WTO’s Ninth Ministerial Conference in December 2013 
is an exception that proves the rule about the demise of global trade 
liberalisation: the package deal was reached with great difficulty but in 
July 2014 India decided against signing onto the trade facilitation 
protocol that was agreed upon as a key deliverable in Bali. It was only 
after the US and India came to a permanent agreement regarding 
India's food subsidies in November 2014 that the Bali Package received 
the final seal of approval. This saga shows that both the development 
spectrum and the appetite for liberalisation inside the WTO are rather 
variable. This is especially so in some of the more modern trade policy 
areas that are important to Washington and Brussels, such as 
                                                          
2 See Ries (2014). 
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competition frameworks, intellectual property protection and market 
access for financial services. As noted by former European 
Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson:  
If GATT had been a club of self-described liberalisers, the 
WTO had become a club of guardians of the global trade rule 
book. For members who see global trade liberalisation as a 
work in progress the WTO can be a frustrating place to be, 
moving as it seems to do at the speed of the slowest of its 
members.3 
Second, transatlantic tariffs may be low, but the size of the 
transatlantic economy is so huge that even small reductions could be 
more important than bigger tariff cuts in smaller markets, and tackling 
tariffs makes it easier to tackle regulatory differences, where even more 
substantial gains could be made. 
Third, TTIP is indeed a big negotiation. But deep integration 
between the US and EU economies means that greater alignment and 
coherence on issues ranging from services and investment to regulatory 
differences could do far more to generate jobs and economic growth 
than a narrow focus on trade alone. This is especially so in areas like 
automotive and pharmaceuticals, where regulation is essentially 
science-based and the desired outcomes are basically the same on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Also, the value of agreeing better regulatory 
process frameworks (i.e. identical standards for regulatory 
consultation, impact assessments and other forms of transparency) 
should not be underestimated.4 
The backdrop to the negotiation is a widely held perception that 
support for the multilateral institutions and the post-WWII principles 
on which they rest is eroding. This is due in part to ambivalence among 
rising powers about the nature of the international order, including a 
sense among some political elites in those countries that their moment 
in history has come (back) and that models other than those promoted 
by the US and the EU may be more relevant to future growth and 
prosperity. The creation of a BRICS Development Bank and the 
Chinese-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank are cases in point. 
The need felt on both shores of the pond to strengthen the 
transatlantic partnership is fuelled by the fear that perceptions of a 
weakened ‘West’– Europe afflicted by the worst economic and financial 
crisis since the Great Depression and the US unwilling to police crucial 
                                                          
3 See Mandelson (2014). 
4 See chapter 2 in this volume, Chase & Pelkmans (2015). 
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hotspots of the world – will take hold and lead to more robust 
challenges to the international financial institutions and security 
arrangements that have traditionally been controlled by the US and 
Europe. China's pinpricks in the East and South China Seas could 
indeed be seen as attempts to undermine American maritime 
dominance in Asia-Pacific, just as Russia's aggression in Ukraine is a 
direct challenge to the EU and NATO. 
In short, TTIP reflects a new transatlantic consensus that the 
international order inspired and supported by the transatlantic alliance 
is fading fast, and that Americans and Europeans must work together 
more urgently to build a partnership that is more effective in generating 
economic opportunity at home, dealing with new competitors, 
especially in emerging growth markets, and shoring up basic norms 
and principles guiding the international system.  
2.2 The economic dimension 
The transatlantic economy generates $5.5 trillion in total commercial 
sales a year and employs up to 15 million workers. It is the largest and 
wealthiest marketplace in the world, accounting for three-quarters of 
global financial markets, over half of world trade, and 35% of global 
GDP in terms of purchasing power. No other commercial artery is as 
integrated. Nonetheless, much more can be done to lower tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, kick-start services and investment and tackle 
unnecessary and costly regulatory differences.5 
TTIP is first and foremost an economic negotiation seeking 
agreement in three areas. The first addresses such market access issues 
as tariffs and rules of origin. The second seeks to reduce, where feasible, 
non-tariff barriers and to find coherence, convergence or recognition of 
essential equivalence on regulatory issues. The third area seeks 
common agreement on a range of norms and standards regarding such 
issues as investment, intellectual property rights, discriminatory 
industrial policies and state-owned enterprises. Some of these 
standards are likely to extend prevailing WTO standards (WTO+); 
others could go beyond existing multilateral norms (WTO-extra). 
In addition, the TTIP will not necessarily be concluded with a 
final document. TTIP is essentially a process whereby negotiators seek 
a ‘living agreement’ consisting of new consultative mechanisms 
                                                          
5 For more on jobs, trade and investment between both sides of the North 
Atlantic, see Hamilton & Quinlan (2015). 
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regarding regulatory and non-tariff issues as they evolve in response to 
developments in trade, technology or other changes. Taken together, 
these elements underscore that TTIP is not just another trade 
agreement, it is a new-generation negotiation aimed at repositioning 
the US and European economies for a more diffuse world of intensified 
global competition. 
TTIP’s economic impact depends upon the final nature of any 
arrangement.6 Its importance will be a function of the depth and 
content of the binding commitments and rules achieved, particularly 
whether or not it is seriously a WTO+ agreement. If TTIP eliminates or 
reduces most transatlantic tariffs; lowers barriers to the services 
economy; aligns or reduces inefficiencies in regulatory discrepancies; 
and ensures continued high standards in such areas as labour, 
consumer, safety and health and environment, then it is likely to boost 
jobs and growth significantly on both sides of the Atlantic.  
2.3 Strategic considerations 
TTIP is about more than just trade. It is about creating a more strategic, 
dynamic and holistic US-EU relationship that is better positioned with 
regard to third countries to open markets and to strengthen the ground 
rules of the international order.  
TTIP is politically important to the US-EU relationship itself. The 
bilateral relationship encompasses a diffuse array of issues, but many 
are mired in process without overarching purpose. Revelations of 
National Security Agency (NSA) spying have also polluted the political 
environment in which the transatlantic partners confront global 
challenges and opportunities. The transatlantic engine is sputtering 
and needs some fuel. TTIP offers a framework for a concrete set of 
ambitious objectives to forge a more global partnership. It is the first 
real transatlantic initiative for the ‘post-post’ Cold War world and 
would be the first congressionally ratified agreement between the 
United States and the European Union. It could give the US-EU 
relationship new life, new focus, and new direction. 
In this sense TTIP could be both a symbolic and practical 
assertion of transatlantic renewal, vigour and commitment, not only for 
the US and the EU towards each other but also to high rules-based 
standards and core principles of international order. It is an initiative 
                                                          
6 For simulations, Erixon & Bauer (2010) and Francois et al. (2013). See also 
Fontagne et al. (2013). 
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that could be assertive without being aggressive: it challenges 
fashionable notions about a ‘weakened West,’ that are prevalent in the 
context of the ‘rise of the rest’. 
TTIP is rooted in a core truth: despite the rise of other powers the 
US and Europe remain the fulcrum of the world economy, each other’s 
most important and profitable market and source of onshore jobs, each 
other’s most important strategic partner, and still a potent force in the 
multilateral system – when they work in concert. The US-EU 
relationship remains a foundational element of the global economy and 
the essential underpinning of a strong rules-based international order. 
Americans and Europeans literally cannot afford to neglect it. TTIP is 
evidence that the two partners are committed to open transatlantic 
markets, to strengthen global rules and leverage global growth.  
In this respect, TTIP could also be an operational reflection of 
basic values shared by democratic societies across the Atlantic, even if 
differences on specific values exist (e.g. GMOs). Surely, the values 
dimension should be extolled, not suppressed, for it is certain to have 
broader resonance. Revolutionary advances in communications 
technologies mean that governments are no longer able to control what 
information citizens receive. 
There is also a reassurance element to the TTIP. When plans 
about TTIP were unfolded, NATO was wobbly and many Europeans 
were worried that the US ‘pivot’ to Asia would translate into less US 
attention and commitment to Europe. While Russia’s shock to the 
European – even global – security order has given NATO a new lease 
on life in defence of its original mission, the bigger picture still reflects 
a strategic rebalancing of America’s military might towards Asia 
Pacific. In this context, TTIP is strategically important. The creation of 
what would essentially be an EU-US marketplace, together with a 
commitment to work together to advance shared (‘Western’) norms 
and standards, would offer reassurance that the EU is in fact America’s 
‘partner of choice’ and that the pivot to Asia is not a pivot away from 
Europe. To be sure, TTIP will not be an ‘economic NATO’7 – a term that 
can easily be misinterpreted – but it could be what former Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton called a “second anchor” for the transatlantic 
relationship, rooted in the deep and growing integration of our 
economies and societies. 
                                                          
7 See remarks by then NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at a 
conference organised by the Confederation of Danish Industry (Rasmussen, 
2013). 
TTIP’S BROADER GEOSTRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS  243 
 
TTIP is also important to each partner’s own goals for itself. A 
successful agreement could help lessen America’s political polarisation 
and generate significant economic opportunities. If TTIP and TPP are 
successful, the US and its partners will have opened trade and 
investment across both the Atlantic and the Pacific with countries 
accounting for two-thirds of global output. As the only party to both 
initiatives, the negotiations give the US a distinct advantage in 
leveraging issues in one forum to advance its interests in the other, 
while potentially reinvigorating US global leadership. TTIP is also 
important to generate growth and jobs in EU member states, to win 
greater popular support for the European Union, particularly in 
members like the United Kingdom, and to spur implementation of 
some of the EU’s own goals, such as completion of the Single Market. 
TTIP is important for the EU – its member states and institutions alike 
– to off-set its relative decline on the global stage.8 
The rise of the US as a global energy power has given the TTIP 
negotiations added importance. Energy-dependent European allies, 
particularly in Eastern Europe, as well as energy-dependent Pacific 
partners such as Japan are looking to the US as a new energy source. 
US law, however, currently limits natural gas exports to countries with 
which the United States has a free trade agreement. This gives some 
partners considerable motivation to move quickly to such an agreement 
with the US. A surge in transatlantic energy trade would generate even 
greater benefits for both sides of the Atlantic than most calculations 
have shown. 
For all these reasons – much as war is too important to be left to 
generals – TTIP is too important to be left to economists. The foreign 
policy community has a fiduciary responsibility for the success of TTIP, 
which could offer new glue for the transatlantic relationship. 
3. Geo-economics: Impact on rising powers 
America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed the limits of military 
might. In spite of Russia’s sabre-rattling in the neighbourhood it shares 
with the EU, and the turmoil in the Middle East, today’s great political 
games revolve mostly around another dimension of power: geo-
economics. The rise of China is central to this story. 
There are four sets of big international negotiations under way: 
TTIP, TPP, EU efforts to forge bilateral deals with India and Japan, and 
                                                          
8 See Gros & Alcidi (2013). 
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US-EU led talks between more than 20 advanced and rising economies 
to liberalise trade in services (the Trade in Services Agreement, TiSA). 
Pull the strands together and – despite rhetoric to the contrary – the 
message is that the US and the EU have given up on the grand 
multilateralism that defined the post-World War II era and are 
repositioning themselves for the world of tomorrow. The outcomes of 
all four sets of negotiations promise to draw the geo-economic contours 
of the globalised world, fix the point of balance between advanced and 
rising states, and circumscribe China’s place in the world. They will 
decide what can be salvaged from the present multilateral system. The 
choice lies between open global arrangements and an economic order 
built around competing blocs. 
TTIP is important in terms of how the transatlantic partners 
together might best relate to rising powers, especially the emerging 
growth markets. Whether those powers choose to challenge the current 
international order and its rules or promote themselves within it 
depends largely on how the US and the EU engage, not only with them 
but also with each other.9 The stronger the bonds among core 
democratic market economies, the better their chances of being able to 
include rising partners as responsible stakeholders in the international 
system. The more united, integrated, interconnected and dynamic the 
international liberal order is – shaped in large part by the US and the 
EU – the greater the likelihood that emerging powers will rise within 
this order and adhere to its rules. The looser or weaker those bonds are, 
the greater the likelihood that rising powers will challenge this order. 
Thus, the US and the EU have an interest in protecting and reinforcing 
the institutional foundations of the liberal order, beginning with their 
own partnership and extending it to the WTO. This means not only 
refraining from imposing such national protectionist measures as trade 
tariffs, export subsidies or 'buy national' policies, but coordinating 
efforts to ensure high standards globally that can lift the lives of their 
own people and create economic opportunity for billions of others 
around the globe. 
There are already signs that TTIP is affecting third countries. 
TTIP was ‘the elephant in the room’ at the 2013 EU-Brazil summit; it is 
causing Brazilian leaders to reframe how they think of their evolving 
role and position.10 Japan’s decision to join the TPP was due as much to 
the start of TTIP negotiations as to intra-Asian dynamics. With the EU 
                                                          
9 See Eizenstat (2013). 
10 See e.g. Thorstensen & Ferraz (2014). 
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now also negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with Japan, both the 
US and the EU are in direct talks with Tokyo about opening the 
Japanese market – a goal that for decades has seemed unattainable. 
There is also reason to believe that the trade facilitation deal struck by 
WTO members in Bali in December 2013 was due in part to concern 
from various holdout countries that with the TTIP and TPP the global 
trading system was moving ahead without them. There is no denying 
that TTIP and related initiatives are injecting new impetus into efforts 
to open markets and strengthen global rules.11 
China has woken up to fact that it is being left behind in today’s 
most important sets of trade negotiations. China has long sought to 
translate its economic clout into military influence (e.g. in the South 
China Sea) or into diplomatic and political influence (e.g. by holding 
down the value of its currency to boost its companies), but Beijing has 
changed its position and signalled a willingness to join plurilateral talks 
on services (TiSA) and has suggested that negotiations with the EU on 
investment rules could be followed by the negotiation of a trade pact. 
The responses from Washington and Brussels have been distinctly 
lukewarm. The US and the EU want evidence that Beijing is ready to 
open up its economy. China has been the big winner from the open 
global economy but is seen as a free-rider on the multilateral system. 
The US is asking why it should further expand arrangements that 
empower its rival. The US response to China’s rise has long been to 
engage and hedge – to draw Beijing into a rules-based system while 
refurbishing old alliances as an insurance policy. The emphasis now is 
on hedging. 
TTIP is a values-based, rules-based initiative that is likely to 
strengthen international solidarity and cohesion, facilitate US energy 
exports to Europe, and enhance the attractiveness of the transatlantic 
model of liberal democratic economies. All this is anathema to the 
current leadership in the Kremlin.12 Russia is engaged in a bidding war 
with the EU over the shared neighbourhood. Realising that the promise 
of accession to the future Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) does not 
exert enough power of attraction,13 the Kremlin has been using military 
and economic coercion in an effort to drive a wedge between the EU 
                                                          
11 As noted above, India eventually made good on its change of heart (i.e. not 
signing the TFA in July 2014) by agreeing in November 2014 with the US on its 
food security and public stockholding concerns. 
12 See Lucas (2014). 
13 See Blockmans et al. (2012). 
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and countries like Armenia (which caved in and joined the EEU on 2 
January 2015), Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Although the European 
Commission has initiated proceedings before the dispute settlement 
body DSB against Russia for its alleged infringement of WTO rules 
under four separate counts, the EU’s overall pushback on Russia’s 
actions has been weak, which reinforces views in Eastern Europe that 
TTIP could offer advantages that a multilateral framework might not.14 
Meanwhile, the Kremlin is reported to be conducting active measures 
in Eastern Partnership countries and in the EU itself to foment 
opposition to the TTIP.15 
The risks of fragmentation of international trading rules are 
obvious enough. A positive sum can quite quickly become a zero sum 
game, carrying the unfortunate flavour of a contest between “the West 
and the rest”. Sidelining China would carry threats to the existing fabric 
of the global system; and history throws up some ugly examples of how 
disputes about trade are the precursor to more serious conflict. 
4. Addressing concerns of poorer countries 
A related consideration has to do with how the United States and the 
EU approach poorer countries. Much depends on the way the US and 
the EU handle the multiple trade agreements that each has with third 
countries and regions. The two parties would do well to send a clear 
signal that the TTIP is about common efforts to open markets by 
harmonising their current hodgepodge of trade preference mechanisms 
for low-income African countries. 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world, accounts for 
a minuscule 2% of world trade. This marginalisation of the region is 
holding back its development at a time when its economic governance 
is rapidly improving. Sub-Saharan Africa needs generous access to 
developed consumer markets to spur investment in labour-intensive 
export sectors that can spark growth and contribute to its successful 
economic transformation.16 
Both the United States and the European Union give trade 
preferences for (some) products from (some) countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The EU provides duty-free and quota-free access to its markets 
for all products – but only to the 27 least-developed countries in the 
                                                          
14 See Hamilton (2014b). See also Novák (2014). 
15 See Lucas (2014). 
16 See e.g. Herfkens (2014). 
TTIP’S BROADER GEOSTRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS  247 
 
region. It also offers less generous access to former colonies through 
preferential deals. The US scheme benefits 40 of the 48 countries in the 
region, but excludes key agricultural products (such as cotton) that 
African countries can produce competitively. These schemes may look 
good on paper, but they are actually underutilised because of their 
administrative complexity and outdated rules. Local content 
requirements are too high, and the rules of origin required for product 
eligibility were created decades before the development of today’s 
value chains, which involve many countries specialising in fragmented 
tasks. Moreover, the US and the EU use different methods to define 
origin, forcing exporters to cope with a myriad of rules.17 
It will be difficult to justify or implement a North Atlantic deal 
in which the participants have differing rules for developing countries. 
What foreign policy interest is served, for example, if the EU and the 
US provide different access to Kenya’s products? In addition, once TTIP 
is in place it will make no sense to have differing access arrangements 
for companies from third countries. The United States and the 
European Union could gain considerable political advantage while 
following through on the logical consequence of their own negotiations 
if they were to harmonise their trade preference schemes for sub-
Saharan Africa, either as part of or as a complement to their partnership 
pact.  
The scheme should cover all products, since excluding just a few 
could encompass most products that these countries can produce 
competitively. Rules of origin need to be relevant, simple and flexible 
for beneficiaries to be able to use the schemes and benefit from the 
growth of value chains. Such value chains have virtually bypassed the 
Sub-Saharan region so far, but they hold considerable potential for less-
developed African countries. It is much easier for these countries to 
develop capabilities in a narrow range of tasks (e.g. at the low end of 
global value chains) such as simple assembly, as long as infrastructure 
is sufficient to attract FDI) than in integrated production of entire 
products or processes.  
Updating these rules to the realities of 21st century production 
networks is long overdue. WTO negotiations on clarifying rules of 
origin are likely to take decades; the US and the EU could do something 
together now. As an interim solution the European Union and the 
United States could recognise each other’s product origin regime. If an 
import is eligible for preferential treatment in the US, it should also be 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
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eligible in the EU, and vice versa. By doing so, the US and the EU would 
also demonstrate that TTIP is about opening markets rather than 
diverting trade. This is admittedly very tough politically, given 
protectionist measures in both the US and the EU. But the logic of an 
ever-closer transatlantic market will raise this question sooner or later. 
If the US and the EU address the issue sooner, they gain some 
additional political advantages. If they address it later, those 
advantages disappear and domestic political infighting over the 
removal of cotton subsidies in the US, for instance, is likely to grow. 
5. TTIP and multilateralism 
Europeans and Americans share an interest in extending prosperity 
through multilateral trade liberalisation. The December 2013 Bali 
agreement on trade facilitation is a sign that piecemeal progress can be 
made. But the overall Doha Round has been underway for over 13 years 
with no agreement in sight, and the WTO system is under challenge, 
especially from emerging growth markets that have benefited 
substantially from the system. A number of rapidly emerging countries 
do not necessarily share the core principles or basic structures that 
underpin open rules-based commerce and show little interest in new 
market-opening initiatives. As a result, the global economy is drifting 
dangerously towards the use of national discriminatory trade, 
regulatory and investment practices. 
In this regard, TTIP could indeed represent a new form of 
transatlantic collaboration to strengthen multilateral rules and lift 
international norms. Given the size and scope of the transatlantic 
economy, standards negotiated by the US and EU could become a 
benchmark for future global rules, reducing the likelihood that others 
will impose more stringent, protectionist requirements for either 
products or services. Mutual recognition of essentially equivalent 
norms and regulatory coherence across the transatlantic space, in areas 
ranging from consumer safety and intellectual property to investment 
policy and labour mobility, not only promise economic benefits at 
home but could also form the core of broader international norms and 
standards.18 TTIP’s first market access pillar could result in clearer, 
more straightforward and transparent rules of origin arrangements 
that could serve as the basis for future preferential rules of origin – a 
common public good. In many cases, the standards being negotiated 
are intended to be more rigorous than comparable rules found in the 
                                                          
18 See Chase & Pelkmans, chapter 2 in this volume. 
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WTO. Agreement on such issues as intellectual property, 
discriminatory industrial policies or state-owned enterprises could 
strengthen the normative underpinnings of the multilateral system by 
creating benchmarks for possible multilateral liberalisation under the 
WTO.  
There is a precedent for this. When the Uruguay Round stalled 
in the early 1990s, the US, Canada and Mexico negotiated the North 
American Free Trade Agreement in just 14 months in 1992; it came into 
force in 1994. This plurilateral effort had a catalytic effect on the 
multilateral system;19 the Uruguay Round restarted and concluded 
successfully. The Information Technology Agreement negotiated by 
the US and EU also eventually became the basic multilateral agreement 
in this area. With the Doha Round stalled, we may again be at a point 
where plurilateral initiatives could ultimately re-energise the 
multilateral system. TTIP may spur others to come back to the Doha 
table. 
TTIP may be useful not only to shore up the multilateral system 
but to extend it to new areas and new members. Even a successful Doha 
Round agreement would not address a host of issues that were not part 
of its mandate and yet are critical to the transatlantic partners and the 
global economy. Transatlantic initiatives in investment or clean 
technologies, for example, could be extended to WTO members who 
are willing to take up the same responsibilities and obligations covered 
by such agreements.  
Hence, the ‘multilateral vs. transatlantic’ dichotomy is a false 
choice. The US and EU should advance on both fronts simultaneously; 
push multilateral liberalisation while pioneering transatlantic market-
opening initiatives in areas not yet covered by multilateral agreements. 
The alternative to this WTO+ agenda is not drift; it is growing 
protectionism, US-EU rivalry in third markets, and the triumph of 
lowest-common-denominator standards for the health and safety of 
our people. The absence of agreed rules and procedures weakens the 
leverage of our two regions to ensure that high standards prevail.  
In this regard, those who worry that TTIP could threaten the 
multilateral economic system should consider that the opposite may in 
                                                          
19 Other developments were also significant to moving the Uruguay Round 
forward, such as the deepening and widening of economic cooperation 
between European Community member states (1992) and the effect this had on 
the states belonging to the European Free Trade Association. In 1994, the EC 
and EFTA states joined the newly created European Economic Area. 
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fact be true. Although the notion of an ambitious transatlantic compact 
has been discussed for two decades, the US and EU refrained from 
going ahead, and yet the Doha Round still didn’t work. TTIP could be 
a laboratory for the WTO and a vanguard for the rest of the world.  
TTIP is not just about regulatory coherence across the Atlantic, it 
is about setting global benchmarks. In this regard it is more ambitious 
than the TPP. In fact, a successful TTIP would actually be a TPP+ 
agreement with regard to regulatory coherence. TTIP is likely to have 
more impact on Asian economies than TPP is likely to have on 
European economies. 
There are still some concerns, however. Political energy is finite, 
and mega-regional deals could take the oxygen out of multilateral 
efforts.20 Also, the values argument loses some of its punch if TTIP is 
perceived to be about trade diversion rather than trade creation. TTIP 
could spur multilateral liberalisation, but only if and when other states 
go along with the transatlantic agreement and if no great trading 
powers work against it. In fact, much may depend on the outcome of 
the two other sets of negotiations promising to test allegiance to 
multilateralism. One will decide whether it is possible to secure a global 
accord on climate change (COP 21 in Paris in December 2015); the other 
whether rich nations are ready to extend help to poorer nations 
enshrined in the soon-to-expire 2015 Millennium Development Goals. 
The debates in both cases centre on rights and responsibilities. How to 
share out the burden of cutting carbon emissions; how much should 
rich countries pay for development? Should their largesse be matched 
by greater responsibility on the part of the recipients? Do governments 
from north and south, or west and east have the political will and 
energy to recognise their mutual interest in new multilateral 
agreements? While modest progress has been made (e.g. with the 
December 2014 Lima Call for Climate Action), success on both 
multilateral tracks remains elusive. Governments elsewhere pay lip 
service to the facts of interdependence while jealously guarding 
outdated notions of national sovereignty. Enlightened self-interest is an 
approach lost on most of today’s world leaders. Then again, 
globalisation without global rules may work for a while, but it may not 
last. 
In short, while multilateral agreement is preferable, it is not 
currently available. TTIP represents a very significant second-best 
                                                          
20 See Straubhaar (2014). 
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option. However, a weak element to the TTIP thus far relates to 
openness. 
6. The issue of openness 
Governments have not stated whether and how TTIP, once concluded, 
might be open to others willing and able to commit to similar goals and 
ground rules. United States Trade Representative (USTR) Mike Froman 
has characterised TTIP as an “open platform” but the two parties have 
made no official statement to this effect.21 This stands in contrast to the 
TPP, where the United States and its negotiating partners have stated 
explicitly that the TPP is open to other APEC members (including 
China and Russia) and in principle much of the Asia-Pacific region.22 
Framing the TTIP as an element of ‘open architecture’ accessible 
to others could give the US and the EU tremendous leverage in terms 
of ensuring ever broader commitment to the high standards and basic 
principles governing modern open economies, much as NATO and EU 
enlargement gave them significant leverage over transitional 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. One reason why many 
Turks are interested in TTIP, for instance, is that it represents a 
“transatlantic form of governance” as opposed to other models, and is 
thus important as a means to influence Turkey’s own modernisation.23 
Yet the US and EU have not been clear about whether Turkey could in 
fact accede at some point. Turkey has a Customs Union with the EU, 
but nothing similar with the US, which means that under a TTIP US 
goods could flow via the EU onto the Turkish market without Turkish 
engagement on the terms. NAFTA countries Canada and Mexico face 
similar issues, as do EFTA states such as Switzerland, Iceland, Norway 
and Liechtenstein. The issue of ‘open architecture’ is also likely to have 
great resonance for Eastern Partnership countries like Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, with which the EU has recently concluded deep 
and comprehensive free trade arrangements, integral to their 
Association Agreements. As noted above, it is also likely to influence 
countries such as Brazil and other emerging economies.  
The US and the EU could issue a leaders’ statement that TTIP is 
part of an open architecture of trade. The leaders’ statement could also 
                                                          
21 See remarks by Ambassador Froman (2014).  
22 TPP Leaders’ Statement, Honolulu, 12 November 2011 (www.apec.org/ 
Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2011/2011_aelm.aspx).  
23 See e.g. Kirişci (2014). 
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announce that the two parties are initiating consultative/information 
mechanisms for third parties potentially affected by a final agreement, 
recognising that some of this is already under way. Once such a 
statement is made, further internal work should be done to make it 
operational. The underlying premise is that the TTIP package would be 
opened only once it has been negotiated. On this basis, various options 
may be worth exploring. One would be straightforward accession: 
countries that are willing and able to meet the same high standards as 
negotiated could accede to the agreement. There may be an option to 
open individual elements to others, for instance market access or 
signing on to basic investment principles. This option would recognise 
that there are likely to be limits as to how open TTIP can be. For 
instance, it will be difficult simply to open some regulatory 
arrangements that might emerge from TTIP, or to open the ‘living 
agreement’ aspect of a TTIP process, because such elements are likely 
to be based on the trust and confidence generated among US and EU 
regulators, legislators and certifiers.  
But countries may be able to join or attach themselves to certain 
provisions. For instance, when the US and the EU finalised their Open 
Skies agreement on transatlantic air transport in 2007, legal texts were 
created enabling a range of additional countries, not only in Europe but 
in other parts of the world, to also implement provisions of the 
agreement through separate accords.24 Another option would be for the 
US and the EU to negotiate new or additional WTO-compatible 
agreements. There is some precedent for this option. For instance, since 
Chile could not accede to NAFTA, the US negotiated a separate 
bilateral arrangement. The latter option may convince true 
multilateralists that TTIP should not be seen as an alternative to WTO 
frameworks but rather as a catalyst in reforming them by ‘uploading’ 
key aspects of TTIP onto the multilateral plane. Such an approach 
would do justice to the twin-track approach advocated above. 
Whatever modalities are chosen, once the agreement is 
concluded the two parties should be proactive about making the ‘open 
architecture’ of TTIP a reality.  
                                                          
24 For instance, a Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement between the 
European Union and Israel was signed on 10 June 2013, published in the Official 
Journal of the EU, 2013 L 208/3. 
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7. Concluding remarks  
There should be no illusions about the difficulties involved in achieving 
a TTIP. Remaining transatlantic tariff barriers, especially in agriculture, 
often reflect the most politically difficult cases. Some of the most intense 
transatlantic disagreements have arisen over differences in regulatory 
policy. Issues such as food safety or environmental standards have 
strong public constituencies and are often extremely sensitive in the 
domestic political arena. There is considerable debate about how and 
whether to include financial services and energy. For the EU, TTIP will 
really only be worth its salt if export barriers to energy products are 
lifted. Yet it is questionable whether either side is prepared to gore its 
sacred cows on the TTIP altar – audio-visual for the EU, the Jones Act25 
for the United States. Defence trade is off-limits. To complicate matters 
further, responsibility for regulation in the EU is split between Brussels 
and member states, and in the US between federal and state 
governments. 
Investor state dispute settlement mechanisms envisaged under 
TTIP could present the biggest risk of all. Some view the issue as a self-
inflicted wound, offering little gain at great pain. Investment flows 
freely across the Atlantic; few potential investors are deterred due to 
fear of arbitrary, discriminatory court action or regulatory takings. Yet 
the issue has awoken an unholy alliance of sovereigntists and populists 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Others argue that the investor state issue 
goes to the heart of TTIP’s role as a regulatory pace-setter and that it is 
essential to a ground-breaking agreement.26  
This list of difficult issues has raised concern that TTIP could 
divide rather than unite Europeans and Americans. The regulatory 
elements in particular have elicited a generalised concern in the EU that 
TTIP could enable the American ‘system’ to steamroll the European 
way of life. GMO issues feed these fears, even though GMOs are not 
part of the negotiations; NSA revelations offer further nourishment.  
                                                          
25The Jones Act is a common reference for the U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 1920. 
In essence a protective tariff, it dictates that all waterborne cargo shipped 
between domestic ports-known as cabotage - be handled exclusively by US 
built, owned, and crewed vessels. For more, see Justin Lewis, “Veiled Waters: 
Examining the Jones Act’s Consumer Welfare Effect”, Issues in Political 
Economy, Vol. 22, 2013, pp. 77-107.  
26 See the debate between Freya Baetens and L. Poulsen, J. Bonnitcha and J. 
Yackee in chapters 5 and 6 of this volume.  
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Both US and EU officials have been clear that TTIP will not 
undermine existing levels of protection. It will reinforce each side’s 
right to regulate, but now informed by common consultations and a 
process that should create greater trust and confidence in each other’s 
regulatory processes and decisions. Yet this message has not really 
come through. Part of the problem is that TTIP costs can be translated 
into negative, personalised anecdotes, whereas TTIP benefits are more 
abstract and broad. Arguably, US and European officials could do more 
to raise awareness with average citizens about the benefits of TTIP.27 
These concerns and uncertainties underscore the importance of 
managing expectations while building a more energetic and effective 
outreach effort to both public and elite audiences. Such strategies 
should convey not only what TTIP is, but what it is not. It is not the first 
step towards, or justified by, ‘globalisation.’ It isn’t a supranational 
regime and it poses no threat to the American or European way of life. 
It is a means to generate jobs, open markets, and ensure high standards 
for the food we eat, the products we buy and the services we receive. 
Thus far both parties have signalled strong political commitment 
to a successful TTIP agreement. But as the going gets tough and other 
issues intrude, the open question remains whether both sides will 
consider that they need each other enough to make TTIP a priority and 
invest the necessary political capital to see the deal through to a 
successful ratification.  
Unanticipated third issues might also emerge that could damage 
or even scuttle the negotiations, for instance a British referendum 
rejecting EU membership; renewed economic crisis; an environmental 
disaster or a terrorist attack, among others. The most prominent issue 
is still the disclosure of extensive spying operations by the US National 
Security Agency against European allies and other governments, which 
has eroded mutual trust and confidence to such an extent (especially in 
Germany) that some in Europe have called for the EU to suspend 
various agreements with the United States and to halt TTIP 
negotiations.28 Thus far European leaders have resisted such demands, 
as they know that TTIP is far more than just another trade agreement 
and that the EU has a great stake in a successful outcome to the 
                                                          
27 The European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström has been 
particularly active in this area since she assumed her new position in November 
2014. 
28 See German Marshall Fund, “Transatlantic Trends 2014” 
(http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf). 
TTIP’S BROADER GEOSTRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS  255 
 
negotiations. But the issue remains unresolved and may become a bone 
of contention with a more critical European Parliament. It is also 
unclear whether an ultimate TTIP deal will be considered a final 
agreement to be ratified only by the European Parliament, or a so-called 
‘mixed agreement’ to be ratified by all 28 EU member states as well, an 
issue that may run into trouble with Members of the US Congress who 
may find it difficult to explain to their constituents that the entry into 
force of the agreement might be upheld by a single disgruntled EU 
member state. 
TTIP is ambitious. It will be tough to conclude. But the potential 
payoff is high, and the geostrategic impact of such an agreement could 
be as profound as the direct economic benefits. 
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9. AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND 
TTIP: POSSIBILITIES AND 
PITFALLS 
TIM JOSLING AND STEFAN TANGERMANN* 
1. Introduction 
Agriculture is always a difficult area in trade negotiations. The US and 
the EU have butted heads on the issue of market access and export 
subsidies for 50 years, as each tries to protect its own farm interests and 
farm programmes. However, a combination of domestic reforms, WTO 
constraints and firmer world market prices has reduced the gap 
between US and EU farm product prices and led to a possible opening 
up of trade across the Atlantic. Food trade issues are also tricky: 
countries are hesitant to change engrained regulatory habits. In the last 
20 years there have been significant disagreements between the US and 
the EU over food regulations, and in particular food safety standards. 
In some instances there has been convergence of standards; in other 
areas the differences in regulations and standards appear 
unbridgeable. Moreover, the differences in food safety regulations have 
played into the public debate about TTIP, narrowing the room for 
flexibility, particularly on the side of the EU. But with the extensive 
development of supply chains in the food industry, the need for more 
cohesion in food safety and food quality rules is becoming increasingly 
urgent.  
The progress in agriculture and food issues in the TTIP talks will 
largely be determined by the level of ambition in the negotiations as a 
whole. If ambitions are modest, a low-level agreement could probably 
be reached that included some limited commitments on agricultural 
market access and food regulations. These could include promises of 
mutual support in the area of opening up agricultural markets through 
                                                          
* Helpful comments on an earlier draft received from Daniel Hamilton, Jacques 
Pelkmans and Jo Swinnen are gratefully acknowledged. 
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the WTO and of further transatlantic cooperation in trying to resolve 
conflicts over food regulations. Bolder ambitions would allow more 
scope for tackling the difficult problems, although at the cost of time. It 
would be unfortunate if the opportunity were not taken to make some 
significant progress in removing some long-standing irritants in the 
area of agricultural policy and food regulations: this is where the 
economic gains are likely to be significant and the spill-overs useful. 
This chapter will make the case that it is worthwhile making the effort 
to secure a constructive and imaginative agreement on agriculture and 
food regulations in the TTIP.1 
2. Agriculture and food in transatlantic trade 
To put the agricultural issue in perspective, it is useful to review the 
extent and nature of transatlantic trade flows in agriculture and food 
products and the tariff and non-tariff barriers that exist. These non-
tariff barriers mainly reflect differences in food regulations and 
standards, and have attracted public attention beyond their economic 
significance. The TTIP agenda in agriculture will reflect the balance 
between the economic interests of the US and the EU in these areas and 
the extent to which each of the negotiating partners have room to make 
accommodating changes to policies.  
2.1 Trade flows in agricultural and food products 
The value of transatlantic trade in food and agricultural products 
(chapters HS 1-24 of the tariff code) has been increasing modestly over 
the past 20 years mainly as a result of increased exports of food and 
beverage products. Trade values slumped a little with the economic 
downturn in 2007-08 but the expansion of trade has been rather rapid 
since 2009, reaching $23 billion in 2012. The EU has generally exported 
more agricultural and food products to the US than it imports from that 
source, and now shows a surplus of $9 billion on transatlantic 
agricultural and food trade (see Figure 9.1). Much of this surplus is 
accounted for by buoyant exports of beverages and spirits and of 
processed foods. EU producers have been reasonably successful in 
gaining access to the US market, up 48% since 2000. Although the 
importance of the US as a trading partner in agriculture and food for 
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion of the 50-years history of agricultural trade relations 
between the US and the EU and implications for the TTIP negotiations, see 
Josling & Tangermann (forthcoming). 
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the EU is somewhat less than it is for total merchandise trade, the US 
remains the largest single export market for the EU's agriculture and 
food industry.  
Figure 9.1 Food and agricultural trade between the EU-27 and the US, 
2000-12 
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Source: Josling & Tangermann (forthcoming).  
With respect to food and agricultural imports into the EU, the US 
is a relatively minor supplier (only 8%) of EU food and agricultural 
imports. The US trails well behind Brazil as a source of the EU's food 
and agricultural imports: Brazil sells 70% more agricultural and food 
products to the EU than does the US. Correspondingly, the EU is a 
relatively unimportant market for US agricultural and food exports. 
Moreover, the importance of the EU as an agricultural trading partner 
for the US has declined steadily over time with the growth of markets 
in Asia: the ‘pivot to Asia’ has certainly taken place in US agricultural 
trade. US exporters to the EU of food and agricultural products have 
found themselves with a stagnant market for the past decade, down 6% 
since 2000. This difference between the US and the EU in the 
significance of transatlantic agricultural trade could prove an 
important aspect of the political backdrop to the TTIP negotiations.2  
                                                          
2 This raises the question as to whether it is successful exporters who take the 
lead in trade negotiations or those who are frustrated by slow growth in certain 
markets. One assumes that exporter concerns focus on import barriers into 
potentially lucrative markets. 
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Certain types of food and agricultural products dominate these 
trade flows. By far the largest item in the EU’s exports of agricultural 
and food products to the US is accounted for by beverages and spirits 
(HS 22), where EU exports of spirits, wine and beer figure most 
prominently (and in that order).3 That sector makes up one-half of all 
EU food and agriculture exports to the US. No other sub-sector in the 
field of food and agriculture (at the 2-digit HS level) accounts for more 
than 6% of the EU’s transatlantic food and agricultural exports.4 The 
largest category of imports into the EU in food and agriculture trade 
from the US is edible fruit and nuts (HS 08), such as almonds and 
walnuts, followed by oilseeds and oleaginous fruit (HS 12) including 
soybeans. These two subsectors represent 18% and 16% respectively of 
the total of all EU imports from the US in the food and agriculture 
sector, and are more important than beverages and spirits (14%), and 
cereals (6%). The difficulties in selling genetically modified (GM) 
products in Europe has been in part a cause of the slow growth, but as 
significant has been the success of Latin America in providing bulk 
commodities to Europe. 
One might expect in such a two-way trade pattern that there 
would be significant trade flows in both directions within each 
individual product sector, at least for processed foods that are less 
homogeneous than raw agricultural commodities. This ‘intra-industry 
trade’ could be as politically significant as trade among sub-sectors. 
One widely-used measure of the extent of intra-industry trade is the 
Grubel-Lloyd index (Grubel & Lloyd, 1975). That index lies between 1, 
indicating that all trade in the sub-sector concerned is of an intra-
industry nature, and zero, signalling that there is no two-way trade 
flow within the sub-sector concerned. The Grubel-Lloyd index for EU-
US trade in food and agricultural products (at the level of 2-digit HS 
product groups) is presented in Table 9.1, where product sectors are 
arranged in decreasing order of their share in total EU-US trade.5 The 
                                                          
3 Trade shares reported here relate to the average of 2010-12. 
4 For convenience we use ‘transatlantic’ to refer to US-EU trade and not trade 
between the EU and Canada. 
5 That share is defined as the percentage of EU exports to the US plus EU 
imports from the US of the product sector concerned in the aggregate of all EU 
exports plus imports in food and agriculture in trade with the US, for the 
average of 2010-12. Table 9.1 contains all product sectors where that percentage 
is 3% or more. The broad definition of the sectors might lead one to expect that 
relatively high degrees of intra-industry trade would be found. 
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Grubel-Lloyd index shows that for the nearly all of the most important 
product sectors in agricultural and food trade between the EU and the 
US (including the major trade flows in the beverages sector) there is 
relatively little intra-industry trade. Major exceptions are three rather 
heterogeneous product sectors (animal or vegetable fats and oils; 
miscellaneous edible preparations; preparations of vegetables, fruit, 
nuts) where such inter-industry trade is to be expected.  
Table 9.1 Intra-industry trade in major EU-US trade flows in the food and 
agriculture sector 
HS Product sector 
Grubel-
Lloyd 
index 
Share in total 
EU-US 
agricultural 
and food trade 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 0.273 35.6% 
08 Edible fruit and nuts etc. 0.157 7.0% 
12 Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits etc. 0.226 6.5% 
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils etc. 0.624 4.5% 
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 0.983 3.8% 
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts etc. 0.587 3.7% 
23 
Residues and waste from the food 
industries etc. 
0.308 
3.3% 
04 Dairy produce, birds' eggs etc. 0.165 3.3% 
18 Cocoa and Cocoa preparations 0.101 3.1% 
19 Preparations of cereals etc. 0.229 3.0% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
On this basis it might appear that in the agriculture and food 
sector the US and the EU are primarily engaged in trade where the 
respective exporter has a clear comparative advantage, i.e. where there 
is not much of an issue of competition between these trading partners 
but rather the less-contentious trading relationship of 
complementarity. However, the existing structure of trade is the result 
of the current regime of trade and regulatory policies – i.e. of precisely 
the policies that are set to be liberalised and harmonised as a result of 
the TTIP. So the low degree of intra-industry trade could be interpreted 
as an indication of a potential for an increase in such trade if barriers 
could be reduced. 
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2.2 Tariff barriers 
As a result of many rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, tariff 
barriers on transatlantic trade are already relatively low. Average 
trade-weighted tariffs on imports into the US stand at 4.7%: the 
corresponding average tariff for the EU is 6.4%. Even in the case of 
agriculture and food products, the average MFN tariff applied on all 
agricultural and food products by the US is only 3.9%.6 In the EU, the 
average tariff is more than double that figure, at 8.6%, but even that 
appears reasonably low compared to agricultural tariffs in other 
countries. However, these averages hide significant tariff peaks in 
sensitive products (agriculture, textiles, beverages, etc.). Figure 9.2 
shows tariff profiles across individual product groups within 
agriculture. The EU maintains a tariff level above 50% to protect dairy 
products, above 30% in the sugar and confectionary sector, and around 
20% for animal products as well as for beverages and tobacco. In the 
US, tariffs are highest in dairy products, beverages and tobacco and 
sugar. In all product sectors, with the exception of cotton (where EU 
output is close to zero), EU tariffs are considerably higher than those of 
the US. 
Figure 9.2 EU and US tariff profiles in agriculture: MFN applied duties 
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Data sources: WTO, ITC & UNCTAD (2013).  
                                                          
6 Source of tariff information discussed here is WTO, ITC and UNCTAD (2013), 
as well as European Parliament (2014). 
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Moreover, trade-weighted tariff averages tend to under-
represent these tariff peaks as import volumes of such products tend to 
be small. And the average includes those tariffs in agriculture (at the 6-
digit HS level, MFN applied) that are already duty free, accounting for 
30.7% of tariffs in the US and 31.2% of tariffs in the EU 31.2%. High 
tariffs themselves are somewhat unevenly distributed: tariffs above 
15% are found in only 5.3% of all agricultural product categories in the 
US, while in the EU 26.2% of all product categories in agriculture have 
tariffs above that level.  
This disparity is even more apparent if one examines more 
disaggregated information on tariff levels: this is more likely to identify 
the so-called 'sensitive' products that can pose particularly potent 
political problems. Some of the levels that these mega-tariffs can attain 
are shown in Figure 9.3.7 The dairy sector in the EU is protected, for 
example, by a mega-tariff of up to 600% and in other agricultural 
sectors there are four cases of tariffs above 100%.8 In the US, the highest 
tariff, at 350%, is found in the beverages and tobacco sector, and there 
are two other sectors with a tariff above 100%.9 Thus, the common view 
that tariffs, including those for agricultural products, will not be a major 
obstacle in the TTIP negotiations may be somewhat premature. Free 
bilateral trade will cause some disruption. There will be a request for 
long transition periods and safeguards for sensitive products 
(Trachtenberg, 2012). The political economy of trade negotiations will 
be fully on display as interest groups, from sugar, beef and dairy to 
fruits, nuts and vegetables, will play their cards. The dilemma for trade 
negotiators will be whether to exclude sensitive sectors that are 
protected by high tariffs, so as to avoid the talks getting bogged down, 
or to hope that lofty ambitions will carry enough weight to overcome 
sector resistance.  
                                                          
7 It should be noted that the vertical axis of Figure 9.3 extends to much higher 
tariff levels than that of Figure 9.2. 
8 Mega-tariffs are often specific tariffs, and their estimated ad valorem equivalent 
depends on the import price assumed. This is one reason why alternative 
sources report different levels of maximum (ad valorem equivalent) tariffs.  
9 It is also worth noting that mega-tariffs of such orders of magnitude are an 
exclusive agricultural phenomenon. Outside the agricultural sector, the highest 
tariff rate reported for the EU is 26% (in the product group fish & fish products), 
and that for the US is 55% (in the group leather, footwear, etc.). 
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Figure 9.3 EU and US tariff profiles in agriculture: maximum applied MFN 
duty within the respective product group 
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Data source: WTO, ITC & UNCTAD (2013).  
 
2.3 Non-tariff trade impediments 
Even though it may be difficult to approach complete tariff elimination 
in agricultural trade between the US and the EU, the biggest hurdle in 
the trade part of the TTIP negotiations is reduction of the trade barriers 
resulting from non-tariff measures (NTMs).10 However, this is also the 
element that can generate the largest benefits. Thus it will be crucially 
important to find an effective way forward in dealing with the many 
NTMs, both at and behind the border, that result from diverging 
regulatory approaches used in the two entities. In many cases these 
NTMs stand in the way of harmonious trade relations across the 
Atlantic, and in a number of instances they have caused, and continue 
to cause, serious acrimony and legal disputes in the WTO. Though 
NTM issues cause difficulties in US-EU trade relations across the board 
in all sectors, they are particularly pronounced and troublesome in the 
agriculture and food sector, where particular problems result from 
health and safety (sanitary and phytosanitary – SPS) measures. 
                                                          
10 The value of removing non-tariff barriers to trade is notoriously hard to 
quantify. As shown below, studies find considerable economic benefits from 
the harmonisation of regulatory measures in the transatlantic marketplace, 
benefits that by far exceed those resulting from tariff elimination. 
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The main impetus behind dealing with NTMs will come from the 
US. Agricultural businesses in the US want a number of long-standing 
regulatory issues with the EU resolved. They perceive these as the 
major impediments to market access. These include the use of growth 
additives in livestock, methods of pathogen reduction in 
slaughterhouses and approval of genetically modified varieties of corn 
and soybeans (Grueff, 2013).11 But not all the offensive interests are on 
one side of the Atlantic. Agricultural and food producers in the EU 
would like better access to the US market, specifically for dairy 
products and meats. As EU milk quotas are abolished, the need to find 
overseas markets for cheeses and other high-value dairy products will 
increase. Moreover, the EU would like more protection for 
geographical indications (GIs) in the US, for cheese and for specialty 
meats (as well as wines), an issue that has led to stalemate in the context 
of the TRIPS negotiations.  
3. Estimates of benefits from TTIP 
A number of recent studies have aimed at estimating the potential 
quantitative impacts of a TTIP on variables such as GDP, trade and 
output in the US, the EU and third countries.12 These models include 
agriculture, although often at a highly aggregated level. Most of the 
studies have employed some type of a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for the analysis, representing the whole economy, 
disaggregated into several sectors, and including all important 
feedback mechanisms, in particular linking income generation with 
expenditures for both consumers and governments. In the models a 
number of individual countries are identified, in particular the US and 
the EU, while the rest of the world, closing the global model, is often 
treated as one country. 
As one might expect, results differ from study to study, 
depending on factors such as the structure of the model and its 
parameters, underlying data, the baseline assumed (in the absence of 
TTIP) and the scenarios considered. A study by Fontagné et al. (2013) 
                                                          
11 GM crops are approved for sale on the EU market only after an extensive 
scientific investigation as to their safety to health and the environment. The 
slowness of this process was at the root of a WTO challenge by the US on the 
EU’s biotech approval process. 
12 See, for example, Ecorys (2009 and 2012), Felbermayr et al. (2013), Fontagné 
et al. (2013), Francois et al. (2013), Kinnman & Hagberg (2012) and European 
Parliament (2014). 
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conveys the types of impacts of agricultural trade liberalisation 
suggested by such models, and their orders of magnitude. The 
modelling framework used in that study is dynamic, generating future 
time paths for all variables. The results shown below are those for the 
year 2025, expressed as percentage deviations from the baseline (in 
which no TTIP is assumed), in constant prices.  
3.1 Impact on trade flows 
Estimated impacts on bilateral trade flows are summarised in Table 9.2, 
for the ‘reference’ scenario, assuming a complete phasing out of all 
tariffs, and a 25% cut in the trade restrictiveness of all NTMs, for all 
sectors of the US and EU economies. The impacts of liberalising trade 
between the US and the EU are found to be significant: bilateral trade 
between the US and the EU would increase by around half overall, 
indicating the extent to which current barriers prevent the transatlantic 
trade potential from being fully tapped.  
Table 9.2 Estimated impacts of TTIP on bilateral trade flows (‘reference’ 
scenario percentage deviation from baseline in 2025) 
Exporter Importer Total Agriculture Industry Services 
Transatlantic trade 
US EU27 52.5 168.5 66.4 14.0 
EU27 USA 49.0 149.5 61.8 24.0 
Other trade flows 
US RoW -1.4 -1.9 -1.3 -1.6 
EU27 RoW -1.4 -0.4 -1.4 -1.4 
RoW USA -2.5 -0.8 -2.8 -0.7 
RoW EU27 0.2 -1.5 0.1 0.6 
EU27 EU27 -1.2 -2.6 -2.3 2.8 
RoW RoW 0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.2 
Note: RoW refers to the rest of the world. 
Source: Fontagné et al. (2013). 
As the highest trade barriers in both the US and the EU are 
currently found in agriculture, agricultural trade flows are estimated to 
expand significantly in both directions, by 150% and more. The 
estimated strong expansion of bilateral trade within a US-EU free trade 
area (FTA), indicating a potential for large trade creation, might be 
expected to result in considerable trade diversion at the expense of 
third countries, as their exports to the US and the EU would no longer 
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be so competitive. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the authors find that trade 
diversion would be rather small under a TTIP, with US and EU trade 
flows from and to third countries declining by less than 3%.The study 
also estimated the impact of the components of the tariff and NTM 
package separately.  
These results are summarised in Table 9.3, for the ‘reference’ case 
and four alternative policy scenarios. In the ‘tariffs only’ scenario, only 
tariffs are phased out. Under ‘targeted NTM cuts’, NTMs that are more 
restrictive than the median of the respective sector (agriculture, 
industry or services) are reduced by 30%, while the remaining ones are 
cut by 15%. The scenario ‘harmonisation spillovers’ looks into the 
benefits that third countries may reap as they find it easier to deal with 
harmonised standards in the US and the EU, and in this scenario the 
authors assume that the trade restrictiveness of NTMs maintained by 
the US and the EU vis-à-vis third countries is reduced by 5%. 13 
Table 9.3 Estimated impacts of TTIP on US and EU real income and exports 
for alternative scenarios (percentage deviation from baseline in 2025) 
 Alternative scenarios 
 
Reference 
Tariffs 
only 
Targeted 
NTM cuts 
Harmonisation 
spillovers 
Ecorys 
NTMs 
 Real income 
US 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 
EU27 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 
Rest of 
world 
-0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
 Exports 
US 10.1 2.1 10.4 14.5 5.4 
EU27 2.3 0.4 1.9 3.4 1.3 
Rest of 
world 
-0.3 -
0.1 
-0.3 0.9 -
0.2 
Source: Fontagné et al. (2013).  
3.2 Trade impacts of NTMs 
It is difficult to provide a quantitative overview of the significance of 
NTMs. Anecdotal evidence of particularly notable cases helps to foster 
                                                          
13 For a more recent and more detailed discussion and analysis of such spill-
over effects, see Lejour et al. (2014). 
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an impression of the nature of the problem, but the amount of trade 
displaced is more difficult to calculate. The most important conflicts in 
agricultural trade between the US and the EU revolve around 
regulatory differences, and the attention given to them indicates the 
weight of the issues the TTIP negotiations on NTM matters will have to 
deal with. Yet, there are many more barriers of this type that would 
require action if trade across the Atlantic were to be truly liberalised.14 
To what extent do these NTMs impact on trade flows, compared to the 
incidence of tariffs? 
One way of trying to make information on NTMs comparable to 
tariff information is by estimating their price impact. Where a given 
NTM acts as an effective barrier to imports, the domestic market price 
of the product concerned in the importing country is kept above the 
international market price (where necessary corrected for a relevant 
tariff). The resulting price gap, expressed as a percentage of the 
international price, provides a yardstick of the NTM's price impact that 
is directly comparable to an ad valorem tariff.15 Aggregate results for the 
whole food and agriculture sector, as well as for manufacturing and 
services, reported in two different studies are presented in Table 9.4, 
along with average tariff levels in the agriculture and food sector. Even 
though the two studies (Ecorys, 2009; and Fontagné et al., 2013) arrive 
at somewhat different estimates for NTMs, they both agree on three 
interesting findings.16 First, in agricultural and food trade between the 
EU and the US, NTMs result in higher trade barriers than tariffs 
prevailing in that sector. Second, trade barriers resulting from NTMs 
are higher in the food and agriculture sector than in manufacturing and 
services.17 Third, while tariffs in agriculture and food are higher in the 
                                                          
14 For a list of relevant NTMs in trade between the EU and the US, based on 
various sources, including an extensive business survey, see Ecorys (2012). 
15 There are, however, alternative and more complex approaches to estimating 
ad valorem equivalents of NTMs. For studies applying such alternative 
approaches, see for example Ecorys (2009). 
16 The ‘Ecorys NTMs’ scenario, finally, is identical to the 'reference' scenario, 
except that the Ecorys estimates of NTM restrictiveness in the US and the EU 
are used instead of those estimated by Fontagné and his colleagues (see Table 
9.4). 
17 Alternative studies yield different results in this regard. For example, 
Francois et al. (2013) find that NTMs are highest in the sectors of cars and 
chemicals, followed by processed foods. 
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EU than in the US, NTMs in that sector are more pronounced in the US 
than in the EU.18 
Table 9.4 Estimates of ad valorem equivalents of NTMs and tariffs in the 
sector of agriculture and food in the EU and the US  
 EU US 
NTMs: Fontagné et al. 48.2% 51.3% 
NTMs: Ecorys 56.8% 73.3% 
Tariffs in agriculture:  
simple average MFN applied 
 
13.2% 
 
 4.7% 
Data sources: Ecorys (2009); Fontagné et al. (2013) and WTO, ITC and 
UNCTAD (2013).  
4. Possible modalities for the negotiations 
The way in which the US and the EU have negotiated agricultural and 
food issues in other bilateral agreements suggests the likely modalities 
for the TTIP. The US and EU trade negotiators have accumulated ample 
experience with negotiating agricultural provisions in FTAs, and there 
are many other such agreements that provide examples.19 A general 
overview and a few concrete examples from existing FTAs will suffice 
to illustrate some of the major elements that trade diplomats find on the 
FTA negotiating table, and the room for manoeuvre they can 
potentially use. 
4.1 Negotiations on market access 
A significant part of FTA negotiations traditionally deals with tariff 
cuts. The simplest techniques of cutting tariffs in an FTA is to establish 
a timeline over which tariffs on bilateral trade would go to zero. 
Products are often grouped into categories, depending on whether the 
tariffs are to disappear immediately on the FTA coming into force or 
                                                          
18 Using data at a more disaggregate level, another study finds the tariff 
equivalent of NTMs to vary considerably across individual products within the 
food and agriculture sector (Felbermayr et al., 2013). It also finds, contrary to 
the studies cited above, that tariff equivalents of NTMs in the EU are higher 
than those in the US, where estimates are available for both entities. 
19 For a more comprehensive overview of the treatment of agriculture in 
existing FTAs, see Fulponi, Shearer and Almeida (2011) and the literature 
referenced there. 
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over a specified time-period. Many agricultural and food items could 
be liberalised on such a schedule. But in the case of particularly 
sensitive sectors, several options are available for introducing 
modalities specific to agriculture. One of these is exclude some 
agricultural lines from the duty-free treatment.20 As was shown above, 
there are several sectors, including dairy products and sugar, where 
high tariffs are found in both the US and the EU. The existence of these 
‘sensitive’ products in the agricultural sector, often protected by mega-
tariffs, is the major reason why most regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
do not achieve complete tariff elimination on all agricultural products. 
For example, the EU's RTA with South Africa, in force since 2000, 
foresees zero duties on the EU side for no more than 73% of all 
agricultural tariff lines; the RTA between the EU and Korea, on the 
other hand, in force since July 2011, provides for zero duties for imports 
into the EU on 97.9% of all tariff lines in agriculture (WTO, ITC & 
UNCTAD, 2013). Under the RTAs the US has with Chile and Morocco, 
the US is committed to apply zero duties to 100% of the agricultural 
tariff lines, while in the case of its RTA with Peru that share is 97.1% 
(WTO, ITC & UNCTAD, 2013). One notable exception is that in the FTA 
with Australia sugar was excluded altogether from the tariff 
elimination commitment. 
A second option that can be used in FTA negotiations over 
agriculture is the length of the transition period over which tariff cuts 
are phased in.21 Obviously, where tariff elimination is considered 
politically difficult, a longer transition period can be used to attenuate 
some of the pain. Fulponi et al. (2011) have analysed 55 selected RTAs 
and found that on aggregate they provided for duty-free treatment of 
slightly more than 90% of all tariff lines in agriculture, although that 
level is on average reached only after a transition period of somewhat 
more than 15 years. Within the product groups of dairy and sugar, 
however, only 72% of tariff lines were agreed to see complete tariff 
elimination in this set of RTAs. The US regularly uses the device of 
categorising products into categories, where one category is liberalised 
                                                          
20 GATT Article XXIV:8(b) requires that duties are eliminated “on substantially 
all trade” between the partner countries in an FTA. Although often discussed, 
a legal definition of which share of trade constitutes “substantially all the trade” 
has never been agreed. 
21 In this context, GATT Article XXIV(5c) speaks of a “reasonable length of 
time”, which the Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
GATT says “should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases”. 
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on signing and other categories reach zero tariffs over different lengths 
of time. Eventually these transition periods end, and the degree of 
certainty given by such reduction schedules is itself a useful signal for 
investors and farmers.  
A third relevant option regarding ‘sensitive’ products is to agree 
on tariff cuts for only limited quantities of imports, implemented 
through tariff rate quotas (TRQs). For example, under its FTA with 
Egypt, the EU applies TRQs to the importation of 34 agricultural 
products, while the US-Australia FTA specifies TRQs for imports of 17 
agricultural products into the US (Fulponi et al., 2011). An important 
consideration in negotiating TRQs is whether the import quantities 
concerned can grow over time, and at which rate. After all, if the TRQ 
provides for sufficiently fast expansion of the preferential quantity, 
then it can eventually become equivalent to an unconstrained tariff cut. 
Fears that trade liberalisation might result in import surges and 
consequent pressure on domestic farmers have led negotiators of some 
FTAs to include “special agricultural safeguards” in the agreements, 
based on price and/or quantity triggers. Fulponi et al. (2011) found 
several examples in their sample of 55 FTAs, including all six FTAs 
involving the US. Fundamentally the nature of these safeguards often 
resembles that of the Special Safeguards Provisions in the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, although the specific details and 
parameters vary considerably. The applicable product lists also vary 
from case to case, although livestock, dairy, poultry, and fruits and 
vegetables are frequently covered. The remedies allowed also vary, 
including the option to halt tariff reductions or even to revert to the 
MFN tariff. Typically, however, the special safeguard provisions expire 
when the FTA has reached the end of its transition period. Even though 
special safeguards may create some uncertainty for trade flows, if they 
allow agreement on deeper and faster tariff cuts in an FTA they could 
help in completing the negotiations. Many agreements also contain 
provisions for general trade remedies, i.e. anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty measures. They tend to make reference to the 
general rules under the GATT, but also sometimes modify them for 
trade within the FTA. 
4.1.1 Rules of origin 
Since partners of an FTA typically want to avoid trade deflection, i.e. 
re-routing of imports from third countries through the FTA partner 
with the lowest tariff, rules of origin (ROOs) are also an important 
element of FTAs. Partners of an FTA maintain, contrary to those of a 
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customs union, their national MFN tariff schedules applicable to 
imports from third countries. There is, hence, an incentive to re-route 
imports into an FTA partner with a high MFN tariff through the 
territory of an FTA partner with a lower tariff. Such trade deflection 
would effectively undermine the tariff protection maintained by the 
high-tariff partner. In order to prevent this from happening, FTAs 
require that goods imported into any of the partner countries must, in 
order to qualify for duty-free treatment, originate wholly or primarily 
inside the FTA. It is reasonably straightforward to define what 
“wholly” should mean in this context. However, many goods contain 
intermediate products (including agricultural commodities) imported 
from third countries. With a growing tendency for value chains to be 
extended across several countries, there are more and more products 
that include components imported from anywhere in the world, 
including of course from countries outside the FTA. Under these 
conditions it is a matter for negotiation to define which criteria must be 
fulfilled for a product to be considered to originate “primarily” from 
inside the FTA. Resolution on the question of ROOs can require 
considerable negotiation. The outcome will however be important to 
the relevance of the TTIP to agricultural and food trade (see Box 9.1). 
  
Box 9.1 ROOs and EU FTAs 
When negotiating the ROOs for TTIP, two fundamental issues are 
relevant. First, the overall ‘philosophy’ needs to be chosen, in the sense 
that decisions are required as to how restrictive or liberal the US and the 
EU want the ROO to be. That philosophy will determine the criteria to 
be set for all the individual products, but it would also be reflected in a 
number of more general rules. In particular, most ROOs include a 
tolerance/de minimis clause specifying that inputs from third countries 
are allowed as long as their share in the value of the final product is 
below a given threshold, even where these third-country inputs would 
otherwise exclude the product concerned from preferential treatment. In 
most FTAs, that threshold is in the range of 7% to 10% (Donner Abreu, 
2013). In the EU-South Africa FTA, however, it is generally set at 15%, 
but reduced to 10% for some agricultural products. Lower-than-the-
generally-applicable thresholds are also set for certain agricultural 
products in many other FTAs. In the TTIP negotiations, the US and the 
EU could consider setting an example by agreeing on a comparatively 
high de minimis threshold, including for all agricultural products. 
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Such a ‘liberal’ philosophy for ROOs could also include 
exemption from otherwise applicable rules where MFN tariffs meet 
given conditions. In particular, it could be agreed that ROO 
requirements do not apply to products where the difference between 
MFN tariffs of the US and the EU does not exceed a given margin, say 
five percentage points. The reasoning behind such an approach is that 
ROO requirements are not needed where the cost of trans-shipment 
through the partner country is higher than the difference in MFN tariffs. 
Given the geographical distance between the US and the EU, trans-
shipment through the partner territory is rather costly, and hence the 
acceptable margin between their MFN tariffs could also be set at a 
reasonably generous level. 
Another expression of a liberal ‘philosophy’ behind ROOs is the 
degree of flexibility provided to producers. A free choice, e.g., could be 
allowed between two alternative criteria, say between a change in tariff 
classification and a minimum share of value added. 
A second fundamental choice for ROOs is the scope for so-called 
‘cumulation’. It is typical for ROOs in FTAs to allow cumulation of 
inputs and value added across all FTA members when determining 
whether the product concerned has originated inside the FTA. 
Moreover, several FTAs also allow for 'diagonal' cumulation, i.e. inputs 
originating in third countries that benefit from some form of preferential 
treatment by the FTA partners. The EU has spearheaded the inclusion of 
such diagonal cumulation principles in its FTAs, in particular in its 
'PanEuroMed' system of trade preferences with countries in the 
Mediterranean basin, but also in many of its other preferential schemes 
(Donner Abreu, 2013). The US also makes use of diagonal cumulation in 
several of its FTAs.  
It would appear only natural for a TTIP agreement to allow for 
diagonal cumulation to include all countries with which both the US and 
the EU have FTAs, and also those developing countries to which both 
the US and the EU have extended unilateral preferences under the GSP 
regime. In a way, this would be a generalisation of the suggestion to 
exempt products from ROO requirements where the difference between 
MFN tariffs of the US and the EU does not exceed a given margin: that 
criterion could be applied not only to MFN tariffs but also to preferential 
tariffs that the US and the EU charge on imports of a given product from 
the country concerned. 
When deciding on the design of ROOs in the food and 
agriculture sector, it is worth remembering two implications for the 
functioning of markets which result from the fact that many 
agricultural products are so homogeneous in nature that their origin is 
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essentially irrelevant. This means that, first, imported produce can 
replace the domestically produced output in consumption, with the 
result that an FTA country can (theoretically) export all its domestic 
output to the partner country, fully meeting even the most stringent 
ROO requirements. Where that is the case, no ROO can effectively 
exclude trade deflection (Josling, 1993 and 1997). Second, where the 
partner countries of an FTA are on aggregate a net exporter of a given 
product, the price of that product will in any event be at the world 
market level and not reflect tariffs that any partner maintains vis-à-vis 
third countries. In that case, trade deflection is not an issue, and no 
ROO for the product concerned will be effective in protecting its 
producers inside the FTA. 
4.2 Negotiations on subsidies 
Agricultural subsidies have been a large part of the contentious trade 
relations between the US and the EU over the years (Josling & 
Tangermann, forthcoming). In the context of the TTIP it is useful to 
separate out subsidies given on exports from that given to domestic 
producers through various farm programmes. The former is a more 
likely candidate for inclusion in a TTIP agreement. 
4.2.1 Export subsidies 
As export subsidies for agricultural products are still legal, within 
given constraints, under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), they 
could potentially also be used to distort trade flows between partners 
of an FTA. That is why many FTAs require the elimination of subsidies 
on within-FTA exports, although sometimes only after a phasing-out 
period. Some FTAs also contain provisions aimed at avoiding 
distortions caused by subsidised exports from a third country to one of 
the FTA partners. NAFTA, for example, allows the US and Canada to 
subsidise exports of certain products to Mexico if Mexico imports 
products from third countries that subsidise their exports. 
4.2.2 Domestic subsidies 
Domestic subsidies pose an interesting problem for FTA negotiations. 
In principle, like in the case of export subsidies, partners of an FTA may 
well have an interest in seeing domestic subsidies on intra-trade 
disciplined so as to avoid distortions. However, it is technically 
difficult, if not impossible, to cut domestic subsidies to only that part of 
output that will be exported to an FTA partner country: once output 
AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND TTIP  277 
 
has left the farm gate, it can go anywhere. Hence, if FTA partners 
wanted to discipline domestic subsidies, the only feasible way to do so 
is to constrain them for all of domestic output. As this is precisely what 
is being dealt with in the WTO negotiations on agriculture, the 
conventional wisdom is that discipline on domestic subsidies can be 
agreed only at the multilateral level. This is probably also the reason 
why nearly all FTAs are essentially silent on domestic subsidies (except 
for remedies, see below). As a matter of fact, the need to discipline 
domestic subsidies effectively is sometimes used as one of the central 
arguments for continuing multilateral negotiations rather than leaving 
trade liberalisation to regional arrangements.  
However, one can also argue that there may well be good 
political reasons for considering the possibility of agreeing on domestic 
subsidy discipline in TTIP. Among these reasons is the fact that the US 
and the EU still have ‘rights’ to trade-distorting domestic support of 
about $90 billion under the AoA (Orden et al., 2011). Thus, in a way, 
negotiations on domestic support between the two cover a large part of 
the ground that is being debated in the WTO. By agreeing on reduction 
commitments between them, the US and the EU could set an example 
that the rest of the WTO membership would find difficult not to follow. 
This consideration resembles strategic ideas that some countries, 
including the EU, have in mind in the context of global climate talks, 
where they feel that pushing ahead with unilaterally set reduction 
commitments might persuade others to go along. The US and the EU 
could even try to inspire amendment of the WTO rules on domestic 
support by adopting a modified regime, for example by giving up on 
inclusion of market price support in calculating domestic support 
levels, on the grounds that price support is anyhow effectively 
constrained by tariff bindings and export subsidy constraints. The 
counter-argument, however, is that bilateral agreement on domestic 
subsidy disciplines in TTIP would give away negotiating chips that the 
US and the EU may need in the multilateral negotiations in the Doha 
Round, in particular vis-à-vis developing countries, which are trying to 
change the rules of that game in their favour in the current negotiations. 
It would, therefore, appear unlikely that the TTIP negotiations deviate 
from the tradition of not including disciplines on domestic subsidies in 
agriculture in FTAs. 
4.3 Negotiations on regulatory convergence 
The most important, and at the same time the most difficult issue for 
liberalising trade between the US and the EU, will be to manage 
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regulatory divergences and the resulting trade barriers in the form of 
NTMs. It is not unusual for regulatory issues to be problematic in trade 
negotiations. Several reasons can be offered for these difficulties. 
Traditional trade issues such as tariffs and subsidies are more 
transparent and quantitative: the effects of reductions in these trade 
impediments are easier to estimate. The reduction of tariffs also has an 
apparent objective (such as free trade) that can guide a process of 
transition and measure progress: no such clear objective is apparent 
with regulatory convergence or increasing compatibility. Neither is 
there an easy way to define when regulatory differences are themselves 
desirable, even if they have emerged from administrative happenstance 
or protectionist pressures. And, above all, the issues facing negotiators 
discussing regulatory convergence attract the interest of a wider 
constituency than does tariff reduction. Much of the (surprising) public 
interest in the TTIP negotiations, in particular in Europe, revolves 
around minor differences in such regulations as those dealing with the 
washing of chicken carcasses.  
Past FTA negotiations have adopted several different 
approaches to dealing with the question of regulatory divergence. 
While that issue is relevant across the board in all sectors, the trade 
problems caused appear to be particularly pronounced, acute and 
intractable in agricultural and food trade, above all those resulting from 
SPS matters. Although most, but not all, existing FTA agreements have 
some provisions relating to SPS matters and other NTMs, there is no 
obligation to include them at all in regional trade arrangements. WTO 
rules (GATT Article XXIV:8(b)) require FTAs and CUs to eliminate 
“duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” on 
“substantially all the trade” among the partners, but explicitly exclude 
from that requirement those NTMs that are permitted under certain 
GATT Articles, including Article XX (which covers, among others, 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”). 
However, a TTIP that, in its trade part, does not go beyond eliminating 
duties on US-EU trade is simply not conceivable. When the political 
leaders from both sides launched the negotiations in February 2013, 
they explicitly made the point that TTIP would address regulatory and 
other non-tariff barriers.  
This promise would also not be fulfilled if TTIP were to limit 
itself to an option that comes only marginally higher in the hierarchy, 
namely just reaffirming the intention of the participating countries to 
fully respect their rights and obligations under the relevant WTO 
provisions, in particular the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
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Agreement. That option is used in several existing FTAs. There is 
nothing to be said against including a formula like that in an FTA, but 
there is also not much that speaks for it: governments of WTO member 
countries should anyhow live up to their obligations under the WTO. 
For TTIP this option is certainly not sufficient. After all, the existing 
WTO rules have not prevented barriers from inhibiting the free flow of 
trade across the Atlantic, and indeed have not guaranteed the absence 
of serious trade conflicts. There is, therefore, the expectation that TTIP 
goes beyond stating the obvious need to respect WTO obligations. 
Whether this means that TTIP would have to include some type of 
explicit and specific arrangement for all relevant trade barriers in 
agriculture is, however, a different question. But even if some 
negotiators might privately dream of sweeping some of the most 
intractable NTM issues under the rug so as to prevent them from 
getting in the way of concluding the overall deal, they will feel pressed 
to move at least one further step up in the hierarchy of options, which 
is to include at least some procedural provisions in the agreement, 
envisaging future efforts to come to grips with the issue concerned.  
Rather than only making general reference to given WTO rights 
and obligations, an FTA can also contain provisions going beyond 
multilaterally agreed rules, specifying how the FTA partners intend to 
implement WTO provisions in practice. In this regard, too, there are 
different ways of shaping this option, with varying degrees of 
concreteness and exigency. For example, the EU-Korea FTA has a 
chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary measures where a text of less 
than two pages contains fairly general provisions on how the two sides 
intend to deal with SPS matters. A much different example is the EU-
Chile FTA, for which negotiators have worked out a whole agreement 
on SPS measures, annexed to the FTA. The agreement is rather specific 
and runs over nearly 40 pages. It also aims at developing a common 
understanding concerning animal welfare standards between the EU 
and Chile, although finally this focused exclusively on the stunning and 
slaughter of animals. This EU-Chile Agreement also includes 
provisions for matters which, as far as trade in animal products 
between the US and the EU is concerned, are laid down in the US-EU 
Veterinary Equivalency Agreement signed, after six years of 
negotiation, in 1999 (see below).22 It would, therefore, appear 
                                                          
22 The EU also has sanitary and phytosanitary agreements with several other 
countries, either as separate agreements or as parts of FTAs. For a list of the 
agreements, see http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/ 
agreements_en.htm  
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conceivable, if not likely, that this 1999 agreement, with amendments 
later agreed and possibly with further modifications, could also be 
annexed to a TTIP agreement. 
The Task Force that anticipated the agenda of the TTIP23 
addressed the issue of regulatory change by defining the objective as to 
find “new and innovative ways” to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade 
and investment. This phrase may conceal a lack of agreement on which 
approach to take. One approach would be to tackle differences in 
regulatory philosophy, particularly in such areas as the role of science 
in regulations where public opinion is not fully convinced by research 
conclusions. The use of the ‘precautionary principle’ in EU legislation 
has generally been regarded in the US as a sign of weakness, allowing 
public opinion to intrude on matters that can be addressed by scientific 
enquiry. But any direct assault on these differences in the context of 
TTIP is likely to be counterproductive, hardening opinions on both 
sides of the Atlantic and reducing the chances of success.  
So the Task Force modestly called for the reduction of 
“unnecessary costs and administrative delays” arising from 
regulations. No one could be against that, nor could one argue against 
the consequent aim of improving the competitiveness of US and EU 
companies in third markets. And the key questions of harmonisation of 
standards and the mutual recognition of each other’s standards are 
addressed with caution: greater compatibility in standards is to be 
“promoted” “where appropriate”. 
To throw some more light on this part of the heavy package that 
US and EU officials find on the TTIP negotiating table, it is useful to 
consider the range of options as to how to deal with regulatory 
divergences in FTA negotiations, from the least to the most demanding 
in terms of negotiating effort. Clearly, none of these options would be 
applied universally to all NTMs: some cases may qualify for more 
progressive treatment than others. Also, the range can be 
multidimensional, and individual elements of each approach can be 
combined in dealing with a given issue. 
                                                          
23 A High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG), established in 
November 2011 and led by US Trade Representative Ron Kirk and EU Trade 
Commissioner Karel De Gucht, was tasked with identifying “policies and 
measures to increase EU-US trade and investment to support mutually 
beneficial job creation, economic growth, and competitiveness". Within less 
than 15 months, on 11 February 2013, the HLWG issued its final report (see 
HLWG, 2013). 
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4.3.1 Harmonisation 
At the top of the hierarchy of options for dealing with NTMs appears 
the approach of harmonisation, where both partners decide to use the 
same measure. The SPS Agreement urges WTO members to harmonise 
their SPS measures, as far as possible, by basing them on international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist. One may 
expect that in a TTIP agreement, the US and the EU will reaffirm their 
intention to do so, in general terms. However, they could also go 
further than that, by agreeing to harmonise their measures for given 
product sectors, either with international standards where they exist, 
or on a bilateral level. Such a step would be constructive in helping to 
minimise the cost of having different standards co-existing in the 
transatlantic marketplace. At some stage it may even be feasible to 
establish a common agency to administer such standards. Yet, this 
solution is unlikely to be adopted for any but the least controversial 
areas of trade. NAFTA envisaged a degree of harmonisation in 
regulations but the efforts to reconcile Canadian and US standards on 
such matters as border inspection have not met with great success. The 
model for any such cooperation could be the Australia-New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Agreement that has a joint food standards 
agency for those two countries. But the economic relations across the 
Atlantic may never be as close as those across the Tasman Sea.  
Harmonisation of standards raises political red flags. Some 
NGOs claim that convergence of standards implies the destruction of 
the gains made on health, nutrition, environmental protection and 
human rights. Such a widespread accusation hardly constitutes 
constructive criticism, but it does raise the possibility that agreements, 
whether in TTIP or just in MOUs between regulatory agencies could 
become a lightning rod for opposition. Moreover, as the definition of a 
standard and the related procedures for its implementation is a highly 
technical matter requiring substantial detail, it appears unlikely that 
concrete decisions on any harmonised measures could become part of 
a TTIP agreement. What is conceivable, however, is that agreement is 
sought on the establishment of bilateral bodies that would be tasked to 
work towards harmonised measures. 
4.3.2 Mutual recognition 
At a somewhat lower level in the hierarchy of options for dealing with 
NTMs is mutual recognition in the sense that each partner accepts the 
products legally sold domestically in the other partner’s markets. In 
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establishing its Single Market, the EU very much relied on (and still 
upholds) a strong version of mutual recognition.24 Mutual recognition 
can apply to the regulations themselves or the conformity tests. At first 
glance it may appear as if there is not much difference between this and 
equivalence (see below). Equivalence also means that partner countries 
mutually recognise each other’s standards and procedures. Yet, MR in 
its strong form goes very much further than equivalence. The main 
difference is that mutual recognition implies acceptance of a product 
that conforms with the domestic regulations of the exporting country, 
whereas equivalence refers to the product conforming to the standards 
of the importing country. Moreover, equivalence is implemented on a 
case-by-case, and only where positive comity is found in the market 
opened up to imports from the partner country. In other words, 
equivalence agreements are based on a positive list approach. Where 
mutual recognition governs, however, there is an a priori presumption 
that all standards and procedures in the partner country are acceptable 
and hence products from there can be freely imported. If the importing 
country has specific concerns, it must prove that imports of the partner 
country's product would violate one or more of a list of agreed criteria 
(say, public health). Mutual recognition, hence, uses a negative list 
approach, and the criteria are typically defined so stringently that it is 
very difficult to move a product onto the negative list. 
The mutual recognition approach has the great advantage that 
only one decision is needed: partner countries agree to accept the 
validity of each other’s standards and procedures, and from then on 
trade can flow freely. In a purely practical sense, negotiators don’t need 
to spend much time and specific expertise on this approach. They 
simply agree on mutual recognition and move on to other items on the 
negotiating agenda. However, there are reasons why different 
countries have diverging regulatory regimes, some more and some less 
convincing. And there are reasons why such divergences are difficult 
to remove and hence can result, and have resulted, in trade tensions. It 
would be unrealistic to assume that once it comes to FTA negotiations 
such divergences can be resolved by the stroke of a pen. Hence, mutual 
recognition is an option that will most likely have a minor role in the 
outcome of the agricultural and food part of the TTIP negotiations. 
                                                          
24 This strong definition of mutual recognition is sometimes referred to as the 
“Cassis de Dijon” version in reference to a decision by the European Court of 
Justice relating to the free circulation of that French drink in the German (and 
by implication the whole EU) market. 
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For its Single Market, the EU has adopted the mutual recognition 
approach across the board. One could, however, also imagine the 
application of that option to selected product sectors. That approach 
would establish some sort of a half-way house between equivalence 
and overall mutual recognition. It would still go further than 
equivalence as it would open up markets for the products concerned 
on a permanent basis, without the need to verify the partner’s 
procedures time and again. It would, thus, create more certainty for 
producers and traders. But it also requires a significant additional 
amount of mutual trust between the FTA partners. It might be worth 
considering whether (some of) the products for which the US and the 
EU have already determined full equivalence in both directions might 
qualify for a product-specific mutual recognition. Later the two parties 
could aim at widening product coverage under that approach.25 
4.3.3 Equivalence 
At a rather lower level of ambition is the option to establish equivalence 
between US and EU regulations on particular topics. This approach is 
closely interlinked with the concepts of mutual recognition and 
conformity assessment, and all of them represent important 
approaches to reducing non-tariff barriers to trade. The equivalence 
approach has been employed in several areas of standards and was one 
of the strategies supported in the WTO SPS Agreement. Three 
requirements for establishing full equivalence can be identified: first, 
the aims of the standard have to be the same; secondly, the effectiveness 
of the standards has to be comparable; and thirdly the importing 
country has to trust the exporting country to carry out its inspection 
and verification with at least equal diligence (conformity assessment).  
Where agreement on the equivalence of each other’s standards 
(in reaching the set objectives) and testing methods is feasible, this 
represents a more significant step forward in terms of reducing trade 
barriers. The US-EU Veterinary Equivalency Agreement, for example, 
defines those animal products for which the US and/or the EU 
recognise each other’s measures as achieving the importing party's 
                                                          
25 Under the US-EU Veterinary Equivalency Agreement, the degree of 
‘equivalence’ is ranked, and only where a product is assigned the highest rank, 
the importing party agrees that the exporting party’s measures achieve the 
importing party’s appropriate level of sanitary protection, and only for a subset 
of products have both the US and the EU assigned that highest rank (McNulty, 
2005).  
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appropriate level of sanitary protection, and sets out the procedures 
that allow such equivalence to be determined for products not yet 
covered. Where full equivalence is agreed, the importing party 
commits to allowing the products concerned in its market without 
further sanitary restrictions. Agreements of this nature constitute an 
approach that would appear to merit serious consideration in the TTIP 
negotiations. However, practical experience with the US-EU veterinary 
agreement cautions against too high expectations. The six-year period 
that was required to negotiate that agreement indicates how difficult 
the issues involved were at the time in the eyes of the negotiating 
officials. Also, although very far from all products were granted full 
equivalence status in the original agreement, only very few products 
were added to the equivalence list after the agreement went into force. 
Nevertheless, it is worth serious negotiating efforts to make TTIP an 
effective door opener for more equivalence agreements, or even to add 
some equivalence agreements to the TTIP agreement.  
Agreement on equivalence of conformity assessment 
procedures, including those in the food and agriculture sector (though 
the term conformity assessment is not typically used there), is certainly 
useful and hence another step up the hierarchy. Nevertheless, although 
they help to reduce the costs of exporting somewhat, they don’t really 
open up EU and US markets much more widely for each other. 
4.4 Alternative approaches 
Although the trio of approaches discussed above – harmonisation, 
mutual recognition and equivalence – are the usual ways of achieving 
a resolution of differences in standards, they imply that the standards 
themselves are a necessary part of market regulation. But other options 
exist in many areas of food and agricultural marketing that could help 
to resolve trade differences. Two of these alternatives are discussed 
here: the reliance on labelling as a way of providing consumer 
information hence avoiding the use of mandatory public (non-safety) 
standards, and the decision to allow different standards to exist in 
parallel in the marketplace. This would generally imply a greater role 
for the private sector to handle (and potentially benefit from) the range 
of transatlantic consumer attitudes to foods in conjunction with the 
national standards.  
AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND TTIP  285 
 
4.4.1 Labelling as a positive strategy 
This approach could be called “resolution of differences through 
consumer information”, making use of the ability of consumers to make 
decisions on purchases, subject to general or specific laws on 
misrepresentation. The boundary between safety and quality standards 
may be shifting over time, but it still provides a framework for deciding 
on the role of public and private actors in the food system. A key to 
informing the public about the quality of food products is the use of 
labelling. Wherever risks to health, safety or the environment are not 
so serious that banning a particular product characteristic or a process 
is necessary, or requiring a warning label, citizens are generally trusted 
to make their own choices, based on appropriate information provided 
through product labelling.  
Governments, however, often come under pressure from civil 
society groups and special interests to assume responsibility for dealing 
with all types of risks. This tendency is prominent in the food sector 
and has led administrative levels of government to regulate 
extensively. The EU has arguably suffered more from this ‘regulatory 
creep’ than the US in food standards, although in farming it could be 
that the reverse is true. Such over-regulation in itself complicates the 
process of integrating the transatlantic marketplace. An alternative 
approach is to recognise that in most cases their citizens are perfectly 
capable of making their own judgments on what is good and not so 
good for them, provided they have sufficient evidence-based 
information. Thus, rather than banning particular products, including 
imported goods, from the market, they could also require appropriate 
labelling and leave people to choose whether they want to buy them. 
Many trade conflicts could be avoided if labels were allowed to replace 
standards. Thus, one conceivable outcome of TTIP negotiations might 
be that in certain areas the two partners agree to deregulation by 
switching to labelling requirements rather than marketing restrictions. 
4.4.2 Hands-off approach: Diversity is good 
At the other end of the continuum of approaches to regulatory 
differences is the apparently trivial but by no means unimportant 
option of leaving NTMs untouched in the agreement. This may be 
called a vive la difference solution. Not all issues will prove amenable to 
regulatory negotiation. There will always be issues on which 
convergence is not possible or even desirable. Ultimately there may 
have to be an agreement to differ – and “live and let live”. In such cases 
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the aim of negotiations such as TTIP should then be to make sure that 
information on the respective standards is readily available and the 
discussions can continue in appropriate venues. This does not preclude 
activities to build trust among agencies that might eventually lead to 
closer and less provocative trade relations. 
The private sector would play a natural role in such a ‘hands-off’ 
approach to regulatory compatibility. Two standards, one applying in 
the US and the other in the EU, may seem to be a negative situation for 
business, as transactions costs are increased. But it also represents an 
opportunity for product differentiation. If consumer sensitivities are 
different across the Atlantic and different regulatory standards have 
been adopted to meet those concerns, then a firm marketing in both the 
US and the EU must adapt production and marketing strategies 
accordingly. So instead of viewing standards harmonisation as the only 
approach to reducing costs, the firms themselves could tailor their 
products more specifically to particular markets. Of course, this 
happens all the time as a matter of marketing strategy, but it is striking 
that many of the regulatory issues in transatlantic food trade do not 
seem to be seen in this light.  
5. Possible landing zones  
What are the possible outcomes of the negotiations in the area of 
agricultural and food issues? Which areas lend themselves to broad 
agreement and which situations offer little chance of agreement 
without considerable delay or significant domestic opposition? And 
how will that relate to the resolution of trade problems between the EU 
and the US? Table 9.5 provides an overview of some of the possible 
outcomes that could be negotiated over the next two years. 
On issues of market access, the US is unlikely to settle for an 
agreement that does not include significantly better access to the EU 
agricultural market. This could include the removal of EU tariffs on all 
food and agricultural products at no slower a pace than that granted to 
Canada in the CETA (i.e. 94% immediate and 95% within 7 years). 
Indeed, one could imagine an agreement to accelerate this pace in the 
third year to catch up with Canada. There would also no doubt be 
provision for EU TRQs for a limited number of sensitive commodities 
(dairy, beef and pork), but the US would expect these to expand 
regularly. Within-quota imports could be duty-free. In effect, access for 
US exports would be as good as in FTAs with Mexico and Korea and 
the countries that have negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements 
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(EPAs), although not as good as for LDCs under EBA where TRQs do 
not apply. 
The EU will in turn expect the removal of all US tariffs on food 
and agricultural goods at a comparable pace to the schedules of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP – involving 12 countries throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region), if that set of negotiations is also successful. This 
could mean 95% zero tariffs on signing, with further reductions over 
five years. If the TPP were to include the removal of all tariffs, including 
sensitive commodities, then there would be pressure for similar market 
access to be given to the EU. This would imply that TRQs for sugar and 
dairy would be increased over time until removed in (say) year five. 
Other market access outcomes could further open up the 
transatlantic marketplace. There could be an agreement not to use 
agriculture-specific safeguards, including the SSG allowed under the 
WTO. Agreement on broad principles for ROOs, based on WTO rules, 
could also include a commitment to avoid the use of ROOs to protect 
markets. This could include an agreement on diagonal cumulation of 
ROOs over NAFTA and EEA countries and those other countries with 
FTAs with the EU and the US (as appropriate). 
With respect to domestic subsidies, it is unlikely that there will 
be much effort put into negotiating reductions. Strong support for 
seeking closure on the Doha Round constraints on Domestic Support 
may be all that is realistic in this area. However, the TTIP could include 
a ban on export subsidies on bilateral trade when tariffs reach zero, as 
well as an agreement on a common approach to state-trading 
enterprises and an attempt to converge on food aid policy.  
The strengthening of disciplines on export restrictions and taxes, 
which has so far eluded negotiators in the WTO, could be possible in 
the TTIP. The TTIP discussions would seem to be an ideal locus for 
agreeing on a mutual ban on export restrictions and taxes on 
transatlantic trade in agricultural products.26 Although this would not 
in itself prevent export restrictions on third-country trade, it would 
make it more difficult to administer such restrictions. And so the 
inclusion of a ban on US and EU export restrictions in the TTIP could 
pave the way for a similar undertaking by all exporters, either as a part 
of a WTO agreement in the Doha Round or as a plurilateral agreement 
among the major exporters. 
                                                          
26 In any case, the US Constitution prohibits export taxes. The EU has the 
authority to tax exports but has not done so in recent years of high prices.  
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With respect to the regulations that have caused problems for the 
US and the EU, those involving animal and plant health are the least 
controversial. Both the EU and the US support the work of the 
international agencies – the OIE (Office International des Epizooties), 
which is concerned with animal health, and the IPPC (International 
Plant Protection Convention) – that have improved the transparency 
and scientific basis for trade regulations. There seems little reason not 
to harmonise some regulations where there are no critical differences 
in approach to trade. This could be true for many of the regulations 
relating to plant health. The TTIP talks should foster cooperation 
among agencies to take advantage of mutual interests in the area of 
animal and plant health. One focus should be on setting up a system 
for resolving future problems before they become trade conflicts. 
Another set of problems are less likely to be resolved by the 
discussion of regulatory differences by Committees or agencies. These 
involve human diseases and risks as perceived by the importing 
country.27 The issues relating to beef hormones, antibiotics, pathogen 
reduction techniques (PRTs) and zoonotic diseases also fall in this 
category, as explained below. The beef hormone ban may be the most 
politically visible and intractable: any move by the EU to weaken this 
ban in the short run seems unlikely. This may be one case where 
‘agreeing to differ’ may be the best solution, with the political balance 
being kept by opening up the market for hormone-free beef and beef 
products. There seems to be some flexibility in the case of ractopamine, 
and a broader agreement that included third countries may be the way 
to defuse this as an EU-US conflict. 
The potential conflicts over the use of antibiotics for growth 
purposes in animal rearing should certainly be addressed. But the issue 
here is not so much EU policy and US policy conflicting but rather that 
both the EU and the US face the same decisions. Non-therapeutic use 
of hormones is being restricted first in the EU, but US regulations are 
not far behind. So this is a case where the establishment of joint agencies 
to study the scientific issues would be advantageous. The public could 
conceivably come to respect the joint findings of such an agency and 
the recommendations could be made in such a way as to avoid serious 
conflicts. 
                                                          
27 In the absence of any imports of a product the regulatory differences are 
unlikely to show up as trade problems. Of course, EU and US exporters could 
face different regulations in third-country export markets, but solving that 
problem is best left to other negotiations. 
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The seemingly minor regulatory issue of PRTs has been the cause 
of much controversy between the US and the EU in the past few years, 
and has so far eluded resolution. The US industry uses PRTs including 
chlorine wash, lactic acid and other antimicrobials to remove bacteria. 
The EU does not favour such PRTs and banned their use in poultry in 
1997. As a result of these diverging approaches, imports of poultry from 
the US that would be legally sold in that country are banned from the 
EU market. In the EU, this issue is one of the more hotly debated 
matters in relation to TTIP which is sometimes portrayed by critics as 
potentially forcing ‘chlorine chicken’ on the table of reluctant EU 
consumers. The EU only allows water to be used to rinse pathogens in 
slaughter facilities. The argument is that PRTs act to cover up 
unsatisfactory practices at an earlier stage of the process. The US 
government regards the EU ban as unjustified by scientific evidence 
and hence out of line with obligations under the WTO SPS Agreement. 
Within the EU, there are differences of opinion: the European 
Commission has itself suggested in 2008 that PRTs be made legal for 
poultry processing in the EU, but this was rejected by the Council of 
Ministers. However, the EU has recently allowed the use of lactic acid 
as a wash in beef slaughter (as a good-faith measure at the start of the 
TTIP discussions), and there may be a chance for convergence over this 
issue in the negotiations.  
The issue of zoonotic diseases is particularly problematic. Unlike 
hormones and antibiotics, which are used in livestock production but 
which under certain uncontrolled circumstances could pose a threat to 
human health, zoonotic diseases need to be addressed in the animal 
population in order to avoid the spread to humans. Concerns seem to 
be equally prevalent on either side of the Atlantic: the BSE outbreak 
was seen to be a UK problem until cases began to show up in other EU 
countries. Then when a small number of cases were found in the US 
and Canada it was no longer possible to ignore the impact. Export 
markets for beef have still not recovered. This is clearly a case where 
scientific opinion does not differ but the handling of the outbreak can 
vary. Avian flu is another such case. There needs to be a mechanism by 
which the best scientific evidence should be pooled and there should 
be consultation on the appropriate administrative action. As the 
objective of human health is shared on both sides of the Atlantic, it 
seems unfortunate to act in such a way that causes trade conflicts.  
What about geographical indications (GIs)? This conflict has 
been around for many years, mainly as a result of the widespread use 
of European names by immigrants into the US, Canada, South Africa 
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and Australasia. Attempts by the EU to repatriate such names, whether 
for wines, cheeses or meats, have met with resistance. But the issues are 
not insoluble. The agreement on lists of generic names in the US, backed 
up by evidence that the consumer does in fact regard these as common 
names, should not be impossible. Generic names cannot, under WTO 
rules, be protected as GIs. Only a handful of such true generics exist, 
and cause a disproportionate amount of concern: names such as 
“Parma ham” and “parmesan cheese” are commercially valuable to 
some North American firms. The producers in Europe should consider 
purchasing the rights to those names if they feel that their own market 
is being eroded. Regarding wine, the US-EU wine agreement of 2006 
could be reaffirmed and it could be agreed to enter into its second phase 
where a number of outstanding issues could be discussed such as the 
further protection of all GIs for wine on both side, the use of semi-
generic names, the process for acceptance of new wine-making 
practices, or certification requirements. For all other GIs the US should 
be willing to protect the names on the US market. And the question of 
extending the additional protection currently given to wines and spirits 
in the WTO TRIPS Agreement should be left to the multilateral 
negotiations. 
A regulatory issue that has created major tensions between the 
US and the EU in the past is the treatment of GM products. In most EU 
member states there is strong resistance against 'green' (i.e. 
agricultural) GM products among the general public, or at least among 
powerful NGOs claiming to represent the public interest. In response 
to that popular aversion several national governments, for example in 
Austria, Germany and France, have refused to allow the planting of GM 
varieties in their territories even in cases where the European 
Commission, based on a positive assessment of the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA), had decided to authorise the respective GM 
seeds for planting in the EU.28 For a long time the legal status of these 
national deviations from EU-wide decisions remained questionable, at 
both the EU and the WTO level. More recently, though, a new 
procedure was adopted that allows member states to ban cultivation of 
GM crops for reasons other than food safety or environmental concerns. 
The President of the new European Commission installed in November 
2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, has already announced that he intends to 
confirm and strengthen the power of national governments to ban the 
                                                          
28 For more detail on the respective legislative procedures in the EU, see Josling 
& Tangermann (forthcoming), Chapter 5. 
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planting of GM crops in their member states. In effect only one GM 
variety (maize MON810) can currently be planted commercially in the 
EU, most of which is grown in Spain. 
A different matter is the approval of imports into the EU of GM 
products for commercial marketing as food and feed. For a while the 
EU was relatively liberal in allowing the marketing of GM varieties. But 
subsequent approvals of imports ran into opposition from those 
member states where the public resisted 'green' GM technology. 
Approvals on imports came to a halt, and in effect the EU instituted a 
moratorium. The approval process has been speeded up somewhat in 
recent years, and at present there are some 50 GM plant varieties whose 
product can be sold in the EU for use in food or animal feed. These 
products, however, have to be labelled. More than half of these crops 
are types of GM maize. Other crops include soybeans, rapeseed, sugar 
beets, cotton and potatoes. 
One dimension of the growing public opposition to TTIP in 
Europe is fear that the EU might have to open up completely to the 
importation and cultivation of GM products. However, here again a 
distinction needs to be made between the approval of GM products for 
sale in the EU on the one hand and the question of licensing the 
planting of GM seed varieties in Europe on the other hand. It appears 
that US seed companies have for the time being essentially given up on 
hopes that resistance against cultivation of such seed varieties in 
Europe can be overcome in the near future. Hence US negotiators have 
understood that this is a matter that must be left to the EU and the 
member states, and therefore this is an issue that is unlikely to create 
major difficulties in the negotiations. The issue of labelling GM foods is 
also one that should not be a major point of contention in the TTIP talks. 
The US will have to grasp the nettle of public demands for labelling, no 
matter how shaky is the case for such action. Food products, like all 
other retail goods, will remain subject to local labelling and packaging 
regulations. So the main GM issue boils down to the speed at which the 
EU reviews and decides on the marketability of new types of GM 
products on the internal market. In exchange for the “live and let live” 
approach to GM plantings and labelling the EU should at the very least 
set up a more responsive approval process for commercial marketing 
of GM products as food and feed.  
One significant aspect of the tension over GM approval is the 
possibility that it might spill over into future technology. One such 
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example is the use of nanotechnology in food packaging.29 One 
application that would appear to have consumer benefits is the 
development of a packaging material that will give a visual indication 
(e.g. a change in colour) if bacteria are present in significant quantities. 
The calls for regulation have come from concerned groups in the EU 
and in the US. The opportunity exists for the merits and hazards of this 
technology to be addressed by authorities working together, which 
might mean that the split between US and EU opinion apparent in the 
GM case can potentially be avoided.  
Both sides will need some ‘victories’ in the regulatory area to 
demonstrate the value of the outcome. Though regulatory differences 
can persist for years and become major trade irritants, most can be 
resolved when political attention is sufficiently focused. Four cases of 
agreements in this area of food and agricultural regulations illustrate 
this possibility, and provide a basis of cooperation for the TTIP to build 
upon. In 1996 the US and the EU signed a Veterinary Equivalence 
Agreement (VEA) that aimed to facilitate the establishment of 
equivalence in SPS measures. Although this agreement has had limited 
scope so far, it represents a useful starting point for a broader 
agreement covering equivalence of testing and regulating in matters 
related to health and safety of animals.  
In the area of food safety, the EU Food Hygiene Package of 2004 
moved some way to dealing with transatlantic differences over sanitary 
standards by applying risk-based approval for US slaughterhouses. 
The EU has also negotiated a US-EU Wine Agreement (2006) that 
resolved several of the ongoing issues with respect to wine-making 
practices as well as some naming issues. This again created a useful 
basis for further resolution of the GI issue. And in 2012, the US and the 
EU reached agreement on an agreement on Organics that in effect made 
the two different organic certification systems in use mutually 
compatible. A product deemed organic by US officials can now bear the 
EU certification mark. Although each of these agreements may have 
had their own dynamic, they do give some hope that solutions can be 
found when the necessity arises. 
                                                          
29 Nanotechnology refers to the alteration of the molecular structure of a 
material to alter its characteristics. In effect a new material is produced with 
features that are under the control of the developer. The use of the technology 
in medical and energy applications has been widely accepted, but its use in 
food packaging has raised questions of health and safety on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  
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Table 9.5 Potential landing zones for agriculture and food in the TTIP  
Border 
Issues 
US objective EU objective Landing zone 
    
Market 
access  
Access to EU 
cereals and 
vegetable 
markets 
Access to US 
dairy markets 
Free access for 95% of 
agricultural tariff lines 
with most sensitive items 
excluded: expanding TRQs 
for those items 
Domestic 
subsidies 
Lower EU 
farm-level 
subsidies  
Keep lid on 
US spending 
on crop 
insurance 
Agree to work for a 
solution in WTO Doha 
Round to achieve 
reduction of domestic 
support 
Export 
subsidies 
Phase out 
subsidies 
Restrict US 
food “in 
kind” food 
aid and 
export credits 
Agree to avoid intra export 
subsidies and to work 
toward WTO elimination 
of all export subsidies and 
similar measures  
Export 
taxes, 
quotas 
Avoid export 
restrictions on 
US-EU trade 
Avoid export 
restrictions 
on US-EU 
trade 
Agree to avoid export 
restrictions on US-EU 
trade and to work through 
WTO for multilateral 
disciplines on export 
restrictions 
 
 
Regulations 
   
Animal 
health 
Affirm SPS 
commitment 
Affirm SPS 
commitment 
Reaffirm SPS commitment 
to evidence-based rules 
and support work of OIE. 
Set up Committee to 
discuss SPS issues to avoid 
trade conflicts. Pre-
notification of new 
regulations 
Plant 
health 
Affirm SPS 
commitment 
Affirm SPS 
commitment 
Reaffirm SPS commitment 
to evidence-based rules 
and support work of IPPC  
Human 
health 
Achieve 
coherence in 
Achieve 
coherence in 
Set up Committee to 
discuss SPS issues to avoid 
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(including 
PRTs, 
hormones, 
antibiotics 
and 
zoonotic 
diseases) 
standards for 
PRTs; 
persuade EU 
to change 
hormone ban; 
avoid conflicts 
over 
antibiotics and 
zoonoses 
standards for 
PRTs; avoid 
any change in 
hormone ban; 
avoid 
conflicts over 
antibiotics 
and zoonoses 
trade conflicts. Pre-
notification of new 
regulations. Joint scientific 
agencies to advise on 
PRTs; “agree to differ” on 
hormones; joint action on 
antibiotics and zoonoses 
GIs Avoid 
repatriation of 
European 
names 
Register EU 
GIs for 
protection in 
US: expand 
“additional” 
protection 
beyond wines 
Reaffirm US-EU wine 
agreement; agree on a list 
of “generics” that cannot 
be used as a GI; leave to 
TRIPS the issue of 
additional protection 
beyond wines 
GM crops Speed up EU 
approval 
process 
Avoid 
weakening of 
GM planting 
rules and 
maintain 
labelling 
Agreement to expedite 
approval for marketing 
GM crops; approval of GM 
plantings in EU left to EU 
and member states  
Organic 
foods 
Avoid trade 
problems 
Avoid trade 
problems 
Incorporate US-EU mutual 
recognition agreement for 
Organics  
Animal 
welfare 
Avoid trade 
problems 
Avoid trade 
problems 
Agree to build on OIE 
standards for animal 
welfare 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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10. TTIP AND PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT 
STEPHEN WOOLCOCK  
AND JEAN HEILMAN GRIER 
1. Introduction 
For the past 35 years, the European Union and the United States have 
played leading roles in the development of international rules that 
apply to government procurement (or public procurement). They are 
parties to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), 
which accounts for only a quarter of the membership of the WTO, as 
well as other bilateral and regional agreements with procurement 
commitments. Their interest in procurement obligations arises from the 
significant role that government procurement plays in most economies.  
International agreements that provide disciplines for 
procurement have two elements: one is procurement rules and the 
second is the procurement that is subject to those rules. The EU and the 
US share similar views with regard to procurement rules, which are 
intended to ensure that procurement is conducted in a manner that is 
transparent, non-discriminatory, predictable and fair. But they have 
had differences with respect to the procurement that they open to one 
another. As a consequence, they have engaged in often contentious 
negotiations on government procurement for more than 20 years now. 
Their current procurement commitments and unresolved issues 
provide the basis for the TTIP negotiations.  
Under the current state of affairs, the EU does not accord the US 
its most comprehensive coverage because it is dissatisfied with the level 
of procurement that the US has opened under the GPA. The US is 
constrained in responding to the EU’s complaints by both its federal 
structure of government and its domestic purchasing requirements, 
only a few of which it has removed in international agreements. More 
often, the US has excluded procurement subject to such restrictions 
from its international obligations. In contrast to the EU’s quest for 
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access to more US procurement, American suppliers are more or less 
satisfied with their access to procurement in Europe.  
This chapter aims to help the reader understand how the EU-US 
procurement relationship has reached its current state. It begins with 
an overview of the nature of government procurement markets, 
considering the size of the markets and penetration ratios of public 
procurement. It then examines the international procurement 
agreements that apply to the EU and the US, looking at both 
procurement rules and procurement commitments. It will detail the 
procurement that the EU and the US have agreed to open to one 
another, and the procurement that they exclude from their respective 
commitments.  
The chapter then turns to how the EU and US might build on 
their existing commitments and defuse this long-contentious issue. 
Both sides have articulated objectives with respect to government 
procurement under the TTIP. The EU has placed a high priority on 
procurement in the TTIP and has specified a number of areas of interest. 
While the US has not singled out procurement as a priority, it has 
identified several objectives. The chapter proposes expansion of 
existing procurement commitments in several areas. At the same time, 
it points out some of the hurdles to an expansion of covered 
procurement, in particular with respect to US states. The report also 
considers how the TTIP might expand procurement rules that could 
have ramifications beyond the TTIP and set new international 
standards.  
Given the likely difficulty in resolving all of their outstanding 
procurement issues in the TTIP negotiations, the chapter proposes 
ways for the parties to continue addressing these issues with the TTIP 
as a ‘living agreement’. It focuses on the potential use of a forum that 
the EU and the US established at the end of 2011. The chapter also 
addresses the possibility of linking progress in the procurement 
negotiations to other sectors of the TTIP.  
2. The nature of government procurement markets 
2.1 The size of procurement markets 
According to OECD Secretariat estimates, public procurement 
accounted for on average 13% of GDP in the OECD economies in 2011. 
If one adds state-owned enterprises (SOEs) this can mean an additional 
2-12% of GDP, depending on the country. In all economies it is also the 
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sector that has been least touched by the general liberalisation 
paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s. There are, therefore, significant 
potential economic and welfare gains to be achieved from more 
transparent, competitive and efficient procurement. At first glance, 
public procurement looks like an area of considerable promise, 
especially at a time of relatively slow growth and tight public finances. 
In practice, however, much less than 13% of GDP in procurement is 
likely to be open to international competition. If one assumes that 
public spending on health, social and education services, and core areas 
of defence will remain largely outside of competitive markets, this 
leaves 3-5% of GDP potentially open to international competition 
(European Commission (2011a, p. viii). Opening public procurement 
markets has also proved to be one of the most challenging areas of trade 
policy. Experience over the past 35 years shows that agreeing on the 
text of an agreement is only the first step in ensuring increased 
competition in public contracts. Competitive procurement also requires 
effective implementation of agreements, institutional and human 
resources and above all a commitment to open competition on the part 
of the purchasing entity/government.  
Public procurement accounts for a larger share of GDP in the EU 
(with variations among member states) than in the US, for example. 
This is largely because the EU public sector is larger than that of the US. 
Most EU member states also have a state owned enterprises (SOEs) or 
parastatal sector (see Figure 10.1). In the EU internal procurement 
regime, central entities, sub-central entities and utilities are all covered 
by procurement rules and the EU has extended this approach to the 
plurilateral Government Procurement Agreements (GPA).  
This means that the EU approach is more comprehensive than 
that of the US. As discussed above, not all procurement is subject to 
competition because large shares go to expenditures on health and 
social programmes, education, energy or defence. Figure 10.1 shows 
the total share of public procurement in other major markets.  
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Figure 10.1 The share of public procurement in GDP for general government 
and utilities  
 
Data sources: OECD National Accounts Database and Eurostat. Data for 
Australia are based on a combination of Government Finance Statistics and 
National Accounts data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
2.2 The debate on the openness of procurement markets 
2.2.1 The general picture 
The relative size and openness of the EU and US procurement markets 
has been the subject of considerable debate. As in any trade negotiation, 
reciprocity has been an important factor in past and present 
discussions, so differences over the relative openness of markets have 
been a significant complicating factor and there are no unchallenged 
objective data with which to make a comparison. At a very general 
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level, a recent study (Messerlin & Miroudot, 2012) takes the overall 
penetration ratios of public procurement based on imports. This 
appears to show the EU to have a lower penetration rate than China 
and India, but higher than that of the US (see Table 10.1). The 
penetration ratio here is based on direct imports as a share of the total 
public demand for goods and services, defined as the final 
consumption expenditure (government final consumption expenditure 
consists of expenditure, including imputed expenditure, incurred by 
general government on both individual consumption goods and 
services and collective consumption services). This definition of market 
opening therefore considers the general picture for the public sector as 
a whole.  
Table 10.1 Penetration ratios of public procurement markets (selected 
countries and years) 
Market 1995 2000 2005 2007 
European Union 2.6 3.6 4.2 4.5 
Brazil 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 
China 3.8 3.4 5.6 5.2 
India 4.2 4.4 5.8 6.3 
Japan 1.9 2.3 3.2 4.2 
Turkey 5.4 5.8 9.5 10.9 
US 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 
Source: Summary of data provided in Messerlin & Miroudot (2012). 
As the data in Figure 10.2 show, small markets, including the 
small EU member states if these are taken as separate markets, tend to 
have a higher import-penetration ratio. This is to be expected given that 
smaller economies will not have the local/national capacity to supply 
all the goods and services required by their governments. If one takes 
the EU as a single market, one would clearly expect import penetration 
to be lower than in small markets and lower perhaps than developing-
country markets as the EU possesses the capacity to supply the most 
advanced, high-value contracts, which some developing economies 
will be unable to do. Figure 10.2, indeed, shows a correlation between 
market size and ‘openness’ (in other words, imports to total public 
consumption) and shows the EU and US as roughly equivalent in terms 
of their degree of openness on this measure.  
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Figure 10.2 GDP and openness ratios, 2008 
 
Source: Messerlin & Miroudot (2012). 
2.3 Access via investment  
The import penetration in Table 10.1 also relates to ‘imports’ or what 
the European Commission has termed direct imports, in other words 
goods and services crossing borders. It is, however, a feature of 
procurement markets that access is often achieved through foreign 
investment in the target market, which helps get around de facto 
preferences in that contracts awarded to local goods and services create 
local jobs and economic activity, even if the firm is foreign-owned. In 
the EU, cross-border supply of public procurement markets accounts 
for only 1.6% of public contracts and 3.5% of the value of public 
procurement. But indirect supply via an affiliate accounts for 11% of 
contracts and about 14% of the value of public procurement (European 
Commission, 2011b). This indirect access to EU markets appears to be 
focused on ‘supplies’ (goods) rather than services or works 
(construction). Indirect imports make up 25% of the value of EU 
supplies contracts, compared to just 6% for works and 12% for services. 
Access therefore clearly depends on the ease of establishment and 
whether inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is blocked or 
discouraged. This is seldom the case in transatlantic trade as both the 
EU and the US are open to foreign direct investment except in limited 
cases when the host state wishes to defend its national champion 
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against such competition. But the option of setting up an affiliate will 
be less attractive to small- or medium-sized companies. Unfortunately, 
there does not seem to be equivalent data for indirect access to the US 
market, and so again it does not seem possible to conduct an objective 
comparison of how open markets are. But one can assume that larger 
EU suppliers wishing to access the US market will have considered 
doing so via affiliates.  
2.4 Value of procurement covered under commitments in 
agreements  
In the absence of comparable data, the European Commission has 
produced an estimate of relative market opening, summarised in Table 
10.2 below. This appears to be based on commitments made in 
international agreements for contestable markets above the thresholds 
in the GPA. But the US has disputed the accuracy of these figures.  
Table 10.2 Share of procurement covered by commitments  
 EU US Japan Canada Brazil India China 
Total 
procurement 
Above GPA 
threshold (€ bn) 
370 559 96 59 25 42 20 
% of GDP 3% 3% 3% 6% 3% 4% 2% 
Percentage of 
procurement 
Internationally 
committed 
95% 32% 28% 16% 65% 0 0 
Source: European Commission (2012). 
2.5 Strategic market access  
These general figures for procurement and the degree of openness do 
not address the question of what might be called strategic market 
access. In certain sectors, large public contracts can make a significant 
difference between business success and failure. In other words 
winning a large public contract can have a significant effect on the 
relative competitive position of companies. This is especially the case 
in sectors such as aerospace where strategic trade policy conditions 
could be said to apply. The same features, however, are also present in 
other sectors such as rail transport, energy, non-lethal defence 
equipment and even construction. In these sectors, therefore, tacit 
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support for national companies in the awarding of contracts is 
something that is very difficult to address and even governments that 
would otherwise follow liberal procurement policies have arguably 
found ways of awarding contracts to national suppliers. The recent EU 
debate on a Regulation to enhance the EU’s negotiating leverage, which 
has not been adopted, drew on these kinds of strategic market access 
objectives.1  
3. International procurement rules and EU and US 
commitments 
3.1 International procurement agreements  
When the international trading system was established in 1947 under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), government 
procurement was explicitly excluded. As a consequence, there were no 
constraints on the adoption and application of de jure and de facto ‘buy 
local’ policies and practices. This unfettered use continued for more 
than three decades until procurement was brought under international 
trade disciplines. In 1981, the first international procurement 
agreement – the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GATT Code) – was implemented. As a plurilateral agreement, it only 
opened the procurement of the GATT members that accepted it and did 
not provide most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN) to non-Code 
parties.2 It was also limited in scope, applying only to the procurement 
of goods by the central government entities listed by each party in the 
agreement. It did not apply to services or other types of entities. The 
GATT Code was replaced by the Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA), which was established under the WTO in 1996.3  
The GPA significantly expanded procurement subject to 
international disciplines to include services and construction services, 
as well as procurement by sub-central government entities, utilities and 
government enterprises. Currently, the GPA has 15 parties. Given that 
                                                          
1 See Regulation on access to international procurement markets COM (2012) 
124 final 21.3.2012. 
2 Those members included the US, the European Economic Community and its 
member states (Belgium, Denmark, Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), Austria, 
Finland and Sweden.  
3 Grier (2013b).  
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the EU and its 28 member states constitute one party, the GPA covers 
the procurement of 43 WTO members.  
In December 2011, the GPA parties concluded a decade-long 
negotiation to revise the GPA.4 The negotiations, which were led by the 
US and the EU, resulted in an expansion of the procurement covered 
by the Agreement5 and an overhaul of its text.6 In April 2014, the 
revision entered into force for two-thirds of the GPA parties, including 
the EU and the US.7  
3.2 The elements of international procurement 
agreements 
The negotiations on procurement in the TTIP are expected to follow the 
template that has been established over the years in international 
procurement agreements and is reflected in the GPA and bilateral 
FTAs. This template has two parts. One concerns coverage or market 
access commitments, often called ‘liberalisation’, which are based on 
negotiations aimed at achieving reciprocal commitments.  
Neither the EU nor the US covers all of its procurement under 
any international procurement agreement. Instead, each specifies the 
procurement that it promises to conduct in accordance with the 
provisions of the agreement based on several elements, including lists 
of procuring entities. The second part of agreements is comprised of the 
principles such as national treatment and the procedural disciplines 
that apply to the procurement that is covered. See Box 10.1 for the 
elements of coverage commitments and the procurement rules.  
Box 10.1 Elements of International Agreements on Public Procurement  
Coverage 
Rules in international agreements generally cover procurement of 
supplies (goods), works (construction) and services. Coverage is defined 
by several elements: 1) thresholds (monetary values at and above which 
the agreement applies to procurement), which are designed to ensure 
that the most valuable contracts are open to competition and avoid the 
significant compliance costs of imposing international disciplines on 
smaller contracts; 2) the entities covered, as specified in three categories 
                                                          
4 World Trade Organization (2011). 
5 Grier (2014b and d). 
6 Grier (2013c). 
7 World Trade Organization (2014). 
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(central government, sub-central governments and other entities, such 
as utilities and SOEs); 3) negative list of goods, which means that the 
procurement of all goods is covered except those explicitly excluded; 
coverage of defence goods is generally based on a positive list; 4) 
services, including construction services, with coverage based on a 
positive list (only listed services are covered) or negative list (all services 
are covered except those listed); and 5) exclusions. [The coverage of the 
EU and US under the GPA is set out in Table 10.3 below.] 
National treatment  
A cornerstone of public procurement agreements is non-discrimination. 
Parties must provide national treatment for all covered procurement. 
This requires parties to treat the goods, services, and suppliers of other 
parties no less favourably than domestic goods, services and suppliers. 
They may not apply domestic preferences and other discriminatory 
purchasing provisions for procurement covered by an international 
agreement. National treatment obligations are the main means by which 
de jure preferences for specific categories of suppliers are tackled.  
Transparency 
Central to the aim of facilitating increased international competition, 
more efficient purchasing and reduced scope for corruption in public 
procurement is the provision of information. Transparency and 
procedural obligations are aimed at ensuring that procurement covered 
by an international agreement is conducted in a manner that is 
transparent, predictable, fair and non-discriminatory. This encompasses 
both information on the procurement system, as well as information on 
each stage of the specific procurement, including development of 
technical specifications, publication of notices of intended procurement 
and invitations to request participation in procurements, provision of 
tender documentation, tendering process, use of negotiations and 
contract awards. It also includes post-contract award transparency in 
which purchasing entities are obliged to explain contract award 
decisions and publish awards.  
Contract award procedures 
In order to ensure flexibility, procurement rules in international 
agreements tend to provide for open, selective and limited tendering. 
Open tendering allows all interested suppliers to participate and may be 
based on price or most advantageous tenders. Selective tendering is used 
when the procuring entity invites only suppliers that meet certain 
qualification requirements to submit tenders. It requires competition 
and transparent procedures for the selection of qualified suppliers. 
Limited tendering is when the procuring entity invites specific suppliers 
to submit tenders. Agreements include more or less detailed rules on 
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how invitations for tender are issued, what information is provided, and 
what time limits are set for bidding and for awarding contracts. Short 
time limits may put foreign bidders at a disadvantage, while long time 
limits may be detrimental to the work of the procuring entity. 
Technical specifications 
Through specifications, a procuring entity can tailor the requirements 
for a procurement to match the capabilities of certain (local) suppliers. 
To avoid this outcome, rules encourage the use of international 
standards and performance standards over design (or prescriptive) 
standards. Where design standards are used, tenders of equivalent 
goods or services should be allowed.  
Exemptions or exclusions 
Agreements generally provide for exclusions of procurement from 
national treatment obligations for reasons of human health, national 
security and law enforcement.  
Enforcement and compliance 
Experience has shown that without effective compliance, rules on public 
procurement will have little effect. Given the thousands of contracts that 
are awarded every day, central compliance monitoring is impracticable. 
Rules therefore provide bidders who believe they have not been fairly 
treated with an opportunity to seek an independent review of a contract 
award decision. Penalties in the case of non-compliance may involve 
project cancellation, requirements to retender or financial penalties 
(limited to the costs of bids or exemplary damages). Rules requiring 
information on contracts awarded and reasons why bids failed can also 
facilitate compliance. 
 
3.3 EU and US commitments under international 
agreements  
The EU and the US have exchanged extensive procurement 
commitments under two international agreements, the GPA (see Table 
10.3) and a 1995 exchange of letters (see Table 10.4).8  
                                                          
8 Grier (2013a).  
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Table 10.3 EU and US coverage under GPA and relevance to TTIP 
Elements of 
coverage 
EU coverage US coverage Issue in TTIP? 
Central 
government  
   
Thresholds: 
goods and 
services 
130,000 Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) 
130,000 SDRs Not likely TTIP issue. EU Directives 
apply same threshold as GPA; EU has 
not applied lower thresholds in FTAs. 
But, US often applies lower thresholds 
in other FTAs. For example, it applies 
a $100,000 threshold in the US-Korea 
FTA. Since US reserves most federal 
procurement at and below $150,000 for 
small businesses, there would be little 
value in a threshold below that level. 
Thresholds: 
Construction 
services 
5,000,000 SDRs 5,000,000 SDRs  
Entities Covers 3 EU-wide entities 
(Council, Commission and 
European External Action 
Service) and all central 
government entities of member 
states; withholds 
approximately 200 entities 
from access by US 
85 federal entities, with several 
exclusions, including 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Both could expand their coverage. US 
should be able to cover all federal 
agencies subject to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. The EU 
should be able to provide the US with 
comprehensive coverage of central 
government entities of member states 
and cover more EU-wide entities. 
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Sub-central 
government 
   
Thresholds: 
Goods and 
services 
200,000 SDRs 
 
355,000 SDRs EU is seeking reduction. US likely to 
resist because of difficulty of obtaining 
necessary agreement of states. 
Thresholds: 
Construction 
services 
5,000,000 SDRs 5,000,000 SDRs  
Entities All regional or local 
contracting authorities and all 
contracting authorities that are 
bodies governed by public law, 
as defined by EU public 
procurement directive. 
Includes indicative lists of 
entities covered. 
37 states (see Table 10.4) EU seeks expanded coverage of states, 
including the 13 states not covered by 
the GPA and greater access to the 
procurement of the 37-covered states.  
 
Restrictions 
on coverage 
EU denies rights to US 
suppliers to participate in 
services procured by its sub-
central entities. 
 
Exclusions include domestic 
content restrictions that apply to 
federally-funded highway and 
mass-transit projects and state-
specific exclusions  
EU seeks removal of the restrictions 
for mass transit projects. 
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Utilities 
and 
government 
enterprises 
   
Thresholds: 
Goods and 
services 
400,000 SDRs $250,000 for federal enterprises; 
400,000 SDRs for other entities 
 
Thresholds: 
Construction 
services 
5,000,000 SDRs 5,000,000 SDRs  
Entities All contracting entities whose 
procurement is covered by EU 
utilities directive and which are 
contracting authorities covered 
by the GPA. It also covers 
public undertakings, which are 
engaged in activities in sectors 
that include drinking water, 
electricity, airports, maritime or 
inland ports and transportation 
(railways, urban railways, 
automated systems, tramway, 
trolley bus, bus and cable); 
Includes indicative lists of 
entities. 
Federal electric utilities 
(Tennessee Valley Authority and 
four Power Administrations), St. 
Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation. 
3 sub-central entities (Port 
Authority of New York and New 
Jersey, Port of Baltimore and 
New York Power Authority).  
Waives domestic content 
requirements for power 
generation and 
telecommunication projects 
financed by Rural Utilities 
Service.  
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Restrictions Excludes US from all utilities, 
except electric sector. 
Excludes domestic content 
restrictions that apply to federal 
funds provided for airport 
projects.  
 
Goods Covers all goods Covers all goods with several 
exceptions 
 
Defence 
goods 
Positive list of goods procured 
by defence and security entities. 
Positive list of goods that are 
generally covered, subject to 
national security exception 
 
Services Uses positive list which lists 
only the services that it covers, 
including most land and air 
transport services and all 
telecommunications services. 
EU does not give US rights to 
services procured by its sub-
central entities. EU also 
provides US with access to a 
covered service only if US also 
covers that service.  
Uses negative list to cover all 
services except transportation 
services; services associated with 
management and operation of 
government facilities, or 
privately owned facilities used 
for governmental purposes; 
public utilities services (except 
enhanced/value-added 
telecommunications services); 
and R&D services. Excludes 
printing for states. It provides 
EU with access to a covered 
service only if EU covers it. 
EU could adopt negative list and US 
could consider expansion of 
telecommunications services. 
Source: Grier (2013a).  
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Under those agreements, the US gives the EU the best access to 
its procurement that it offers any trading partner. In fact, it gives the 
EU better access than others because the 1995 agreement opens up 
procurement not provided to any other party. Under the GPA, the US 
does not withhold any of its procurement from the EU. But the EU does 
not reciprocate by providing the US with its best coverage. Instead, it 
denies the US the legal rights to participate in a significant portion of 
its GPA-covered procurement. This denial of de jure access applies to the 
procurement of services by its sub-central entities, procurement by EU 
utilities (except in the electric sector) and at least 200 central 
government entities of its member states. The EU withholds this 
procurement in response to US coverage. This disparity is less 
significant than it appears because US companies often have de facto 
access to the excluded procurement.1  
Central government entities: Under the 1994 GPA, both the EU and 
the US used positive lists to specify their coverage of central 
government entities. The US continued that approach in the revised 
GPA, with the addition of 11 entities, to bring its total of covered 
entities to 85 – the most it offers in any agreement. However, in the 
negotiations on the revision of the GPA, the EU changed its approach 
and offered comprehensive coverage of the central government entities 
of its member states, that is, all existing entities, whether or not listed, 
as well as those created in the future. But it reserved this 
comprehensive coverage for members of the European Free Trade 
Association (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and the 
Netherlands with respect to Aruba. For the US and other GPA parties, 
the EU not only continued to use a positive list, but it also withheld 
some of the listed entities – more than 200 listed entities in the case of 
the US.2  
Sub-central coverage: With regard to sub-central entity coverage, 
the EU provides comprehensive coverage of the sub-central entities of 
its member states, but withholds their purchases of services from the 
US. US sub-central coverage is not as comprehensive. Under the GPA, 
it covers 37 of its 50 states3 and not all of the procurement of those 
                                                          
1 Grier (2014k). 
2 Grier (2014f). 
3 The 13 states that are not covered by the GPA are: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, 
Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. 
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states. A variety of restrictions apply to the states.4 For example, the US 
takes an exception for the domestic content restrictions that are 
attached to federal funds given to states for mass-transit and highway 
projects. In addition, the states open their procurement at a threshold 
that is almost twice that of the EU’s sub-central entities (355,000 SDRs 
versus 200,000 SDRs). See Table 10.4 on US states covered under GPA 
and the 1995 exchange of letters.  
Table 10.4 US states covered under GPA and 1995 Exchange of Letters 
State GPA State-specific exclusions in GPA  1995 
Exchange 
of Letters 
Arizona X None  
Arkansas X Construction services  
California X None  
Colorado X None  
Connecticut X None  
Delaware X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Florida X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Hawaii X Construction services; software 
developed in state 
 
Idaho X None  
Illinois X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
X 
Iowa X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Kansas X Construction services, 
automobiles, aircraft 
 
Kentucky X Construction services  
                                                          
4 Grier (2014n). 
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Louisiana X None  
Maine X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Maryland X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Massachusetts X None  
Michigan X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Minnesota X None  
Mississippi X Services  
Missouri X None  
Montana X Goods  
Nebraska X None  
New 
Hampshire 
X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
New York X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, 
coal; procurement by public 
authorities and public benefit 
corporations with multi-state 
mandates; transit cars, buses and 
related equipment 
 
North Dakota  None X 
Oklahoma X Construction services, 
construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Oregon X None  
Pennsylvania X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
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Rhode Island X Boats, automobiles, buses, related 
equipment 
 
South Dakota X Beef  
Tennessee X Services, including construction 
services 
 
Texas X None  
Utah X None  
Vermont X None  
Washington X Fuel, paper products, boats, ships, 
vessels 
 
West Virginia  None X 
Wisconsin X None  
Wyoming X Construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on 
subcontracts, motor vehicles, coal 
 
Source: Grier (2014n).  
In addition to the GPA, the US opens procurement of several 
sub-central entities under a 1995 US-European Communities Exchange 
of Letters.5 That Agreement, which does not include any EU 
commitments, provides EU suppliers with access to the procurement 
of two states not covered by the GPA (North Dakota and West Virginia) 
and Illinois state procurement that is not covered under the GPA. The 
obligation in the Exchange of Letters is limited to best of out-of-state 
treatment for EU suppliers, but only if the state considers non-state 
suppliers in a procurement. It also commits to best of out-of-city 
treatment by seven cities (Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, 
Indianapolis, Nashville and San Antonio), if they consider bids from 
suppliers outside of their cities. Finally, that Agreement provides that 
the Massachusetts Port Authority will provide best of out-of-state 
treatment if it considers non-Massachusetts suppliers. That agreement 
does not include thresholds or any exclusions.6  
                                                          
5 Office of the US Trade Representative (www.ustr.gov/trade-
topics/government-procurement/us-european-communities-1995-exchange-
letters). 
6 Grier (2014g). 
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Other entities (utilities and government enterprises): Under the GPA, 
the EU covers a broad spectrum of utilities in sectors that include 
drinking water, electricity, airports, maritime or inland ports and 
transportation (railways, urban railways, automated systems, 
tramway, trolley bus, bus and cable). But it withholds US access to all 
except the electric sector in response to the limitations in US coverage. 
The US covers only federal electric utilities plus several other entities in 
other sectors. In the revision of the GPA, the US expanded its coverage 
by extending its waiver of domestic content requirements that apply to 
funding by the Rural Utilities Services, a unit of the Department of 
Agriculture, to include telecommunications projects, (see Table 10.3).  
Exclusions: Since its implementation of the GATT Code, the US 
has excluded procurement that it sets aside for its small and minority 
businesses from the GPA and FTAs. The federal government uses set-
asides to help it meet the directive in the Small Business Act of 1953 to 
award a portion of its procurement to small and minority businesses. 
The current target is almost a quarter (23%) of federal procurement. The 
US Congress has explicitly prohibited waiver of the small business set-
asides.7  
3.4 EU and US commitments under bilateral and regional 
FTAs  
In addition to their GPA membership, the EU and the US have 
undertaken procurement commitments with other trading partners in 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). The US is a party 
to 13 FTAs that cover the procurement of 19 countries on terms and 
conditions similar to those in the GPA. Several of those countries 
(Canada, Israel, Republic of Korea and Singapore) are also GPA parties. 
The only US FTA that does not include robust procurement 
commitments comparable to the GPA is its FTA with Jordan. That 
FTA’s procurement provision is limited to a commitment that the 
parties engage in negotiations on Jordan’s accession to the GPA. In 
addition to FTAs, in 2010, the United States and Canada negotiated a 
procurement agreement in which they exchanged sub-central coverage, 
and Canada opened up the procurement of its provinces and territories 
for the first time.8  
                                                          
7 Grier (2014i). 
8 Grier (2013b). 
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The EU has included public procurement provisions in all of its 
comprehensive bilateral trade agreements. The agreements negotiated 
with GPA signatories such as the Republic of Korea, Canada and 
Singapore, simply apply the GPA rules but extend commitments. In the 
case of Canada in the CETA agreement, Canada extended its 
commitments to include its municipalities, municipal organisations, 
school boards and publicly funded academic, health and social service 
entities (MASH sector) for the first time. In preferential agreements 
signed with middle developing countries, such as those with Colombia 
and Peru and Central America, the EU has included procurement rules 
largely based on the GPA. With these partners the EU has accepted a 
degree of asymmetry in commitments in that it has offered more or less 
the same level of commitments to these countries as to GPA signatories 
but accepted more limited commitments from the countries concerned.  
The EU–CARIFORUM agreement also includes rules very similar to 
those of the GPA, but it does not include coverage commitments, which 
are to be decided by the parties in the future. In its preferential 
agreements with developing countries such as the other ACP states 
procurement is envisaged for a later stage.9  
4. Enhancing access to procurement markets  
4.1 De jure and de facto barriers to access  
The de jure preferences take the form of, for example, ‘buy national’ 
policies, which grant national suppliers a price preference as in the case 
of the US since the 1930s, in the case of the utilities Directive in the EU 
and in many other countries today. There are also de jure preferences 
for small- and medium-sized companies, used by developed as well as 
developing countries, such as US set-asides for its small and minority 
businesses. There is also a trend towards the use of public contracts to 
promote other policy objectives, such as through the use of ‘green’ 
procurement’ that can constitute a potential barrier to access. Such de 
jure preferences can be targeted by national treatment commitments, 
such as in the GPA or a bilateral agreement such as the TTIP.  
But experience suggests that the main barriers to public 
procurement markets are less obvious, de facto discrimination that 
exists as a result of the discretion available to contracting authorities or 
costs and other disincentives to bid. Such discretion is built into even 
                                                          
9 Woolcock (2013). 
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the most extensive rules as a result of the flexibility necessary to 
accommodate the diverse nature of public procurement. Cost effective 
means of addressing such de facto discrimination are not easy to 
develop, although the OECD has developed a set of Principles for 
Integrity in Public Procurement that begin to address some of the de 
facto barriers.10 Requiring transparency is one approach, as is the 
specification of objective criteria for contract awards, the use of 
standard documentation and award procedures. The OECD Principles 
also include recommendations to ensure a proper cost-benefit analysis 
of the use of procurement in the pursuit of other policy objectives, 
better planning across the whole procurement cycle, promotion of 
procurement as a profession and tighter control of exceptional cases. 
Experience, including that with the EU internal market, suggests that 
much more than commitments to national treatment is required if there 
is to be increased competition. It may indeed, only come as a result of a 
paradigm shift in national policies towards acceptance of open, 
competitive markets and away from explicit or implicit policies of 
support for national champions and then usually as a result of indirect 
supply or exports, in other words via local affiliates.  
4.2 De jure barriers to access  
As described above, the EU and the US have exchanged extensive 
commitments under the GPA that provide substantial market 
opportunities in their respective government procurement markets. 
However, there are significant barriers to access in public procurement 
in both the EU and the US, and a tendency for such measures to grow, 
especially in the US, with the ‘Buy American’ provision in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) as a prominent 
example. The barriers are summarised in the following tables.  
Table 10.5 Restrictions on market access in the US 
Procurement 
Restriction 
Description Treatment in Trade 
Agreements 
American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 (ARRA) 
Required US-
produced iron, steel 
and manufactured 
goods to be used in 
ARRA-funded 
projects 
Did not apply to 
projects covered by 
trade agreements 
                                                          
10 OECD (2009). 
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Berry Amendment Requires DoD to 
purchase US-
produced food and 
clothing, fabrics, 
specialty metals, 
stainless-steel flatware 
and hand- measuring 
tools. 
Covered goods are 
excluded from trade 
agreements 
Buy American Act of 
1933 
Requires federal 
agencies to purchase 
US goods unless a 
waiver applies 
Waived for goods 
covered under trade 
agreements 
Buy American Act Requires use of US-
produced iron, steel 
and manufactured 
products (with 100% 
domestic content) in 
highway, transit, 
railway and airport 
projects funded by 
DoT, unless a waiver 
applies. 
Restriction is excluded 
from trade agreements 
Small Business Act of 
1953 
Requires federal 
government to award 
a portion of federal 
procurement to US 
small and minority 
businesses 
Set-asides for small 
and minority 
businesses are 
excluded from trade 
agreements 
US-flag vessels 
requirements 
Items procured by the 
military must be 
shipped in US-flagged 
vessels 
Procurement of 
transportation services 
are excluded from 
trade agreements  
Sub-central 
procurement not 
covered by trade 
agreements  
Use of domestic 
content requirements 
and insufficient 
transparency 
Not covered by trade 
agreements 
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Table 10.6 Barriers to market access in the EU 
Cross-cutting NTM Sectors where it 
applies 
Other observations 
Favouritism of EU firms Construction  
Diverse national and 
local practices 
All sectors  
Unavailability of 
procurement statistics 
(regarding foreign 
bidders) 
All sectors This NTM is 
decreasing in 
importance. 
Local (domestic) content 
requirements in the bid 
(at least 50% European)  
Water (production, 
transport, and 
distribution of 
drinking water), 
energy (gas and heat), 
urban transport 
(urban, railway, 
automated systems, 
tramway, bus, trolley 
bus, and cable), and 
postal services 
 
Excessive delays in 
finalising the contract 
and beginning of work 
Infrastructure projects  
High level of 
bureaucracy and 
corruption 
Public works  
Onerous qualification 
requirements 
Government 
procurement 
 
Use of offsets in defence 
procurement 
Defence  
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
5. Potential Expansion of Procurement under TTIP  
5.1 Procurement objectives of the EU and US in TTIP 
In the February 2013 final report of the United States-European Union 
High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG), the EU and 
US shared the goal to substantially improve access on the basis of 
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national treatment.11 Subsequently, each side has elaborated on their 
objectives for the TTIP. In March 2013, the US notified the Congress of 
its intention to launch negotiations of TTIP and its objectives.12 It 
subsequently pointed to its interests in expanded access to 
procurement in construction, engineering and medical devices.13 In 
July 2013, the European Commission published initial TTIP Position 
Papers, including one on public procurement.14 See Table 10.7 for a 
comparison of the EU and US objectives in the negotiations.  
Table 10.7 EU and US procurement objectives in the TTIP 
Joint HLWG 
objectives  
Enhance business 
opportunities 
through 
substantially 
improved access 
to government 
procurement 
contracts at all 
levels of 
government on 
the basis of 
national 
treatment  
EU objectives  
Central government entities  
- Use negative list 
- Coverage of US federal 
government entities not 
covered under GPA  
- Access to procurement 
subject to specific policies, 
such as those related to small 
businesses (small business 
set-asides)  
Sub-central entities 
- Coverage of the 13 states not 
covered by the GPA; removal 
of restrictions maintained by 
the 37 states covered under 
the GPA 
- Coverage of municipalities, 
airports, ports, transit 
authorities and railway 
authorities 
US objectives  
Expand market 
access opportuni-
ties for US goods, 
services and 
suppliers to 
procurement 
markets of the EU 
and its MSs  
Ensure that US 
suppliers are 
treated as 
favourably as 
domestic and 
other foreign 
goods, services, 
and suppliers in 
the EU and 
member states  
Ensure  procure-
ment is conducted 
in a fair, transpar-
ent & predictable 
manner  
                                                          
11 See USTR (2013). 
12 See letter from Acting USTR Demetrios Marantis to Speaker of the US House 
of Representatives John Boehner, dated 20 March 2013 (Marantis, 2013). 
13 See USTR (2014). 
14 European Commission (2013). 
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- Coverage of sub-central 
government entities 
“operating at the local, 
regional or municipal level, as 
well as any other entities 
whose procurement policies 
are substantially controlled 
by, dependent on, or 
influenced by sub-central, 
regional or local government 
and which are engaged in 
non-commercial or non-
industrial activities”  
Other entities: coverage of “all 
entities governed by public 
law, state-owned companies 
and similar operating in 
particular in the field of 
utilities” (special interest in 
transit/railways, urban 
railways and urban transport)  
Services: Coverage of all 
services, with specific interest 
in Information society 
services, particularly cloud-
based services  
Buy American restrictions 
- Removal of existing 
domestic content 
requirements on mass-transit 
and highway projects  
- Commitment to not impose 
any new Buy American 
requirements on federal funds 
given to states or other sub-
central government entities, 
such as were imposed by the 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA)  
Expand 
opportunities to 
bid on 
government 
contracts in areas 
that include 
construction, 
engineering and 
medical devices 
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Procedural disciplines: GPA-
plus disciplines, including 
access to procurement 
information, technical 
specifications, award criteria, 
qualification procedures, 
domestic challenge 
mechanisms 
Sources: Grier (2014a); USTR (2013 and 2014); European Commission (2013) and 
Marantis (2013). 
 In addition to its stated objectives, the US may be expected to 
seek access to the procurement that the EU covers under the revised 
GPA, but to which it does not provide access to the US. That includes 
the procurement of services by the EU’s sub-central government 
entities, procurement by EU utilities, access to EU works concessions 
and procurement of more than 200 central government entities of 
member states.  
Expanding procurement under the TTIP will be difficult since 
most of the easily covered procurement has already been offered. 
Moreover, the EU and the US have engaged in extensive negotiations 
over many of the remaining issues, most recently in the revision of the 
GPA. Nonetheless, there are some areas in which the two parties 
should be able to build on their existing commitments (see Table 10.3). 
The potential areas are explored in this section, along with the 
constraints.  
5.2 Comprehensive central government coverage 
In the TTIP, the EU and the US should exchange comprehensive 
coverage of central government entities, providing one another with 
the best coverage of central government entities that they offer any 
trading partner. This could be accomplished with the EU proposal to 
base TTIP coverage of central government coverage in the TTIP on a 
negative list. For the EU that would mean providing the US with the 
same comprehensive coverage of the central government entities of its 
member states that it provides to favoured parties under the revised 
GPA (see section 3.3). Comprehensive coverage could also extend 
beyond the three EU-wide entities that the EU covers under the GPA.15 
                                                          
15 Grier (2014f). 
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The US may not be able to mirror the EU approach by offering 
coverage of all federal entities since there is no comprehensive list of 
federal agencies and, without such a list, the US could not ensure full 
compliance. Nonetheless, the US should be able to offer comprehensive 
coverage of all federal entities subject to the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR). The FAR is the primary federal regulation that 
applies to the procurement of most federal agencies and is intended to 
provide “uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all 
executive agencies”.16 Basing US coverage on the entities subject to the 
FAR should address US uncertainty of ascertaining all the entities that 
would be captured by an overly broad category, while fulfilling the EU 
request for comprehensive coverage. If there are certain agencies that 
are subject to the FAR that the US is not able to cover for security or 
other reasons, they could be put on the negative list and excluded from 
the TTIP. It may be noted that the Federal Aviation Administration is 
not subject to the FAR, even though most of its regulations are 
consistent with the FAR.  
The US approach should be acceptable to the EU as it is similar 
to central government coverage used by Japan and Armenia in the 
GPA. Both provide comprehensive coverage of all entities subject to a 
specified law. In Japan’s case, it is covered by the Accounts Law and for 
Armenia, it is the Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia.  
If the TTIP is to set a new standard for procurement obligations, 
one step that would contribute to that goal is for the EU and the US to 
exchange comprehensive coverage of central/federal entities and to 
offer one another their best coverage.  
5.3 Constraints on broader sub-central entity coverage  
Less promising for expansion of commitments is sub-central coverage. 
The EU has placed a high priority on coverage of the 13 states not 
covered by the GPA and access to more procurement of the states 
covered by the GPA. But it will likely be very difficult for the US to 
meet fully – or perhaps even partially – the expectations of the EU for 
several reasons.17  
                                                          
16 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 1.101 
(http://www.acquisition.gov/far/loadmainre.html). 
17 Grier (2013d). 
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The first hurdle is the process for covering state procurement 
under trade agreements. As a consequence of the US federal system of 
government, the Administration only covers procurement of sub-
central governments, including states and cities, with that 
government’s authorisation.18 In negotiations of prior agreements, the 
US Trade Representative has requested such authorisation from the 
state governors (or city mayors), on a state-by-state (or city-by-city) 
basis. Where a state has authorised coverage of its procurement, it has 
been allowed to limit its covered procurement to specific agencies and 
to exclude procurement of sensitive goods or services, such as those 
subject to domestic preferences.  
A second hurdle is declining state interest in covering 
procurement under FTAs. The US covers state procurement under the 
GPA and eight FTAs, with the number of states covered varying by 
agreement. It lists 37 states under the GPA, and it covered those same 
states in the first two FTAs to cover state procurement – the US-Chile 
FTA19 and the US-Singapore FTA,20 without seeking additional 
authorisation from the states. However, in the subsequently negotiated 
FTAs, states were covered only with their authorization, and state 
participation declined. Thirty-one states were covered under the 2005 
US-Australia FTA,21 but the number dropped to 23 states in the 2006 
US-Morocco FTA22 and to 22 states (plus Puerto Rico) in the US-Central 
American-Dominican Republic FTA.23  
In the latest FTAs – with Peru, Colombia and Panama, the US 
applied a reciprocity policy, which was aimed at encouraging state 
participation and avoiding the so-called ‘free-rider’ problem.24 Under 
                                                          
18 USTR (2011). 
19 US-Chile FTA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of the United States. 
20 US-Singapore FTA, Annex 13A, Schedule 1, For the United States, Section B. 
21 US-Australia FTA, Annex 15-A, Section B, Schedule of the United States. 
22 US-Morocco FTA, Annex 9-A-2, Schedule of the United States. 
23 US-DR-CAFTA, Annex 9.1.2(b)(i), Section B, Schedule of the United States, 
List A. The United States provides Honduras with access to only 16 states plus 
Puerto Rico. CAFTA, Annex 9.1.2(b)(i), Section B, Schedule of the United States, 
List A. 
24 The ‘free rider’ situation arises where states that do not authorise coverage of 
their procurement in an FTA nonetheless gain the same access to the 
procurement covered under an FTA as the states that agreed to cover their 
procurement under the FTA.  
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that policy, the FTA gave rights to a state’s suppliers to participate in 
the FTA partner’s sub-central procurement only if that state authorised 
its procurement to be covered under the FTA.25 Unfortunately, the use 
of the reciprocity policy did not accomplish its aim, as only eight states 
and Puerto Rico agreed to bring their procurement under those FTAs.26 
(Subsequently, two more states were added to the FTA with Peru.27)  
Another hurdle exists in states that have enacted legislation 
transferring the authority to cover a state’s procurement in a trade 
agreement from the governor to the legislature. Beginning in 2005, 
several states, including Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota and Rhode 
Island, have enacted such legislation. Seeking the authorisation of 
states with this legislation is likely to result in a longer and more 
complicated process, and one that may be more politicised.  
A fourth obstacle is the lack of a mechanism that would bring 
states together to develop a unified approach to covering state 
procurement under agreements, and perhaps lay a foundation for more 
comprehensive coverage.28 Canada has such a mechanism under its 
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), an intergovernmental agreement 
among its federal government, provinces and territories. The AIT’s 
chapter on procurement establishes a framework to ensure that all 
Canadian suppliers have equal access to the country’s procurement 
above certain thresholds, and that such procurement is conducted in an 
open and transparent manner. The AIT even extends to Canada’s so-
called ‘MASH sector’, which includes all municipalities, municipal 
organisations, school boards and publicly funded academic, health and 
social service entities.  
As a consequence of the AIT, Canada has been able to 
expeditiously develop negotiating positions on opening procurement 
by its provinces and territories. This was evident in two recent 
negotiations. First, in the negotiations of the US-Canada Agreement on 
Government Procurement in 2010, Canada was able to move quickly – 
in only six months – to reverse its long-standing refusal to open the 
procurement of its provinces to foreign firms. With the agreement of its 
                                                          
25 See for example, Peru TPA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of Peru, Notes 7 
and 8 to the Schedule of Peru and Notes 1 and 2 and Schedule of the United 
States. 
26 Colombia TPA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of the United States; Panama 
TPA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of the United States. 
27 US-Peru TPA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of the United States.  
28 Grier (2014c). 
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provinces, Canada offered permanent access to its provincial 
procurement, and to bind that coverage under the GPA, as well as 
temporary access to additional provincial and municipal construction 
projects. Canada undertook those commitments in exchange for access 
to the US states covered under the GPA and – most important – US 
agreement to not apply the Buy American requirement in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) to Canadian iron, steel 
and manufactured goods in a number of ARRA-funded programmes. 
More recently, in 2013, Canada was able to mobilise its provinces and 
MASH sector to open the procurement of both provincial utilities and 
the MASH sector under an agreement with the EU.29  
The US does not have any similar means for developing common 
negotiating positions with its states. The US should consider setting up 
a forum for state consultations on covering procurement under 
international agreements. Such a mechanism could build on the US 
advisory committee system that the US Congress established 40 years 
ago to ensure that US trade policy and trade negotiation objectives 
adequately reflect US economic and commercial interests. That system 
includes an Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), 
composed of state and local representatives from the three branches of 
government (executive, legislative and judicial), to provide advice on 
the impact of trade issues on state and local governments. While that 
Committee serves an important role, it is not sufficient for the type of 
consultations needed with respect to covering state procurement under 
trade agreements. Its broad membership includes only a few 
representatives from state governments.30 A broader procurement 
consultation mechanism could be used for both the education of states 
on the consequences and benefits of coverage, and development of US 
positions. It would not be a panacea but it could facilitate discussions 
with the states.  
But, whether or not the US develops a new consultative 
approach to the states, greater state participation in the TTIP will be 
possible only if states are convinced that there are substantial benefits 
in a commitment to open procurement to foreign suppliers and to 
refrain from adopting new measures that would favour local suppliers. 
From a state’s perspective, it does not need a trade agreement in order 
to accept bids from foreign suppliers. For potential suppliers from the 
                                                          
29 Grier (2014m). 
30 Grier (2014j). 
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EU however, the diversity of purchasing practices does not enhance 
transparency and could well discourage them from bidding.  
A potentially more fruitful area of expansion of US sub-central 
procurement commitments is cities. The 1995 Exchange of Letters may 
be a model for coverage of more cities because it only imposes a 
national treatment obligation and does not impose any other 
procedural obligations. This approach could focus on cities of a certain 
size or cities of particular interest to EU suppliers.  
5.4 Coverage of utilities and government enterprises  
Of the three categories of entity coverage, the EU and the US have 
exchanged the narrowest coverage with regard to ‘other entities’, 
namely utilities and government enterprises. As described above, the 
EU has broad coverage of utilities under the EU’s regime and in the 
GPA, but limits US access to just its electric utilities. This limited access 
reflects the EU aim of offering only reciprocal access to US suppliers 
given that US coverage extends only to its federal electric utilities and 
a handful of other entities. For example, it covers a few airports, most 
prominent of which are those under the jurisdiction of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) (La Guardia, JFK 
and Newark) and three port authorities (PANYNJ, Port of Baltimore 
and the Port Authority of Massachusetts), as well as a scattering of 
transit entities under covered states.  
With regard to other entities, the EU is particularly interested in 
coverage of transit and railway authorities, urban railways and urban 
transport entities. Unless they are transit agencies covered under states, 
their participation would have to be solicited. More importantly, even 
if authorised, their coverage would be limited as long as they are 
subject to Buy American requirements that apply to railway and transit 
projects funded by the federal government.31 See section 5.5.  
One of the possible approaches to expanding procurement 
obligations by utilities and government enterprises may be to limit the 
commitments to national treatment, and not require GPA-type 
procedures, as in the 1995 Exchange of Letters. The primary benefit of 
such an approach for the entities would be that they would not have to 
alter their procurement procedures. The requirement to adopt GPA-
type procedures, in particular, the time periods for tendering, may 
serve as a deterrent to participation by such entities. For the EU, the 
                                                          
31 Grier (2014k). 
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benefit would be access to the procurement of the entities. The fact that 
procedures do not conform to GPA rules would be less of an 
impediment for the kind of large companies that would supply railway 
or public transport equipment. The EU’s identification of those entities 
of greatest interest should facilitate US engagement with a workable 
number of entities.  
5.5 Buy American requirements attached to federal 
funding to states  
A major aim of the EU in the TTIP negotiations is to remove the 
application of domestic content requirements that apply to state and 
local projects, especially transit projects, undertaken with federal 
funds. Those requirements, which are often referred to as Buy 
American32 requirements, apply to iron and steel, as well as to 
manufactured products, used in non-federal infrastructure projects. 
European firms want to be able to participate in these projects without 
having to meet the Buy American requirements. The US has never 
waived these domestic content requirements in any agreement. 
Instead, it has consistently excluded them from its GPA and FTA 
obligations.33 There would be strong opposition to any alteration of the 
US position on this issue from the iron and steel industry and their 
supporters in the Congress.  
The US may be more amenable to a second EU aim – to obtain a 
US commitment that it will not impose any new Buy American 
requirement on EU suppliers when the federal government provides 
new funds to states and other sub-federal entities. In essence, the EU is 
seeking to avoid a repeat of the Buy American requirements in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). Even 
though the ARRA Buy American requirement did not apply to 
procurement covered by international agreements, its effect was wide-
reaching as it disrupted EU and other country’s participation in 
projects, such as water projects, not covered by agreements.  
                                                          
32 The term “Buy America” is often used to refer to domestic content 
requirements in US federal government funding of state and local projects. This 
is in contrast to the term “Buy American,” which generally refers to the Buy 
American Act that applies to US federal government procurement of goods. In 
this chapter, Buy American is used to refer to both situations.   
33 Grier (2014h). 
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A commitment to not impose any new Buy American 
requirements in legislation authorising funding to states and other sub-
federal entities may be more than the US Congress could accept. 
However, such a commitment that was limited to EU goods, services 
and suppliers may be acceptable. As such a measure would constitute 
a significant US concession, the EU could be expected to reciprocate 
with an equally difficult concession in procurement, or some other 
element of the TTIP negotiations.34  
5.6 Services coverage  
The coverage of services provides another opportunity for the EU and 
US to expand their commitments. The US bases its coverage of services 
in the GPA and its FTAs on the use of a negative list. The EU has to date 
used a positive list. To align their commitments to the extent possible, 
they should consider basing their services coverage on a negative list.35 
That would provide an important foundation for them to seek similar 
services coverage in the next round of GPA negotiations.  
Use of a negative list ensures more comprehensive coverage than 
a positive list, because it means that when new services, such as cloud 
computing, become available, they are automatically covered. By 
contrast, when a positive list is used, a new service is covered only if it 
fits within a category that is already covered. Since it is not always easy 
to fit a new service into existing categories, the issue of coverage of a 
new service can be subject to disputes.  
In addition, the EU and the US should seek as comparable 
coverage of service categories as possible. One area that warrants close 
consideration is telecommunications. Until the revision of the GPA, the 
EU did not cover all telecommunications services. In the revision, the 
EU offers all such services, but conditions access on reciprocal 
coverage. The US continued its limited offering of telecommunications 
services, opening only enhanced or value-added services. The 
description of its covered telecommunications services has not changed 
since the GPA entered into force in 1996. Yet, there have been 
significant advances in telecommunications in the intervening two 
decades. Thus, the US should re-examine its coverage of such services 
with the aim of updating and broadening its coverage. It could exclude 
specific services as needed for national security or other purposes.  
                                                          
34 Grier (2014l). 
35 Grier (2014k). 
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5.7 Exchange coverage of build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
contracts and works concessions 
The EU and the US should also expand their commitments with respect 
to construction services. Currently, they open all construction services 
to one another, with two exceptions. The US excludes dredging and the 
EU does not extend its coverage of works concessions to the US. The 
latter would appear to be an area in which they could exchange 
commitments. While the US does not cover works concessions under 
the GPA, it covers build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts and public 
works concessions under its FTAs, including in the US-Korea FTA 
(KORUS FTA). In its FTA with the EU, Korea provides that same BOT 
coverage. Since the EU has treated Korean coverage of BOT contracts 
as reciprocal to its coverage of public works concessions in both the 
GPA and their bilateral agreement, it should be able to accept US 
coverage of BOT contracts in the TTIP.36  
6. Impact of broader procurement coverage  
As discussed in the previous section, the prospects for government 
procurement in the TTIP are for relatively modest, incremental 
expansions of procurement commitments, but not a wholesale change 
in the EU-US procurement relationship or resolution of all the 
outstanding issues. While the sub-central level is of particular interest 
to the EU, it is also the most difficult for the US, as described above.  
A challenge of the TTIP procurement negotiations is the fact that 
the United States has opened most of the procurement that is within the 
authority of the Administration. Many of the EU’s requests are beyond 
the authority of the Administration, however, and would require 
changes in US laws or commitments by sub-central entities to bring 
their procurement in line with the discipline of the TTIP. For the US to 
undertake such a heavy burden, the EU would need to provide a strong 
incentive either in the procurement sector – or perhaps in other areas 
of the TTIP where the US is making demands on the EU.  
While the EU imposes significant limitations on US rights to EU-
covered procurement, those legal restrictions do not necessarily dictate 
what is happening on the ground. They do not prohibit EU entities 
from procuring US goods and services in the restricted areas, such as 
services purchased by EU sub-central entities. Even where purchasing 
entities retain the right to discriminate against foreign suppliers, this 
                                                          
36 Grier (2014e). 
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does not mean that they do so. Purchasing entities are also interested 
in obtaining the best value for money and often find that this aim can 
best be achieved by purchasing from abroad. As a consequence, it 
would appear that US suppliers are relatively satisfied with their 
current access to EU procurement markets, notwithstanding their lack 
of legal rights.  
Moreover, market access can also be achieved in the absence of 
any legal commitments to not discriminate against foreign suppliers. 
As noted above, access is very often indirect via affiliates established in 
the target market. EUROPEBUSINESS, a leading EU business 
organisation, has acknowledged that EU businesses have access to 
more procurement than is covered by agreements.37  
The projections offered by the impact studies of welfare gains 
from the TTIP provisions on procurement are relatively small 
compared to the potential gains from measures addressing regulatory 
and technical barriers to trade. The estimates put welfare gains at €10.8 
billion per year (in the long run) from the reduction of barriers in the 
field of public procurement. The benefits derived from economic 
changes are expected to be higher for the EU at €9.7 billion per year and 
the US €0.9 billion (Ecorys, 2009).  
Trade flows are projected to grow slightly in procurement on 
both sides, but in percentage terms more growth will occur in the US. 
This is not unexpected; as discussed above, the nature of the 
procurement markets on both sides of the Atlantic is such that indirect 
supply is more the norm. The long-term household impact and wage-
level effects range between 0.0% and 0.01% for the US and between 
0.03% and 0.07% for the EU. With regard to the impact on the sectoral 
level, the motor vehicles, chemicals and food and beverages sectors in 
the EU are projected to benefit the most in percentage terms. In the US, 
electronics, metal production and machinery would gain the most (in 
line with the general results). In particular, construction is also expected 
to benefit in both the EU and US. These projections need to be treated 
with caution, however, as they may not have picked up some potential 
gains. Competition in procurement markets depends on potential 
suppliers bidding for contracts. When there are entrenched de facto 
preferences for local suppliers, this does not happen. International 
commitments such as an ambitious agreement on procurement in TTIP 
could provide potential suppliers with the confidence they need to bid 
for contracts they otherwise would not have. Nevertheless, in the field 
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of procurement, we have a classic example of the political economy of 
liberalisation in which the benefits of liberalisation are widely diffused 
through society but the costs in terms of increased foreign competition 
are heavily concentrated.  
7. Impact of TTIP procurement provisions on third 
parties and the trading system  
A second core aim of TTIP is to shape broad international trade rules. 
As in other policy areas, the US and the EU have been doing this for 
decades through the GPA (and its predecessor) as well as the OECD, 
including the work on integrity in public procurement discussed above. 
The comprehensive preferential trade agreements negotiated by the US 
and the EU have effectively exported the GPA framework of rules to 
many other countries. These norms have also shaped other more 
voluntary approaches such as the UNCITRAL Model Procurement 
Law. So in terms of the framework of rules governing the procurement 
process, such as transparency and due process, the US and the EU have 
effectively shaped the international rules. By pressing ahead with 
efforts to effectively apply best practice in public procurement at all 
levels of government, such as those set out in the OECD principles, 
bilateral efforts promoted through TTIP would then offer a means for 
the EU and the US to address de facto barriers to competition in public 
procurement and reduce corruption in procurement. Whilst estimates 
of corruption are inevitably very approximate, surveys by the World 
Economic Forum have shown that bribes are more prevalent in 
procurement than any other activity. It has been estimated that as much 
as 20-25% of the value of public contracts could be lost due to corrupt 
practices (OECD, 2013).  
TTIP procurement commitments would not have a direct impact 
on multilateralism because there is no multilateral agreement that 
covers government procurement. Where there are government 
procurement agreements, commitments are made on a reciprocal basis. 
In so far as TTIP succeeds in extending liberalisation commitments, 
there could be some trade-diversion effects on third countries. These 
are likely to be incremental given the extended commitments under the 
revised GPA.  
Extending transparency provisions, such as to more US states, 
and ensuring better implementation of existing transparency 
requirements by EU member states or applying best practice in 
procurement could well benefit third-country suppliers that participate 
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in such procurement. Although third-country suppliers may not 
benefit from national treatment provisions, they would, for example, 
have the benefit of bidding for a contract from a US- or EU-based 
affiliate. In this sense there could well be positive externalities from 
TTIP provisions on procurement.  
In terms of shaping international rules in the field of 
procurement, the EU and the US have effectively done so through their 
contributions to the development of the GPA and through the 
promotion of those agreed GPA rules in their respective FTAs. 
However, the TTIP could contribute to the international procurement 
arena by setting a new standard for procurement agreements. If the 
terms of the TTIP go beyond current procurement agreements, in 
particular, the GPA, it would likely provide the basis for the inclusion 
of its liberalisation of procurement in other agreements. If the US 
expands its sub-central coverage in the TTIP from its GPA coverage, it 
would set a baseline for future FTA and GPA negotiations. If the TTIP 
includes procurement rules that go beyond the revised GPA, they could 
provide the basis for incorporation in a subsequent revision of the GPA. 
Also, such new rules would likely be incorporated in any new FTAs 
that the EU and the US negotiate.  
8. A living agreement  
A Bilateral Procurement Forum, which the EU and the US established 
at the conclusion of the negotiations on the GPA revision, could 
provide the foundation for on-going dialogue, cooperation and 
collaboration on outstanding procurement issues. In December 2011, 
the EU and the US set up the Forum to continue work on procurement 
issues that were not resolved during the GPA negotiations. The Forum 
sets out three tracks: a dialogue on regulatory procurement issues, a 
dialogue on international procurement issues and exploration of 
possible expansion of their procurement commitments on a reciprocal 
basis.  
The Forum’s regulatory element provides an opportunity for an 
enhanced understanding of the respective procurement systems. It 
could also be used to address specific issues raised by either party’s 
private sector with regard to their respective procurement markets. In 
this respect, bilateral efforts could support and draw on work carried 
out in the OECD. The OECD has developed a number of principles for 
integrity in public procurement, which could contribute to addressing 
de facto barriers to competitive procurement markets. The OECD 
principles include, for example, the provision of adequate transparency 
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throughout the entire procurement cycle, so covering how contracts are 
managed as well as calls for tenders and contract award procedures. 
They also call for greater professionalism in procurement, proper 
auditing and the empowerment of civil society, the media and wider 
public opinion to scrutinise procurement (OECD, 2009).  
Bilateral efforts could also promote common approaches to new 
challenges. For example, the increased tendency of governments to use 
public procurement as an instrument of environmental or other 
policies, such as promoting small- and medium-sized companies, could 
result in new distortions to competition if not adequately addressed. 
The increased use of public-private-partnerships (PPPs) could also pose 
a challenge and is another area where the development of agreed 
norms or codes could help to avoid the creation of new restrictions. The 
use of TTIP to promote compatibility between procurement systems 
such as in the use of e-procurement could enhance supplier 
confidence.38 The furtherance of such principles by the EU and the US 
could then set a standard for wider international practice.  
Under the international leg of the Forum, the EU and the US 
could also explore and coordinate positions on a variety of 
international procurement issues, such as China’s accession to the GPA. 
Cooperation on preparing requests for improvements in China’s offers 
(and for Russia when it begins its GPA accession in 2016) would 
strengthen their leverage. They could also develop a coordinated 
approach to encourage other countries, such as the other BRICS (Brazil, 
India and South Africa) to join the GPA.  
The Forum’s third part – exploration of expansion of 
procurement commitments – could be used to add new entities after 
the Agreement is concluded. The US has used this approach for states 
in several FTAs, in which it has a continuing obligation to add states 
after the FTA enters into force. For example, the US added five states to 
the US-Australia FTA after it entered into force and two states to its 
FTA with Peru after it was implemented.  
9. Conclusion 
Public procurement poses challenges when it comes to ‘liberalisation’. 
Most of the low-hanging fruit has been picked, so that further progress 
will not be easy. As outlined above, there are several areas in which the 
US and EU could make, at least, modest expansions in their respective 
                                                          
38 See OECD (2013). 
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procurement commitments and seek to accord one another with the 
best treatment that they provide under trade agreements.  
But if the US and EU are unable in the TTIP negotiations to reach 
a level of commitments that sets a higher standard for international 
commitments, there would appear to be two broad options. The first 
option would be to continue to negotiate on procurement as part of a 
living agreement. Here reciprocal concessions would be within the 
procurement sector. As this chapter has illustrated, however, this is 
unlikely to be done quickly given the work required at the domestic 
level, such as to get US states or cities to authorise coverage. The second 
option would be to make further progress on liberalisation of 
procurement markets by linking with other policy areas under 
negotiation in the TTIP. If the TTIP aim of contributing to welfare gains 
and economic growth are to be achieved, this would be the option to 
follow.  
In terms of the TTIP’s second broad objective of shaping the rules 
for international trade, the US and the EU have effectively done this 
through the plurilateral GPA and the extension of GPA rules to other 
countries through their bilateral FTAs. At issue in the procurement 
field is less setting the rules that would be applied in national 
procurement laws, which has arguably already been achieved, but 
more promoting best practices in procurement by fully applying 
principles such as those developed by the OECD throughout all public 
procurement in the US and EU. 
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11. TTIP: THE SERVICES DIMENSION 
PATRICK MESSERLIN 
1. Introduction 
The negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) are far from being the first attempt to establish a 
‘Transatlantic Market Place’. Indeed, the acronym ‘NAFTA’ was forged 
in the 1960s to designate the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement 
among the US, Canada, the UK and the then European Community. 
This distant ancestor raises two interesting questions about the nature 
of TTIP.  
 First, since their origin, the US-EU trade negotiations have had a 
geo-political dimension: the desire to shape world rules and 
governance, sometimes as a means of challenging other super-
powers (the 1960s NAFTA initiative targeted the Soviet Union). 
Is this dimension still present when TTIP negotiators talk about 
“norms-setting” – a key question in the case of services, which 
are regulations (norms)-intense.  
 Second, TTIP is the last ‘mega-preferential trade agreement’ 
(mega-PTA) to be launched by the world’s largest economies – 
after the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement between China Mainland 
and Taiwan, the China-Japan-Korea, the Regional Cooperative 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) in East Asia, the Japan-EU Free 
Trade Agreement. Why is TTIP the latest of these mega-PTAs, 
and not the first? 
The TTIP ‘negotiations’ got off to a bad start. They were launched 
amid an explosive cocktail of unspecified ‘grand’ ambitions, excessive 
secrecy, unclear concepts (harmonisation, mutual recognition, careless 
mention of equivalence) and totally unrealistic deadlines. All this at a 
time when governments on both sides of the Atlantic are trying to play 
down just how hard it is to mobilise the necessary coalitions for such 
an endeavour – a problem not specific to trade issues, but one that 
prevails in many domains. Add a generous dose of spying among close 
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friends and geopolitical turbulence in the wider world, and the cocktail 
was ready to create huge anxiety, fear and fury among EU and US 
public opinion, troubled by so much bad news since 2008. Both old and 
new opponents to the domestic reforms that TTIP was supposed to 
buttress have been very easy to mobilise.  
All these mistakes are particularly costly in the area of services 
which, as argued below, should be run by ‘talks’ (rather than 
negotiations), well-defined (rather than unspecified) ambitions, trust 
(rather than secrecy) and realistic (not unrealistic) deadlines spread 
over time. The problem is that the economic significance of TTIP 
critically depends on services, which represent 73-79% of GDP on both 
sides of the Atlantic; 35% of EU exports to the US and 43% of US exports 
to the EU. Last but not least, the US accounts for 34% of the foreign 
direct investment stocks held by the EU in the rest of the world, and 
44% of the foreign direct investment stocks held by the rest of the world 
in the EU. 
The early months of 2015 have seen two serious attempts to 
correct these initial mistakes. First came the transparency initiative of 
the Commission (January 2015), which posted papers on its website to 
better explain the situation to stakeholders (see section 2). The second 
initiative (March 2015) is a paper on regulatory coherence and 
cooperation released by the US Chamber of Commerce – tackling the 
most crucial aspects of how to deal with services in the context of 
modern economies (see section 3). 
The thrust of this chapter is as follows. The services dimension 
of TTIP will bring substantial welfare gains only if the two sides are 
convinced that, first, they need to undertake domestic reforms to 
improve the performance of their services sectors and, second, that 
TTIP is an essential instrument to buttress and boost these domestic 
reforms. In turn, such a use of TTIP requires a fundamental overhaul of 
the way ‘talks’ – not negotiations, as explained below – in services will 
be held.1 Without such innovations, TTIP will only deliver welfare 
gains ‘at the margins’ of the services sectors, hence undermining its 
capacity to attract the strong political support it requires to be 
concluded successfully.  
                                                          
1 The need for such innovations justifies abandoning the term ‘negotiations’ in 
services. This chapter uses the term ‘talks’ for reasons outlined in section 3. This 
point was also stressed by P. Lamy in his speech for the Third Jan Tumlir 
Lecture at ECIPE (9 March 2015). 
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The two last years have shown that it would be unwise to assume 
that such strong political support already exists. In fact, since mid-2014, 
TTIP has faced wide-ranging and vociferous opposition, including in 
EU member states that are traditionally free-trade supporters, such as 
Germany. In addition, services have considerable potential to be 
sources of toxic transatlantic disputes – be they old (audiovisual) or 
new (data protection); each of them capable of fuelling, at any time, 
emotional charges among public opinion of both sides of the Atlantic. 
The chapter is organised in five sections. Section 2 looks at the 
broad political economy background, particularly at the strength of 
domestic political support as predicted by economic analysis. Section 3 
examines market access issues in services, and the desirability of TTIP 
as an instrument to ‘deepen’ both the EU and US ‘internal markets’ in 
services. Section 4 turns to what ‘talks’ on services regulations means, 
arguing that the success of TTIP is highly dependent on its capacity to 
deal successfully with this set of issues. Section 5 briefly examines the 
relations between the TTIP countries and the rest of the world in the 
services area. Finally, a section concludes on the interactions between 
the TTIP and Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) discussions. 
2. Political economy background 
TTIP discussions in services are particularly sensitive to two key 
political economy issues. The first one has an international dimension: 
is TTIP a genuinely free-trade agreement or is it the eastern flank of the 
China-containing strategy that (at least some in) the US would like to 
see – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)? This question is particularly 
important since China is now realising the importance of services to a 
fully developed economy, hence will be increasingly ready to play an 
active role in the plurilateral discussions on TiSA in Geneva. The 
second political economy issue is the magnitude of the domestic 
political forces behind TTIP: what can economic analysis reveal about 
the strength and weakness of domestic political support for TTIP? 
2.1 TTIP: A genuinely free-trade agreement? 
The geopolitical background is particularly important for talks on 
services that focus on regulations, and hence require a huge amount of 
trust among partners. It is reasonable to posit that the necessary level 
of trust can only be achieved and sustained if both partners share a 
relatively similar geopolitical approach.  
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The presence of geopolitics in the EU and US PTAs is not new. 
But little attention was paid to it as long as the WTO negotiating forum 
was functioning well. Only a few EU and US PTAs were mostly driven 
by economic considerations: for instance, Canada and Mexico in 
NAFTA; the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (KOREU); and the 
Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). These PTAs have two 
specific features. First, their economic impact on the EU and US 
economies is limited because their partners are (relatively) small 
economies. Second, the EU and US partners (particularly Mexico and 
Korea) have been deliberately using PTAs to shore up much-needed 
but politically painful domestic reforms – the best illustration of which 
being Korea’s willingness to accept the liberalisation of its cinema 
market in KORUS (Parc, 2014).2 
Neither of these features applies in the TTIP case. First, the 
impact of TTIP on each TTIP economy will be much greater than the 
impact of any other PTA because the economic size of the partner is 
much bigger and its range of produced goods and services much wider. 
Second, as of today, the largest EU member states (EUMS) and the US 
have not shown much willingness to undertake the deep structural 
domestic regulatory reforms that they need for their own good. Last 
year saw worrisome developments among the key EUMS in regulatory 
matters: Germany with a more regulated labour market (minimum 
wage) and a sudden attraction for some kind of industrial policy in 
services (internet operators); the UK is engulfed in constitutional 
debates that prevent it from exercising the great influence it once had 
on EU services liberalisation, hence to further expand it; a timid start to 
reform in France that most observers consider to be too limited to 
address France’s challenges.  
The current deadlock in the Doha Round adds its own heavy 
burden to this situation; these negotiations collapsed during the July 
2008 mini-ministerial meeting. The then USTR Susan Schwab had the 
necessary authority to strike a deal during this meeting. Officially, the 
July 2008 failure was a conflict between the US and India over the level 
of safeguard measures in the Doha Agreement in agriculture. In fact, 
the breakdown reflected a much deeper problem: the collision course 
between the US and China on global governance in the WTO. The US 
argued that multilateral rules should be changed to significantly reduce 
the degree of freedom enjoyed by the emerging economies – above all 
China – thanks to the developing economy status in the WTO. China 
                                                          
2 In sharp contrast to France in the TTIP. 
TTIP: THE SERVICES DIMENSION  345 
 
disagreed, arguing that its several hundred million poor people and its 
very recent WTO membership still justified the remnants of its 
developing status in the WTO. Having lost all hope of changing the 
WTO game in July 2008, the US Administration swiftly ‘pivoted’ 
towards East Asia. In September 2008, it formally notified Congress of 
its willingness to be part of – de facto to lead – the TPP predecessor (P4 
Agreement) (Gillson & Oliver, 2012). Since then, the US has seen the 
TPP as the blueprint of the ‘WTO version 2.0’ that it could not establish 
in the WTO forum.  
In short, its origin has made the nature of TPP ambiguous: is it a 
free trade agreement or a China-containing strategy? Signals from 
Washington are still hard to decipher.3 By the same token, the nature of 
TTIP is also ambiguous. Is the US looking essentially for economic 
benefits? Or is it thinking in terms of the ‘West against the Rest (of the 
world)’ by combining TPP (the Western flank) and TTIP (the Eastern 
flank), as echoed by the notion of ‘norms setting’? (Rosecrance, 2013; 
Eizenstatt, 2013) (see section 4). 
2.2 What domestic support for TTIP? 
A successful TTIP requires robust domestic support. If adequately 
interpreted, the estimates of TTIP benefits and costs as provided by 
computable general equilibrium models (see Box 11.1) shed interesting 
light on the support to be expected from the two main groups of actors 
in these discussions: the top decision-makers (presidents, prime 
ministers and equivalents) and the other decision-makers involved in 
the negotiations (ministers, trade officials, business people, consumers 
and NGOs) (Messerlin, 2013). 
 
                                                          
3 For instance, it is said that routine briefings are held on TPP by US negotiators 
in Beijing. In sharp contrast, no less than the US Defense Secretary has stepped 
into the debate on Trade Promotion Authority for TPP (International Wall 
Street Journal, April 8, 2015, p. 14) and a top ranking Democrat senator has 
declared that “the stated goal of this deal [TPP] is to lure […] other countries 
away from China” (International Wall Street Journal, 18-19 April 2015, p. 10). 
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Box 11.1 Modelling TTIP 
Several computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies on TTIP are 
available: Erixon and Bauer (2010), Francois et al. (hereafter CEPR) 
(2013), Febermayr et al. (2013), Kinman and Hogberg (2013) among 
others.4  
For simplicity’s sake, this chapter focuses on the CEPR and CEPII 
studies, which envisage roughly the same various levels of 
liberalisation: i) only tariff cuts focusing on goods; ii) a reduction of non-
tariff measures covering goods and services; iii) a ‘comprehensive’ 
liberalisation combining tariff cuts and a reduction of non-tariff 
measures (NTMs). 
Such estimates are subject to many limits, two of which are 
particularly important in the case of services. First, these estimates do 
not directly take into account foreign direct investment flows, which are 
the main channel of international competition for many services (CEPR, 
2013, p. 22). Second, they aggregate all the economic activities into a very 
small number of sectors. This aggregation process leads to an average 
level of protection by sector. By construction, such a process 
underestimates the big welfare gains to be expected in the highly 
protected sectors because trade in relatively open activities is over-
represented compared to trade in highly protected activities. This bias 
happens to be much more important for services (75% of EU/US GDP 
aggregated into 9 different sectors) than for manufacturing (22% of 
EU/US GDP aggregated into 8 different sectors) and agriculture (3% of 
EU/US GDP aggregated into 2 different sectors).  
2.3 Top policy-makers 
Top policy-makers (presidents, prime ministers, etc.) do not pay much 
attention to whether gains from a trade deal flow from agriculture, 
manufacturing or services. They are more interested in the expected 
impact of the agreement on the whole economy of their country 
because they see trade agreements only as an instrument to boost 
growth (Hamilton & Schwartz, 2012). Top policy-makers care about 
what happens to individual sectors only in ‘crises’ – big sectoral shocks, 
highly visible domestic vested interests; all cases that are more likely to 
occur in manufacturing and agriculture. 
The results of the CEPR and CEPII studies are similar, and can 
be summarised as follows: 
                                                          
4 For an in-depth review of the CEPR model, see Pelkmans et al. (2014). 
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 Gains from a comprehensive TTIP deal (tariff cuts, reductions in 
NTMs in goods and services) remain limited – roughly 0.4 to 
0.7% of GDP. 
 Most of these gains come from the reduction of NTMs in goods.  
 Gains from the reduction of NTMs in services alone are small. 
Before looking at their impact on top policy-makers, the last – 
surprising if one considers the size of the services sectors – result 
should be explained in more detail. In the CEPR and CEPII studies, 
gains from trade are a function of two main variables: the initial size of 
trade flows and the initial level of protection.  
 In both studies, services are (much) less traded across borders 
than goods. But caution is needed here. Cross-border trade is not 
the main channel of international competition in services. In 
other words, the CEPR and CEPII studies underestimate the 
gains from more open US and EU services sectors to the extent 
that they do not directly capture FDI flows. 
 The two studies differ on the level of protection in services 
because they have adopted two different ways to estimate the 
level of protection.  
Indeed, Table 11.1 shows that CEPR and CEPII estimates of the 
level of protection differ much more in services than in goods. 
However, the higher protection level in the CEPII study does not 
generate a much larger impact on the estimated gains than the CEPR 
one because trade flows in services are relatively small. 
Table 11.1 The level of protection in the EU and US (in %) 
 CEPR estimates CEPII estimates Ratios 
 EU US EU US EU US 
Agriculture 56.8 73.3 48.2 51.3 0.8 0.7 
Industry 19.3 23.4 42.8 32.3 2.2 1.4 
Services 8.5 8.9 32.0 47.3 3.8 5.3 
Notes: Ratios are defined as the CEPII estimates divided by the CEPR estimates. 
Sources: CEPR 2013, Ecorys 2009, CEPII 2013, Fontagné et al. (2011). 
Such modest results raise a key question for top policy-makers 
in the US and in the larger EUMS: why risk their limited political 
domestic capital to negotiate a deal with limited economic gains? The 
situation of the US and large EUMS’ top policy-makers differs from the 
one faced by the top policy-makers in Canada or Korea when 
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negotiating with the US and the EU (economic gains were much more 
sizeable for these relatively smaller economies).  
If economic gains are not attractive enough, then the fate of the 
TTIP at the top political level will depend on geopolitical 
considerations. That makes TTIP volatile, as illustrated by two 
episodes: strong negative reactions in Europe (including in Germany – 
initially a staunch TTIP supporter) after leaks of US National Security 
Agency’s phone-tapping; strong reactions in the US against the price 
agreement between the EU and China following the antidumping 
provisional measures on solar panel cells (International Herald Tribune, 
29 July 2013). 
2.4 The other decision-makers 
If TTIP is unable to attract the attention of top politicians, its fate will 
be left to the many other decision-makers – officials (ministers of trade, 
agriculture, etc., trade negotiators and national regulators), business 
people, consumers, etc. involved in the day-to-day negotiations. 
These actors have a much narrower scope of interest. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that they focus on the changes in trade balances 
that TTIP would generate in the sectors they are interested in. 
Economists do not see trade balances as a meaningful indicator, but 
business people, officials and journalists do. The next question is 
whether these decision-makers pay attention to changes in bilateral 
(US-EU) trade balances or to changes in global (world) trade balances 
generated by TTIP. What follows assumes that they pay attention to 
global trade balances because most of the firms involved in TTIP 
negotiations are multinationals (big and small) with worldwide 
interests and views.  
Table 11.2 presents the (CEPR) predicted changes in such global 
trade balances. For simplicity’s sake, it does so only for those sectors 
that would witness “substantial” trade changes – substantial being 
arbitrarily defined as changes in trade balances larger than US$ 1 billion 
in the comprehensive (tariff cuts and reduction of MTNS in goods and 
services) scenario. This threshold eliminates several service sectors 
from the TTIP political economy radar screen: water transport, air 
transport, communications, construction, personal services (for the EU) 
and other services (for the US). 
For the remaining sectors, Table 11.2 assesses their position on 
the basis of changes in their import-export ratios: 
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 a sector with an import-export ratio lower than 1 (imports grow 
more than exports as a result of the TTIP agreement) is assumed 
to be hostile to the TTIP. 
 a sector with an import-export ratio higher than 2 is assumed to 
be supportive of the TTIP; 
 a sector with an import-export ratio of between 1 and 2 is 
assumed to be ‘open’ to a deal until the final days of negotiations. 
Cells 1, 2 and 4 capture the hostile/hesitant sectors on both sides 
of the Atlantic, cells 6, 8 and 9 capture the supportive/hesitant sectors, 
cells 3, 5 and 7 the sectors likely to be open to a deal by the end of the 
negotiations, either because both sides are hesitant (cell 5) or because 
one side is supportive and the other side hostile (cells 3 and 7). 
Table 11.2 suggests two main observations from a political 
economy perspective: 
 The global rapport de forces based on all the goods and services 
that emerges from Table 11.2 looks very uncertain. Only one 
sector (cell 9) is strongly supportive in both partners, but it is a 
very heterogeneous (industrial) sector, hence unlikely to be the 
basis of a robust coalition. The same situation prevails for cells 6 
and 8.  
 The relatively homogeneous open sectors (chemicals and cars) 
are expected to play a key role in the negotiations. The same 
could be expected from business services, with the caveat that it 
is a very heterogeneous (huge) sector. 
 No homogeneous services sector (finance, insurance) is ready to 
be strongly supportive of TTIP. Rather, these services reflect 
opposing views, depending on their side of the Atlantic. 
Table 11.2 deserves a final caveat. As stated, most services in 
Table 11.2 are highly aggregated, heterogeneous sectors. As a result, 
some activities in a heterogeneous sector could strongly support TTIP 
while the other activities could strongly oppose it. That said, the long 
history of many PTAs negotiations shows that even tiny vested 
interests can poison negotiations, to the point of derailing them for 
years. Indeed, a small services sector – the French/EU audiovisual 
sector – has rapidly shown its trouble-making capacity in the TTIP 
context.  
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Table 11.2 TTIP political economy: A sectoral view 
 
Note: Sectors in bold are those with the largest weight in trade changes (more than US$ 10 billion US$ in the comprehensive scenario). 
Source: Author’s own configuration.
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3. Market access issues 
In services, the High Level Working Group (HLWG) report states three 
objectives: “i) to bind the highest level of liberalisation that each side 
has achieved in trade agreements to date, ii) while seeking to achieve 
new market access by addressing remaining longstanding market 
access barriers, iii) recognising the sensitive nature of certain sectors”.  
This wording was not prudent enough. Binding is associated 
with the already reached ‘highest’ level of liberalisation, ignoring the 
massive differences among the existing level of liberalisation within the 
EU (see Tables 11.3 and 11.4, below) and probably within the US. Calls 
for new market access target the remaining longstanding market access 
barriers, that is, those successfully kept by the presumably strongest 
vested interests. The caveat for sensitive sectors was minimal 
(“recognition”) – offering to the most aggressive vested interests a 
golden opportunity for fighting to set aside their services, such as 
French-EU audiovisuals and US maritime transport, despite the fact 
that these sectors are now much more divided about market opening 
than they used to be (for audiovisuals, see Messerlin, 2014).  
3.1 The baseline: How are EU and US services protected? 
As illustrated by the wide differences between the CEPR and CEPII 
estimates (Table 11.1), it is notoriously difficult to assess the current 
level of protection in services. That said, it is useful to have a sense of 
which are the most and the least protected services sectors – a sense of 
the ranking in terms of protection level that is provided by estimated 
ad valorem ‘tariff equivalents’ for the various services (CEPR, 2013). 
Table 11.3 suggests several observations in this respect: 
 There are marked differences among sectoral tariff equivalents 
in the EU and US. 
 The ranking of services sectors is not dissimilar on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
 There is a positive correlation between the level of tariff 
equivalents and the degree of ‘actionability’ (defined as the 
degree (according to the sectoral experts) to which non-tariff 
barriers can ‘realistically’ be reduced by 2018 if the political will 
to do so exists). 
 The level of ‘actionability’ as assessed by the experts is relatively 
high. In other words, there is room to improve domestic 
regulatory quality, and by the same token market access. 
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Table 11.3 “Tariff equivalents” and actionability in services 
 Tariff 
equivalents (%) 
‘Actionability’ 
 USa 
1 
EUb 
2 
USa 
3 
EUb 
4 
A. Sectors relatively more protected     
Financial services 31.7 11.3 55 49 
Insurance services 19.1 10.8 48 52 
Communication services 1.7 11.7 66 70 
B. Sectors relatively less protected     
Other business services 3.9 14.9 49 51 
Construction services 2.5 4.6 57 38 
Personal, cultural & recreational 
services 
2.5 4.4 47 37 
C. Sectors with no estimated tariff 
equivalents 
    
Travel services n.a. n.a. 61 60 
Air & water transport services n.a. n.a. 59 56 
Notes: [a] US barriers to EU exports; [b] EU barriers to US exports. 
Source: Ecorys (2009). 
3.2 What does ‘binding’ mean in services? 
The goal of ‘binding’, as stated by the HLWG is rather more difficult to 
interpret than it might seem at first glance (as is the case for goods). 
Table 11.4 illustrates this point on the EU side (for a detailed review of 
barriers in EU services, see Mustilli and Pelkmans (2013)). It provides 
the highest and lowest OECD-calculated “product market regulations” 
indicators for 18 EUMS, with the name of the corresponding EUMS for 
2007, and for 2003, 2007 and 2013.1 Naming the EUMS allows more light 
to be shed on the ‘large’ EUMS, which are likely to have more weight 
in the negotiations. It also gives a better sense of the two possible layers 
of the TTIP discussions: the one that is ongoing between the US and the 
EU, and the one that could be conducted among the EUMS and the 
various states of the US.  
                                                          
1 The original range of the PMR indicators is 0 to 6, from the least to the most 
restrictive countries. A larger range (0 to 100) is used because it seems easier to 
read. But these PMR indicators should not be interpreted as tariff-equivalents 
since they only rank the existing level of protection associated with current 
services regulations in the services sectors covered. The services listed in Table 
11.4 represent roughly two-thirds of the entire US and EU service sectors. 
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Table 11.4 Barriers to market access in selected services and EUMS, 
2003-13 
 
Notes: [a] Accounting, Architect, Engineer, Legal. The ‘large’ EUMS are the UK, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain. [b] Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Slovakia. [b] Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Slovakia, Sweden 
and the UK. 
Source: OECD (2014). 
Table 11.4 helps to convey the elusiveness of the notion of 
“binding” as stressed by the HLWG report, and the huge differences in 
its various interpretations, such as: 
 Would it consist of binding the autonomous liberalisation 
carried out between 2003 and 2013 by the most protected EUMS 
(the one having the highest PMR in 2013)? In this case, Table 11.3 
shows that such binding would consist of limited additional 
market access. 
 Or would it consist of binding the PMRs at the level of the 
second-highest PMR among the large EUMS in 2013? In this case, 
binding would generate rather better market access to most 
services sectors in the most protected EUMS. 
 Or would it consist of binding the PMRs at the level of the most 
open large EUMS? This would create substantial (huge in some 
sectors, such as electricity, gas or airlines) new market access in 
the most protected EUMS. 
Crucially, a complete assessment of the notion of ‘binding’ in 
TTIP would require equivalent information for the American states. 
There is some evidence that the American states also have regulatory 
differences in a significant number of service sectors. Unfortunately, 
there is no systematic evidence of such differences and providing such 
an assessment appears to be one of the most pressing tasks in the TTIP 
context. It would either dispel wrong expectations from the EU side if 
differences among American states happen to be small. Or it would 
2003 2008
PMR EUMS PMR EUMS PMR EUMS
Electricity 68 67 54 Estonia 53 France 15 Spain
Gas 89 69 63 Greece 42 France 0 Britain
Post 78 72 56 Slovenia 56 Italy 11 Netherlands
Telecoms 52 38 33 Slovenia 19 Germany 5 Britain
Airlines 82 83 59 Slovenia 8 France 0 5 EUMS [b]
Rail 100 88 81 Ireland 67 Spain 4 Britain
Road 100 71 71 Italy -- -- 25 8 EUMS [c]
Retail 78 76 68 Belgium 53 Italy 10 Sweden
Prof. services [a] 59 50 48 Hungary 44 Germany 9 Sweden
B: Highest PMR in
large EUMS 2013
A: Highest
PMR 2013
Highest PMR C: Lowest
PMR 2013
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make these states more conscious of the internal reforms they need to 
implement for their own good if differences happen to be large – 
illustrating the role of trade agreements as a boost for better domestic 
governance. 
3.3 The state of play 
Nothing in the TTIP will limit the ability of both sides to provide state 
support to public services, to designate public monopolies or to place 
limits on market access and national treatment regarding publicly 
funded education, health care or water services (Heydon, 2015). There 
is a long tradition in trade agreements of not dealing with such sectors. 
This situation is reinforced in the TTIP case by less polarised views on 
both sides of the Atlantic on these matters – the US and the EU are 
becoming more accommodating on these issues because their 
education, health and water services face problems that are different 
but severe in both economies. There now seems to be a willingness to 
learn lessons from others rather than impose any specific regime.  
In January 2015, the EU Commission improved its website on the 
TTIP in order to give a better idea about what was going on. However, 
services are not as well covered by this effort as industrial goods. In its 
two-page ‘Fact sheet’ cover for services, the Commission lists five broad 
goals in a few words each:2 
 tackle barriers in maritime services and in “other” (unspecified) 
services; 
 improve mobility of qualified providers of professional services 
(such as architects or lawyers); 
 make it faster and simpler to obtain licenses or formal approval 
in services like banking and insurance, accountancy, 
management consultancy and legal advice; 
 agree on new rules in telecommunications, e-commerce, 
financial services, postal and courier services, and maritime 
transport; 
 ensure protection for sensitive sectors such as audiovisual, 
public health and education, social services and water 
distribution.  
The two other Commission papers that deal with services are 
devoted to “TTIP and culture” and “Protecting public services”. But 
                                                          
2 European Commission website (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfm?id=1230). 
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these papers simply restate the usual EU position on these topics – 
ranging from reluctance to outright opposition. 
The US equivalent website is both more laconic and more vague. 
It states briefly that the US seeks: 
 to obtain improved market access in the EU on a comprehensive 
basis; 
 to address the operation of any designated monopolies and state-
owned enterprises, as appropriate; 
 to reinforce transparency, impartiality, and due process with 
regard to authorisations to supply services; and  
 to obtain additional disciplines in certain services sectors, while 
improving regulatory cooperation where appropriate. 
A better idea of the current situation may be provided by using 
non-official sources. In Europe, a recent communication from the 
European Services Forum (the most active coalition of EU service 
providers) lists six services where the EU believes to have strong export 
interests: professional services, maritime transport, aviation transport, 
financial services, mobility of services suppliers and public 
procurement in services (Kerneis, 2015). It also stresses the US 
reluctance to tackle the key issue of US-driven regulations and/or 
enforcement (particularly in professional services) and American 
unwillingness to discuss financial services, mobility of services 
suppliers and the Jones Act (maritime transport) in particular.3 In the 
US, a forthcoming book adds three other recommendations for a TTIP 
compromise to the usual general desire for TTIP commitments to go 
beyond TiSA commitments: to target infrastructure, information 
communications technology and construction; to delay the application 
of TTIP obligations with regard to financial services regulatory policies 
until three years after the entry in force of TTIP; that is, once regulatory 
restructuring in each market is solidified. Finally, there is a desire to 
coordinate US and EU efforts to produce a successful TiSA in Geneva 
(Schott et al., forthcoming). 
The last point to be examined is the fundamental choice among 
the two modalities available to the negotiators: would negotiators work 
on ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ lists of services to improve market access? 
The EU has traditionally relied on the positive list (only the sectors 
listed are liberalised, as in the KOREU agreement) while the US has 
                                                          
3 The Jones Act requires that all goods transported by water between US ports 
be carried on US flagships, constructed in the US, owned by US citizens, and 
crewed by US citizens and US permanent residents. 
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traditionally relied on negative lists (every service is deemed to be 
liberalised except those listed, as in the KORUS agreement) – at least as 
long as US barriers are not imposed by American states (in some 
sectors, such as professional services, a US federal offer is of very 
limited interest since many American states have very specific 
regulations). Evidently, negative lists offer a much clearer view of what 
is effectively liberalised. By contrast, positive lists often require from 
the service providers a thorough knowledge of what has not been 
liberalised, which is crucial to take advantage of the agreed 
liberalisation provisions – a constraint that imposes high costs on 
foreign newcomers, and considerably weakens the pro-competitive 
impact of the liberalisation measures. 
The EU seems ready to shift to a negative list approach. But, the 
full consequences of this shift on the whole TTIP architecture remain to 
be seen. First, the EU has to make its new negative list approach 
consistent with its previous positive list approach in its other PTAs, 
which means re-phrasing the many exceptions granted to EUMS. 
Second, such an exercise would logically require that the US starts to 
list its commitments at the American state level; an exercise it has rarely 
carried out before (the best illustration being public procurement) and 
may not be ready to do so.4 
3.4 A ‘static’ vs. ‘dynamic’ negotiating structure 
The current situation is thus problematic. It would greatly benefit from 
a table of ‘enlarged’ negotiations (in a form to be defined) to the EUMS 
and American states themselves. Why is the case? Table 11.4 suggests 
that the EU internal market is still very fragmented since PMRs vary 
considerably among EUMS (see also Miroudot and Shepherd (2011)). If 
it were possible for US or EU firms to export their services from a 
relatively open EUMS to a more protected EUMS, then efficient US and 
EU service providers would have established their activities in the most 
open EUMS and operate from there towards the rest of the EU. But if 
this were the case, then keeping high barriers at the EUMS level would 
make little sense for the most protected EUMS. In other words, the 
existence of high PMRs across EUMS is a robust indicator that the EU 
internal market remains fundamentally incomplete.  
This lesson is essential because it suggests the adoption of a TTIP 
negotiating structure that is more conducive to a ‘deep’ liberalisation in 
                                                          
4 For a detailed discussion of public procurement issues, see Woolcock and 
Grier (2015). 
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services than the current one. As of today, the structure of discussions 
is exclusively bilateral – that is, the US vs. the EU. By contrast, a more 
open structure of discussions that would involve (in ways to be found) 
individual EUMS and the US could develop interesting dynamics that 
would enlarge the frontiers of the available concessions in the direction 
of ‘deeper’ liberalisation. For instance, service providers from the most 
open EUMS and the most open American states in a given service 
would have an intrinsic interest in building an explicit transatlantic 
coalition in their sector in order to open the markets of the most 
protected EUMS and the US for the service in question. This approach 
is perfectly consistent with the need to involve regulators in talks on 
services, which is highlighted below (section 3). 
4. Regulatory issues 
The first question when discussing services in a trade deal is whether 
these discussions should be limited to pure market access issues 
(allowing foreign firms to enter new markets without taking into 
account the impact of the existing regulations) or whether they should 
include ‘talks’ on regulations (examining whether some regulations 
constitute unjustified barriers to market access). The frequency and 
magnitude of NTMs in services explains why discussions in services 
very often boil down to ‘talks’ on regulations, as in the case of TTIP 
(Chase & Pelkmans, 2015). 
This raises two challenges for a deal in services. The first is well 
known and occurs during the negotiation phase: it is hard to assess the 
level of ‘unjustified’ restrictions imposed on business in a given service 
by existing regulations. The second challenge is rarely mentioned 
although it is probably more important. It occurs after the conclusion 
of a deal: it is very difficult to monitor the faithful implementation of 
the liberalisation commitments of a trading partner. This is different 
from tariffs on goods where each country can easily monitor whether 
its trading partner is cutting its tariff as agreed. The post-agreement 
monitoring of commitments in services is particularly difficult when a 
partner modifies its regulations in order to improve the functioning of 
the service market at stake. By doing so, a partner may well make a 
foreign services provider’s life more difficult, giving the impression of 
having reneged on its commitments.  
All these challenges make it clear that ‘talks’ on services 
regulations should rely on innovative techniques or they will end up 
with pleasant but empty words.  
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4.1 How to ‘talk’ on services regulations? Innovation 
urgently required 
The first step to defining innovative techniques is to be clear about 
words. The HLWG report is remarkably vague in this respect. It refers 
almost indiscriminately to “harmonization”, “mutual recognition”, 
“mutual equivalence”, “regulatory convergence”, “regulatory 
cooperation” and “regulatory coherence”. This vagueness has fuelled 
suspicion and fear among public opinion that TTIP would boil down to 
a ‘single transatlantic market’ imposing changes in regulations on both 
partners that would inevitably lead to a general race to the bottom. 
After months of confusion, a recent paper by the US Chamber 
(2015) is the first attempt in circles close to the TTIP discussions to 
clarify two of these terms: “regulatory cooperation” and “regulatory 
coherence”:5 
 regulatory coherence is “about good regulatory practices, 
transparency and stakeholder engagement in the domestic regulatory 
process”. Clearly, regulatory sovereignty cannot be limited by 
regulatory coherence, which is an entirely domestic matter. The 
only influence that TTIP could have on regulatory coherence is 
very indirect. It would consist of stimulating emulation among 
partners: the partner having the better practices in a given service 
is likely to emulate its partner in this service (and vice-versa for 
other services). 
 regulatory cooperation “is the process of interaction between US and 
EU regulators, founded on the benefits regulators can achieve through 
their partnership and greater regulatory interoperability”. Here again, 
regulatory sovereignty is not limited by a regulatory cooperation 
process which puts the appropriate regulators (not the trade 
negotiators) explicitly in the driving seat of the TTIP talks, which 
are those in charge of the services at stake. 
That said, adopting innovative techniques in the talks on services 
regulations requires clarification of the four remaining terms: 
harmonisation, mutual recognition, mutual equivalence, regulatory 
convergence (Messerlin, 2007, 2011, 2014). 
                                                          
5 The Commission’s website still illustrates this confusion with the title 
“Regulatory Cooperation” as its first paper under the “Regulatory Coherence” 
chapter. 
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4.2 Harmonisation (and regulatory convergence) 
In their daily speeches, most TTIP trade negotiators and EU decision-
makers refer to harmonisation (see Fabry et al. (2014)). This is rather 
paradoxical because the history of the EU internal market is a long 
history of failure to harmonise, especially in services. There is a good 
reason for such a poor outcome. As modern economies are 
characterised by a huge variety of differentiated services, a regulation 
can work well in one country, and badly in another. The OECD 
database on regulations in services shows that, in most services, only a 
few regulations have a systematically detrimental impact in all member 
states on the efficient provision of the service at stake. Moreover, the 
simultaneous but uncoordinated negotiations of several mega-PTA 
add another reason to doubt the usefulness of the harmonisation 
instrument in such a context: how could it be possible to harmonise at 
the same time and in a consistent way within TTIP, within TPP and 
within EU-Japan? 
Regulatory convergence is a weak variant of harmonisation. It 
consists of a belief that, although harmonisation is not possible now, it 
will occur over time. Such a belief relies on an unfounded assumption: 
the existence of an ideal regulation in a given service that would be 
better than all the other alternatives for all the partners – an assumption 
very unlikely to be met for reasons mentioned above on the dominant 
role of differentiation in modern economies. Indeed, such a belief is not 
supported by evidence in the EU case. It would suggest that over time 
the EUMS regulatory performance would have become increasingly 
similar – an observation that is not supported by the available 
indicators such as those of Doing Business or the World Economic 
Forum. These indicators do not suggest that the EUMS converge to the 
same level of regulatory quality. Rather, they suggest complex 
trajectories over time, with some EU-founding EUMS having slipped 
behind some recently acceded EUMS in terms of regulatory quality.  
4.3 Mutual recognition 
Mutual recognition (MR) means that each party accepts the regulations 
of its partner for the services at stake. But this recognition is conditional 
upon the adoption of a ‘core’ of common provisions (“essential 
requirements” in EU legal jargon). MR is thus a hybrid instrument: 
there is a harmonised “core” of provisions, and only the remaining 
provisions are subject to mutual recognition. As the core is harmonised, 
the whole MR approach suffers from the same limits as harmonisation 
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– pressures from firms and their backing EUMS for limiting the pro-
competition impact of MR by imposing core provisions making costly 
entry to market. Over time, as core provisions have often been more 
numerous and costly, MR has increasingly drifted towards 
harmonisation – hence today a very imperfect “internal market” in 
many services. 
4.4 Mutual equivalence 
Mutual equivalence (ME) means that each party considers the partner’s 
regulatory package – the regulations per se, the certification or licensing 
procedures, or both – in a given service as “different but equivalent” to 
its own.6 To be politically acceptable, ME requires a systematic crucial 
step: a joint process of “mutual evaluation” of existing regulations (and 
their certification or licensing procedures) by the regulating bodies of 
the partners. The aim of this joint evaluation process is for each partner 
to decide whether the regulations at stake could be accepted as 
equivalent or not. (Such an involvement of the national regulatory 
bodies fits the definition of regulatory cooperation in the US Chamber’s 
paper perfectly.) 
At first glance, ME seems a bold move into the unknown. The 
EU’s perspective is somewhat different, however. In sharp contrast to 
the case of goods, the EU has drawn its conclusions about the poor 
performance of harmonisation and MR in services by adopting the ME 
approach when designing its 2006 Services Directive (Article 15 of this 
Directive provides a fine description of what should constitute ‘talks’ 
in services). 
The joint process of mutual evaluation of their respective 
regulations by the two TTIP partners has two interesting features. First, 
it reinforces the good regulatory practices required by domestic good 
regulatory coherence. As it requires the involvement of the partner’s 
regulating bodies in the negotiating process, it suggests some kind of 
division of labour between TTIP trade negotiators and national services 
regulators. Trade negotiators could suggest broad areas of services they 
consider as promising candidates for the ME approach in the TTIP. 
Then, national regulators in charge of these services should confirm 
                                                          
6 Of course, there is the option of “unilateral equivalence”: one partner 
considers the partner’s laws and/or processes as equivalent to its own 
regulations, while the other partner does not do the same. 
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these opportunities and undertake the mutual evaluation process 
consisting of: 
 Examining the partner’s regulations; 
 Asking for clarifications and possibly changes in the partner’s 
regulations as pre-requisites for granting the ME status; 
 Defining exceptions (if any) for some sub-sectors of the services 
examined and, 
 Requesting reviews to be performed after a few years. 
The joint evaluation process offers a unique opportunity to build, 
restore and/or improve trust within each signatory and among them. 
First, within each signatory. Among the most interesting documents on 
the Commission’s website on TTIP are those on the joint evaluation of 
seatbelts and lighting and visibility for cars.7 These documents offer a 
very careful technical review of each element of these two essential 
components of car safety. The EU public has thus the best available 
assessment of EU regulations by the US and EU regulators, and vice-
versa. Second, trust is built among the signatories. It would be unwise 
to assume that the US and the EU have little need to build trust. 
Paradoxically, the long history of the transatlantic trade tends to 
highlight cases where mistrust has flourished. In this respect, mutual 
evaluation offers an appropriate solution to such situations. 
4.5 A realistic bundle of techniques 
Of course, it would be unwise to assume that TTIP negotiators could 
shift entirely to the ME approach. First, it cannot be excluded that 
harmonisation could remain the best solution in rare cases. Second, the 
ME approach requires a serious change of mind from regulators, trade 
negotiators, the public and, last but not least, by politicians since, at 
least in some TTIP countries, regulators are closely monitored by 
parliaments. As a result, the TTIP negotiators may have to stick to the 
traditional MR approach in a substantial number of cases for some time 
in the future. 
Such a situation is not a serious problem as long as TTIP is 
conceived as a living agreement – meaning that the EU and the US 
agree to return to the table of negotiations within a few years after the 
conclusion of this first episode of TTIP negotiations in order to further 
deepen and/or expand their market opening. Indeed, the joint process 
                                                          
7 European Commission website (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfm?id=1230). 
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of mutual evaluation itself requires time to be appropriately conducted, 
and also a living agreement in order to review the previous evaluations, 
if needed. 
5. TTIP and the world 
Almost any PTA is doomed to generate discrimination against non-
PTA members. This discrimination is costly for efficient non-PTA 
producers that are excluded from the PTA markets, and by the same 
token for the PTA consumers who buy goods produced in the PTA 
which happen to be less expensive than those produced in the rest of 
the world only because efficient foreign producers have still to face 
trade barriers on their products. These general remarks raise four 
specific issues in the TTIP case: the likelihood and magnitude of its 
discriminatory impact, the case for compensating spill-over effects, 
preference erosion of previous EU and US PTAs, and the beneficial 
impact of mutual equivalence in this worldwide context. 
5.1 TTIP discriminatory impact 
The TTIP is the PTA between the current two largest world economies. 
It may thus be a source of discriminations on an unprecedented scale 
(for a more detailed examination of the risks of discrimination, see 
Akman et al., 2015). In a nutshell, the risks and costs of discrimination 
depend on three key elements: 
 the higher the initial (pre-TTIP) MFN protection of the TTIP 
countries, 
 the deeper the intra-TTIP liberalisation and 
 the stronger the intra-TTIP emulation long-term dynamics (the 
capacity to ‘deepen’ further the transatlantic market access as 
time flows. 
The higher the risks and magnitude of discriminatory impacts on 
non-TTIP economies. For instance, a ‘deep’ TTIP agreement in 
agricultural products would open wide the highly protected EU 
markets to US products to the detriment of similar goods produced in 
the rest of the world at a much lower cost, since the EU MFN barriers 
are high in agricultural products. Similarly, the high ad valorem 
equivalents shown in Table 11.3 clearly set out the risks of strong 
discriminatory impact in the most protected services.  
That said, it is often stated that the risks of discrimination are 
much lower in services than in goods because it is difficult to open 
markets in services in a discriminatory way. However, there is no 
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systematic evidence of such an intrinsically ‘non-discriminatory’ 
nature of services regulations. Rather, Table 11.4 supports the opposite 
view: the remaining range and magnitude of intra-EUMS barriers in 
services suggests strong possibilities of substantial discriminatory 
protection. 
5.2 Spill-over effects 
The potential discriminatory impact of TTIP on non-TTIP economies 
could be mitigated by the fact that dismantling barriers between US and 
EU markets would generate positive ‘spill-over’ effects for the rest of 
the world. There are two kinds of spill-over effects. Direct spill-over 
effects would occur if post-TTIP regulations in the US and the EU 
would decrease trade costs, not only among the US and the EU services 
providers, but also those of the third countries exporting to the US and 
to the EU. Indirect spill-over effects would occur if third countries 
adopted ‘better’ regulations that TTIP partners would adopt in the 
emulation context examined in section 3. 
Spill-over effects are mere possibilities. Their likelihood and 
magnitude are unknown. From a policy perspective, it is important to 
stress the fact that the nature of these two spill-over effects is very 
different. 
 Direct spill-over effects do not require action by third countries. 
They are provided somewhat ‘automatically’ by post-TTIP 
regulations, which are assumed to be cost-improving for non-
TTIP and TTIP service providers. It is crucial to stress that such 
situations depend, at least partly, on the instruments used in the 
‘talks’ on services regulations. Under harmonisation and mutual 
recognition, post-TTIP regulations are entirely (harmonisation) 
or partly (mutual recognition) negotiated. As experience shows, 
it is far from certain that negotiated regulations are necessarily 
better than the pre-existing ones: this is because they are the 
outcomes of political compromises that may ignore important 
economic and technological aspects. By contrast, because it 
introduces emulation among regulators, mutual equivalence 
(ME) is more amenable to the possibility of post-TTIP regulations 
being truly better than the pre-TTIP ones. 
 Indirect spill-over effects require appropriate action by third-
countries which choose to align their national regulations to the 
post-TTIP regulations. Hence, such spill-over effects should 
rather be interpreted as autonomous (unilateral) liberalisations 
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undertaken by third countries. It seems quite inappropriate to 
interpret them as a TTIP result. Once again, such unilateral 
liberalisations are likely to occur more often in a context of ME-
engineered regulatory emulation among TTIP regulators eager 
to deliver better regulations. 
5.3 Preferences erosion 
The non-TTIP economies are not ‘equal’ with respect to the TTIP 
discriminatory potential.8 Non-TTIP countries with a PTA with the US 
and/or the EU already in place have a kind of ‘insurance’ scheme 
against TTIP discriminatory impact. (The case of non-TTIP economies 
without a PTA with the EU and the US is examined in the concluding 
section.) EU and US PTAs with a substantial services dimension are 
rare: Canada, Chile, Korea and Singapore with both the EU and the US, 
Australia and Mexico with the US. The deeper the existing PTAs with 
the EU and/or the US, the better the ‘insurance’ scheme of the non-
TTIP country. 
That said, the preferences that the non-TTIP countries listed 
above could have enjoyed under their PTAs with the EU or the US will 
be eroded or eliminated by TTIP to an extent that depends on the TTIP’s 
own ‘depth’. From these non-TTIP countries, such a turn of events may 
be painful for their service providers that will face increased 
competition from additional TTIP services providers. But, viewed from 
a world welfare perspective, this evolution should be seen as positive: 
preference ‘erosion’ is a systemic, inevitable and indeed desirable 
down-side effect of PTAs in a world subject to the permanent forces of 
further liberalisation. 
5.4 Mutual equivalence and world welfare:  
From ‘norm setting’ to ‘norm attracting’ 
Finally, the impact of TTIP on the rest of the world’s economies 
depends on the ‘basic philosophy’ of TTIP negotiations. TTIP 
negotiators have often made reference to TTIP as a ‘norm-setting’ 
                                                          
8 Of course, there are the options of ‘opening’ TTIP to other countries on an ex 
post basis and the option to design it as an open agreement. Such options will 
substantially reduce the TTIP’s discriminatory impact and the risks of 
preference erosion. Despite their intellectual attraction, it is fair to say that such 
options have rarely been used in the past and, more decisively, that they do not 
fit today’s mood in trade matters. That said, the mutual equivalent approach 
can easily be adapted to such options on a case by case basis. 
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endeavour for the rest of the world, particularly in the context of 
regulations. This notion conveys a sense of TTIP as a duopoly of 
(shrinking in relative terms) economies trying to impose their 
regulations on the rest of the world while there is still time. This is not 
a very convincing approach, for two reasons. From an international 
relations perspective, it is hard to believe that the large non-TTIP 
economies will accept such a set of ‘diktat’. From an economic 
perspective, such an approach increases the risks and magnitude of 
TTIP discriminatory impact because the EU and the US, being very 
similar economies and societies, inevitably have intrinsic difficulties to 
take into account the wide range of regulatory capacities and objectives 
in the rest of the world. 
That said, once again the choice of the techniques used for talks 
in services plays a key role. Harmonisation and mutual recognition 
have an intrinsic bias in favour of ‘norm setting’. By contrast, mutual 
equivalence offers the alternative of a dynamic ‘norm-attracting’ 
approach because it generates de facto emulation among the regulatory 
bodies of TTIP members, hence giving incentives to each regulator to 
provide the best regulations to its domestic firms. 
 The more innovative a TTIP regulator member is, the more 
attractive the regulations it designs may be for its own domestic 
firms and possibly for the TTIP partner’s firms. 
 The more innovative a TTIP regulator is, the more attractive it 
may also be for third-countries’ service providers. As a result, 
third-country service providers may be induced to enter TTIP 
markets via the most innovative TTIP member (a case of direct 
spill-over effects) and/or to adopt regulations similar to those of 
the most innovative TTIP member (a case of indirect spill-over 
effects). Of course, all these dynamic effects are conditional on 
the fact that TTIP has no restrictive rules of origin on foreign 
services or services providers. 
Last but not least, mutual equivalence is the best protection 
against regulatory reforms that would diminish the country’s welfare 
– the much feared ‘race to the bottom’. Not only is such an attempt the 
last thing to expect from a regulator (it would be suicidal), but 
promoting welfare-diminishing reform would also immediately trigger 
the partners’ regulators withdrawing their agreement for mutual 
equivalence for the regulation at stake. 
In short, by inducing TTIP to shift from a ‘norm-setting’ to a 
‘norm-attracting’ perspective, mutual equivalence largely blurs the 
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frontiers between multilateral and bilateral negotiations by creating 
permanent incentives among the TTIP members to take into account 
the rest of the world – the multilateral dimension – when reforming 
their domestic regulations. 
6. Concluding remarks: TTIP, the WTO and TISA 
In order to eliminate the risks of discrimination generated by TTIP, 
non-TTIP countries with shallow or no PTAs in services with the EU or 
the US could apply some collective pressure to re-launch the WTO 
negotiations in services or to focus on the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TiSA) discussions.  
Re-launching (it would probably be more accurate to say 
launching) the services negotiations in the WTO forum is highly 
unlikely. The chapter has provided ample explanation that talks on 
services regulations require a level of trust among negotiating countries 
to a point never before needed in the case of negotiations in goods. 
Trust is necessary to assess regulations that are hard to compare. It is 
needed to monitor the implementation of the agreed commitments in 
an economically sound way. And it is needed to use the mutual 
equivalence instrument – both at the preliminary stage of the joint 
mutual evaluation and during the regulatory emulation process that 
mutual equivalence nurtures. The WTO cannot provide the sufficient 
level of trust needed: each member cannot trust all its (current) 159 
partners. 
The trust factor can be (much) better handled by plurilateral 
negotiations, such as TiSA, because of their limited number of like-
minded participants. Indeed, today TiSA negotiators are testing the 
level of trust that could exist in TiSA, including if China or other large 
emerging economies enter into these negotiations. 
In this context, the fates of TTIP and TiSA appear largely 
interdependent – more precisely the mirror image of each other. If the 
TTIP negotiations do not see the necessary innovations in services 
‘talks’, they are unlikely to deliver more than improved market access 
at the margin. Political support is then doomed to be low and the whole 
fate of TTIP becomes volatile and highly subject to political turbulence 
and/or on small but aggressive vested interests. 
In such a case, TiSA becomes an attractive alternative to TTIP. 
The reason is not that TiSA will deliver significantly deeper results than 
those of TTIP. In fact, TiSA is unlikely to be friendly to a mutual 
equivalence process – the only one that is promising in terms of 
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substantial economic benefits. But it will deliver (very) limited 
additional market access on a wider range of countries – hence possibly 
on a wider range of services. As a result, it is quite possible that the 
global outcome to TiSA would be (notably) higher than the TTIP 
outcome if TTIP negotiators are unable or unwilling to use innovative 
ways to hold ‘talks’ on services regulations. 
If correct, this analysis suggests that a good yardstick to measure 
true progress in TTIP talks in services is not TTIP negotiators’ 
declarations or the number of TTIP negotiating rounds, but the 
intensity of TiSA negotiations. 
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12. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
THE INTERNET: TTIP'S DIGITAL 
DIMENSION 
ANDREA RENDA 
AND CHRISTOPHER S. YOO 
1. Introduction 
As negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) have progressed, the digital component appears to be growing 
in importance. This is due to a number of recent events that have led 
digital issues to increasingly occupy the spotlight in the negotiations. 
First, the Datagate scandal, spurred by the revelations of Edward 
Snowden, has seriously undermined trust between US and EU 
authorities, leading the European Parliament to call for the suspension 
of the Safe Harbour Agreement, which allows smooth flows of data 
between the two sides of the Atlantic. Tensions between the parties at 
the table are so heightened now that it is widely thought that there can 
be no TTIP agreement without an agreement on data protection 
(possibly outside the TTIP and before its conclusion). Second, the 
growing importance of the data economy and the enabling nature of 
ICT as a driver of productivity and innovation in many other sectors 
makes the Digital TTIP a key complement, if not a precondition, to a 
successful and comprehensive agreement between the US and the EU. 
Third, the evolution of the debate over network neutrality in both legal 
systems has led the general public to focus on the possibility for the two 
superpowers to achieve some consistency in the regulation of traffic 
management practices on the Internet. Last but not least, all of this is 
occurring as the stalemate in other chapters (e.g. agriculture, financial 
services, and others) is motivating the parties to revert to the digital 
transatlantic economy as a natural candidate for a resounding 
agreement.  
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To date, however, the evidence on convergence between the two 
major blocs is mixed at best. In fact, while there have been some timid 
attempts to reach agreement on delicate issues such as data protection 
and cybersecurity, differences in the application of competition law and 
regulation in a number of crucial policy areas (such as online search, e-
commerce and copyright) seem to be growing, rather than shrinking, 
undercutting the preconditions for creating a vibrant transatlantic 
digital economy. One easy example is the evolution of the European 
Commission’s antitrust investigation against Google, now coupled 
with the launch of an extensive sectoral inquiry into e-commerce and a 
pompous campaign against geo-blocking practices, both likely to target 
US-based IT giants such as Amazon. More generally, the European 
Parliament and some national authorities (primarily France and 
Germany) are extensively campaigning against the so-called ‘GAFA’ 
(Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple), or even the ‘GAFTAM’ (Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Microsoft), all companies 
headquartered in the US. And to some extent, similar signals are also 
sent by large-scale government policies on advanced manufacturing, 
which seem to be developing incompatible standards in essential fields 
such as the Internet of Things and cloud computing.  
Many of these initiatives are now included in the new Digital 
Single Market Strategy adopted by the European Commission on 6 May 
2015. The strategy, expected to contribute €415 billion per year to the 
EU economy, includes 16 targeted actions based on three pillars: i) 
better access for consumers and businesses to digital goods and 
services across Europe, ii) creating the right conditions and a level 
playing field for digital networks and innovative services and iii) 
maximising the growth potential of the digital economy. The 
Commission wants to complete the package by 2016, noting that all 
proposals have to go through the European Parliament and the 
Council: the first initiatives have mostly focused on copyright reform 
(see below).  
Against this background, what are the prospects for a 
comprehensive Digital TTIP? In an unprecedented effort to increase the 
transparency of the ongoing negotiations, the European Commission 
has recently stated that its primary objectives in the negotiations on the 
ICT chapter are to improve enforcement of regulations and consumer 
protection, to make it easier for EU firms to export to the US and to cut 
unnecessary costs. It also stated that the agreement will not lead to any 
lowering of safety and security standards for EU citizens, an outcome 
that some commentators and advocacy groups had otherwise 
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considered likely. Current documents released by the European 
Commission suggest that the parties may be able to reach agreement 
on an initial set of important issues.1 These include:  
 e-labelling: setting standards for providing product information 
to consumers in electronic format, replacing labels and stickers;  
 e-accessibility: making ICT easier to use for people with 
disabilities and 
 cryptography: setting common principles for certifying ICT 
products, especially for encoding and decoding information. 
However, the Digital TTIP has the potential to become much 
more ambitious, covering issues such as network neutrality and data 
protection, if not also intermediary liability, cybersecurity and 
copyright. Already in its first document released in early 2015, the 
European Commission mentions one issue that appears simple, but can 
prove very controversial in practice: the potential for an agreement on 
data interoperability, which would enable users to exchange data easily 
between different products or platforms. In addition, a ‘non-paper’ 
presented at the EU Council Trade Policy Committee by the French and 
Austrian delegations in October 2014 contained a much more 
comprehensive list of issues, including an adaptation of the concepts of 
‘essential facilities’ and ‘major suppliers’ to the digital environment, an 
agreement on the treatment of digital platforms concerning privacy, 
interoperability and competition, and agreement on network neutrality 
principles. 
In this chapter, we explore the current divergence between the 
US and the EU on a number of issues and comment on potential 
consequences for the TTIP. Section 2 below discusses rules on 
infrastructure-sharing and network neutrality and the prospects for 
convergence between the two legal systems on these crucial issues. 
Section 3 contains an illustration of the divergence between the US and 
the EU on antitrust rules. Section 4 compares the approach followed by 
the two jurisdictions in the online search market and in e-commerce, in 
what has been termed the ‘platform regulation’ debate. Section 5 
addresses issues related to user information and in particular e-
labelling and e-accessibility. Section 6 compares US and EU public-
policy initiatives for the transition towards the Internet of Things. 
                                                          
1 The European Commission published in February 2015 a series of 2-page 
factsheets and EU textual proposals on parts 2 and 3 of the TTIP (see 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230).  
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Section 7 compares data protection legislation in the US and the EU and 
comments on possible scenarios for transatlantic data flows, including 
the possible suspension of the Safe Harbour.  
2. Broadband infrastructure and net neutrality 
2.1 Infrastructure-sharing: Between competition and 
investment 
Over the past decade, the regulatory approach to broadband 
telecommunications in the US and the EU has diverged widely. On the 
one hand, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 
actively pursued a deregulatory approach in order to stimulate the 
deployment of high-speed broadband networks, which resulted in the 
lifting of infrastructure-sharing obligations on high-speed broadband 
networks since 2003. The presence of a pervasive legacy cable 
infrastructure, which itself could be upgraded to high-speed networks 
thanks to new technologies and standards such as DOCSIS 3.0, has led 
to the emergence of vibrant facilities-based competition throughout the 
US.2  
On the other hand, the absence (in many countries) of a legacy 
cable infrastructure in Europe has led regulators to opt for 
infrastructure-sharing, which was made even more extensive and 
invasive after 2003, exactly as the US was going in the opposite 
direction. The application of the so-called ‘ladder of investment’ model 
to encourage the entry of new players in each of the EU member states 
has led to a significant fragmentation of the market, with hundreds of 
telecoms operators now populating the continent.3 While offering 
consumers a variety of alternative providers, in many countries this 
fragmentation has led to a catch-22 situation, in which the obligation to 
share any improvements at regulated prices deters incumbent players 
from upgrading their infrastructure and the ability to access the 
existing infrastructure on quite favourable terms discourages new 
entrants from investing as well. European regulators once placed great 
hopes in the so-called ‘ladder of investment’ model, under which 
infrastructure-sharing served as a stepping stone to full facilities-based 
competition. Empirical studies have shown that although existing 
                                                          
2 See Renda (2007, 2009) and Yoo (2014). 
3 For a description, see Renda (2009) and Pelkmans & Renda (2011). 
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policies have encouraged entrants to shift from resale to bitstream 
access to accessing unbundled local loops, they have failed to 
encourage them to make the final step to full facilities-based 
competition.4 The result is new entrants compete only by squeezing 
margins ever closer to the wholesale price rather than by investing in 
improved services. Against this background, the only (limited) 
investment in ultra-fast broadband in Europe has come from cable 
operators and electric companies or from municipalities, often using 
EU cohesion funds.5  
The impact of these policies is most visible in the availability of 
Next Generation Networks (NGNs) capable of providing service of 30 
Mbps. Studies commissioned by the US and the EU on broadband 
coverage in 2011, 2012 and 2013 reveal that the US has consistently 
outpaced Europe in NGN coverage (see Figure 12.1).6  
Figure 12.1 Next generation coverage in the US and EU, 2011-13 
 
Source: Yoo (2014). 
Data on investment levels reveal the same pattern. From 2007 to 
2012, US providers invested on average more than twice as much per 
                                                          
4 See e.g. Bourreau et al. (2010). 
5 Yoo (2014). 
6 Note that although the European Commission defines NGN as 30 Mbps 
service, it collects data on 25 Mbps service. 
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household as their European counterparts. Since 2008, European 
investment levels have languished at 35% below their pre-2008 peak, 
while the drop-off in the US has been more modest 7% (see Figure 
12.2).7 
Figure 12.2 Electronic communications sector investment per household in 
the US and EU, 2007-12 
 
Source: Yoo (2014). 
At the same time, a proactive spectrum policy by the FCC has led 
to the early auctioning of the digital dividend spectrum (e.g. the 700 
Mhz band), which enabled the early deployment of very high-speed 
mobile broadband networks such as 4G (Long-Term Evolution, LTE). 
Likewise, difficulties in achieving the needed coordination between 
national authorities have led to significant delays in the reallocation of 
spectrum to mobile operators in key bands such as 800Mhz and 
700Mhz. The absence of a timely, coordinated EU spectrum policy has 
made Europe a laggard in the deployment of 4G broadband (see Figure 
12.3). The US market has also become quite competitive. As of 
December 2014, AT&T served 99% of the US population with LTE, with 
Verizon serving 96%, Sprint serving 78% and T-Mobile serving 72% 
(FCC, 2014b). This makes it quite likely that more than 70% of the 
population can choose from among three, if not four, LTE providers. 
                                                          
7 Yoo (2014). 
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Figure 12.3 4G LTE coverage in the US and EU, 2011-13 
 
Source: Yoo (2014). 
This stark divergence of regulatory approaches has led to the 
exact result one would expect: while in the US the FCC has started to 
worry about vertical exclusion, in Europe the priority is now 
stimulating investment and possibly achieving a degree of industry 
consolidation. Both stances bear important consequences for the 
current debate on network neutrality, since recent initiatives in the two 
jurisdictions on this issue have been grounded in (or heavily affected 
by) the current state of the telecommunications infrastructure. 
2.2 Network neutrality 
One of the policy areas in which the divergence between the US and 
the EU has been most evident over the past decade is network 
neutrality, defined as a rule prohibiting network operators from 
discriminating between types of Internet traffic and thus obliging them 
to treat all bits in the same manner. Companies operating at the 
application and content layers of the Internet ecosystem have 
advocated such a rule since the mid-2000s. Their efforts have triggered 
a furious debate first in the United States and later in the EU and 
globally. Arguments in favour of regulatory intervention to mandate 
network neutrality and to keep telecoms networks as ‘dumb pipes’ 
developed mostly with reference to the infrastructure and logical layers 
of the Internet value chain. On the one hand, telecoms operators claim 
that disabling them from managing traffic on their networks would 
jeopardise the quality of the user experience, deny the possibility of a 
68%
86%
98%
8%
27%
59%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2011 2012 2013
US
EU
378  RENDA & YOO 
 
more efficient and effective provision of the Internet service and leave 
the whole Web prey to spam and illegal peer-to-peer file-sharing, 
which – despite its illegality – has continued for many years to 
represent roughly half of all Internet traffic. On the other hand, 
‘neutralists’ challenged this view by stating that the end-to-end nature 
of the Internet should not be contaminated by intelligence in the core 
of the network, which would reduce the value of the network due to 
filtering of content and speech and the narrowing down of spaces for 
creativity at the edges.  
The network neutrality debate can be approached from several 
angles. From a competition policy perspective, network neutrality is 
more needed if consumers do not have sufficient choice between 
alternative Internet Service Providers (ISPs): the existence of a single 
ISP with significant market power could lead to situations in which 
blocking or throttling of competing applications or ‘unwanted’ content 
could be the equivalent of discrimination or refusal to deal (see below, 
section 2). From a dynamic efficiency perspective, a relaxation of 
network neutrality rules could allow ISPs to monetise investment in 
new networks by charging ‘bandwidth hogs’, such as Netflix, a fee for 
the occupying their networks or by offering certain application 
providers a ‘toll lane’ over the public Internet, where quality of service 
would be guaranteed. Moreover, the neutrality debate has been 
approached from the standpoint of data protection (Should ISPs inspect 
the traffic that flows over their networks?), innovation (Will the new 
Google be forced to bribe an ISP to be visible on the Internet?), and even 
freedom of expression and media pluralism (Will ISPs decide which 
content should be prioritised, and which one should be delayed? or 
Should ISPs be free to decide which content to prioritise, in the name of 
freedom of expression?). While a full account of all these positions 
would fall outside the scope of this chapter, appreciating the 
complexity of the debate is critical for anyone seeking to assess the 
likelihood that the US and the EU will find common ground.  
2.2.1 Network neutrality in the United States 
Although the controversy over network neutrality can trace its roots to 
disputes over open access to cable modem systems that took place 
during the late 1990s, the debate began in earnest in 2002, when the 
FCC issued a ruling to classify cable modem systems as ‘information 
services’ instead of ‘telecommunications services’, which exempted 
them from Title II regulation, including, inter alia, network-sharing 
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obligations (FCC, 2002b).8 The US Supreme Court eventually upheld 
the FCC’s action in Brand X Internet Services v. FCC (2005). 
In response to concerns raised in the aftermath of this ruling, 
then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell (2004) called upon the industry to 
voluntarily embrace a series of Internet freedoms that would ensure 
end users’ ability to access content, run applications and attach 
personal devices as they saw fit, subject only to restrictions needed to 
manage networks, ensure quality experiences, prevent disruption of 
the network and prevent theft of service. Powell also called for the 
industry to provide consumers with clear and meaningful information 
regarding the terms of their broadband service plans.  
Concerns about blocking were heightened when a small local 
telephone company known as Madison River Communications 
prevented its DSL (digital subscriber line) customers from using the 
ports needed to access Internet telephony (also known as Voice over 
Internet protocol or VoIP) The FCC (2005a) invoked Title II when 
approving a consent decree settling this matter. The FCC (2005b) 
reversed course after the US Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, 
classifying DSL and other wireline forms of broadband Internet access 
constituted an information service. Shortly thereafter, the FCC also 
classified broadband over powerline and wireless broadband as 
information services as well (FCC, 2006 and 2007). 
Since then, the FCC has constantly been under pressure to 
strengthen network neutrality rules. For example, at the same time that 
the FCC classified DSL as an information service, it issued a Policy 
Statement recognising the agency’s intent to preserve consumers’ 
rights to access content, run applications and attach devices as they saw 
fit. As such, the rule prohibited the blocking of content, but did not 
explicitly prohibit non-discrimination and even acknowledged the 
need for exceptions to the no-blocking principle for the needs of law 
enforcement and for “reasonable network management” (FCC, 2005c). 
But the Policy Statement did not formally adopt any regulatory 
mandates, and network neutrality proponents began to regard non-
                                                          
8 As the cable modem declaratory ruling noted, the federal government had 
never subjected cable systems to common carriage regulation (FCC, 2002b). Just 
the FCC concluded that broadband was an information service did not 
necessarily mean it would not be regulated. With respect to both DSL and cable 
modem service, the FCC sought comment on what regulations, if any, the FCC 
should impose under its general rulemaking authority (FCC, 2002a, pp. 3040-
3048; 2002b, pp. 4839-4854). 
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blocking obligations as insufficient. Also the US Congress began to 
debate the issue during its consideration of major telecommunications 
reform legislation in 2006.9 Although attempts to introduce network 
neutrality into the legislation were rejected by wide margins in the 
House of Representatives, the issue proved more controversial in the 
Senate, where an evenly divided Commerce Committee rejected a 
network neutrality amendment by a vote of 11 to 11. The underlying 
bill was never brought to the floor of the Senate. 
During the Obama Administration, calls for stronger network 
neutrality have become even more frequent.10 After taking office, the 
Obama Administration included provisions in the stimulus package 
that required that that broadband infrastructure grants made by the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration comply 
with the 2005 policy statement on network neutrality (American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). This new momentum led the 
FCC to issue a notice of proposed rule-making recommending the 
adoption of formal network neutrality rules for the first time in 2009: 
the proposed rule also included provisions on non-discrimination, 
while maintaining exceptions for reasonable network management and 
law enforcement/public safety and applying a lower standard to 
wireless networks. At that time, the FCC decided against reclassifying 
broadband as a Title II telecommunications service. Although the 
FCC’s first Open Internet Order was adopted at the end of 2010, it was 
not published in the Federal Register until 23 September 2011. Shortly 
thereafter, Verizon challenged the 2010 order in court, with the court 
resolving the matter in January 2014 (Verizon v. FCC 2014). The court 
ruled that the FCC has ancillary authority over the broadband Internet 
as a general matter, but struck down the FCC’s non-discrimination and 
non-blocking rules as improper exercises of that authority, while 
providing guidance on how to reframe those rules so that they would 
comply with the statute.11  
                                                          
9 For a review of the history of this legislative debate, see Yoo (2006). 
10 Barack Obama endorsed network neutrality both as a Senator and a 
candidate during the 2008 presidential campaign 
(http://change.gov/agenda/technology_agenda/). 
11 Specific exercises of ancillary authority under Title I are subject to the 
constraint that they not contravene any other specific statutory provision. The 
statute provides that the FCC can impose common carriage obligations only on 
providers of telecommunications services, not on providers of information 
services. Because the prohibition of unjust and unreasonable non-
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In May 2014, four months after the court’s opinion in Verizon v. 
FCC, the agency proposed new rules that followed the approach 
described by the court (FCC, 2014a). But while the FCC seemed to 
favour a compromise solution in which non-blocking rules would be 
coupled with exceptions for specialised services and reasonable traffic 
management, the political landscape changed abruptly in November 
2014, when the President endorsed Title II as the basis for network 
neutrality in a public speech. This speech heavily influenced the 
content of the new Open Internet Order adopted by the FCC on 26 
February 2015, and released on 12 March 2015. 
The new Open Internet Order reclassified broadband Internet 
access services (BIAS) as a telecommunications service governed by 
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, completing what can only 
be seen as a U-turn from the direction the FCC had taken since 2002.12 
The Order establishes three ‘bright-line rules’ prohibiting blocking, 
throttling and paid prioritisation, with all other conduct being 
governed by a general standard prohibiting unreasonably interfering 
with disadvantaging consumers’ ability to reach the content, 
applications, services or devices of their choice or edge providers’ 
ability to access consumers using the Internet. The order created 
exceptions for reasonable network management, defined as practices 
primarily used for and tailored to achieving a legitimate network 
management purpose as opposed to a business purpose. Another new 
feature of the Order is that it extends full network neutrality protection 
to wireless networks.13 With respect to specialised services, which the 
order renamed non-Broadband Internet Access Services (non-BIAS) 
data services, the FCC continued to permit providers to offer these 
services while continuing to monitor their development and use. But 
                                                          
discrimination is the quintessential obligation borne by common carriers, 
mandating non-discrimination would represent an improper imposition of 
common carriage obligations onto an information service. The court similarly 
concluded that the anti-blocking rule combined with prohibition of charging 
edge providers any fee for providing connectivity essentially imposed common 
carriage obligations with a price of zero. The court did uphold the transparency 
rules as a valid exercise of the FCC’s ancillary authority under Section 706. 
12 The FCC has also stated it will refrain from applying as many as 27 provisions 
of Title II, and as many as 700 codified rules, resulting in what the Commission 
calls a “light-touch” approach for the use of Title II” See FCC (2015, p. 12).  
13 Instead of a separate rule for wireless, the FCC ruled that it would instead 
simply take engineering attributes into account when assessing reasonable 
network management. 
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perhaps the biggest change in the scope of the order is the inclusion of 
interconnection in its regulatory purview. Until the adoption of the 
2015 order, network neutrality sought to equalise how traffic is handled 
within a broadband network. Regulating interconnection, in contrast, 
seeks to equalise the terms under which how traffic arrives at a 
network. 
What is most striking is the extent to which network neutrality 
has represented a moving target. What began in 2005 as a prohibition 
on blocking also became in 2010 a prohibition on discrimination and in 
2015 direct regulation of interconnection as well. At the same time, the 
jurisdictional foundation for network neutrality has shifted from the 
general, more flexible provisions of Title I to the more intrusive 
framework of Title II. What will happen next is anyone’s guess, since 
(as occurred in 2010 after the adoption of the first Open Internet Order) 
network providers have brought a judicial challenge to reclassification 
of broadband as a Title II service.  
2.2.2 Network neutrality in Europe 
Back in 2005, when the Madison River case was intensifying the network 
neutrality debate in the US, the European Commission was deeply 
convinced that the debate would never gain traction in Europe. Ten 
years later, it is clear that these early predictions were wrong: since 
2009, Europe has been trapped in a fierce discussion, which – as will be 
clarified at the end of this section – seems to have been recently affected 
also by the resurgence of protectionism and industrial policy at the EU 
and at the national level and is likely to reach new policy areas, such as 
platform neutrality and search neutrality.  
The first EU rules on network neutrality were adopted in 2009 
and included in Articles 20 and 22 of the then-amended Universal 
Service Obligations (USO) Directive. Article 20 of the USO Directive 
mandates that network operators that manage traffic should inform 
end users in a transparent way of the practices they adopt so that users 
can make an informed choice when deciding whether to subscribe. 
Article 22 of the USO Directive introduced the possibility for national 
regulators to intervene and impose a minimum quality-of-service level 
in case the quality of certain applications became unacceptable for end 
users, arguably due to traffic management practices.  
Despite difficulties faced by national regulators in applying this 
rule, in late 2013 the ‘Connected Continent’ proposal presented by the 
European Commission contained a very similar approach. On the one 
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hand, the proposed package recognised that network neutrality is what 
keeps the Internet open and as such should be the default principle for 
all ISPs (Internet service providers) in the EU-28. On the other hand, the 
proposed rule left the door open to the creation of specialised services 
through agreements between ISPs and application/content providers, 
under the condition that such services do not disrupt the open Internet. 
However, in April 2014, the proposal was significantly modified by the 
European Parliament, which basically rejected the possibility of 
specialised services and reinstated network neutrality as an almost 
insuperable principle for ISPs.  
The text of the Connected Continent package is currently under 
trilogue (negotiations between the European Commission, the 
European Parliament, and the Council), but a political agreement was 
announced by the European Commission on 30 June 2015. Under the 
new agreement, the principle of net neutrality will for the first time be 
enshrined into EU law: users will be free to access the content of their 
choice, they will not be unfairly blocked or slowed down anymore and 
paid prioritisation will not be allowed. In parallel, Internet access 
providers will still be able to offer specialised services of higher quality, 
such as Internet TV and new innovative applications, so long as these 
services are not supplied at the expense of the quality of the open 
Internet. These rules will be a reality across all member states as soon 
as the text officially applies on 30 April 2016.14 Accordingly, the final 
compromise is closer to the original position of the European 
Commission and, as such, contemplates the possibility of specialised 
services and reasonable traffic management. More specifically, the 
Commission explains that “all traffic will be treated equally, subject to 
strict and clearly identified public-interest exceptions, such as network 
security or combating child pornography, and subject to efficient day-
to-day network management by Internet service providers”.15 
In summary, the EU position on network neutrality is likely to 
remain controversial in the coming years: despite the recent political 
agreement, which will take effect in April 2016, implementation issues 
are still far from settled.16 Meanwhile, a number of member states have 
taken the initiative to regulate the issue, leading to remarkable 
inconsistencies across the EU. While countries like the Netherlands, 
                                                          
14 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5265_en.htm.  
15 Ibid.  
16 See Renda (2013) on the lack of detail on the implementation of a rule based 
on the co-existence of best effort Internet and specialised services. 
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Finland and Slovenia have enacted very strict neutrality rules, France 
has explicitly allowed traffic management practices, and the United 
Kingdom regards the possibility to charge quality of service fees as a 
much-needed opportunity for ISPs to monetise their investments in 
broadband networks.  
2.2.3 Will there be convergence on network neutrality rules in 
the TTIP? 
Despite the similarities of the terms of the debate on both sides of the 
Atlantic, there are many reasons to doubt that there will be explicit 
convergence on network neutrality in the Digital TTIP, even if – as 
seems straightforward – such a result would be greatly beneficial for all 
the players in the Internet ecosystem. First, the state of competition and 
investment in broadband networks is very different, and accordingly 
the rationale for intervening on network neutrality (and the likely 
impact of neutrality rules on the market) is also likely to be very 
different. Not surprisingly, the FCC has mentioned the lack of real 
alternatives (beyond one fibre, one cable and wireless network) for 
consumers in many parts of the United States as the basis for 
mandating network neutrality in the 2015 Open Internet Order. In 
Europe, if anything, there is a growing concern that there might be too 
many telecommunications operators, hence the calls for industry 
consolidation and the need to foster investment.  
Second, the recent ruling of the FCC and the upcoming 
Connected Continent package in the EU incorporate slightly different 
rules on network neutrality. A deeper look at the text of the two rules 
reveals a remarkable degree of uncertainty, both due to the threat of 
extensive litigation in the United States and to the implementation 
challenges that the rules will pose on both sides of the Atlantic. As these 
uncertainties are unlikely to be solved in the coming months, a 
meaningful agreement on network neutrality seems incompatible with 
the timing of the first version of the TTIP.  
To be sure, finding an agreement on specific issues would be 
advisable and would add to legal certainty and overall market 
performance both in the United States and in the increasingly 
fragmented European Union. Examples include a black list of practices 
that are always to be considered prohibited (regardless of the market 
power of the ISP); a grey list of practices that are to be prohibited under 
well-detailed circumstances; and a white list of allowed practices, to be 
consistently interpreted and regularly updated in what could become 
a very useful living agreement. 
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Finally, the prospects for an agreement on network neutrality 
chiefly depend on the position that the EU will take in related fields, 
and most notably in its regulatory reforms on e-commerce and 
copyright and in the antitrust investigations against Google. All these 
dossiers are deeply intertwined with network neutrality, not only 
because they call into question the potential introduction of platform-
neutrality obligations; but also since they all directly or indirectly refer 
to the conduct of US companies in the European territory. We deal with 
these issues in the sections 3 and 4 below. 
3. Antitrust and cyberspace 
3.1 How similar are antitrust rules in the US and the EU? 
Nowhere have the United States and Europe shown signs of 
convergence in the past century as they have in the area of antitrust. As 
a matter of fact, the introduction of rules on competition in the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957 is seen as largely inspired by the US tradition, starting 
with the 1890 Sherman Act and the 1914 Clayton Act. And indeed, the 
rules contained in the antitrust legislation of the two blocs are quite 
similar. When it comes to antitrust, however, the devil is the details, 
and the details are numerous. Without pretending to provide an 
exhaustive explanation, this section explores existing differences with 
a specific focus on digital markets and the Internet ecosystem. 
First, even if the wording of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
and Arts 101 and 102 TFEU is comparable, the two jurisdictions have 
taken divergent approaches to single-firm conduct (‘abuse of 
dominance’ in the EU jargon), due to the prevalence of the Chicago 
School of economics in the United States and the influence of the more 
structuralist ‘Ordoliberal school’ in Europe, starting from the early days 
of the debate on the Treaty of Rome.17 This is not only a matter for 
historians or a subject for academic writings: the different approach has 
resulted in starkly divergent positions being adopted in merger control 
(e.g. the GE/Honeywell merger cleared in the US but was rejected in the 
EU in 2001) and also most notably in the area of single-firm conduct 
(e.g. the US and EU Microsoft cases).18  
Second, some of the most notable differences between the two 
legal systems on the treatment of single-firm conduct are highly 
                                                          
17 See Gerber (1994) and Akman (2009).  
18 Renda (2001 and 2004). 
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relevant for the electronic communications sector. For example, EU 
antitrust rules (and consequently, also the 2003 e-communications 
package) rely heavily on the so-called ‘essential facilities’ doctrine, 
whereas the US Supreme Court has never embraced that doctrine. In 
practice, this means that EU authorities are more likely to mandate 
asset sharing or compulsory licensing in ‘refusal to deal’ cases than US 
authorities. Cases like Trinko in the United States contrast sharply with 
the interoperability stance taken by the European Commission and the 
Court of First Instance (now the General Tribunal) in their Microsoft 
decisions in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Moreover, the rulings of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on issues of predation 
and margin squeeze (especially the Telia Sonera case) have confirmed 
that EU antitrust dances to a different drummer than the US. In 
particular, in Europe large companies are explicitly attributed a special 
responsibility vis-à-vis their market, which has recently led the Court 
to theorise that large firms should ensure, besides the survival, also the 
profitability of their smaller rivals.19 By contrast, the US antitrust law 
has rejected price squeezes (linkLine) and is more equivocal than 
European law with respect to loyalty rebates (compare LePage’s with 
PeaceHealth). 
Third, differences in the way in which antitrust economics are 
applied in the two jurisdictions becomes even more acute when it 
comes to high-tech markets and in particular on the Internet, due to the 
prevalence of network externalities and multi-sided platforms. Many 
of these settings tend to be characterised by competition ‘for’ rather 
than ‘in’ the market, as firms compete in a high-risk, high-reward game 
that produces only one winner. The structuralist view of competition 
prevailing in the European Union reverberates on the authorities’ 
distrust of this dynamic form of competition (regarding it as a 
‘sequence of monopolies’, rather than a static situation of pluralism), 
despite the fact that in Europe, just as in the US, market power is not 
equated with market share, but in principle requires a finding of 
independence of behaviour.20 The consequence is that the European 
                                                          
19 See Petit (2014).  
20 Thus, as the European Commission explains on its website: “Market shares 
are a useful first indication of the importance of each firm on the market in 
comparison to the others. The Commission's view is that the higher the market 
share, and the longer the period of time over which it is held, the more likely it 
is to be a preliminary indication of dominance. If a company has a market share 
of less than 40%, it is unlikely to be dominant” (see http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html). 
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Commission can regard certain companies as dominant companies 
even when they have a high chance of being displaced by market 
competitors in the generation of their product in what is an ever-
changing competitive landscape.  
The continental drift in antitrust, exacerbated by the peculiar 
economics of high-tech markets, lies at the roots of many differences 
between regulatory practices in the two legal systems, particularly 
regarding infrastructure regulation and network neutrality. It underlies 
the US relatively hands-off approach to both merger regulation and 
single-firm conduct in cyberspace, which contrasts sharply with the EU 
interventionist approach. And while the numerous antitrust 
investigations against Microsoft in both jurisdictions over the past 15 
years are probably the clearest illustration of the existing divergence, 
the current European Commission’s case against Google is a good 
example of a case dismissed by the FTC in the United States and 
currently being re-proposed, with remarkable emphasis, in the 
European Union. The new European Commissioner for Competition 
Margarethe Vestager announced on 15 April 2015 that the Commission 
had sent a Statement of Objections to Google, arguing that the giant IT 
company abused its dominant position in the “general Internet search” 
market. The Commission has also launched a similar investigation with 
respect to the market for mobile operating systems, apps and services. 
Most importantly, Ms Vestager is accusing Google of having awarded 
preferential treatment to its own online comparison-shopping service 
to the detriment of competing services. In so doing, Google has 
allegedly leveraged its market power in searching into a neighbouring 
market, thereby foreclosing competitors from that market and 
thwarting competition on the merits.  
3.2 Is an agreement on antitrust principles in cyberspace 
possible, and desirable? 
In the case of antitrust rules, a full agreement between the two parties 
in the Digital TTIP (and on pending cases) is unlikely for a variety of 
reasons. First, full alignment of antitrust rules would neither be 
possible, nor advisable, particularly given that enforcement of antitrust 
rules is completely different in the two legal systems. The prevalence 
of private enforcement (i.e. actions before the court aimed at seeking 
injunctions and damage compensation) in the US contrasts with the 
almost-exclusive reliance on public enforcement in the European 
Union, which significantly limits the effectiveness of antitrust rules. To 
some extent, antitrust rules in the US that appear more light-handed 
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may be more effectively enforced compared with the EU’s stricter rules 
that omit such formidable tools as ‘opt-out’ class actions, criminal 
sanctions, punitive damages and contingent fees between lawyers and 
clients.21  
Second, the Google investigation is a good example of the 
attempt to extend the net neutrality debate into the higher layers of the 
Internet. The main allegation against Google is indeed one of ‘non-
neutrality’: Google is charged with unduly discriminating among 
Internet content by providing a non-neutral, non-objective view of the 
Internet. Without entering into the merits of the Google search 
investigation, which would exceed the scope of this chapter, it is clear 
that advocating neutrality for search engines raises a range of complex 
issues. And it is also clear that in the United States, any attempt to 
compel a re-design of Google’s home page or the disclosure of Google’s 
algorithm would be seen as contrary to the narrow and deferential 
approach towards product design that US courts have followed since 
the antitrust cases against IBM in the 1970s.22 
Third, any convergence on antitrust rules would have to dispel 
the suspicion that some of the most far-reaching antitrust investigations 
of the past years have been motivated by a combination of competition 
policy and industrial policy concerns. On the one hand, recent rumours 
have hinted at possible White House involvement in the FTC decision 
not to proceed against Google for anti-competitive conduct.23 On the 
other hand, the European Commission’s current investigation against 
Google is difficult to disentangle from the calls for enhanced regulation 
of online intermediaries launched by several institutions, including the 
European Parliament and the legislatures of France and Germany. If 
the Google antitrust investigation is part and parcel of a more general 
tendency towards platform regulation and neutrality, the United States 
is unlikely to follow Europe. This would not only go against the 
interests of many US-based companies; it would also contradict the 
way in which competition policy has been framed and applied in the 
United States for more than a century.  
                                                          
21 See Renda et al. (2006).  
22 See e.g. Telex Corp. v. IBM (1973); Innovation Data Processing v. IBM (1984). 
23 See “Inside the US Antitrust Probe of Google”, Wall Street Journal, 19 March 
2015 (www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-
1426793274).  
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4. The EU’s platform regulation debate: Towards the 
end of the ‘mere conduit’ principle? 
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, while the network 
neutrality debate still looms, the Juncker Commission has also 
launched a new initiative to extend the neutrality principle to Internet 
platforms. Many official documents published by the European 
Commission and the European Parliament in the past months allude to 
the pressing need to limit US-headquartered companies’ dominance 
over the value of the Internet. Since last year, French and German 
institutions have repeatedly called on the European Commission to 
split Google into two companies, a recommendation endorsed by the 
European Parliament in November 2014. The French Digital Council 
has vigorously called for legislation that would impose neutrality 
obligations on large Internet platforms, starting obviously from Google 
but then reaching all of the so-called GAFTAM companies.24 And the 
first weeks of the Juncker Commission seem to have emphasised the 
need to go beyond a ‘silo’ approach in telecoms and media regulation 
to address the problem of the rising power of over-the-top (OTT) 
platforms through a consistent set of legal documents covering 
competition, copyright, privacy and security issues. What might 
emerge is an additional layer of regulation and responsibilities for 
Internet intermediaries, which would be a complete U-turn compared 
to the early days of the Internet, when legislation such as the EU e-
commerce Directive and the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
provided for intermediary immunity to preserve the ‘mere conduit’ 
role of network operators as well as the neutrality of the Internet itself. 
The most relevant issues currently being examined by EU policy-
makers in this context (and most notably included in the Digital Single 
Market strategy presented by the European Commission on 6 May 
2015) are the reform of copyright and e-commerce rules, in particular 
regarding the liability of online intermediaries. The two must be 
analysed together, since such reform would represent the revision of a 
concept that has governed the relationship between both areas of 
legislation since the birth of the Internet, namely the ‘mere conduit’ 
principle. 
Regarding copyright, the Commission plans to propose revisions 
by the end of 2015. The increasingly poor fit between the 2001 
Information Society Directive and the features of the evolving Internet 
                                                          
24 See Conseil National du Numérique (2014). 
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ecosystem make the need for such reforms particularly urgent.25 In 
particular, the 2001 Directive was adopted at a time when the key 
principle of Internet regulation was immunising ISPs from liability for 
the conduct of their subscribers. The US Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act follows the same approach. Both enactments are strongly linked to 
the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, which sought to strengthen 
technological protection measures while preserving the ‘dumb pipe’ 
nature of ISPs.26 Moreover, the 2001 Directive clearly reflects the 
assumption that digital rights management technologies would 
become the dominant mechanism for protecting content online, an 
assumption that has proven wrong in many media sectors. Since then, 
many member states (with France often being the most vocal) have 
called for giving ISPs greater responsibility for detecting and even 
penalising copyright infringements, which would represent a sea 
change in EU copyright legislation and enforcement.27 This issue has 
already proven extremely controversial in the negotiations over the 
copyright package: during the hectic debate that led to the European 
Parliament’s rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) in 2012, ISP liability proved to be a sticking point for both IT 
companies and civil society. 
Reforming the Information Society Directive to introduce ISP 
liability would also clash with the ‘mere conduit’ principle introduced 
in the 2000 e-commerce Directive.28 This means that any reform of 
copyright reform necessarily requires reform of EU e-commerce rules 
as well. In this respect, the European Commission has recently 
announced a “comprehensive assessment of the role of platforms 
before the end of 2015 that will examine both the sharing economy, and 
online intermediaries. Issues will include such as (i) transparency, e.g., 
in search results (involving paid for links and/or advertisement), (ii) 
platforms’ usage of the information they collect, (iii) relations between 
platforms and suppliers, (iv) constraints on the ability of individuals 
                                                          
25 See Renda et al. (2015).  
26 See WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, adopted in Geneva, 20 December 1996 (www.wipo.int/treaties). 
27 See France’s HADOPI law (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des œuvres et 
la Protection des droits d'auteur sur Internet), which was introduced in 2009 to 
promote the distribution and protection of creative works on the internet. 
28 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178, 17 July 2000. 
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and businesses to move from one platform to another, (v) the best way 
to tackle illegal content on the Internet.”29 The underlying position of 
the Commission is that while the ‘mere conduit’ principle enshrined in 
the e-Commerce Directive has underpinned the development of the 
Internet in Europe, today blocking access to and removing illegal 
content by providers of hosting services can be slow and complicated, 
and “it is not always easy to define the limits on what intermediaries 
can do with the content that they transmit, store or host before losing 
the possibility to benefit from the exemptions from liability set out in 
the e-Commerce Directive”.30 In other words, the more ISPs manage 
and inspect traffic and use data generated by user behaviour, the 
weaker the justification for exempting intermediaries from liability 
becomes.  
Just like the net neutrality debate, the war on copyright and the 
‘mere conduit’ principle is extending from ISPs into the higher layers 
of the Internet ecosystem. After large EU countries like Germany, 
France and Spain have taken action to expand Google’s liability for 
copyright infringement, the European Commissioner for the Digital 
Single Market Günther Oettinger recently stated that in future EU 
legislation, “when Google takes intellectual works from within the EU 
and works with them, then the EU can protect those works and demand 
a levy from Google.” However, recent history about the likely impact 
of current plans to strengthen copyright liability are not encouraging: 
the two existing examples of ancillary copyright being rolled out 
nationally, in Germany and in Spain, seem to have largely backfired.31 
Finally, one critical component of the current debate on 
copyright and e-commerce reform is the aggressive stance adopted by 
the European Commission against so-called ‘geo-blocking’ practices, 
now being considered as one of the worst obstacles on the way to 
market integration, and accordingly included in the new EU Digital 
                                                          
29 See the European Commission’s Communication on “A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe”, COM(2015) 192 final, Brussels, 6.5.2015. 
30 Ibid.  
31 In Germany, local publishers were forced to grant Google free use of their 
text snippets and thumbnails after the company delisted them from Google 
News, and traffic to their websites predictably plummeted. In Spain, the 
severity of the local ancillary copyright law has created an even-worse situation 
– the publishers, who lobbied for the law, cannot grant Google free access even 
if they want to do so, and now Google has axed Google News in Spain 
altogether, again causing a precipitous drop in traffic to publishers’ websites. 
392  RENDA & YOO 
 
Single Market strategy.32 Geo-blocking refer to commercial practices 
that either prevent online customers from accessing and purchasing 
products and services from a website based in other member states or 
automatically re-route requests to a domestically located store. As a 
result of these practices, consumers are often charged more for 
products or services (particularly music or audio-visual) purchased 
online on the basis of their IP address, their postal address, or the credit 
card used to make the purchase. Again, practices adopted by US-based 
e-commerce giants like Amazon are often quoted as the real target of 
initiatives of this kind. This suspicion was strengthened by the launch, 
on 6 May 2015, of a Competition Sector Inquiry to assess whether geo-
blocking restrictions (often embodied in contractual and distribution 
agreements for online trade of tangible goods but also in the licensing 
of audio-visual and content online services) constitute undue barriers 
to cross-border online shopping;33 and finally confirmed by the 
subsequent opening, on 11 June 2015, of an antitrust investigation 
against Amazon for certain business practices adopted in the 
distribution of electronic books.34  
In conclusion, the EU seems to have opened a debate on issues 
that are largely underexplored in the United States. This is partly 
justified by the greater integration of the US internal market (at least in 
terms of geo-blocking practices). But at the same time, it also reflects 
the fact that Europe is increasingly considering policies to re-distribute 
revenues along the Internet value chain, away from large IT 
intermediaries and towards content producers (in copyright 
legislation) and infrastructure operators (deviations from net 
neutrality). We consider it quite unlikely that any measure on 
intermediary liability and deviations from the mere conduit principle, 
if actively pursued by the European Commission within a Digital TTIP, 
would be subject of an agreement. Moreover, an agreement on platform 
liability based on the emerging EU approach would likely be 
unfortunate in economic and legal terms. Imposing heavy obligations 
on emerging Internet intermediaries both in terms of neutrality and 
liability for copyright and privacy would amount to a true oxymoron: 
treating them as dumb pipes on the one hand and as editors of content 
on the other.  
                                                          
32 European Commission’s Communication, “A Digital Single Market Strategy 
for Europe”, COM(2015) 192 final, Brussels, 6.5.2015. 
33 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4921_en.htm.  
34 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5166_en.htm.  
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5. End user information and accessibility issues  
Among the many issues that are under discussion in the final TTIP 
agreement, one of the most promising relates to consumer protection 
issues, particularly e-labelling and e-accessibility. The first issue relates 
to the possibility of displaying some of the required and voluntary 
product information via a product’s screen instead of physically 
affixing a permanent label to the product. Electronic marking would 
ensure that any changes to any labelling mandated by regulation can 
be updated more easily and therefore be more likely to remain current. 
In addition, the use of electronic marking would enhance consumers’ 
ability to access and understand the regulatory information as well as 
facilitate access by disabled users. It would reduce costs and reduce 
time to market. 
On the specific issue of e-labelling, legislation has already been 
enacted in both legal systems. However, the EU legislation was 
adopted specifically for medical devices and limited to the provision of 
instructions for use. In particular, Regulation 207/2012 on electronic 
instructions for use of medical devices specifies how to build the 
instructions for use in a medical device’s label in an electronic format 
and the devices for which they may be used.  
In the United States, the Enhance Labelling, Accessing, and 
Branding of Electronic Licenses Act of 2014 (E-LABEL Act) was signed 
by President Obama at the end of November 2014. The Act requires the 
FCC to allow manufacturers of radio-frequency devices to use 
electronic labelling for the equipment instead of affixing physical labels 
to the equipment. The statute defines “radio-frequency device with 
display” as any equipment or device that 1) requires the FCC’s 
authorisation before the equipment or device may be marketed or sold 
within the United States and 2) is capable of digitally displaying 
required labelling and regulatory information. On 10 July 2014, the FCC 
also issued guidance describing how devices with integrated displays 
can present label information electronically. 
Despite the differences in the frameworks adopted by the two 
legal systems, there should be no significant obstacle to the adoption of 
common solutions on e-labelling in the Digital TTIP. The starting point 
could be the US guidance on how to present information, with further 
discussions focusing on issues such as the clarity and user-friendliness 
of the message to be displayed, as well as the modalities of the 
transmission.  
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In contrast, e-accessibility has been one of the core issues 
discussed by the Transatlantic Economic Council throughout the past 
decade. Back in December 2005, the European Commission issued 
standards mandate n. 376 (M376) to harmonise and facilitate the public 
procurement of accessible ICT products and services and to enable 
public procurers to make use of these harmonised requirements in the 
procurement process. The intention of M376 was already aimed at 
achieving a degree of similarity with section 508 of the US 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (S508), but the industry has long criticised 
the two standards as needlessly different, and has been long calling for 
further harmonisation.35 Since then, the M376 and S508 teams have 
been working without frequent technical exchanges and on different 
schedules at a time when close cooperation is vital for success. Work is 
underway to ensure better coordination, and the S508 standard is being 
revised following a proposal by the US Access Board, which aims to 
merge them with its guidelines for telecommunications equipment and 
customer premises equipment covered by section 255 of the 
Communications Act of 1934. The proposed revisions and updates to 
the section 508-based standards and section 255-based guidelines are 
intended to ensure that ICT covered by the respective statutes is 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. Both parties in 
the TTIP can use as a reference the Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, an international standard prepared by a 
working group composed of academics and corporate representatives 
within the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).  
Agreements on both e-labelling and e-accessibility appear to be 
attainable for the Digital TTIP chapter. The European Commission’s 
TTIP factsheet on the information society concurs, and there is no 
reason to expect negotiations to fail on these issues.  
In addition to these matters, which have been part of the 
transatlantic dialogue for quite some time, other related topics might 
also find their way into an initial agreement. These include consumer 
protection standards or rules for e-health and in particular M-health 
applications, on which the industry has been quite vocal over the past 
months.  
                                                          
35 The problems are exemplified by the delay in the publication of the latest US 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule-making (ANPRM) version of S508 that was 
announced by the US Access Board in early October 2011. Because of the lack 
of exchange of information, this delay has caused a problem for the EU M376 
team that could lead to a harmonisation failure. 
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6. The Internet of Things and smart manufacturing 
One of the most important current developments in the digital sector is 
the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT). According to major IT 
companies such as Cisco and Huawei, the number of devices connected 
to the network globally is projected to grow from fewer than 10 billion 
to more than 50 billion devices by 2020. The quest for connecting the 
“remaining 99% of things” that have not been connected to date and for 
capturing market share in the run-up to the IoT age is one of the most 
vibrant competitive races of our time. Like all network-based 
phenomena, IoT is a natural candidate for global standards in order to 
allow market participants to fully realise the benefits of scale economies 
and network economic effects. As a result, one would expect the many 
industrial sectors involved to share an interest in developing standards 
and rules that will be adopted worldwide. Indeed, a number of 
industry players have called for including harmonised rules for IOT 
within the TTIP, especially on the manufacturing side. However, the 
temptation to develop incompatible standards as a way to protect 
domestic industry is reportedly emerging, in particular on the EU side.  
In the US, since February 2010, manufacturing has added more 
than 700,000 jobs, the fastest pace of job growth since the 1990s. In order 
to continue this extraordinary momentum, the Obama Administration 
launched an Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP) within the 
President’s Council of Advisors in Science and Technology. President 
Obama then launched four manufacturing innovation institutes with 
four more on the way; invested nearly $1 billion to upgrade our 
community colleges to train workers for advanced manufacturing jobs; 
expanded investments in applied research for emerging, cross-cutting 
manufacturing technologies; and launched a new initiative to deploy 
the talent of returning veterans to in-demand jobs, including advanced 
manufacturing. The AMP delivered its final report in November 2014, 
making recommendations addressing three key pillars that support 
American manufacturing: 1) enabling innovation, 2) securing the talent 
pipeline and 3) improving the business climate. These 
recommendations are now being followed up by executive actions in 
all three areas.  
In Europe, work on advanced manufacturing has been 
underway, especially since the launch of the 7th Framework 
Programme for Research (followed in 2014 by the Horizon 2020 
program) and the Europe 2020 strategy announced in 2010, which 
contained a flagship initiative dedicated to an Industrial Policy for the 
Globalisation Era. However, the March 2014 report of the European 
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Commission’s Task Force on Advanced Manufacturing for Clean 
Production acknowledged that initiatives so far have remained mostly 
patchy and isolated.36 But the new European Commission seems 
willing to shift gears and is reportedly ready to adopt a non-legislative 
initiative that will expand the Industrie 4.0 already launched by the 
German government in cooperation with industry and academia in 
2011 to the pan-European level. The use of cyber-physical objects and 
equipment in the factories of the future is often described as the ‘fourth 
industrial revolution’, which might prove so disruptive that it is 
expected to bring about paradigm shifts in modes of production and 
distribution. 
Industry 4.0 is indeed powered by a mix of technologies, which 
include nano-technologies and IoT technologies that design and realise 
smart objects, cloud computing technologies for the low-cost storage of 
data and applications, a mix of wireless technologies for always-on 
connectivity (including 5G), advanced robotics, 3D printing, and big-
data analytics for optimised management of the supply chain. A report 
by PwC for the German government estimated that over the next five 
years, a yearly investment of as much as €40 billion might bring an 18% 
increase in the productivity of German industry and a 12% increase in 
the industry’s turnover37.  
However, the Europeanisation of the German Industrie 4.0 
strategy will not come without consequences. First, it is to be 
anticipated that all other member states will find the initiative less 
attractive, since they do not feature the same industry leadership that 
Germany still enjoys in some sectors. Germany’s market for embedded 
systems, i.e. computer systems with a dedicated function within a larger 
mechanical or electrical system, generates €20 billion annually (expected 
to reach €40 billion by 2020) and ranks third in the world behind the US 
and Japan. Other countries do not reach anywhere near these figures 
and thus have much lower chances to develop industrial leadership in 
most of the technologies involved. At the same time, countries like Italy 
(second only to Germany in terms of industry size in Europe) feature a 
completely different industry structure, with a myriad of micro-
enterprises that would lack the scale to fully capitalise on a pan-
European initiative of this size.  
                                                          
36 See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/advanced-
manufacturing/index_en.htm  
37 See PwC, Opportunities and challenges for the Industrial Internet, 2014, 
available at http://www.pwc.nl/en/publicaties/industrie-4-0.jhtml.  
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But perhaps the most worrying aspect of the European side of 
the debate is the possibility that some of the key industry players 
involved in Industrie 4.0 might decide to develop standards that are 
incompatible with those being developed in the US, in particular when 
it comes to cloud computing, but also with respect to supply chain 
management. One possible example is the recent joint initiative 
launched by Deutsche Telekom and SAP to merge production 
technology with IT and telecommunications. The CEO of Deutsche 
Telekom recently observed: “We don't need to fear standards from the 
United States. We want Germany's voice to be heard as well on such an 
important issue.”38 The emergence of national standards in such a 
globalised industry is apparently motivated by industrial policy, such 
as the need to counter the current leadership of US-based companies, 
such as AT&T, Cisco, IBM, Intel and General Electric, which dominate 
the top standards alliances in this field, including the Industrial Internet 
Consortium, the Open Interconnected Consortium and the 
AllSeenAlliance. But an additional motivating factor is the desire to 
respond to the Snowden revelations by creating a national environment 
in which data will be preserved within German territory – the so-called 
‘German cloud’ (or, at least, a European cloud), already invoked a few 
times by Chancellor Angela Merkel.39  
In summary, an agreement on IoT standards would be highly 
desirable in the Digital TTIP and would likely speed up the deployment 
of Industrie 4.0 technologies. However, such an agreement is unlikely to 
occur, since both parties are deploying advanced manufacturing 
strategies as part of their industrial policy initiatives and are therefore 
acting more as competitors than as allies. In addition, the NSA scandal 
seems to be making an agreement in this field harder to reach and 
appears to be spurring the development of incompatible standards.  
7. A continental drift in data protection? 
No other issue related to the online world has been as prominent in the 
debate over the TTIP as data protection. Even before the Snowden 
revelations, the issue was almost intractable in transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation. Against this background, the emergence of the Internet, 
and even more of cloud computing, creates significant legal challenges 
                                                          
38 https://www.telekom.com/media/company/271966.  
39 See, inter alia, Hilmar Schmundt and Gerald Traufetter, “Digital 
Independence: NSA Scandal Boosts German Tech Industry”, Der Spiegel, 4 
February 2014.  
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alongside undoubted potential benefits. Cloud computing permits a 
degree of flexibility that makes it increasingly difficult to identify who 
should be held accountable vis-à-vis cloud customers for the handling 
and processing of personal data and on the legal regime that should 
govern data transfers outside the US and EU jurisdictions (Hon et al., 
2011a, 2011b, 2012; Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz & Solove, 2013). This 
section briefly describes the existing legislation on privacy in the US 
and the EU and the current debate on the regulation of transatlantic 
data flows. Section 6.1 introduces the main privacy laws (along with 
case law and enforcement practice) in the United States and the EU. 
Section 6.2 discusses the Safe Harbour regime and the Binding 
Corporate Rules. Section 6.3 briefly concludes by illustrating possible 
‘landing zones’ in current TTIP negotiations or in separate deals.  
7.1 Privacy law in the United States and in the EU 
The United States and the European Union have always followed 
different legal approaches to privacy and data protection (Schwartz & 
Solove, 2013). First, the US has traditionally relied on piecemeal, 
sectoral regulation and private ordering to address privacy issues. The 
European Union, in contrast, enacted the first horizontal, omnibus data 
protection laws in the 1970s followed by the adoption of the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data in 1981 and the enactment of the EU Data 
Protection Directive 95/46 in 1995. Moreover, in Europe privacy is 
explicitly considered as a fundamental right, whereas the US 
Constitution contains no explicit reference to privacy.40 Many 
prominent US scholars consider privacy as amounting to a property 
right, i.e., an alienable commodity that can be traded in exchange for 
customised service. Finally, in the US privacy legislation and case law 
traditionally focused on the protection of the citizen against violations 
and misbehaviour of public authorities (also due to the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment), whereas in the EU the focus is rather on the 
private sector. In a widely cited article published in the Yale Law Journal, 
James Whitman (2004) interpreted the fundamental divergence 
between the legal approaches to privacy in the US and the EU as rooted 
                                                          
40 The term ‘privacy’ does not appear explicitly in the US Constitution or the 
Bill of Rights. However, the US Supreme Court has ruled in favour of various 
privacy interests, deriving the right to privacy from the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.  
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in a cultural difference between those who view privacy as an aspect of 
liberty and those who regard privacy as an aspect of dignity.41 
7.1.1 Privacy laws in the United States 
In the United States, the right to privacy is historically and legally 
rooted in the Fourth Amendment, which provides: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.” The Supreme Court initially framed 
such a right with respect to the confidentiality of personal postal 
correspondence such as letters and sealed packages.42 Over the past few 
decades, various scholarly approaches to privacy have emerged, 
mostly viewing privacy as control over data and framing it as a 
commodity rather than a fundamental right, with important 
consequences in terms of its alienability (Solove, 2006).  
Regarding statutory law, early attempts to regulate privacy 
include the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970 and the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974. Other federal 
statutes addressing specific privacy issues include the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), the Health Information 
Portability and Accessibility Act (HIPAA), the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA). Several of these federal statutes focused on the presence 
                                                          
41 See Whitman (2004, p.161) quoting Post (2001), and arguing: “Continental 
privacy protections are, at their core, a form of protection of a right to respect 
and personal dignity …By contrast, America, in this as in so many things, is 
much more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially liberty against the 
state.” 
42 See Ex parte Jackson (1878) in which the US Supreme Court ruled: “The 
constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers 
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed 
against inspection, wherever they may be … No law of Congress can place in 
the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade 
the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations 
adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great 
principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.” Later, the 
US Supreme Court has ruled in favour of various privacy interests – deriving 
the right to privacy from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. 
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of ‘personally identifiable information’ while others focus on 
transparency and access to information, on protecting consumers from 
inappropriate use of their personal data or on imposing duties of 
confidentiality. Of these statutes, the most relevant are certainly ECPA 
(in particular its Title II, also known as the Stored Communications 
Act), the US PATRIOT Act and the FAA. All these statutes have 
received criticism over the past few years: while ECPA (and its Title II 
in particular) has been criticised for having been largely outpaced by 
technological innovation, and in particular by cloud computing, the 
Uniting and Strengthening America Provide Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (US PATRIOT) Act of 2001 was 
criticised for provisions that can lead companies to turn over data to 
the US government even without notice to the customer. Data stored 
outside US borders, if held in servers owned by a US company, are 
potentially covered by this provision: even contract provisions 
specifying that data will be governed by foreign law can be ignored by 
the US government.43 But the most heavily criticised provision is 
certainly the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act (FAA), 
which amended the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Section 
1881a of the FAA introduces the possibility for the US government to 
monitor foreign communications and access data of foreign citizens 
located outside of the US without a warrant (a requirement that, by 
virtue of the Fourth amendment, would apply only to US citizens). A 
recent report for the European Parliament observed that “while there 
has been a great deal of concern at the international level over the US 
PATRIOT Act, there has been virtually no discussion of the 
implications of … § 1881a of FAA,” which “for the first time created a 
power of mass-surveillance specifically targeted at the data of non-US 
persons located outside the US, which applies to cloud computing” 
(Bigo et al., 2013). 
Beyond privacy legislation and case law, which mostly focuses 
on the possibility for government institutions to inspect personal data 
and communications, an increasingly important player in the privacy 
domain is the Federal Trade Commission in its role of consumer 
protection enforcer. The number of investigations and sanctions 
accumulated by the FTC over the past few years is remarkable (Cline, 
2014). To be sure, the FTC has filled an important gap in US privacy law 
                                                          
43 Specifically, section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the FBI to access data related 
to investigations in an ex-parte proceeding with the requirement that “no person 
shall disclose to any other person … that the [FBI] has sought beyond privacy 
legislation and case law … or obtained things under this section.”  
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by protecting customers against privacy- and security-reducing 
practices adopted by their providers. However, there seems to be 
significant space for a clarification of the FTC powers, as well as of the 
criteria and definitions used by the FTC in enforcing legislation to 
protect consumer privacy and data security. 
All entities that store consumer information on the Internet face 
the threat of FTC enforcement if the way they store and secure 
information does not match their declarations to their customers. This 
unfair behaviour amounts to a deceptive or unfair practice under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act. In addition, the FTC enforces a handful of 
sector-specific privacy laws, including COPPA, GLBA, FCRA, TCPA 
and the Telecommunications Act, as well as the EU-US Safe Harbour 
(see below).44  
7.1.2 The EU legal framework for data protection 
The first European data protection laws were enacted in the 1970s, 
followed by the adoption of the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 
1981. At the EU level, the right to privacy has been so far regulated by 
Data Protection Directive 95/46 (1995) (DPD), which, however, does 
not cover judicial and police cooperation.45 Other relevant legislation in 
force include the 2002 and 2009 e-Privacy Directives and the data 
retention Directive, which has however been declared invalid by the 
Court of Justice in a recent decision. The EU data protection Directive 
applies to data held both by the public sector and the private sector. 
There are, however, important exemptions that give government the 
possibility to access and process data for tax and criminal law purposes. 
As a result, it is fair to state that, contrary to what occurs under US 
statutory law, the main EU Directive applies far more stringently to the 
private sector than to the public sector.  
                                                          
44 Under Section 5, a trade practice is: 
 Deceptive, if it involves a “material representation, omission or practice 
that is likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably in the 
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment”;  
 Unfair, if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and is not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition” 
(the so called ‘three-part test’ of Section 5(n) of the FTC Act). 
45 Such area is currently covered by the Council of the European Union’s 2008 
Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
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In terms of scope, the DPD focuses on the protection of personal 
data, which it defines as “information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person”. No data protection rules will apply at all 
where data are not personal but are instead anonymous, i.e. “data 
rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer 
identifiable” (Recital 26). The DPD identifies three main classes of 
persons to whom EU data protection law applies:  
 Data controllers, who are those persons who determine the 
purposes for which and the means whereby personal data are 
collected and processed; 
 Data processors, who act under the instruction of controllers and 
do not themselves decide the processing purposes and 
 Data subjects, the individuals whose personal data is being 
processed.  
The DPD directed member states to impose legal obligations on 
controllers to protect personal data by complying with certain 
principles when processing personal data, including transparency, 
purpose specification and limitation and erasure, meaning that 
personal data that are not necessary anymore must be erased or truly 
anonymised.  
Besides the DPD, privacy laws in the EU also include the e-
Privacy Directive (as amended in 2009), which forms part of the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications and introduces 
obligations of security and confidentiality for providers of e-
communications only. It deals with a number of important issues, such 
as confidentiality of information, treatment of traffic data, spam and 
cookies. Security of services includes the duty to inform the subscribers 
whenever there is a particular risk, such as a virus or other malware 
attack. Confidentiality obligations are addressed at member states, who 
should prohibit listening, tapping, storage, or other kinds of 
interception or surveillance of communication and related traffic, 
unless the users have given their consent or conditions of Article 15(1) 
have been fulfilled. 
Finally, the data retention Directive (2006/24/EC) was adopted 
to amend the e-Privacy Directive to provide a more effective response 
to the terrorist attacks in New York 2001 and Madrid in 2004. It focused 
on the regulation of data retention to permit access by law enforcement 
authorities for a certain period if necessary as a means for prevention, 
investigation and prosecution of serious crime as defined by each of the 
member states in its national law. In April 2014, a judgment of the CJEU 
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held that the directive was invalid as it “interferes in a particularly 
serious manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private life 
and to the protection of personal data”. Hence, “by adopting the Data 
Retention Directive, the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed 
by compliance with the principle of proportionality”. This judgment 
might constitute an important precedent for the interpretation of the 
validity of existing US legislation (e.g. the FAA) in the EU context and 
shows that even security issues are unlikely to trump privacy when it 
comes to EU legislation and CJEU case law.  
Recently, in evaluating the data protection Directive and related 
legislation, the European Commission acknowledged that the legal 
framework needs an update, both in light of the new challenges posed 
by technological developments and differences in the ways that 
member states have transposed and enforced the DPD. Moreover, the 
application of the EU data protection acquis in the area of police 
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, in particular 
the 2008 Framework Decision, resulted in gaps and inconsistencies 
(European Commission, 2012). Accordingly, the Commission proposed 
a strong and consistent legislative reform, which consists of a 
Regulation (replacing Directive 95/46/EC) setting out a general EU 
framework for data protection46 and a Directive replacing the 2008 
Framework Decision setting out rules on the protection of personal 
data processed for the purposes of prevention, detection, investigation 
or prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities.  
The new proposed rules aim to improve individuals’ ability to 
control their data by ensuring that when their consent is required, it is 
given explicitly, meaning that it is based either on a statement or on a 
clear affirmative action by the person concerned, and is freely given; 
equipping internet users with an effective ‘right to be forgotten’ in the 
online environment;47 guaranteeing easy access to one’s own data and 
a right to data portability; and reinforcing the right to information so 
that individuals fully understand how their personal data are handled, 
particularly when the processing activities concern children. The rules 
                                                          
46 It should be noted that the choice of a Regulation replacing the DPD implies 
much less discretion in the implementation of the text at national level, as the 
Regulation is directly applicable and requires no transposition measure by EU 
member states. 
47 The right to be forgotten is described as the right to have one’s data deleted 
if the owner withdraws his/her consent and if there are no other legitimate 
grounds for retaining the data (see European Commission, 2012).  
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also seek to improve the means for individuals to exercise their rights 
by strengthening national data protection authorities’ independence 
and powers and enhancing administrative and judicial remedies when 
data protection rights are violated. In particular, qualified associations 
will be able to bring actions to court on behalf of the individual. Finally, 
the new rules aim at reinforcing data security by encouraging the use 
of privacy-enhancing technologies, privacy-friendly default settings 
and privacy certification schemes and introducing a general obligation 
for data controllers to notify both data protection authorities and data 
subjects about data breaches without undue delay. This implies 
measures aimed at enhancing the accountability of those processing 
data: companies with more than 250 employees and in firms that are 
involved in processing operations which, by virtue of their nature, their 
scope or their purposes, present specific risks to the rights and 
freedoms of individuals will be asked to designate a Data Protection 
Officer. The proposed regulation also foresees very harsh sanctions for 
non-compliance.  
In a recent commentary, Berkeley Professor Paul Schwartz (2013) 
observed that the proposed new rules would significantly affect US 
companies’ daily practice of authorising the sharing of personal 
information through simple ‘notice and consent’. As mentioned, the 
Proposed Regulation lists ‘consent’ as one of the legal justifications for 
the processing of personal data, but requires that written consent for 
personal information processing be presented in a form 
‘distinguishable’ from any other matter. More importantly, Article 7 of 
the proposed text places the burden of proof of demonstrating consent 
on the controller. This requirement “heightens the risk that a user’s 
consent will not stand up if a data protection commissioner or the user 
herself challenges the assent after the fact.”  
Finally, and most problematically, the proposed Regulation 
states that consent “shall not provide a legal basis for the processing” 
when “there is a significant imbalance between the position” of the 
controller and the party to whom the data refers. Thus, Internet 
companies would not be able to justify processing by a party’s consent 
if they offer take-it-or-leave-it terms for the processing of personal data 
or provide services for employees or other parties that lack effective 
bargaining power. As a consequence, Schwartz concludes that US IT 
companies will not be able to rely on one-sided click-through 
agreements. The new rules are far-reaching also in terms of jurisdiction, 
since the proposed Regulation potentially subjects all cloud services to 
EU privacy law.  
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The effect of the expansion of the remit of EU data protection 
rules is already being felt while the general Data Protection Regulation 
is still pending final approval by EU institutions. In May 2014, the 
European Court of Justice (CJEU) ruled against Google in Google Spain 
SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González, a case brought by a Spanish individual who requested the 
removal of a link to a digitised 1998 article in La Vanguardia newspaper 
about an auction for his foreclosed home for a debt that he had 
subsequently paid.48 The court ruled in Costeja that search engines are 
‘data controllers’ and, as such, are responsible for the content to which 
they point. Thus, Google was required to comply with EU data privacy 
laws. In so ruling, the Court also clarified that even if the physical 
server of the search engine operator processing the data is located 
outside Europe, EU rules apply if the operator has a branch or a 
subsidiary in a member state that promotes the selling of advertising 
space offered by the search engine. Moreover, search engines are to be 
considered controllers of personal data. Google can therefore not 
escape its responsibilities under European law when handling personal 
data by saying it is a search engine. EU data protection law applies, and 
so does the right to be forgotten. Furthermore, the CJEU ruled that 
individuals have the right – under certain conditions – to ask search 
engines to remove links with personal information about them. This 
applies where the information is inaccurate, inadequate or excessive 
and is subject to a balancing test with other fundamental rights such as 
freedom of expression. The responsibility for performing this test rests 
with the data controller in the first instance.  
The Costeja case is a good example of the tendency, increasingly 
evident in Europe, to expand the territorial scope of EU data protection 
rules to avoid their circumvention by the locating of servers outside the 
territory of the EU and to increasingly ask online intermediaries to 
cooperate in the enforcement of the EU rules. The latter tendency is, 
indeed, consistent with other reforms currently being discussed in the 
EU, including the proposed reform of the 2001 Information Society 
Directive and the 2000 e-Commerce Directive.  
                                                          
48 Costeja initially attempted to have the article removed by complaining to 
Spain’s data protection agency, which rejected the claim on the grounds that it 
was lawful and accurate, but accepted a complaint against Google and asked 
Google to remove the results. Google sued in the Spanish Audiencia Nacional, 
which referred a series of questions to the CJEU. 
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7.2 Cross-border data flows: What future for the US-EU 
Safe Harbour? 
The EU data protection Directive also governs the transfer of data, 
permitting data transfers only to other countries with an ‘adequate’ 
level of protection. The US does not appear on the list of countries with 
‘adequate’ protection. However, the US Department of Commerce 
(DoC) in consultation with the EU developed a Safe Harbour 
Agreement so that that US companies can transfer European data to the 
United States if the company handling the transfer essentially complies 
with the DPD in handling and processing the data. Today, almost 5,000 
organisations are reportedly certified under the Safe Harbour 
framework.  
Safe Harbour principles include the following: 
 Notice: Individuals must be informed that their data are being 
collected and about how it will be used. 
 Choice: Individuals must have the option to opt-out of the 
collection and forward transfer of the data to third parties. 
 Onward transfer: Transfers of data to third parties may only occur 
to other organisations that follow adequate data protection 
principles. 
 Security: Reasonable efforts must be made to prevent loss of 
collected information. 
 Data integrity: Data must be relevant and reliable for the purpose 
for which it was collected. 
 Access: Individuals must be able to access information held about 
them and correct or delete it if it is inaccurate. 
 Enforcement: There must be effective means of enforcing these 
rules.  
The Safe Harbour has always been controversial: in Germany, 
data protection authorities have voiced their concerns since 2010.49 
After the Snowden revelations, some member states, the European 
                                                          
49 In 2010, the Dusseldorf Kreis, a working group comprised of 16 German state 
DPAs that are responsible for the private sector, issued a resolution requiring 
German data exporters to exercise additional diligence when transferring data 
to Safe Harbour-certified organisations, and prohibited German data exporters 
from relying solely on Safe Harbour in order to transfer data to the US, By 
requiring additional diligence, the resolution appeared to question Safe 
Harbour, and whether the system was sufficient to demonstrate an adequate 
level of protection for personal data. 
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Commission and, in March 2014, the European Parliament called for a 
suspension and a thorough revision of the Safe Harbour.50 Meanwhile, 
on the basis of a thorough analysis and consultations with companies, 
the European Commission made 13 recommendations to improve the 
functioning of the Safe Harbour scheme. The Commission called on US 
authorities to identify remedies by summer 2014 (but the deadline was 
not met). The Commission would then review the functioning of the 
Safe Harbour scheme based on the implementation of these 13 
recommendations. 
The Commission’s recommendations address four key areas.  
 First, in terms of transparency, the Commission recommended 
that self-certified companies should publicly disclose their 
privacy policies, that online Safe Harbour privacy policies 
should include a link to the Department of Commerce’s Safe 
Harbour list of current Safe Harbour members, that self-certified 
companies publish privacy conditions of any contracts they 
conclude with subcontractors, and that the DoC’s Safe Harbour 
list clearly flags those companies that are not current members.  
 Second, on redress, the Commission stated that online Safe 
Harbour privacy policies should include a link to the chosen 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) provider, that the ADR 
choice should be readily available and affordable, and that the 
DoC should systematically monitor ADR providers, specifically 
in relation to the transparency and accessibility of their 
procedures and how they follow up complaints.  
 Third, concerning enforcement, Safe Harbour members should be 
subject to spot check ex-officio investigations in order to verify the 
substantive compliance of their privacy policies. In addition, 
where there has been a finding of non-compliance, follow-up 
investigations should be implemented after one year. The DoC 
                                                          
50 In July 2013, the Conference of the German Data Protection Commissioners, 
including both federal and state Commissioners, issued a press release stating 
that surveillance activities by foreign intelligence and security agencies 
threaten international data traffic between Germany and countries outside the 
EEA. In light of these recent developments, the German Commissioners 
decided to stop issuing approvals for international data transfers until the 
German government can demonstrate that unlimited access to German 
citizens’ personal data by foreign national intelligence services complies with 
fundamental principles of data protection law (namely, necessity, 
proportionality and purpose limitation). 
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should inform the competent EU DPA of pending complaints 
and suspected non-compliance. Finally, allegations of false 
claims of Safe Harbour adherence should be investigated 
thoroughly.  
 Finally, on the issue of access to data by US authorities, the 
Commission stated that Safe Harbour privacy policies should 
specify the extent to which US law allows public authorities to 
collect and process data transferred under Safe Harbour and that 
the national security exception under Safe Harbour should be 
used only to the extent strictly necessary or proportionate.  
In addition to the recommendations, new developments have 
created even more tensions between the two blocs. The concerns, 
initially voiced mostly with respect to existing legislation, have also 
gradually moved towards questioning the conduct of giant online 
intermediaries, accused of infringing even the principles of the Safe 
Harbour. Most notably, Austrian privacy activist Max Schrems argued 
that the National Security Agency’s PRISM programme has shown that 
no meaningful data protection for Europeans exists under US law and 
that Facebook Ireland was “facilitating the processing of such data.”51 
In a letter dated 26 July 2013, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner 
refused to investigate Facebook because the Irish branch of the 
company was registered under the Safe Harbour arrangement and 
provided access to US law enforcement. Following these 
considerations, the Irish High Court decided on 18 June 2014 to refer 
the case to the CJEU. While the ruling is expected by the end of 2015, 
various committees of the European Parliament have called for an 
official intervention in the case. The opinion of the CJEU’s Advocate 
General on this case, originally expected on 24 June 2015, has 
meanwhile been delayed. At the same time, a coordinated series of 
investigations into Facebook’s privacy practices is being carried out by 
privacy regulators in the Netherlands, Spain, France and Germany. On 
15 May 2015, Belgium’s Privacy Commission released a report 
examining the new privacy policies that Facebook implemented this 
year for use of data from its services, which include Instagram and 
WhatsApp, to target advertising. The report observes that Facebook 
processes the personal data of its members as well as other Internet 
                                                          
51 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310; [2014] 3 CMLR 37 
(text freely available at <www.europe-v-facebook.org/hcj.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2014). 
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users “in secret”, without asking for consent or adequately explaining 
how the data would be used; and the president of the Belgian authority 
publicly stated: “The way in which [Facebook] is contemptuous of the 
private lives of its members and of all Internet users demands action.”52 
As tensions mount in the EU, the US has shown signs of reaction. 
In 2014, the FTC brought several instances of enforcement, including 
high-profile actions against MySpace, Facebook, and Google.53 In 2015, 
actions were brought against companies that were falsely claiming to 
be under Safe Harbour certification in an attempt to show more concern 
for the adequacy of the Safe Harbour’s self-certification procedure.54 
Similarly, the Department of Commerce, which is responsible for 
administering the programme, is likely to increase the rigor with which 
it oversees the programme. While the certification process is a self-
certification programme and not subject to formal regulatory approval, 
an increase in substantive focus from the Department of Commerce 
during the certification phase and thereafter is likely as a result of the 
pressure from Europe.  
                                                          
52 See “Belgian Watchdog Raps Facebook for Treating Personal Data ‘with 
Contempt’”, Lisa Fleischer and Tom Fairless, Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2015 
(www.wsj.com/articles/belgian-watchdog-slams-facebooks-privacy-controls-
1431685985).  
53 See e.g. “Google, Facebook, MySpace: Privacy rule breakers or trend 
makers?”, John Fontana, ZDNet (www.zdnet.com/article/google-facebook-
myspace-privacy-rule-breakers-or-trend-makers/). 
54 In January 2014, the FTC announced settlements with 12 companies that 
allegedly falsely claimed they complied with Safe Harbour, even though there 
were no substantive violations of the Safe Harbour privacy principles. In 
February, the Commission announced a proposed settlement with Fantage.com 
for allegedly deceptively claiming in its privacy policy that it held a current 
Safe Harbour certification, when in fact its certification had lapsed in June 2012. 
In May 2014, the FTC announced a settlement with the clothing manufacturer 
American Apparel related to charges that the company falsely claimed to 
comply with Safe Harbour, even though it had allowed the certification to 
expire. In November 2014, the FTC announced that data privacy certifier True 
Ultimate Standards Everywhere, Inc. (‘TRUSTe’) agreed to settle charges that 
the company deceived consumers about its Safe Harbour recertification 
programme (see Press Release, “FTC Settles with Two Companies Falsely 
Claiming to Comply with International Safe Harbour Privacy Framework”, 7 
April 2015 at www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/04/ftc-settles-
two-companies-falsely-claiming-comply-international).  
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Moreover, both courts and legislators have taken action to 
address the problem of bulk collection of metadata. An important legal 
clarification came recently from the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper, in which the Court ruled that the NSA’s 
bulk collection of phone and other records was never authorised under 
section 215 of the US PATRIOT Act. The appellate court’s decision in 
ACLU v. Clapper is the culmination of a series of lawsuits by activists 
and the civil liberties community aimed at putting an end to the NSA’s 
mass surveillance programmes.  
This decision arrived just as the US PATRIOT Act (set to expire 
at the end of May 2015) was being replaced by the US Freedom Act, 
approved by the House Judiciary Committee on 19 May 2015, and now 
finally signed into law on 2 June 2015.55 The new Act explicitly bans the 
limitless collection of telephone data by forcing the government to use 
a ‘specific selection term’ (SST) in any surveillance warrant and 
replaces the centralised bulk-data collection system with an obligation 
for network providers to store data and, upon request, deliver it to the 
government. More specifically, the Act requires the FBI, in applications 
for ongoing production of call detail records for investigations to 
protect against international terrorism, to show reasonable grounds to 
believe that the call detail records are relevant to such investigation; 
and a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the SST is associated with a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international 
terrorism or activities in preparation for such terrorism.  
The Act also requires a judge approving such an ongoing release 
of call detail records for an investigation to protect against international 
terrorism to limit such production to a period not to exceed 180 days 
but allow such orders to be extended upon application, subject to 
approval by the FISA Court. The Act will allow the government to 
require the production of an initial set of call records using the 
reasonable, articulable suspicion standard that the term is associated 
with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and then a 
subsequent set of call records using session-identifying information or 
a telephone calling-card number identified by the specific selection 
term that was used to produce the initial set of records (thus limiting 
the government to what is commonly referred to as two ‘hops’ of call 
records). The government should however adopt minimisation 
                                                          
55 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring 
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 or the USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015.  
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procedures requiring prompt destruction of produced call records that 
are not foreign intelligence information. 
This new system has been criticised for failing to remove massive 
data collection (which, critics say, is only delegated to private 
corporations), and at the same time reducing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government surveillance action. Criticisms have also 
been raised since a few hours after signing the act into law, the Obama 
administration reportedly asked the FISA court to restore the mass data 
collection at least for a transitional period of six months, even clarifying 
that the ACLU v. Clapper decision, being a second circuit ruling, does 
not constitute controlling precedent for the FISA court.56 The Act also 
re-authorises Section 215 of the US PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the 
FISA Amendments Act (see above) through to the end of 2017. Against 
this background, the new Freedom Act seems unlikely to achieve all 
the steps forward that EU authorities were expecting, and its actual 
impact on mass surveillance activities seems obscure at best at the time 
of writing. 
Finally, another development in the United States is the 
introduction in the House of a proposed Judicial Redress Act of 2015 by 
Representatives from both of the leading parties. The Act aims at 
extending to citizens of designated countries (including EU member 
states) the right to challenge possible misuse of their data by the US 
government in US courts. The proposed Act would allow the Attorney 
General to extend US judicial redress protections to citizens of selected 
third countries. If eventually passed by Congress, the Act would 
address some of the key concerns expressed over the past few years by 
EU institutions with respect to US privacy laws. For example, former 
EU Vice-President and Commissioner for Justice Viviane Reding 
observed: “When Americans come to Europe and they think the 
authorities have not handled their case correctly, they can go to a 
European court. However an EU citizen cannot do the same in the US 
and go to an American court. There is no reciprocity; we do not have 
the basis for judicial redress … The US has recognised the importance 
of this request on several occasions – but they need to have a law. I have 
                                                          
56 See, inter alia, S. Ackerman, “Obama lawyers asked secret court to ignore 
public court's decision on spying”, The Guardian, 9 June 
(www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/obama-fisa-court-surveillance-
phone-records).  
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not yet seen it.”57 Also the new European Commission President 
Juncker wrote in his mission letter to Vĕra Jourová, the new 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, that one of 
her tasks will be to “conclude negotiations on a comprehensive EU-US 
data protection agreement which provides justiciable rights for all EU 
citizens, regardless of where they reside, as well as reviewing the Safe 
Harbour arrangement”. 
Will these initiatives be enough to avoid the suspension of the 
Safe Harbour? As things stand, it is still unclear whether or not the US 
will implement the entirety of the EU’s recommendations, such as 
empowering the FTC to conduct ex-officio investigations to assure that 
US companies are in compliance with their privacy policies and that 
any false claims would eventually be further investigated. At the end 
of 2014, when taking office, Ms Jourová already expressed strong 
doubts that Safe Harbour can be considered as really secure for EU 
citizens and called for a ‘plan B’. Vice President Andrus Ansip was even 
more aggressive and specified that if there are no satisfying results from 
negotiations with the US, “the suspension of the agreement might then 
be the option”.58 Some commentators have reported that the 
negotiation pendulum is shifting between calls for interoperability of 
EU and US legislation; proposals to suspend the Safe Harbour and take 
it out of the TTIP, also due to the European Commission’s uncertain 
mandate;59 and more aggressive calls for ‘data localisation’ 
                                                          
57 See Vivian Reding’s speech at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
SPEECH-14-431_en.htm.  
58 See the initial hearing of Andrus Ansip in the European Parliament 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings-2014/resources/library/media/ 
20141022RES75838/20141022RES75838.pdf).  
59 The negotiation mandate for the European Commission instead refers to 
Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World 
Trade Organization. Article XIV contains a general exception clause stipulating 
that “nothing in the agreement may be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any member of measures [...] necessary to secure compliance 
with laws or regulations [...] relating to [...] the protection of the privacy of 
individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data.” 
The Commission's negotiation mandate states in Article 18: “The Agreement 
will not preclude the enforcement of exceptions on the supply of services 
justifiable under the relevant WTO rules (Articles XIV and XIVbis 
GATS).”Article XIV of GATS was indeed copied verbatim into a draft text of 
the TTIP agreement proposed by the Commission negotiators in July 2013 and 
leaked in February 2014. 
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requirements, with localisation even being presented as a fundamental 
right. This is even more worrying since on the US side, drafts from the 
e-commerce section of TTIP include completely opposite stances: the 
principle of ‘interoperability’ of European and US data protection rules, 
and a ban on ‘localisation.’ In October 2014, the US negotiators placed 
a concrete text proposal on ‘data flows’ on the table. But the papers 
published in January 2015 by the European Commission clearly state: 
“Data protection standards won’t be part of TTIP negotiations. TTIP 
will make sure that the EU’s data protection laws prevail over any 
commitments.”60 
7.3 What landing zones for data protection in the TTIP? 
In an age of convergence, globalisation, and the data-driven economy, 
the US and the EU do not seem to be converging fast enough in their 
approaches to data protection. First, existing legislation confirms the 
existence of key differences in the main approaches followed by the two 
legal systems, with a clear focus on government intrusion into the 
private sphere in the US and significant emphasis on the relationship 
between data controllers and data subjects in the EU. Second, and 
relatedly, while in the United States privacy law focuses on redressing 
consumer harm and balancing privacy with efficient commercial 
transactions, in the EU privacy is considered as a fundamental right 
that prevails over competing interests (Hartzog and Solove 2014). 
Third, privacy protection is essentially triggered by the existence of 
‘personal data’ or ‘personally identifiable information’ (PII): however, 
the definition of PII on the two sides of the Atlantic diverges 
significantly, with the US featuring a patchwork or partly inconsistent 
definitions and the EU relying on a single definition that broadly 
defines PII to encompass all information that is identifiable to a 
person.61 Fourth, coverage of both personal identified and identifiable 
information seems to be more consistent in Europe than in the US: 
however, the EU seems too expansionist in its coverage of PII, whereas 
the US might err at the opposite extreme.  
In addition, frictions between the US and EU authorities have 
mounted in the months following the Datagate scandal, such that even 
                                                          
60 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_152999.2% 
20Services.pdf  
61 Hartzog & Solove (2014, p. 888) explain that there are three predominant 
approaches to defining personal information in the US: 1) the tautological 
approach, 2) the non-public approach and 3) the specific-types approach.  
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established cooperation and recognition frameworks such as the Safe 
Harbour regime are now being reconsidered. Calls for a European 
cloud or even clouds limited to national territory (e.g. in Germany) 
have become common in the debate over cloud privacy and security. 
The European Parliament has expressed its intention to reconsider the 
Safe Harbour as well as the Data Protection Umbrella Agreement that 
has been under discussion between the two parties since 2011. Reforms 
underway in the United States, including the US Freedom Act, do not 
seem to fully address the concerns expressed by the EU authorities, and 
the negotiations on the Safe Harbour seems still likely to face problems: 
on the one hand, EU authorities deem US privacy laws inadequate in 
terms of the level of protection they achieve for European citizens and 
increasingly consider data localisation as a fundamental right; on the 
other hand, US authorities seek to obtain a recognition of 
interoperability and a ban on data localisation in the TTIP negotiations. 
In short, the parties are almost as far from an agreement as they were a 
year ago, and despite some signs of good will the tensions are unlikely 
to be put to rest any time soon: on the contrary, the situation is even 
worsening as some EU member states are now taking action to create 
massive surveillance programmes, as in the case of France, which (after 
the terrorist attacks of January 2015) is considering the instruction of a 
Loi de renseignement (Intelligence Bill) that would go further than the US 
PATRIOT Act and the already annulled EU Data Retention Directive in 
providing authorities with new technologies of mass surveillance of 
electronic communications.62  
Needless to say, the persistence of divergent approaches can 
become an obstacle (or, at a minimum, a source of unnecessary 
compliance burdens) for companies wishing to provide Internet-based 
services on both sides of the Atlantic. This is especially the case for 
world-leading US-based Internet companies, which would profit 
enormously from a streamlining, update, and harmonisation of the 
definition of PII and, more generally, of the rules that apply to online 
data protection. To be sure, the Internet is challenging both legal 
                                                          
62 These new technologies include so-called ‘black boxes’ or source code 
injected by French intelligence services on ISPs’ infrastructure to detect 
suspicious user behaviour in real time. This would bring all residents in France 
under surveillance and expand monitoring to include private pictures, 
company trade secrets, medical records, etc. The authorities are expected 
shortly to propose a new register for suspected persons and new measures to 
record phone calls without authorisation from a judge, thus undermining data 
privacy protections. 
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regimes in a way that might end up requiring a thorough reform 
process. As of now, what seems likely is that the US will keep under-
protecting privacy in the name of efficient commercial transactions 
(with a great responsibility being placed on the FTC to monitor abuses 
of bargaining power and other deceptive/abusive practices), whereas 
in the EU, Internet services might end up caught in the net of an overly 
formalistic, overly comprehensive legal framework, which leaves little 
room for trade-offs between privacy and welfare-enhancing 
customised service for data subjects.  
8. Conclusions: What should the Digital TTIP achieve 
and what will it achieve? 
Notwithstanding the strong political commitment shown by both the 
US and EU negotiators to speed up the conclusion of the TTIP 
agreement, the overall environment does not seem favourable to a 
comprehensive agreement in the digital sphere. Suffice it to recall that 
in a recent interview, President Barack Obama accused European 
corporations and regulators to be strategically hampering the position 
of US Internet companies.63 The underlying reason, according to the 
American President, is that European companies “can’t compete with 
us” and thus need to alter the level playing field to be able to survive. 
The reference is not only to the ongoing antitrust investigation into 
Google, but also to recent calls by the European Parliament to unbundle 
search engines (read: Google) from other commercial services, the 
current uprising of taxi drivers against Uber in many cities, the 
mounting debate on tax avoidance practices by several IT companies, 
the wave of ‘Google taxes’ imposed to remunerate publishers and the 
repeated calls to suspend the US-EU Safe Harbour Agreement on data 
protection due to the alleged unreliability of US companies’ privacy 
policies. Obama’s statements triggered a blunt reaction: a European 
Commission’s spokesperson called these comments “out of line”.64  
Is Obama right or wrong? To be sure, much of the EU regulation 
that applies to the Internet is stricter than US regulation, but these rules 
apply regardless of nationality. In the EU, network operators have to 
share their networks even when they invest in high-speed broadband, 
                                                          
63 See “Obama attacks Europe over technology protectionism”, by Murad 
Ahmed, Duncan Robinson and Richard Waters, Financial Times, 16 February 
2015 (www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41d968d6-b5d2-11e4-b58d-00144feab7de.html# 
axzz3ejxpiSNf).  
64 Ibid.  
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while in the US such obligation was lifted a decade ago. In the EU, 
privacy is a fundamental right, whereas in the US it is treated as a 
tradable right. In the EU, antitrust follows a different approach than the 
US, and this usually results in stricter remedies imposed on companies 
with market power. Other fields, such as cybersecurity and consumer 
protection are more regulated in the EU than they are in the US. These 
rules have been applied more often to US companies since these 
companies have come to dominate the Internet ecosystem since the 
early days. In some cases, an aggravating factor was that EU rules were 
largely unfit for the Internet age, and this created significant problems 
when it came to their application to the Internet. That said, there is 
reason to believe that it is mostly the inadequate and obsolete features 
of EU law, rather than a design to hamper US companies, that inspired 
the Commission in these actions. Otherwise, important merger cases 
such as Google/DoubleClick, Google/ITA, Facebook/WhatsApp, 
Microsoft/Nokia, Microsoft/Skype and others would have been 
handled differently by the Brussels trustbusters. 
The past months, however, have marked a change of direction. 
Many recent documents of the European Commission and European 
Parliament speak clearly of the need to revive industrial policy in a way 
that protects EU champions against the current domination of US 
Internet companies. The Commissioner for the digital agenda Günther 
Oettinger claims that EU telecom companies should become more 
profitable. Conferences are being organised in the Parliament with 
titles such as “How can we stop Internet giants?”. Google and Facebook 
are constantly demonised in the public debate, not to mention Uber 
(but this would probably occur even if Uber were European) and 
Amazon (recently accused of unfair tax deals in, and with, 
Luxembourg). The Digital Single Market debate is mostly centred 
around industry consolidation and the creation of large mobile 
operators that would negotiate on a more equal footing with the 
Googles and the Apples. In Germany and France, pressure from 
content providers and publishers even led institutions to think that 
splitting Google could be reasonable. The European Parliament 
followed this trend by advocating such a structural remedy in the belief 
that “indexation, evaluation, presentation and ranking by search 
engines must be unbiased and transparent” (although an in-depth 
discussion of effects on users has never occurred to date). And most 
importantly, the European Commission is reportedly considering the 
extension of regulation from telecoms infrastructure to Internet 
platforms, in the name of so-called ‘platform neutrality’. Such move 
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would impose interoperability obligations on all leading platforms, in 
the attempt to create a neutral Internet. And again, it would likely 
damage consumers.  
Getting out of this impasse and inverting the current trend of 
divergence requires an effort on both sides, and TTIP talks could 
become a viable setting to this end. The EU should understand that 
economic recovery would be hampered, not helped, by a revival of 
protectionism, and that the word “neutrality” is not a panacea for all 
the evils of the Internet, but rather a double-edged sword to be handled 
with care. Not surprisingly, but also not fully convincingly, the 
European Commission has taken great pains to reassure the United 
States that the DSM is not a protectionist strategy. The US should do its 
homework on data protection, settle the network neutrality debate with 
a convincing compromise, and avoid that the urge to claim US 
leadership in global Internet talks ends up bringing the Internet under 
an unprecedented, ill-advised wave of regulatory interventionism. 
Should the TTIP take the form of a ‘living agreement,’ as seems likely, 
then obvious starting points would be the easy-to-reach agreements on 
e-labelling and e-accessibility, plus (if possible) an agreement to 
cooperate on standards related to cloud computing and the Internet of 
Things. In the coming years, however, it would be of utmost 
importance that such agreement encompasses network neutrality rules, 
data protection rules, intermediary liability, online copyright 
protection and related exceptions and limitations, and gradual 
convergence of competition law and policy in a field that is increasingly 
thirsty for legal certainty and streamlined, converging regulatory 
requirements on both sides of the Atlantic.  
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13. GREATER TTIP AMBITION IN 
CHEMICALS: WHY AND HOW 
E. DONALD ELLIOTT 
AND JACQUES PELKMANS 
Politics is the art of the possible. 
Otto Von Bismarck (1867). 
1. Introduction and purpose 
This chapter discusses the chemicals chapter of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in particular the regulatory part. 
The flaw we see in US-EU chemical regulatory cooperation is that the 
focus has been far too much on the differences in procedures between 
the two regulatory systems rather than on what ultimately matters: the 
actual level of SHEC (safety, health, environment and consumer) 
protection provided for substances that are regulated by both the EU 
and the US. This flaw is still valid today in TTIP. The only difference is 
that the TTIP initiative is being sold as far more ambitious in terms of 
regulatory cooperation for the North Atlantic than ever before, and that 
it might also influence regulatory ambitions of other WTO partners. But 
this prospect seems not to apply to chemicals, which is precisely one 
motivation of the chapter. To date, the TTIP talks over chemicals have 
not been ambitious enough in our view and there is no chance 
whatsoever that a TTIP chemical regime will emerge as a shining 
example for the rest of the world. Within the confines of this chapter, 
we shall attempt to demonstrate that it is far more productive to focus 
on the identification of equivalent levels of protection against risky 
chemical substances than to harp on the ‘systemic’ divergences.  
So far, the political and societal debates on the chemical aspects 
of TTIP have been neither productive nor constructive. They are stuck 
in stereotypes that are believed simply because certain forces keep on 
repeating them endlessly, rather than systematically scrutinising the 
various arguments. Outside industry (but in the present climate, 
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industry suffers from a credibility problem, rightly or wrongly), few, if 
any, experts or independent analysts take the trouble to publish careful 
assessments and steer the public debate into fact-finding and 
constructive analyses. Assertions about a lowering of levels of 
protection are repeated, although such lowering was neither explicit 
nor implicit in the mandate; indeed, the opposite is found in writings 
and in numerous statements of the EU and by the negotiators on both 
sides. Discussions tend to be elusive or highly principled, 
complemented by plenty of accusations, misunderstandings, 
caricatures, recriminations or indeed outright suspicion. In such a 
political climate for the case of chemicals, the original ideas behind 
TTIP tend to be forgotten or dismissed without any search for the facts 
or for solid ideas. Such a style of ‘debating’ and the creation of a climate 
of profound suspicion, despite the distinct separation between the 
untouchable level(s) of protection and having a focus on the 
instruments (as indeed is done for other TTIP sectoral annexes), is not 
in keeping with the aim and spirit of TTIP. It cannot be in the EU 
and/or US public interest either.  
The aim of our chapter is to introduce at least the beginnings of 
a fruitful factual analysis of what can and cannot be done in chemicals 
in TTIP and why. Our chapter will not deeply discuss the differences 
between the two systems, as this has been done before: this divergence 
is, for now, far too great. Nevertheless, the knowledge and 
understanding of how the US regulates chemicals are poor in Europe 
and therefore we do offer a concise ‘primer’ on it (see Box 13.1 in section 
4). However, agreeing that ‘the systems’ are different is not the end of 
the story but precisely the beginning! Protecting citizens and workers 
against risky chemicals is less a matter of systems and much more, if 
not decisively, a matter of checking the protection in terms of results 
for each and every substance. When focusing on the level of protection 
against risky chemicals – and not on ‘the systems’ or their equivalence 
– we shall focus on two possibilities: one is TTIP action when, for 
individual substances, the level of protection is found to be equivalent 
in the US and EU, and the other is an opt-in choice for companies to the 
more stringent regime for substances that are regulated on both sides, 
automatically allowing access to the market with the less-stringent 
regime but at the price of following the more-restrictive standard in 
both markets. The EU and the US can act together in TTIP and in its 
living agreement in all cases where the level of protection is adequate, 
despite the systemic differences of how this came about. However, 
where equivalence of protection levels is found, it is far from easy to 
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appreciate what can be done and requires innovative policy thinking. 
This is what our chapter attempts to do, in the spirit of TTIP as first 
formulated in the US-EU High Level Group (2013) and later in the TTIP 
mandates.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We begin by querying 
whether the often-mentioned ‘systemic’ divergences in chemical 
regulation of the US and the EU are a justifiable reason to remain 
unambitious in TTIP. The present authors do not think so. Instead, the 
ultimate goals of chemical regulation should be the main focus of TTIP: 
where exactly are the levels of protection similar and where not, and 
when similar, can the trading costs, in particular duplications of many 
costly obligations, be addressed? In section 3 we observe that the TTIP 
chemicals discussions are modest, in sharp contrast with suggestions, 
at high transatlantic level, nearly two decades ago. Have all such efforts 
come to nothing at all? This is elaborated in section 4, recalling US-EU 
chemical regulatory cooperation since the mid-1990s. In the late 1990s, 
proposals were far more ambitious than even TTIP is today! It is no 
exaggeration to characterise the intervening period as an era of missed 
opportunities, whether selective harmonisation, carefully crafted 
mutual recognition or targeted equivalence agreements. Section 5 
explains in some detail how modestly TTIP is now pursued in 
chemicals. Unfortunately, the information on the US position is scant, 
and no transparency has been provided so far. Therefore, we mainly 
rely on the EU positioning. The EU proposals, as published in 
November 2014, are summarised in Box 13.3. However, we have also 
inserted a Box 13.2 on the OECD’s accomplishments in chemicals 
regulatory cooperation; this begs the question of how much more 
ambitious TTIP in chemicals really is. Some highly tentative discussion 
of the unspoken background to the proposals in Box 13.3 is provided 
as well.  
This discussion is followed by two sections: one (section 6) about 
perceptions and criticism when contrasting the EU’s Regulation on 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH)) and the US Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA,) and section 
7 about ‘frozen’ policy attitudes in Brussels and Washington, under the 
heading ‘carved in stone’. A brief and inevitably incomplete discussion 
of the links with a global regime, so important now that the share of 
non-TTIP chemical production in the world is increasing steadily, is 
provided in section 8. It deals with potential positive spill-overs and US 
objections against REACH as the basis for a world regime. Our 
approach to eventually faciliate mutual market access between the US 
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and the EU, highly tentative to be sure, is spelled out in section 9. As 
noted, it focuses on SHEC (safety, health, environment and consumer) 
objectives and functional equivalence of protection against risky 
substances, in areas where the level of legal regulation is similar or 
allowing companies to opt into abiding by the more stringent system 
everywhere. The latter can improve market access immediately, as an 
early harvest in TTIP, and is spelled out in section 10. The final section 
11 concludes. 
2. Divergences in regulatory systems are not the right 
focus in TTIP 
A quarter century ago, during the heyday of rational actor models 
derived from neo-classical economics, UC Berkeley political scientist 
and business professor David Vogel made a powerful prediction that 
trade negotiations would result in ‘harmonising up’. By that term, he 
meant adopting the more stringent or precautionary environmental or 
consumer standards in order to obtain the efficiency gains that come 
from eliminating inconsistencies that impede trade for mutual gain. 
Trade liberalization is most likely to strengthen consumer and 
environmental protection when a group of nations has 
agreed to reduce the role of regulations as trade barriers and 
the most powerful among them has influential domestic 
constituencies that support stronger regulatory standards.1 
As book goes to press, it seems highly unlikely that Vogel’s 
prediction for ‘harmonising up’ will come to pass in the TTIP 
negotiations for chemicals. NGOs and mass publics on both sides of the 
Atlantic are concerned that TTIP will become an excuse for ‘rolling 
back’ regulatory protections.2 Both negotiating parties seem wedded to 
                                                          
1 See Vogel (2012, p. 8). In fairness, Vogel did include a number of caveats, 
including that there must be powerful support for the tougher standards in the 
domestic politics of the “most powerful” nation in the trade talks. Unlike 
NAFTA, which was the model uppermost in Vogel’s mind, the EU-US 
negotiations are taking place between two relative equals in economic power.  
2 See Matthew Dalton, “TTIP Could Weaken Chemical Rules, Environmental 
Groups Say”, Wall Street Journal Real Time Brussels Blog, 7 October 2014 
(http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2014/10/07/ttip-could-weaken-chemical-
rules-environmental-groups-say/). On both sides of the Atlantic, NGOs, often 
jointly, keep repeating these types of messages of doubt, if not suspicion. On 10 
July 2014, no less than 111 (!!) NGOs – 30 of which were EU organisations and 
78 US – wrote a letter to top TTIP negotiators Michael Froman and Karel De 
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sticking with their own systems for regulating the health and safety 
issues relating to chemical usage.  
The goal of this chapter is to explain why the current negotiations 
seem unlikely to result in mutually-beneficial ‘harmonising up’, as 
suggested by Vogel’s logic, and to recommend ways in which we can 
eventually achieve more North Atlantic regulatory cooperation in 
chemicals, in particular, by reducing the costs and instances of pointless 
duplication in the future. We consider several possible explanations for 
why the current negotiations did not set more ambitious goals for the 
chemicals sector, but in the final analysis, we conclude that the two 
sides cannot yet agree on what constitutes ‘up’: European 
governments, industry trade associations and the general public 
generally perceive their recently-enacted Regulation on registration, 
evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH) as 
providing better protection than does the US system,3 as also do some 
US academics and NGOs. US companies and negotiators, however, are 
loathe to adopt the REACH system, which they perceive as being 
overly ‘precautionary’ and unduly burdensome.4 This problem of 
                                                          
Gucht, with an annex spelling out seven types of concerns. A return letter from 
Commissioner De Gucht dated 2 October 2014, firmly dismissed all seven 
concerns in clear terms. For reasons that are hard to understand, however, this 
clear rebuttal seems almost irrelevant for (at least) some NGOs, because 
statements of doubt and fear are still reiterated. Just one more recent example 
is BUND (2015). It would take a separate paper to try to understand this NGO’s 
tendency to make long-rejected allegations on TTIP all the time. One wonders, 
for instance, whether European NGOs and some sceptical MEPs do not believe 
that the European Commission is capable of sticking to the levels of protection 
in the TTIP negotiations and would not be lured into ‘issue linkages’ or trade-
offs on this question.  
3 Of course, it will be remembered that the enactment of the REACH Regulation 
late in 2006 took place amidst enormous controversy. Now that REACH is EU 
law, there seems little point in continuing the debate, but this does not mean 
that REACH is well accepted. What is accepted are the objectives of REACH, 
much less (or rejected) the high costs.  
4 As this book goes to press, long-pending legislation in the US Congress to 
adopt a somewhat more ‘REACH-like’ system of national chemical regulation 
has cleared some important hurdles but still faces others (Kollipara, 2015). 
TSCA Reform has been passed by the House, and it now seems that the US 
Senate may pass it in early August, and a merged version of the two (House 
and Senate bills) might well go to the US President for signature in September 
2015. Even if TSCA reform is eventually enacted, it will take many years to be 
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divergent perceptions of the effectiveness of the other sides’ regulatory 
system is not limited to chemicals. These perceptions (or 
misperceptions) are inverted for other sectors: some Americans 
perceive European regulation of automobiles as ‘weaker’ than theirs,5 
and they, like Europeans regarding chemicals, are so far unwilling to 
‘roll back’ existing protections in order to strike a trade deal. 
These perceptions are probably at least in part caricatures. The 
most amazing are the perceptions of some (mostly European) NGOs 
and indeed citizens (e.g. in social media and in advocacy activities) 
about how Americans seem to live with woefully inadequate protection 
against risky chemicals. The caricature amounts to the notion that 
Americans are swimming in a toxic soup of dangerous chemicals every 
day! Few if any in Europe appear to have second thoughts about such 
caricatures, as if American citizens and workers would easily accept 
such a predicament, as if liability would not undo this at least in part, 
as if many other laws than TSCA do not exist (which actually have the 
effect of regulating many substances). If it were so bad, have Americans 
(and especially workers) contracted many diseases associated with 
such unregulated risky chemicals to an extent not found6 in Europe? 
The surprising fact remains that there is very little objective data that 
would allow a neutral observer to assess whether it is so bad in the US, 
or, more generally, which side is ‘right’. In addition, the actual situation 
                                                          
implemented through regulations and enforcement and to gain credibility in 
Europe. 
5 See Brad Berman, “Lusting for Europe's Illegal 60-MPG Cars”, 8 December 
2008 (www.hybridcars.com/lusting-europe-illegal-high-mpg-cars-25323/). 
6 There are some instances where a substance, prohibited in the EU, may cause 
adverse health effects in the US, e.g. electronic devices with nickel in their cases, 
but is this product-specific or a general pattern? And are people actually being 
exposed to the nickel? Europe often regulates based on ‘hazard’, the presence 
of a potentially toxic substance, whereas the US tends to consider ‘risk’, which 
also weighs in the balance exposure and the seriousness of the harm. The 
seriousness of the adverse health effect might also be weighed in considering 
whether a ban or some other form of regulation such as a notice to susceptible 
populations makes sense. In the case of nickel in electronic devices, the main 
adverse health effect seems to be a skin rash in a small proportion of the 
population who are allergic to nickel. One proposed solution is to cover the 
nickel with a case or a lacquer to avoid skin contact (see Rita Arrup, “Electronic 
Devices and Nickel Allergic Reactions”, Nickel Allergy Information News and 
Solutions, 14 July 2014 (www.nickelallergyinformation.com/2014/07/ 
electronic_devices_and_nickel.htm).  
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may be a mixed bag, in which one side regulates more stringently in 
some areas, and the other more stringently in others. The fact is we just 
don’t know, although this is rarely acknowledged. Most of the 
literature comparing the two regimes7 is anecdotal and evidently not 
sufficient to persuade governments and their publics that the 
differences in actual outcomes are not as great as they are often 
perceived to be. That in itself is a puzzle: those who think the world is 
efficient would predict that both sides would invest in developing 
better information about how the two systems of chemicals regulation 
actually function so that they could make rational decisions for their 
mutual benefit. 
That the two largest trading blocs are making important 
decisions about one of their largest market segments without good data 
about how chemicals regulation actually works (in terms of what is 
regulated and how well for SHEC protection) on the two sides of the 
Atlantic suggests there may well be something to a tradition older than 
rational actor models such as Vogel’s. This alternative vision of how 
human beings behave emphasises the role of error and misperception, 
in addition to rational calculation in human affairs, and it is now 
experiencing a rebirth under the rubric ‘behavioral law and 
economics’.8 Its essence is aptly captured in former Israeli foreign 
minister Abba Eban’s line: “History teaches us that men and nations 
behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives.”9  
The assumption that people are often guided by errors and 
misperceptions10 leads us to conclude that the negotiators on both sides 
of the Atlantic may not be unwise in setting modest goals after all. 
Greater harmonisation of chemical regulatory systems across the 
Atlantic may be premature. We may have to go through a period of 
mutual confidence-building to overcome the stereotypes and 
misperceptions that currently limit progress; in Abba Eban’s words, we 
                                                          
7 The best work comparing risk regulation in the US and the EU concludes there 
is actually very little difference, but one sector or another may be more 
‘precautionary’ on one side or the other (see Renn & Elliott, 2011). Most of the 
literature comparing TSCA and REACH focuses on the procedural and 
systemic aspects, often with a view to reforming TSCA. Examples include GAO 
(2007) and Applegate (2008).  
8 See Thaler & Sunstein (2008). 
9 Speech delivered in London, 16 December 1970, as quoted in The Times 
[London], 17 December 1970 and in Great Jewish Quotations (1996) by Alfred J. 
Kolatch, p. 115 (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Abba_Eban).  
10 See generally Kahneman (2011). 
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have to “exhaust all the other alternatives” before we can move to a 
more rational, more efficient system that would benefit both sides by 
eliminating needless duplication and inconsistency. The negotiators 
appear to be setting only modest goals to promote greater data-sharing 
and collaboration at the technical level. This might eventually lead both 
sides to greater convergence in regulatory outcomes and to increasing 
the perception that the actual substantive results of the two systems of 
chemical regulation in many areas are not that different, despite major 
differences in legal structure and procedure. 
Our assessment of the current situation leads us to make two 
practical recommendations, which will be elaborated later in this 
chapter. 
1) Optional asymmetric harmonisation. We recommend that the 
TTIP should include an optional process for ‘harmonising up’ by 
gradually voluntarily opting into what are perceived to be more 
stringent regulations on one side or the other. This would be achieved 
by maintaining an official list of regulations that are deemed to be more 
stringent by both sides and allowing companies to opt in to be 
governed by the concededly more stringent rules. This option would 
promote efficiency by eliminating duplication where the benefits of 
eliminating duplicative regulation are greater than the costs of over-
compliance. Opting in to more stringent regulation where the costs of 
doing so are low also may begin a bottom-up process of creating de 
facto internationally harmonised regulations worldwide. 
2) Ongoing expert assessment of comparative effectiveness of 
regulation. We also recommend that the TTIP should include a new 
institution for developing mutually credible assessments and data 
about the actual performance of chemicals regulation on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Future negotiators should not be working from the 
stereotypes and caricatures that currently define mutual 
misperceptions of the other’s system of chemicals regulation. Joint 
panels of experts should be convened to assess and report on where 
actual regulatory outcomes differ and where they are either ‘essentially 
equivalent’ or at least good enough to protect the public as intended. 
An interesting model for such an institution was recently 
provided by the automobile industry. The European Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Association, the American Automotive Policy Council 
and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers together commissioned 
a recent study by two leading engineering think tanks, one American – 
the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute – and one 
European – SAFER, a transportation research centre at Chalmers 
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University in Gothenburg, Sweden – to evaluate whether motor 
vehicles manufactured in compliance with EU and US regulatory 
requirements provide essentially equivalent real-world safety 
performance.11 Although one might debate whether ‘essential (or 
functional) equivalence’, as opposed to ‘adequate to protect the 
public’,12 is the right standard for evaluation, the model of neutral 
evaluation by experts on both sides of the Atlantic is a promising one. 
We recommend that something like this should be embodied in a 
permanent institution under TTIP, which would be mandated to carry 
out comparative studies of the effectiveness of regulation in the two 
trading partners and make consensus recommendations for areas 
where greater harmonisation would not reduce the practical level of 
protection on either side.13 
3. Why did so much effort and prospective gains 
produce so little?  
Why did so much effort produce so little convergence of regulatory 
systems is the over-riding question about the TTIP negotiations for the 
chemicals sector. In fact, a lot of effort in chemicals preceded the TTIP 
negotiations under the Transatlantic Market Place since 1996 and the 
                                                          
11 See European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association Press Release, “TTIP: 
Study examines EU & US vehicle safety equivalence”, 21 May 2014 
(www.acea.be/press-releases/article/ttip-study-examines-eu-us-vehicle-
safety-equivalence). The results of this highly technical study were not yet 
available when the present book went to press. However, the European 
Commission published two practical examples of testing for equivalence, one 
on seat belt anchorages and one on lighting and vision standards, both of which 
were found functionally equivalent, despite diverging technical requirements. 
See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153023.pdf 
and 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153168.pdf  
12 See US Administrative Conference Recommendation 2011-6 on International 
Regulatory Cooperation, Paragraph 4, adopted 8 December 2011: “To deploy 
limited resources more effectively, agencies should, where appropriate and 
practicable, identify foreign authorities that maintain high quality and effective 
standards and practices and identify areas in which the tests, inspections, or 
certifications by agencies and such foreign agencies overlap.” 
(www.acus.gov/recommendation/international-regulatory-cooperation) 
13 For an analysis of the political economy of recommendations by expert 
consensus bodies, and why they are often adopted by politicians without 
controversy, see Elliott (2008).  
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proposals of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). As we shall 
remind the reader, the common chemical TABD proposals of one and 
a half decades ago were much bolder than what is on the table in TTIP. 
In chemicals, TTIP as it stands today, is anything but bold. Although 
the terms of a final agreement are still to be agreed, the negotiators 
(particularly those for the EU) have taken pains in public statements to 
reassure an anxious public and NGO community that “joint chemicals 
regulation is absolutely off the table”.14 As reported in ENDS Europe 
DAILY, “both [US chief negotiator Dan] Mullaney and the EU’s [chief 
negotiator Ignacio] Garcia Bercero emphasised that they are not 
considering ‘harmonising or mutually recognising’ the two regulatory 
systems.”15 Of course, some two decades ago, REACH did not exist. 
One can argue with some justification that the emergence of REACH 
itself has killed the ambitious proposals emerging from the TABD. 
However (as far as we know), no alternative approaches have been 
suggested by the negotiators to reduce significantly technical barriers 
to trade (TBTs) in chemicals trade, without reducing SHEC -protection 
on either side. Looking at the EU negotiation position on chemicals,16 
the proposals are modest and will hardly address the high costs of TBTs 
in the sector.  
And it is lowering TBTs that is the prime economic justification 
of TTIP. The present chapter is not the right place to elaborate on TBTs 
in chemicals trade. The most respectable study on the overall costs of 
TBTs and their partial removal under TTIP is Francois et al. (2013) for 
the Commission’s Impact Assessment. A non-technical assessment of 
the study and alternatives can be found in Pelkmans et al. (2014) for the 
European Parliament. The simulations by Francois et al. are the only 
ones with specific sectoral TBT estimates: for chemicals, TBT costs of 
EU exports to the US amount to 19.1%; for US exports to the EU, some 
13.6%. These compare with chemical tariffs in the 3%-6% range, with 
quite a few actually being zero. This is not to suggest that these TBT 
estimates are rock-solid – it is exceedingly difficult to come to such 
estimates (which is why sectoral TBT estimates are so very rare). 
Moreover, in discussions with the chemicals industry, it was indicated 
that TBTs due to regulatory (systems) divergence are costly, no doubt, 
                                                          
14 “Shared Chemicals Assessment on TTIP Table”, ENDS Europe DAILY, 3 
October 2014. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See the EU’s position on chemicals on the European Commission’s website 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152468.pdf).  
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and should be reduced significantly, but these fairly high costs are not 
seen as a true trade barrier by the larger chemicals firms, only by the 
many SMEs. Still, going by the best study available (Francois et al., 
2013), a halving of the TBT costs in chemicals would give a boost in 
mutual exports of respectively €29.9 billion (36%) for the EU and €27.3 
billion (34%) for the US, which are impressive statistics by any account. 
It ought to be noted that these effects incorporate general equilibrium 
effects (e.g. also of other TTIP sectors and their relations with the 
chemical industry) and, moreover, are calculated on the assumption of 
positive spill-overs to third countries.17 However, if SMEs would find 
it feasible, once TTIP would have reduced TBTs significantly, to enter 
transatlantic trade, the economic effects would become larger still. This 
SME effect cannot be modelled in CGE approaches. Thus, the case for 
tackling TBTs in chemicals in TTIP is powerful.  
This is not to say, however, that a TTIP agreement on chemicals, 
without lowering TBTs significantly at first, would be unimportant. An 
agreement, if one is eventually reached, will undoubtedly result in 
progress towards reducing certain trade barriers, including the 
elimination of (relatively low) tariffs on chemicals, as well as increased 
collaboration at the scientific and technical level and probably also to 
greater standardisation of testing methods, labelling and sharing of 
datasets. According to reports in the trade press, “EU and US 
negotiators are examining how regulators can share the work of 
assessing priority chemicals as part of the TTIP trade deal ….”18 These 
could lead to substantial accomplishments. Moreover, eliminating 
tariffs alone is estimated to save €1.5 billion annually,19 and this tariff-
cutting would also avoid distorting trade by deterring transactions that 
                                                          
17 A spill-over of 20% has been assumed. This also has a positive effect on EU 
and US exports of chemicals to the rest of the world, up by some 9%. It is also 
good to re-emphasise that TBTs have nothing to do with SHEC objectives (or, 
the ‘level of protection’). TTIP discussions painfully demonstrate that many 
commentators are hardly or not at all aware of the WTO TBT agreement, which 
assumes SHEC objectives of national governments as given. It is all about 
instruments or red tape or avoidable duplications of tests, etc.  
18 ENDS Europe DAILY (3 October 2014). See also Box 13.2.  
19 “US-EU trade pact can cut import duties on €48 billion in chemical trade: 
Cefic”, Platts, 18 June 2013 (www.platts.com/latest-news/petrochemicals/ 
london/us-eu-trade-pact-can-cut-import-duties-on-eur48-26030822). 
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might otherwise occur in their absence.20 Greater collaboration and 
familiarity at the scientific level may eventually lead to building greater 
confidence in one another’s regulatory approaches and that in turn 
could lead to further progress to reduce regulatory differences.21  
4. Two decades lost? Missed opportunities for 
harmonisation? 
Proponents of regulatory convergence in the chemical sector had 
higher hopes22 when the US and the EU announced that chemicals 
regulation would be a focus of the TTIP negotiations. TTIP came on the 
heels of nearly two decades of attempts to reduce the costs of mutual 
market access in chemicals through the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue, as well as increased regulatory cooperation between the 
European Commission and the US Environmental Protection Agency,23 
and also broad-based efforts to harmonise chemical regulatory systems 
in developed countries more generally through the OECD.24 The 
rationale behind all these efforts to reduce regulatory divergences was 
                                                          
20 One study (Erixon & Bauer, 2010) estimates that eliminating tariffs on all 
products would boost EU exports by 7% and US exports by 8%. See also the 
comments of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (2013): “Elimination of 
the remaining import duties on chemicals, currently averaging between 3-6%, 
would result in considerable savings to our company and remove many 
economic barriers to shipping technical and chemical intermediates.”. Francois 
et al. (2013) estimate that tariff removal only would boost EU chemical exports 
to the US by 5.4%; for US exports, it is no less than 12.4% (again, under the 
assumption of a 20% spill-over to 3rd countries).  
21 Remarks of Jim Jones, Acting Assistant Administrator for the Office of 
Chemicals Safety and Pollution Prevention, US Environmental Protection 
Agency, “Towards a Transatlantic Market for Trade in Chemicals”, 17 July2013, 
Washington, D.C.  
22 See remarks e.g. of Stuart E. Eizenstat (2013) in E!Sharp: “In fact, we should 
have confidence in the 21st century that the regulatory standards in both the EU 
and US are adequate to protect our publics and should be accepted, … Mutual 
recognition is a sounder basis for regulatory cooperation than actual 
harmonization.” 
23 For summaries of these precursors, see Quick (2007) and Shaffer & Pollack 
(2005, pp. 220-221). 
24 For example, see Box 13.1 and OECD Guidelines for the Testing of Chemicals 
(www.oecd.org/env/ehs/testing/oecdguidelinesforthetestingofchemicals.ht
m).  
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succinctly summarised in a 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
report to the US Congress: 
Since the mid-1990s, both US and European multinational 
companies have viewed divergent ways of regulating 
markets for both goods and services as the most serious 
barriers to transatlantic commerce. The primary reason why 
these companies seek to achieve greater harmonization in 
standards and regulatory procedures is to reduce costs 
imposed by complying with two different sets of regulations 
and standards.25 
The CRS report went on to opine: “Redundant standards, testing, 
and certification procedures are seen by [multinational] companies as 
far more costly and harmful than any trade barriers imposed at the 
border, such as tariffs or quotas” and that “[i]n no area has [regulatory 
divergence] been a greater problem than in chemicals”.26 
Hopes for progress on regulatory convergence received a boost 
in May 2012, when President Obama signed Executive Order 13609, 
Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation,27 which declared the 
following as official US policy: 
In some cases, the differences between the regulatory 
approaches of US agencies and those of their foreign 
counterparts might not be necessary and might impair the 
ability of American businesses to export and compete 
internationally. In meeting shared challenges involving 
health, safety, labor, security, environmental, and other 
issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify 
approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or 
would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation. 
International regulatory cooperation can also reduce, 
eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory 
requirements.28 
                                                          
25 Raymond J. Ahearn, “Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Analysis: 
Background and Analysis”, Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress, 22 October 2008 
(http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112019.pdf).  
26 Ibid., pp. 2-3. This is consistent with the economic study conducted by 
Francois et al. (2013) for the Commission’s Impact Assessment of TTIP, finding 
that the costs of chemical TBTs are the second-highest (after automotive).  
27 www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200327/pdf/DCPD-201200327.pdf  
28 Executive Order 13609, §1. 
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Nevertheless, it is useful to recall that chemical regulatory 
cooperation was agreed to be reinforced following the New 
Transatlantic Marketplace in Madrid in 1995. As the survey by Quick 
(2007) describes in painstaking detail, joint US-EU business proposals 
by TABD were made, some of which were innovative. One might even 
call them bold! Without rehearsing the history in all its aspects, already 
in 1996 in Chicago, proposals were launched to follow up the OECD 
GLP and MAD agreements (see Box 13.2 in section 5) and negotiate 
Conditional Equivalence Agreements in a) risk assessment, b) 
notification of new chemicals, c) application and use and d) 
classification and labelling. Interestingly, the end point would be 
‘unconditional equivalence agreements’ by 2000! Knowing that 
harmonisation was pointless, the TABD made a strong plea for forms 
of mutual recognition or acceptance as feasible alternatives. For 
instance, enhancing understanding and acceptance of methods used for 
hazard assessment and risk assessment was seen as a priority; 
exceptions for low-risk chemicals, polymers and R&D chemicals were 
favoured when registering new chemicals substances (to be fair, these 
suggestions were later echoed in REACH to some degree). For new 
polymers, an equivalence agreement (like mutual recognition) was 
proposed: once allowed to be sold in the US (EU), it could also be 
marketed in the EU (US). But Quick (2007, p. 255), complains that the 
“biggest obstacle to progress is the lack of understanding among the 
authorities concerning the other regulatory system”. And, not to forget, 
REACH was in the early preparatory stages, which undoubtedly 
widened systemic divergence.29 
While misunderstanding of one another’s systems is certainly an 
important factor, we also suggest an additional reason: the perception 
by key players that Atlantic regulatory cooperation is but an interim 
step towards developing chemical regulatory systems worldwide. 
Since REACH was proposed in 2003, if not before with the Chemicals 
White Paper in 2001 proposing the precautionary principle, Atlantic 
regulatory cooperation was throttled, if not in coma (except for very 
specific practical issues, case by case). Staking out positions for this 
larger game of defining the rules for trade in chemicals worldwide was 
more important to participants on both sides than the immediate gains 
that could be made by reducing differences in regulatory systems 
between the US and the EU. 
                                                          
29 See Pelkmans (2005). 
GREATER TTIP AMBITION IN CHEMICALS: WHY AND HOW  437 
 
However, other factors also contributed to the failure of chemical 
regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US, including the 
politics of chemical regulation. As a practical, political matter in the 
current environment, making changes to REACH in Europe would 
have been extremely difficult and reform of TSCA has long been stalled 
in Congress. As this book goes to press, there is renewed hope that a 
bipartisan compromise may finally be reached in Congress to overhaul 
the outdated US Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), first enacted in 
1976 and not significantly amended in the ensuing 40 years. However, 
from the EU end, the proposed changes are regarded as incremental: 
easier to regulate ‘restrictions’ but no comprehensive requirement for 
‘registration’ (testing) of all chemicals before bringing them to the 
market 30 and no ‘authorisations’ regime for SVHCs on a company 
basis, and hence, only a little bit more ‘REACH-like’.31 
There is a broad consensus in Europe and among academics in 
the United States that Section 6 of TSCA, which gives EPA authority to 
regulate chemicals analogous to ‘restriction’ under REACH, is 
currently ineffective. However, it is not always appreciated, 
particularly in Europe, that TSCA Section 6 is by its terms only one tool 
available to the federal and state governments in the US to regulate 
chemicals; indeed, by law EPA is supposed to regulate under (many) 
other statutes than TSCA if it can. 32 Thus, the TSCA-REACH 
                                                          
30 This should not be misread: for new chemicals, a PMN (= pre-manufacture 
notification) is required, but testing is not necessarily comprehensive (and not 
standardised a priori, as in REACH), dependingt e.g. on whether the substance 
is very similar to other ones known to be safe. Around one-third of the 
chemicals, for which a PMN is submitted, are not approved. For existing 
chemicals, no registration or testing is required and the burden of proof is on 
the EPA; here, the gap with REACH is wide.  
31 See Kollipara (2015).  
32 TSCA Sec 6, which is similar to ‘restrictions’ under REACH, only applies if 
the EPA lacks authority to address the risk under another statute. This 
limitation is explicit in the statutory language: 
If the Administrator [of EPA] determines that a risk of injury to health or the 
environment could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by actions 
taken under another Federal law (or laws) administered in whole or in part by 
the Administrator, the Administrator may not promulgate a rule under 
subsection (a) to protect against such risk of injury unless the Administrator 
finds, in the Administrator’s discretion, that it is in the public interest to protect 
against such risk under this Act. In making such a finding the Administrator 
shall consider (i) all relevant aspects of the risk, as determined by the 
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comparison is far from a complete comparison of the effectiveness of 
chemical regulation as a whole. For this reason, Box 13.1 provides a 
primer on how the US regulates chemicals, as this seems too little 
known in Europe, and perhaps even in the US.  
Box 13.1 A primer on how the US regulates chemicals 
The US system for regulating chemical exposures is much more complex 
and multi-faceted than the one followed in Europe. This complexity is 
not necessarily desirable but instead reflects aspects of the US 
constitutional system and the incentives for US politicians to pass new 
laws for which they can claim credit rather than to amend or codify old 
ones.33 In addition, US legal culture and traditions are more skeptical of 
government, resulting in the construction of multiple, redundant 
programmes.34 The multiplicity of US laws and institutions does mean, 
however, that a simple-minded comparison between TSCA and REACH 
is misleading. TSCA is merely a last line of defence; by law, TSCA 
Section 6 authority can only be used if regulation under another statute 
would not be effective.35  
                                                          
Administrator in the Administrator’s discretion, (ii) a comparison of the 
estimated costs of complying with actions taken under this Act and under such 
law (or laws), and (iii) the relative efficiency of actions under this Act and under 
such law (or laws) to protect against such risk of injury. 
15 USC. §2605(c), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/2605  
The EPA has generally found that addressing particular uses of a substance, 
e.g. in pesticides, foods, consumer products or releases to water, etc., is more 
effective than addressing it across the board under TSCA.  
33 For an account of ‘competitive credit claiming’ by politicians in creating US 
environmental laws, see Elliott, Ackerman & Millian (1985). 
34 This fundamental difference between the prevailing legal strategies in 
Europe and the US was noted by the sagacious European observer Walter 
Bagehot (1901) over a century ago: “The English constitution, in a word, is 
framed on the principle of choosing a single sovereign authority, and making 
it good; the American, upon the principle of having many sovereign 
authorities, and hoping that their multitude will atone for their inferiority.” 
35 TSCA Sec 6, which is somewhat similar to banning or ‘restriction’ for 
particular uses under REACH, only applies if EPA lacks authority to address 
the risk under another statute. This limitation is explicit in the statutory 
language. If the Administrator [of EPA] determines that a risk of injury to 
health or the environment could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent 
by actions taken under another Federal law (or laws) administered in whole or 
in part by the Administrator, the Administrator may not promulgate a rule 
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Numerous other statutory authorities and common law 
principles would have to be considered in order to assess the overall 
effectiveness of chemical regulation in the US versus Europe, and so far 
as we are aware, this has never been done.36 For example, the standard 
West Publishing Company pamphlet of Federal Environmental Statutes 
lists 59 federal environmental laws alphabetically from the Acid 
Precipitation Act of 1980 through the Wood Residue Utilization Act of 
1980, running to a total of 1,842 pages of small, 10-point type. About half 
of them apply to chemicals in various contexts. Add to these the 
administrative regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) which 
are much more voluminous and detailed than the statutes themselves 
and the laws of the 50 states, which are generally allowed to add legal 
restrictions in addition to the federal ones in most fields.37 And in 
addition, there are many other federal laws that regulate chemicals in 
various contexts that Americans do not consider ‘environmental’. For 
example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)38 regulates 
permissible exposure limits (PELs) for several hundred chemicals in the 
workplace.39 Under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has promulgated several short lists of 
chemical additives that are permitted for use in cosmetics, medicines 
and foods but bans all others unless they obtain special approval on a 
                                                          
under subsection a) to protect against such risk of injury unless the 
Administrator finds, in the Administrator’s discretion, that it is in the public 
interest to protect against such risk under this Act. In making such a finding 
the Administrator shall consider: i) all relevant aspects of the risk, as 
determined by the Administrator in the Administrator’s discretion, ii) a 
comparison of the estimated costs of complying with actions taken under this 
Act and under such law (or laws) and iii) the relative efficiency of actions under 
this Act and under such law (or laws) to protect against such risk of injury. See 
15 C. §2605(c) www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/2605 and 
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7416.  
36 In the 1990s, one of the co-authors published a 97-page chapter in a treatise 
merely cataloguing the various federal environmental laws affecting the 
chemical industry, but did not purport to assess their effectiveness (see Elliott 
& Thomas, 1993). 
37 See e.g. Clean Air Act, §116, 42 U.S.C. §7416. 
38 29 U.S.C. ch. 15 § 651 et seq. 
39 See 29 CFR 1910.1000, Tables Z-1, Z-2 and Z-3 (www.osha.gov/pls/ 
oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9992).  
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case-by-case basis based on test data.40 The Consumer Product Safety 
Act (CPSA) regulates toxics in articles to which consumers may be 
exposed such as toys.41  
Thus, the frequently quoted nostrum that REACH regulates 
‘articles’ but TSCA does not, while literally true, is inherently 
misleading; TSCA does not regulate chemical usage in articles, but 
another federal statute does. Finally, one should not forget that the US is 
a common-law country. One of the reasons that TSCA has not been 
amended in 40 years is that many adaptations have been accomplished 
by judicial and administrative interpretation and practice, without ever 
codifying them in changes of the statute. Thus, the ‘endangered species 
act’ was converted from a statute protecting individual animals into one 
that protects biodiversity and critical habitat, without ever modifying 
the words of the statute. A somewhat analoguous example of adaptation 
by administrative interpretation is the EPA’s standard ‘consent decree’ 
for new chemicals (which comes closer to specific ‘authorisation’ under 
REACH) that a company agrees to restrict production, distribution and 
disposal of a new – presumably risky - substance until more knowledge 
becomes available.42 Its application is quite different from what the 
statute’s drafters originally contemplated.  
Yet another very different example is POPs (Persistent Organic 
Pollutants), which are chemical substances that persist in the 
environment, bioaccumulate through the food web and pose a risk of 
causing adverse effects to human health and the environment. Although 
the US signed, but never ratified, the Stockholm Convention, POPs are 
forbidden in the US in domestic legislation. In summary, the legal 
systems in the US and Europe are very different in their structure, which 
makes comprehensive comparisons difficult, but one thing is sure: 
counting the number of chemicals banned under REACH versus the 
number banned under TSCA is not an accurate measure of their 
differences.  
                                                          
40 21 CFR Parts 73, 74, 81 and 82 (www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ 
ColorAdditives/ColorAdditiveInventories/ucm115641.htm).  
41 See Ed Loewenton, “CPSC Toughens Lead Regulations in Toys”, 28 October 
2008, describing provisions of the US Consumer Product Safety Improvement 
Act of 2008, §101 (http://turnertoys.com/CPSC-Toughens-Lead-Regulations-
in-Toys.html). 
42 See Renn & Elliott (2011, p. 237) describing “EPA’s standard consent decree 
[under TSCA §5], which allows limited production and use of substances in 
specified uses with limited potential to cause harm while further information 
is developed”. 
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One paper found that only a few substances had been regulated 
under TSCA, but conceded that at least 1,134 chemicals had been 
regulated under other US statutes as of 2011 (Schwarzman & Wilson, 
2011, p. 109, Table 5.1).. These statistics are old,43 however, and do not 
even include de facto restrictive or chilling effects caused by tough US 
liability cases or voluntary withdrawals under EPA pressure. 
Schwarzman and Wilson went on to declare TSCA’s ineffectiveness 
had created a ‘data gap’ and a ‘safety gap’ between the US and Europe. 
It is easy to count how many substances have been regulated under 
TSCA. It is much more difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of the 
US chemical control programme44 and incentives created by common-
law liability cases (see Box 13.1). In other words, there seems to be no 
ready, comprehensive and accessible information about the extent and 
level of protection against risky chemicals in the US, a remarkable 
circumstance to say the least.  
There is very little literature comparing the actual breadth and 
stringency of regulation of chemicals in the US versus Europe on a 
systematic basis. There is, however, a widespread perception that 
REACH is more effective than TSCA and even if Congress ultimately 
does strengthen TSCA, it will require many years of implementation to 
build confidence in Europe that US regulation of chemicals is 
comparable to that in Europe. 
The perceived differences between the effectiveness of 
regulation under TSCA and REACH may have been uppermost in the 
minds of the industry and the negotiators when drafting TTIP 
negotiation positions and we do not wish to be misperceived as 
discounting the importance of this factor. But in the long run, 
describing the politics of chemical regulation in the US and the EU at a 
particular point in time is less important than understanding the 
                                                          
43 Note that Table 5.1 is based on rather old evidence by Dernbach (1997).  
44 Schwarzman & Wilson (2011) mention five such statutes: Clean Water Act, 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Clean Air Act, Occupational Health 
and Safety Act and the Toxics Release Inventory of the Community Right-to-
Know Act. As noted in Box 13.1, this is a painfully incomplete view of chemical 
protection in the US. At the same time, both the EU and the US have a lot of 
product-specific regulation of chemicals; in other words, also for the EU, there 
is much more than REACH (e.g. hazardous chemicals in electronic goods, end-
of-life-vehicles, POPs, toys, food contact materials, etc.) A survey of 155 pieces 
of EU legislation, outside REACH, which may affect chemicals is in Milieu 
(2012). 
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dynamics of bilateral trade negotiations in the new era of globalisation 
of trade, and it is on that larger lesson that we focus. 
5. Setting modest goals for TTIP 
5.1 The joint position of the chemical industry and EU 
suggestions 
Despite high hopes for greater regulatory convergence in the run-up to 
TTIP, substantive changes to the divergent regulatory systems for 
regulating chemicals on the two sides of the Atlantic were taken off the 
table even before the TTIP talks began, according to the position of the 
European negotiators that were leaked early in the process: 
Industry associations, civil society and governments are 
aware that neither full harmonisation nor mutual recognition 
seems feasible on the basis of the existing framework 
legislations in the US and EU: REACH (Regulation (EC) 
1907/2006) and TSCA (Toxic Substances Control Act) are too 
different with regard to some fundamental principles. 
The recently completed REACH Review concluded 
that REACH should not be amended, while in the US a 
bipartisan proposal to amend TSCA has been introduced into 
Congress in May 2013. 
However, the draft TSCA reform legislation does not 
foresee any general registration obligation for substances as a 
condition for their marketing (a fundamental requirement 
under REACH), nor elements comparable to authorisation, 
while it would give the EPA (Environmental Protection 
Agency) new and easier possibilities to conduct chemical 
assessments and adopt risk management measures such as 
restrictions.45 
This positioning rings true because, remarkably, the trade 
associations representing the chemicals industry on both sides of the 
Atlantic proposed a limited (joint) agenda that did not include making 
progress towards reducing non-tariff trade barriers in the form of 
duplicative regulatory reviews. A joint paper drafted by the European 
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), “with the cooperation of ACC,” 
the American Chemistry Council representing the US chemical 
                                                          
45 These quotations are literally found in the EU’s position on chemicals, 
published a little later on the European Commission’s website 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152468.pdf). 
GREATER TTIP AMBITION IN CHEMICALS: WHY AND HOW  443 
 
industry, outlined very limited “joint ACC-CEFIC proposals for 
enhanced cooperation in chemicals”: 
 Common prioritisation principles and burden-sharing for 
assessments of high-priority chemicals and, where appropriate, 
categories of substances (e.g. substance evaluation under 
REACH and high-priority targeted risk assessments under the 
current TSCA and safety determinations under a modernised 
TSCA). 
 Recognition of each other’s data and studies and harmonised 
standards and methodologies for hazard and risk assessment are 
necessary for effective burden-sharing.46 
The chemical industry’s joint position was that: 
Closer cooperation on prioritisation of substances for further 
assessment would lead to cost reductions for both authorities 
and companies by creating opportunities for burden-sharing. 
That would also contribute to narrowing the difference in 
outcomes of assessments by fostering coherence and building 
confidence in each other’s assessments. In the long run that 
could also result in greater coherence in regulatory outcomes 
including down-stream legislation which would further reduce 
regulatory divergence.47 
Box 13.2 OECD accomplishments in chemicals regulatory cooperation 
The OECD is usually regarded as fostering policy research in many 
domains, ensuring the quality of statistical series and economic studies 
in many fields and stimulating a wide range of cooperative and 
exchange activities amongst policy-makers. But it is not typically 
referred to as an agenda-setter or rule-maker. Yet, that is exactly what it 
has accomplished in chemicals, after decades of low-key technical work. 
Interestingly, the US and the EU have been leading in this work. When 
discussing regulatory convergence in chemicals over the North Atlantic, 
and even more so when suggesting that a gradual move to a common 
minimum of world regulatory requirements and methods in chemical 
risk management is so important for the EU and the US, one should first 
                                                          
46 See CEFIC’s response to the European Commission’s request for further 
details on joint ACC-CEFIC proposals for enhanced cooperation on chemicals 
under TTIP, 7 March 2014 (www.cefic.org/Documents/PolicyCentre/ 
TTIP/%5bTTIP%5d%20Cefic%20response%20to%20Commission%20ACC-
efic%20proposal%20on%20TTIP%207%20March%202014%20(web%20and%20
click-in).pdf).  
47 Ibid. (emphasis supplied). 
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be aware of the achievements by the OECD. Alternatively, when 
assessing the current ideas of the negotiators in TTIP or, for that matter, 
of the chemical industry in their joint paper, the accomplishments of the 
OECD so far prompt the query: What value-added can the TTIP 
proposals really bring beyond the results of the OECD, quite apart from 
other – indeed higher - ambitions on chemical cooperation? 
The OECD has generated three significant accomplishments. The 
most important one is the MAD system (MAD = Mutual Acceptance of 
Data). This is a binding agreement for member states based on an OECD 
Council Act from 1981.* The obligation is to accept chemical safety data 
from other OECD countries, plus seven other signatories (e.g. India, 
Brazil, South Africa, Singapore), if and only if these data have been 
generated using OECD Test Guidelines and OECD Good Laboratory 
Practices (GLP). The objectives of the MAD system is i) to save resources 
by avoiding duplication, ii) reduce NTBs, iii) reduce animal testing by 
acceptance of earlier testing and iv) arrive at a level-playing field for 
industry in if not beyond the OECD. The second accomplishment 
consists of agenda-setting for and follow-up actions in four types of 
OECD activity, all building on MAD: burden-sharing between countries 
on actual assessments of chemicals, such as the evaluation of safety of 
high-production-volume (HPV) chemicals; harmonisation of industry 
dossiers for chemicals and review reports for pesticides; exchanging 
technical and policy information; and outreach to non-OECD countries, 
crucial as the weight of chemical output in non-OECD countries rapidly 
increases. For instance, the ‘guidance documents’ for industry dossiers 
and reviews for pesticides (sometimes called a ‘monograph’) formulated 
ever since 1998 can be found in areas such as biocides, chemical 
accidents, regulatory oversight of biotech, safety of novel food and feed, 
and manufactured nanomaterials. 
____________  
* There are two other OECD Council texts relevant for MAD. One is a 
Recommendation in 1989 on a range of practical implementation and 
enforcement issues of GLP. The other is a Decision of 1997 providing a step-
wise procedure for allowing non-OECD countries to take part. 
Source: Sigman (2013). 
Conspicuous by its absence from the chemical industry’s ‘wish 
list’ is any mention of regulatory convergence or recognition of 
regulatory outcomes on either side. On the contrary, according to the 
chemical industry’s joint position, reducing regulatory divergence will 
have to await downstream legislation, because of differences in current 
legislation. The joint paper continues: 
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REACH and TSCA are very different with regard to 
prioritisation of substances for assessment and further risk 
management actions. Whilst TSCA applies risk-based 
prioritisation, REACH includes prioritisation based on 
production volume or hazard and, in several procedures, 
risk. 
There are also substantial differences at later stages of the 
regulatory process, including ‘authorisation’ and whether government 
or the industry has the burden of producing safety information. It is 
interesting, and perhaps significant, however, that the joint industry 
paper emphasises the differences in the front end of the process, setting 
priorities. One even wonders how far beyond the useful but modest 
OECD chemical programme can TTIP move, with such a timid 
mandate (see Box 13.3). With the UN GHS being partly adopted inside 
the US (e.g. by OSHA) and the OECD programme working more or less 
reasonably well, should TTIP not go far beyond the mild aspirations of 
these intergovernmental organisations?  
Box 13.3 Edging towards a draft text of the chemicals annex, EU 
suggestions 
Following the EU position on chemicals (May 2014), the Commission 
published two so-called ‘non-papers’ in November 2014. In May 2014, it 
proposed ‘enhanced cooperation’ in four areas: i) prioritisation of 
chemicals for assessment and assessment methodologies; ii) promoting 
alignment in classification and labelling of chemicals, i.e. a full 
implementation of GHS in the US, which is a binding obligation – 
although without sanctions; iii) new and emerging issues, e.g. endocrine 
disruptors and nanomaterials; and iv) enhanced information-sharing, 
while protecting CBI (confidential business information). All these are 
useful but low-key approaches (in the words of the Commission, they 
“seek opportunities for cooperation exclusively in specific areas which 
do not require or imply any change in the regulatory systems of each 
side”). However, when no change in the systems and/or objectives is 
implied, one can do so much more to lower TBT costs. One ‘non-paper’ 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/november/tradoc_1529
12.pdf) is a first outline of how the Annex on chemicals in TTIP would 
look like. It repeats most of what is in the Position Paper, but adds a 
series of objectives, which do include (for the ‘living agreement’, one 
supposes) i) to “avoid unnecessary duplicative requirements” and ii) “to 
identify and implement actions that can lead to reduction of unnecessary 
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costs to transatlantic trade”. Thus, in the longer run, a reduction of TBTs 
remains possible within the living agreement of TTIP.  
Also, a Chemicals Working Group would be established, 
consisting of regulators. The second ‘non-paper’ 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/november/tradoc_1529
13.pdf) provides considerable practical detail on six areas of cooperation 
and how the US (usually, EPA) would be involved, step by step, in notice 
& comments and information (with an explicit call on the US to draft a 
similar non-paper for three of the six areas). These areas are: 
prioritisation of chemicals, i.e. updates of CoRAP under REACH, 
process for harmonised classification and labelling (which is already a 
UN standard, called GHS, but implemented in the US only by OSHA, so 
far; call on the US to develop a similar scheme for their NTP activities), 
nomination of SVHCs (very risky chemicals) for the candidate list of 
authorisation, prioritisation of SVHCs to be moved from candidate list 
to authorisation (Annex XIV REACH), involving the US when a 
restriction proposal (by ECHA or a member state) is listed in the Registry 
of Intent, and finally when companies (or consortia) submit applications 
for authorisation (e.g. link with alternatives based on EPA’s Design for 
Environment Program).  
These options cannot be belittled: no less than 22 different steps 
involving the US are identified for the six areas, implying numerous 
consultations, exchanges, comments and follow-ups between US and EU 
regulators. However, in TTIP one would assume the US to offer similar 
options, which would perhaps double the number of optional or 
obligatory interchanges between the two authorities. Where SHEC 
objectives are not that different over the North Atlantic, one should 
expect that quite often convergence or similar outcomes might finally be 
found. Although all this does not amount to a direct assault on TBTs, it 
is essential for building trust.  
5.2 Backtracking by the European Parliament: ‘Angst’ or 
a sound case? 
In July 2015 and without referring to the detailed proposals in Box 13.3, 
the European Parliament adopted a TTIP resolution which seems to 
turn against, or at least minimises, the chemicals negotiations in TTIP. 
The rationale of the negative attitude on chemicals is problematic. For 
this reason, we offer some further considerations on the hesitations of 
some European political actors. These considerations, however, are 
only partially based on public documents, as some actors are careful 
not to go public with their views. Therefore, the authors have weighed 
the drawbacks of relying on informal information obtained from 
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various discussions in the US and EU policy circuits, against the 
benefits for the readers of additional insights about the implications of 
these positions or interests. We have decided that the insights matter 
more, but the reader should judge.  
A good deal of the nervousness or mistrust amongst some EU 
member state governments as well as some political forces in Europe, 
not to speak of some NGOs, is caused by the conviction that the US is 
suspected to have (hidden) hopes to be able to soften REACH or, seen 
as more likely, exercise ‘regulatory chill’ in the TTIP living agreement 
in subtle ways for future issues. This conviction may be right or wrong 
– there is no way of verifying48 – but it is prompting a fairly defensive 
stance by the Greens and others in the EP, but also by some EU national 
governments (including, apparently, Germany). Asserting that, in 
future, TTIP might lead to ‘regulatory chill’ is a very poor ‘argument’; 
in fact, it is not really an argument at all, it is a conviction driven by 
mistrust. In numerous trade and regulatory negotiations, all kinds of 
suspicions might be uttered, but should that be a reason not to 
negotiate?  
More logically, the fear might be a reason to carefully draft 
agreements and rules, presumably. Moreover, what is ‘regulatory chill’ 
actually? Regulation has to be based on scientific risk assessment and 
subsequently solid impact assessment, as the Guidelines of the 
Commission help to do. If, and only if, risk assessment is not fully 
possible, as science cannot (yet) establish risks with acceptable degrees 
of probabilities, is there a choice of opting for the application of the 
precautionary principle. Is ‘regulatory chill’ meant to refer to TTIP 
possibly limiting the freedom to exercise this choice? Or is it a concern 
that joint work on the science might eventually persuade Europeans 
that their present approach is overly precautionary? But that is exactly 
what has to be specified in both horizontal and sectoral TTIP regulatory 
cooperation. Why would that be different for chemicals to such a 
degree that the EP should be so negative about it?  
The present authors have difficulty understanding the logic of 
this defensive stance. Even if ‘regulatory chill’ might be regarded as a 
possibility, why would that be a problem for EU negotiators in TTIP 
now, or, later, in the living agreement? If US suggestions would be 
made having this effect, they would simply be dismissed and this is not 
                                                          
48 US negotiators or involved officials have been tightlipped and no detailed 
documents, let alone proposals or positions, have been published by US Trade 
Representative.  
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new. Discussions with the US on REACH have been conducted for a 
decade or longer, in Brussels, Washington and indeed in Geneva 
(WTO) as well. Why would the Commission suddenly be incapable of 
properly pursuing a well-defined EU mandate or its specific 
manifestations? Can it be traced back to a simmering tension or distrust 
between those (more?) preoccupied with environmental and health 
matters and those primarily working on chemicals with industry and 
other chemicals found downstream in value-chains? The ‘angst’ for 
regulatory chill is found frequently amongst advocacy groups in 
Europe – it is a most convenient plank on which to campaign but it is 
purely assertive. It seems to reflect a sentiment that EU regulators and 
negotiators are too ‘malleable’ due to business pressures or simply soft 
negotiators. Given the record of the EU in many FTAs and in EU trade 
policy more generally, as well as in the international debate on REACH 
(including with the US), there is no rationale whatsoever to support this 
defensiveness.  
Nevertheless, the European Parliament has, in its TTIP 
resolution of 8 July 2015,49 stipulated that negotiators, when it comes to 
regulatory cooperation, should “recognise that, where the EU and the 
US have very different rules, there will be no agreement, such as on ... 
REACH and its implementation ... and therefore not to negotiate on 
these issues”. The possible problem of this formulation is not that 
REACH cannot be negotiated, as noted before: this was always clear 
and explicit, too. The additional words “and its implementation” 
constitute an attempt to exercise ‘cooperative chill’ due to plain 
mistrust. The ‘cooperative chill’ in TTIP on the ‘implementation’ of 
REACH imposed by the EP is of course a heavily-fought political 
compromise, or reflects an ‘exchange’ of give-and-take, in an already 
rather fragmented EP (with many parties) exhibiting several severe 
sensivities with respect to TTIP. Moreover, it would appear to be 
inconsistent with several other paragraphs in the same resolution, also 
a regular phenomenon in EP resolutions. One can also query what the 
‘implementation’ of REACH really refers to. The present chapter is not 
the place to analyse this question in-depth, but the giant REACH 
regulation cannot possibly be made to work satisfactorily by 
mechanical and pure ‘implementation’, as the resolution seems to 
suggest. REACH has and must have many processes which are 
governed by the overall objectives of REACH and disciplined by strict 
criteria, science for risk assessment and many other features, exercised 
e.g. by the Commission, ECHA, the member states and expert 
                                                          
49 Under P8_TA-PROV(2015)0252 of 8 July 2015, para. 2. (c) (iii).  
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committees. The four elements in the EU’s suggestions for chemicals in 
TTIP (Box 13.3) would not ‘undermine’ or negatively affect these 
processes. As noted, all four, in different ways, are discussed in 
international organisations, too. Does the EP fear that TTIP regulatory 
cooperation amounts to a duty-to-agree? This would be absurd. Does it 
fear that the involvement (mostly by comments and consultation more 
broadly) of the US will a priori exercise a chilling effect, or, lead to 
compromises that would be less ambitious than what the EU on its own 
would have decided (apparently this is what German government 
circles are afraid of)? But is it not true as well that, if TTIP would come 
into being, the EU could then exercise a similar influence in the US 
where chemicals are hardly less controversial than in the EU?  
It is also worthwhile to discuss briefly three of the four 
suggestions in Box 13.3 (ignoring data-sharing). First on classification 
and labelling where the UN GHS has long been accepted by both the 
US and the EU (and many other countries). However, whereas OSHA 
in the US applies GHS, EPA does not. What is holding back the EPA 
from implementing a binding agreement that has the advantageous 
effect of lowering trading costs over the Atlantic and worldwide? It is 
said that this is due to pressures from leading pesticides companies 
(which include three European firms as well). Moreover, when 
applying GHS, one might attempt to harmonise further (e.g. in 
choosing the same classification for any given substance), but here the 
intricacies become greater. Why and when does the EU or US classify 
substance x as carcinogenic or not (and subsequently apply GHS)? Let 
us suppose that one would agree to apply a Vogel-type harmonisation-
up and decide to always go for the highest classification on either side. 
On the face of it, this would rule out controversy. But there is a snag: 
the EU identifying x as a SVHC thereby automatically blocks its use in 
pesticides. Second, the prioritisation for the evaluation of chemicals 
(and methodologies) does not affect the decision how and how 
stringently one protects, in case the substance turns out to be risky. This 
cooperation is meant to cut costs for the two parties by sharing the 
burden. Of course, this does require regulatory cooperation and precise 
agreement, case by case or in agreed programmes, presumably based 
on the chemical annex in TTIP. To block such useful cooperation 
(aiming precisely at cutting needless duplication), on the basis of the 
EP resolution, is simply not sensible.50 These are REACH processes that 
have to be pursued anyway.  
                                                          
50 Paragraphs 2.(c)(v), (vi) and (viii) of the EP Resolution acknowledge this.  
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What one might suggest doing is that such (TTIP) programmes 
are first justified by scientific analysis in a report and discussed in the 
EP, so that trust is created. Third, ‘new and emerging issues’ such as 
endocrine disruptors (EDs) and nanomaterials has a scientific and a 
more judgmental or ‘political’ aspect. On the former, cooperation and 
burden-sharing seems eminently sensible in TTIP, OECD, WHO or 
indeed in all of them. On the latter, the EU has become quite prudent. 
For example, Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans has 
decided to subject the draft delegated act on EDs, biocides and 
pesticides, which has passed its deadline for publication, to impact 
assessment, a sound decision in itself but mistrusted, by the same forces 
that are so sceptical in the EP, as a sign of unwillingness to extend the 
EDs list. For them it is a small step to suggest that this is ‘due’ to TTIP. 
These sensitivities are not a good reason to reject the option of 
regulatory cooperation on ‘new and emerging issues’ – not least 
because chemicals is a world market and derivatives in value chains 
can simply not be ignored. Nevertheless, one should exercise utmost 
prudence and make every attempt to build confidence-building 
measures rather than turn a blind eye to the problem. One may also 
want this issue to be shifted from horizontal regulatory cooperation to 
the specific chemicals annex where chemicals regulators govern the 
process. 
The chemicals section of TTIP has been much less controversial 
in the US, with most of the concern focusing instead on the 12-nation 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which has been characterised as 
America’s “most ambitious trade deal since the North American Free 
Trade Agreement in the 1990’s”.51 Much of the political dialogue in the 
US does not distinguish between TTIP and TPP, but is opposed to free 
trade agreements more generally as weakening US regulatory 
protections.52 
                                                          
51 Writing in the New York Times, Granville (2015) observes: “Opponents in the 
United States see the pact as mostly a giveaway to business, encouraging 
further export of manufacturing jobs to low-wage nations while limiting 
competition and encouraging higher prices for pharmaceuticals and other 
high-value products by spreading American standards for patent protections 
to other countries. A provision allowing multinational corporations to 
challenge regulations and court rulings before special tribunals is drawing 
intense opposition.” 
52 In a posting on techdirt.com, a blogger quotes from a press release from the 
Sierra Club: “Governments must take a page out of the history books and stop 
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6. Contrasting REACH and TSCA: Perceptions and 
critical assessment 
6.1 Why both are criticised? 
Curiously, there is resistance against TTIP chemicals negotiations going 
deeper both from the two sides in the negotiations and from NGOs. The 
position of business (CEFIC and ACC together) is accommodating this 
resistance by not offering an alternative view, but merely a useful, yet 
cautious preparatory route. From a trade-policy point of view, this is 
peculiar because the costs of TBTs in chemicals trade over the North 
Atlantic are amongst the highest of all industrial sectors. Lowering 
these TBT costs drastically would probably yield large economic gains. 
It is thus disappointing that the chemicals TTIP chapter does not reflect 
the original spirit of the partnership and is not more ambitious in 
focusing on removing or minimising TBTs.  
Can one understand this resistance from a regulatory point of 
view? Yes and no. No, one cannot, once one is willing and capable to 
assume a more rational and detached analytical view of how EU-US 
chemical regulation should be designed. Yes, one can, if one joins the 
many stakeholders and officials of the chemical policy-making 
communities on both sides, repeating all the time that the two 
regulatory regimes are too divergent. Nobody seems to ask the more 
relevant question whether the one or the other regime, or both, embody 
‘good regulation’, applying GRPs (Good Regulatory Practices). And, as a 
corollary, whether, if GRPs were applied on both sides, the ‘divergence’ 
would shrink with it. ‘Better regulation’ would yield additional 
economic welfare, and if its application would indeed also shrink the 
divergence, TBTs would be much lower, too: a clear win-win. It is fairly 
obvious that both chemical regulatory regimes can be improved and a 
mutually compatible and sound way of doing that is to employ ‘Better 
Regulation’ principles, most of which have long been agreed 
transatlantically!53 Since the very purpose of TTIP is to reap economic 
                                                          
negotiating trade pacts that cut protections for our air, water, land, workers, 
and communities” and adds: “That last comment is a clear reference to TPP, 
but applies equally to TAFTA/TTIP”(see “US Free Trade Agreements Are Bad 
Not Just For The Economy, But For The Environment” at: 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131022/10231424967/us-free-trade-
agreements-are-not-just-bad-economy-environment-too.shtml).  
53 See e.g. Quick (2008a). See also US-EU High Level Regulatory Forum (2011) 
and Chase & Pelkmans, ch 2 in the volume.  
452  ELLIOTT & PELKMANS 
 
gains and, as a subsidiary goal, to set proper world standards for good 
regulation benefitting everybody, why is such beneficial regulatory 
reform not embraced and pursued?  
Both chemical regimes are criticised, but for very different 
reasons. Rightly or wrongly, the TSCA is mainly criticised for not 
addressing existing hazardous chemical substances that meanwhile are 
asserted, feared or found to be of ‘serious concern’ and are or may soon 
be forbidden or restricted in other countries, including EU member 
states. In short, the TSCA is said to suffer from ‘under-regulation’: a 
number of sensitive, risky substances are said not to be tackled and the 
tools and intervention options for the EPA are too restrained. As 
Schwarzman & Wilson (2011) call it: TSCA generates a ‘data gap’ and a 
‘safety gap’.54 How true this is remains unclear. There are isolated 
examples like asbestos,55 but can one generalise?  
REACH, on the contrary, is said by many to suffer from ‘over-
regulation’: it supposedly imposes unreasonably heavy and costly 
means in order to ensure the availability of quite demanding data on 
the possible hazards of each and every substance above 1 tonne per 
year, for presumably some 30,000 substances, including complicated 
information and interaction flows up and down the value chains. There 
is no clarity at all whether or not all this data is ‘needed’ or even ‘read’ 
by regulators (despite their high costs) except in a limited number of 
instances. None of this directly supports health, safety and the 
environment, but some of it might, later on; the latter is all to be ensured 
in a lengthy second set of procedures of REACH, to wit, evaluation, 
authorisation and (new?) restrictions. The costs of the first stage 
(registration) now begin to be better estimated and they seem to be 
roughly double what was already seen as very high upfront costs in the 
constitutive days of the Regulation. This would imply some €4-5 billion 
costs for registration and what it takes, alone.56 Nobody has any clue 
                                                          
54 They also mention a technology gap, the lack of incentives under the TSCA 
to invest in ‘green chemistry’. 
55 Note, however, that the EPA banned asbestos in 1989 (54 Fed. Reg. 29,460), 
but this regulation was set aside by the courts in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir., 1991). Later, under pressure from EPA to re-regulate, 
manufacturers in the US entered into an agreement to take asbestos-containing 
products off the market.  
56 The 2003 Impact Assessment of REACH estimated some €2.3 billion of 
upfront costs (direct costs for registration, mainly testing), some €1.1 billion of 
which would materialise in the early stage. The CSES (2012) review report of 
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about the eventual benefits later on.57 By definition, these direct costs 
are not justified by the benefits because the latter cannot possibly be 
known even in a very crude estimate. The costs are only ‘justified’ by a 
wholesale application of the precautionary principle (PP) to all chemical 
substances known (above 1 tonne). Note that these costly testing and 
registration requirements are not just applied to several thousands of 
substances about which a suspicion might exist but not ‘enough’ 
scientific evidence has been generated – then pre-caution makes sense 
and testing and research seem justified (if possible, proportionately).  
However, the idea is that one applies the (often-costly) PP to 
many thousands, indeed tens of thousands, of chemical substances, 
without having a clue whether that application is in any way justifiable 
in most of these tens of thousands of cases. This is surely not in keeping 
with the avowed notion of that principle, as elaborated e.g. in the 
famous European Commission (2000) paper on the Precautionary 
Principle. Application of PP requires there to be ‘insufficient’ 
knowledge about risks, in other words, there have to be some 
compelling but as yet ‘insufficiently’ certain or clear risk indicators. If 
the PP requires a recognition of ‘insufficient knowledge’, it follows 
directly that it cannot be applicable when there is no risk by any sign or 
indication. The PP may be justified, as historical examples of instances 
in which governments failed to act upon early signs of trouble may 
suggest,58 in instances where there are indications via victims and other 
possible evidence of harm as well as early signals in research, without 
being sure. However, severe and irreversible damage might be caused 
and a temporary PP application can be defended (e.g. BSE should have 
been dealt with PP at an earlier stage).  
The PP may ‘be better safe than sorry’, but it also brings with it 
the risk of false positives and excessively heavy intervention. Assume, 
                                                          
REACH (for the Commission) reports instead a ‘mid-range’ amount of €2.1 
billion. With the big wave of numerous small-volumes registrations driven by 
SMEs in 2018 still ahead, and assuming a similar underestimation in 2003 for 
this wave, it further estimates that one would arrive at direct costs of some €4.5 
billion. 
57 Note that, even if some benefits would be identified under ‘better regulation’ 
principles, this is not necessarily convincing, as – possibly - the same benefits 
might have been found with a far less-imposing system. As in impact 
assessment, one always has to think in terms of alternatives.  
58 See EEA (2001); a second report (“Late lessons from early warnings: Science, 
precaution, innovation”, was published by the EEA in 2013: 
www.eea.europa.eu/publications/late-lessons-2). 
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for example, that of the 30,000 existing substances (from 1981), there are 
no signs of hazard in 25,000 instances, perhaps even more; some others 
suggest that a 40% benchmark would be safe, implying that 18,000 need 
not be investigated at all. The point is that one cannot credibly assert 
that all or nearly all substances pose dangers for inflicting harm on 
consumers or workers. Many of these substances have been around for 
a long time and, in many cases, there are no suspicions whatsoever. 
Why the PP would have to be applied in a heavy way, or at all, for all 
other substances as well, merely on the criterion of tonnage, is still in 
need of justification. One may call this objection ‘risk-based’ – and 
indeed, it is – but it is just as much a proper application of PP. In the 
absence of any sign or indicator of risk, why impose such costs?  
It is, however, possible to assume a slightly more cautious 
position, with some justification, when observing that the C&L 
(classification and labelling) Inventory does comprise many substances 
with hazards (not necessarily risks, as exposures might be minimal). 
The authors have been informed that some 120,000 substances in the 
inventory have been classified with at least one hazard. Thus, it should 
be possible to develop a proportionate system, where substances (not 
known to carry a risk) could be subject to an alert system followed by 
testing, when there would be any reportable sign of this hazard having 
turned into a risk. That would reflect the spirit of PP.  
In all likelihood, there are now huge costs to registration in 
REACH, especially for SMEs,59 and no or next to no societal benefits 
anywhere on the horizon for the very large majority of substances. That 
is ‘over-regulation’, indeed, uniquely costly over-regulation, because of 
the wholesale application of PP to registration via tonnage (rather than 
risks or even a sign of it) and the separation of a lengthy trajectory of 
incurring costs (costly testing and data collection) from the search of 
societal benefits. There is a better case for demanding data collection 
for the registration of ‘new’ substances, but even here sophisticated 
forms of pre-selection of what might constitute hazardous chemicals 
would seem to be possible, underpinning a more targeted approach (as 
noted, some exceptions accepted by REACH do reflect this approach). 
These considerations carry over to different perspectives on priority 
setting for new chemicals, discussed in section 9.  
                                                          
59 See Pelkmans, Schrefler & Gubbels (2013) for worrying mid-range evidence. 
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6.2 What we do not know about ‘divergence’? 
One can also argue, that in the final analysis, what matters for 
improving safety, health and the environment – the societal benefits - 
is the overall effect of the legal system as a whole in banning, restricting 
or (targeted and restrictedly) authorising specific substances, or their 
uses. The critical question in TTIP is not whether the legal procedures 
of the two regimes are so divergent, but whether they are good 
(enough) in delivering the desired societal benefits. To be more precise, how 
comparable are the bans, restrictions and (what in REACH is called) 
authorisations referring to the same substances on both sides of the 
North Atlantic? One would expect some divergence there because the 
TSCA (combined with other US federal laws on food, pesticides, etc.) 
might be ‘under-regulating’ (i.e. not all market failures are overcome), 
but it seems not so easy to establish firmly how severe that ‘divergence’ 
is. Moreover, the effects are not uniform in all areas. In some areas (such 
as suspect carcinogens in diesel exhaust, e.g.), the US tends to regulate 
more stringently than in Europe, whereas in others (such as suspected 
endocrine disruptors), Europe regulates more stringently. The authors 
have not been able to find authoritative evidence on the specifics of this 
divergence, let alone on how ‘wide’ it really is. Adding up REACH 
(where four authorisations have been made so far60 and several 
hundreds or more restrictions61 exist at the moment), some remaining 
chemical directives, pesticides and cosmetics regulation (prohibiting 
animal testing, unlike the US), the EU has probably banned or restricted 
more substances than the US, but that remains a conjecture. Ultimately, 
it is this factual divergence in some sensitive substances regulation, but 
                                                          
60 On 5 July 2015, the REACH Commission website listed four substances with 
an authorisation decision having appeared in the EU Official Journal, and a 
total of eight substances, with a range of applications, “pending adoption”. 
There are 166 substances on the candidates list.  
61 On 11 July 2015, the ECHA list of restrictions (http://echa.europa.eu/ 
addressing-chemicals-of-concern/restrictions/list-of-restrictions) identifies 64 
restrictions in categories of substances, with subdivisions, totalling altogether 
105 entries. Note that this list includes Annex XVII of REACH and ‘old’ 
restrictions under the former Directive 76/769/EEC. Another five restrictions 
are under consideration. However, the total of 105 does not relate to individual 
substances only; thus, entries no. 3, 28, 29, 30 and 40 refer to classes of 
substances (e.g. carcinogens, mutagen categories, flammable gases, liquids, 
solids, etc.). Moreover, quite a few entries refer to families of substances with 
the same name (e.g. azocolourants and azodyes). Any comparison with the US 
would thus have to carefully specify the individual restrictions on both sides.  
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more importantly the overlap of substances regulated both by the US 
and the EU, that matters for SHEC regulation and society. And it is this 
area of overlap where much more constructive and innovative 
transatlantic approaches could be proposed and scrutinised. Even if the 
overlaps were few and far between, say ‘mere islands of convergence 
in a vast sea of divergence’, the places where the two parties can come 
together are what is important for trade agreements. Later we propose 
a system whereby such areas of similar or mutually acceptable levels of 
regulation can be identified and unnecessary trade barriers gradually 
eliminated over time.  
7. Carved in stone: REACH and TSCA suffer from 
excessive rigidity 
7.1 REACH immobilises 
In order to conduct fruitful TTIP negotiations in chemical regulation 
and trade, reform of both regulatory regimes would be very helpful. 
However, these reforms do not ‘need’ TTIP; such reforms are justified 
in their own right. Reforms have a double rationale: i) both systems 
would be much improved if subjected to ‘better regulation’ principles, 
and ii) reforms should facilitate TTIP to generate major economic gains. 
This recognition has emerged in the US, but until recently, it has been 
hard to organise a winning, bipartisan coalition in Congress, leading to 
repeated delays up until today in reforming TSCA. One might also 
wonder how ‘deep’ the reform would be. But such a recognition is 
lacking in the EU. REACH has become a sacred cow! Alas, for the 
wrong reasons. Although the design of REACH is heavy and overly 
costly, especially in its processes, mainly due to the wholesale 
application of PP to registration (with demanding data) of all chemical 
substances, it is treated as ‘untouchable’. A steady flow of criticism 
from e.g. SMEs among others, is answered either with marginal or 
symbolic responses or neglect, or legal defences are formulated without 
ever reacting to the core of the issue.  
There would seem to be two reasons why REACH has become a 
sacred cow, thereby incurring unnecessary burdens for EU industry 
and ultimately the supply chain and possibly consumers, and, in 
addition, making meaningful TTIP negotiations more difficult or 
reducing them to modest features. First and foremost, it is about the 
very long duration of the implementation process. The official position 
is that the process will take 11 years, until 2018 inclusive, when small-
volumes registration will take place. That is an extremely long period 
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during which EU bodies are in the frustrating position of having to 
implement, process and enforce numerous measures, without being 
able to change the legislation (only some annexes in modest or purely 
technical ways). This is a direct consequence of the design of the 
REACH Regulation, with its highly principled and wholesale approach 
of requiring very demanding data for all chemical substances and uses, 
as discussed before. But now that the REACH obligations are enshrined 
in EU law, SMEs cannot be treated on a more sensible and far less-costly 
risk-basis for (say) 2018, as this would be regarded as discriminatory 
for all earlier registrations. REACH has stifled any initiative or even any 
serious debate on switching REACH towards a more risk-based 
approach, which need not and should not affect any eventual societal 
benefit but greatly reduce private costs (and to some extent public costs).  
As a result, a ‘deep’ TTIP approach in chemicals is doomed not 
to touch the instrumentalities of registration (no data, no market), 
which constitutes a big TBT where substances do not have any risk 
indication. Also, the communication over the value chain, often two-
ways and costly,62 is just as valid for US exporters as for EU-based 
producers and users, irrespective of whether the substances are suspect 
or not. The REACH system now governs the TBTs as given, indeed, 
carved in stone, even though precisely this instrument – not a ‘level of 
protection’- should be at issue! In other words, the very long duration 
of REACH implementation creates an excessive form of rigidity that is 
immune to sensible calls for flexibility or amendments made in Europe, 
let alone, for reasons of ‘deeper’ TTIP negotiations or sensible REACH 
reform.  
One might perhaps entertain some hope that TTIP, as a ‘living’ 
agreement, might be able to address such issues after 2018. However, 
and this is the second reason, by 2018, REACH will only be relatively 
early in the complementary stage of going through heavy and time-
consuming authorisation procedures, and possibly new restrictions. 
The original idea behind authorisations was that SVHCs would be 
identified – and not known before or now better understood – so that 
substitution could be stimulated and ‘temporary permissions’ be given 
to companies using the SVHC. An outer bound of the expectation is the 
infamous SIN (Substitute It Now) list put together by the NGO 
community. As is well known, the candidate list of SVHCs, being 
continuously filled up with substances for authorisation, has an 
immediate chilling effect in markets (including value chains), although 
                                                          
62 See CSES (2012) and Pelkmans, Schrefler & Gubbels, (2013).  
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the whole point of the authorisation procedure is precisely to verify risk 
in-depth and subject the production and use to a careful societal 
balancing procedure.  
In any event, an outer bound would be that the EU would end 
up with the SIN list of 300-minus substances. Yet, this would then have 
taken a decade or more of authorisation procedures. And the SIN list is 
a mere 1% of existing substances under REACH (if the 1981 inventory 
is taken). However, that list was already made up in 2007,63 when 
REACH had not even begun. If the SIN list were so clear, and if market 
players do regard it as critical for their reputation, why the huge data 
requirements for all substances over no less than 11 years? And why all 
these heavy procedures for many years more? Most restrictions 
actually pre-date REACH. However, these expectations are now in 
doubt. It is suggested in REACH circles that authorisations will be 
generated for decades to come, as data (including new data) may well 
prompt demands from member states to verify the SVHC nature of 
ever-more substances. Clearly, if this is true, it is of utmost importance 
that the US and the EU cooperate on the prioritisation of substances and 
try to reach convergence on when, and based on what criteria, a risk 
renders a substance a SVHC.  
TTIP in chemicals is perhaps doomed to stick to negotiating the 
forms of ‘regulatory cooperation’, as mentioned in Box 13.3. The 
‘frozen’ attitudes on both sides, working from two instances of 
regulation subject to improvement (that is, not applying Good 
Regulatory Practices), and with regulators not in a position to question 
the instruments of the regimes – the objectives are not at issue - even 
when the arguments are convincing, are inconsistent with the very aims 
of TTIP: higher economic welfare, that is, ensuring societal benefits 
(overcoming SHEC market failures) with the lowest costs possible. The 
high TBTs in chemicals trade are a direct consequence of two regimes 
being subject to significant improvement; their ‘divergence’ is largely a 
consequence of their absolute immobility.  
                                                          
63 The SIN list is a collection of SVHCs as identified by the NGO Chemsec (see 
http://chemsec.org/what-we-do/sin-list). Last updated 8 October 2014, the 
total list includes some 800 possibly harmful chemical substances, but some 300 
are now claimed to be SVHCs (by Chemsec). The list is not considered fully 
reliable from a scientific point of view. 
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7.2 Is the US incapable of ‘harmonising up’? 
One could also argue that the challenging question is not why 
Europeans would want to hang on to the perceived benefits of REACH, 
but why Americans would not want to use TTIP as an opportunity to 
‘harmonise up’ to the system that the EU and many US academics and 
NGOs perceive as superior. 
The prevailing academic understanding of bilateral trade talks 
was defined in the mid-1990s by David Vogel in his influential book 
Trading Up.64 Professor Vogel studied a series of trade negotiations in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico and Canada 
and concluded that ‘harmonisation up’, adopting the more stringent 
standard for mutual gain, was nearly inevitable in trade talks, provided 
that certain minimal conditions were satisfied. Vogel called this the 
‘California effect’, a term that seems somehow quaintly parochial by 
the standards of today’s more international discourse,65 but by which 
he meant a race to the top rather than a race to the bottom: 
Trade liberalization is most likely to strengthen consumer and 
environmental protection when a group of nations has 
agreed to reduce the role of regulations as trade barriers and 
the most powerful among them has influential domestic 
constituencies that support stronger regulatory standards. 
Thus, the stronger the commitment of nations to coordinate 
their regulatory policies, the more powerful is the California 
effect [i.e. race to the top rather than the bottom]. Likewise, 
the weaker the institutions created by regional or 
international trade agreements on treaties, the weaker the 
California effect.66 
Vogel’s model is a simple one: each trade negotiation is imagined 
as a discrete single-play game between two players about a single 
regulatory issue; each side believes that it will benefit to some extent 
from the increased exchange that comes from reducing trade barriers, 
including non-tariff barriers from divergent regulatory systems. If 
more stringent regulations on one side are sufficiently supported by a 
                                                          
64 See Vogel (1995). 
65 However, an interesting elaboration of the interaction between Californian 
regulation and EU regulatory thinking is found in Vogel & Swinnen (eds) 
(2007); in Vogel’s later work, he demonstrates a U-turn for the EU becoming 
more and the US less precautionary. See Vogel (2012).  
66 Ibid., p. 8. 
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domestic political constituency so that adopting them is a condition for 
obtaining the benefits from greater exchange, the more stringent 
regulation will be adopted by the other side, Vogel argues, provided 
that the costs of doing so do not exceed the anticipated benefits of 
getting a deal. Thus, according to Vogel, the greater the perceived 
benefits from reaching agreement, the greater the ‘California effect’ of 
inducing regulatory laggards to come up to the higher standards of 
their trading partners. The game becomes more complicated, and more 
realistic, if more than a single regulatory issue is subject to negotiation, 
so that trading one issue off against another becomes possible, but the 
logic is essentially the same: parties will agree to more stringent 
regulatory standards where the benefits from increased trade are 
greater than the costs from more stringent instruments of regulation. 
From the standpoint of Vogel’s model, harmonisation of 
chemical regulation through TTIP should have been an easy case: 
Europe’s REACH programme is generally perceived as more stringent 
than US regulation under TSCA, at least in the sense of having higher 
compliance costs.67 As described in more detail later, most of these extra 
costs are not a result of setting more constraining standards for 
exposure to substances that are regulated. Indeed, indications suggest 
that actual regulatory levels are remarkably similar in both systems, 
although far more precision on this point is desirable. Rather, the 
higher costs of compliance with REACH are due primarily to two 
factors: i) higher costs of compliance for preparing dossiers of health 
and safety data for all chemicals above certain production limits, 
whereas TSCA uses a much more targeted approach in which health 
and safety data are required for only a very small subset of chemicals, 
and until recently, none for existing chemicals that were already on the 
market when the law was enacted in 1976; and ii) some substances that 
are regulated in Europe are not regulated in the US, and vice-versa. 
                                                          
67 For an argument that a regulatory system is not necessarily better merely 
because it imposes higher costs of compliance, see Renn & Elliott (2011). 
Moreover, according to Elliott & Elliott (2009), “a legal system is not necessarily 
‘ahead’ merely because it stimulates a greater degree of precautionary behavior 
by those it regulates. Rather, the proper question is whether a legal system is 
achieving the degree of precaution that is deemed appropriate under the 
circumstances. Too much precaution, as well as too little, may have both costs 
and benefits, in terms of useful products or innovations that are needlessly not 
marketed.” 
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Why didn’t the US side simply agree to adopt a more REACH-
like system, at least for those substances that are already regulated by 
both the US and the EU, as predicted by Vogel’s model? One obvious 
answer endogenous to Vogel’s model could be that the perceived costs 
of adopting REACH on the US side were greater than the expected 
benefits from harmonisation. In a sense, the conclusion that perceived 
costs were greater than perceived benefits is tautological: there must be 
some rational reason why the negotiators were unwilling to ‘trade up’, 
as Vogel predicts they would.68 But exactly what were the perceived 
costs of adopting REACH (or a more REACH-like compromise) on both 
sides of the Atlantic, and why were these costs thought to be greater 
than the benefits of harmonisation?  
The puzzle becomes even more interesting when one realises 
that virtually all of the extra costs of complying with REACH are (once 
and for all) ‘sunk costs’ that have already been paid by many US-based 
chemical companies, because many of the chemical companies 
operating in the US also either sell some of their products in Europe or 
someone else who does sell that substance in Europe has already 
registered it under REACH and hence they have already been required 
to comply with REACH, at least for existing substances. Rational 
economic actors are not supposed to consider sunk costs, that are 
behind them, in making decisions about what is best for the future, 
although we know that sometimes people (and possibly even 
companies and nations) do not always behave ‘rationally’, as predicted 
by neo-classical economic models.69 It is also theoretically possible that 
the additional economic costs of complying with a REACH-like system 
in the US for new substances not already regulated under REACH were 
perceived to be greater than the perceived trade benefits from 
harmonisation, although we think that is unlikely, in part because US 
chemical companies frequently supply to the large European market. 
Even for substances that will be developed in the future, they must 
anticipate that they are going to have to comply with REACH.  
                                                          
68 See generally Leff (1974), who points out that the ‘discovery’ that the people 
often act to maximise perceived benefits and reduce costs is nominalism. 
69 “Behavioral economics recognizes that sunk costs often affect economic 
decisions due to loss aversion: the price paid becomes a benchmark for the 
value, whereas the price paid should be irrelevant. … Economic experiments 
have shown that the sunk cost fallacy and loss aversion are common, and hence 
economic rationality — as assumed by much of economics — is limited. ….” 
“Prospect Theory” Kahneman & Tversky; For an accessible summary, see 
http://youarenotsosmart.com/2011/03/25/the-sunk-cost-fallacy/  
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A simpler answer to why the US is not capable of ‘harmonising 
up’ might be the pressure from US industry not to accept REACH’s 
costly general registration requirements (with demanding data-
development obligations) for existing chemicals and instead to accept 
– but also limit – new powers for restrictions in a reformed TSCA.  
8. Spill-overs and a world regime?  
8.1 Positive spill-overs with or without TTIP 
Our off-the-record interviews with participants lead us to conclude that 
regulatory convergence was taken off the table early because both sides 
perceived TTIP not as an isolated single-play game (as Vogel’s model 
implicitly assumes) but rather as a step in a larger process of defining the 
rules for commerce in chemicals in a rapidly-globalising economy. Neither 
side was willing to give up its position on what should be the emerging 
worldwide system of chemical regulation in order to obtain the 
immediate benefits of harmonisation through TTIP. The important, and 
generally overlooked spill-overs from the TTIP negotiations, are 
described by Lejour et al. (2014) as follows: 
The CEPR study [Francois et al., 2013] on the TTIP briefly 
deals with the spill-over effect to third countries, following 
the lowering of regulatory barriers between the US and the 
EU. These spill-over effects would not emerge if two small 
countries form a FTA, but this is different once the two largest 
economies in the world cooperate on regulatory issues. Direct 
and indirect spill-over effects are positive for 3rd countries 
and can be modelled. Direct spill-overs improve the trade 
possibilities of third countries with the EU and US without 
any further action on the part of 3rd countries – they are 
automatic. If the EU and the US streamline their regulatory 
procedures, this is subject to most-favoured-nation treatment 
(MFN) under the WTO and it becomes also easier for firms 
from other countries to export to the US or the EU. … It makes 
sense that firms in other countries adopt the regulatory 
standards of large countries, when the former are closely 
linked to the EU, the US or both. This would also improve 
market opportunities for American and European firms in 
these third countries. … 
Of course, the greater the spill-overs to 3rd countries, 
the more TTIP outcomes begin to look like multilateral or 
plurilateral - rather than bilateral - results benefitting all. This 
important significance is further enhanced by the 
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consequence that also TTIP itself would see its gains enlarge 
due to such spill-overs. 70 
This type of argument focuses primarily on the optimistic case in 
which the US and the EU reach agreement on a harmonisation 
approach, where “the two largest economies in the world cooperate on 
regulatory issues”. What they did not analyse until now is the other 
side of the decision tree of how spill-overs from TTIP may play out if 
the two sides do NOT agree on regulatory convergence.  
Many countries around the world are now developing their own 
national system for regulating chemicals. In October 2010, REACH-
style legislation came into effect in China to regulate the environmental 
risk and hazard of China's new chemical substances, under the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP) Order No. 7. Called Measures for 
the Environmental Management of New Chemical Substances, this 
regulation comprises notification requirements for new chemicals and 
catalogues hazardous chemicals among existing ones, but it hardly 
follows REACH principles despite elusive suggestions to the contrary 
(leading to the nickname ‘China REACH’).  
South Korea has also developed its own regulatory system, 
called K-REACH, which went into effect 1 January 2015.71 K-REACH 
was more explicitly “designed to closely mirror REACH”72 (in a more 
risk-based and proportionate form). Other countries such as India, 
Thailand, Australia, Malaysia and Turkey are also reportedly 
developing their own national systems. Indeed, if the EU and the US 
were to reach agreement on a common approach to regulating 
chemicals, it would be hard for other countries to ignore their shared 
approach, as the combined EU-US market is the largest in the world, 
                                                          
70 Much the same point was also made by Daniel Hamilton, co-director of the 
CEPS/CTR project on TTIP, in his public remarks in Brussels on 9 April 2014, 
when the present project was announced. Hamilton observed that if the EU and 
the US were able to agree on their higher standards for protecting environment, 
safety and workers, these standards would become the de facto international 
standards going forward as opposed to lower “Asian standards.” Hamilton 
argued that the benefits to the EU and US of setting the bar higher far 
outweighed the small differences between the two. 
71 See the website dedicated to Korea’s own regulatory system for chemicals 
(www.thereachcentre.com/site/content_south_korean_chemicals_info.php).  
72 Ibid. 
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particularly for chemicals.73 But what happens if the US and EU do not 
agree, but instead maintain their divergent approaches? 
From the European side, Europe might well gain a trade 
advantage vis-à-vis the US if other countries adopt REACH-like 
systems, because European companies would be more familiar with 
REACH requirements in Europe and would not have to bear the costs 
of duplicative regulation in other countries. The European Union is 
quietly promoting the REACH model to other countries. On the US 
side, US chemical companies maintain that they are not yet ready to 
concede that REACH represents the future of chemical management 
worldwide. They still hold out hope that more targeted approaches, 
represented by the Canadian Chemicals Management Plan (CMP),74 
and pending TSCA Reform legislation may prevail over the long run as 
the model for a harmonised international system. 
8.2 US industry objections against REACH 
The essential difference between the Canadian Chemicals Management 
Plan (CMP) and REACH is that under the CMP, experts agree in 
advance on high-priority substances and only require submission of 
test data for those substances. Proposed bipartisan amendments to 
TSCA that are supported by industry in the US adopt a similar 
approach, in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would 
conduct rule-making to categorise substances are either ‘high risk’ 
requiring further analysis, or ‘low risk’ so that they can be marketed 
without further studies.75 This carries forward to existing substances in 
the current approach of the TSCA ‘pre-manufacture notification’ 
programme, under which EPA uses predictive techniques, such as 
computer models and ‘structure activity relationships’ (SARs) or 
                                                          
73 According to Eizenstat (2013), “The EU and US together account for almost 
half of global output of goods and services and almost a third of global trade – 
almost $1 trillion annually.” Specifically for chemicals, the 2012 domestic sales 
in chemicals of the US and the EU amounts to one-third of total global sales, 
with China alone having another one-third. In terms of world exports of 
chemicals, the US and the EU hold 40.5%, with China enjoying 14.3%.  
74 For a description, see 
http://chemicalsubstanceschimiques.gc.ca/plan/index-eng.php  
75 §4(a), Chemical Safety Improvement Act, S. 1009, 113th Congress, 1st 
Session, (https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-
bill/1009/text). 
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‘quantitative structure activity relationships’ ((Q)SARs76) to predict 
whether substances are likely to be hazardous in silico (i.e. through 
computer simulations) rather than requiring animal or other test data. 
Moreover, pathway-based toxicological testing in cell lines is thought 
by many to be the future of toxicology.77 
Many US companies believe it is unnecessarily wasteful to 
require comprehensive testing for all substances if science can target 
limited resources on substances that are most likely to cause problems. 
There are also independent critical voices. One of the present co-
authors has written:  
The new REACH program in Europe requires private parties 
to submit enormous reams of data about the safety of 
chemicals to a new government agency. In our view, one fatal 
flaw in programs such as REACH is that its drafters appear 
to imagine that sufficient analytical resources can be 
marshaled at the governmental level to conduct all of the risk 
assessments that need to be conducted in a complex 
industrial society. We believe that this assumption is 
incorrect, and that the overwhelming majority of the data 
assembled at great cost by industry in response to the 
REACH program will remain unread in government files.78 
One key difference between REACH and the US/Canadian 
approach is that under REACH, prioritisation occurs after data 
submission in terms of what dossiers will actually be reviewed by 
government as opposed to prioritisation in the US and Canada before 
requiring data to be generated and submitted. But it should be noted 
                                                          
76 For an explanation, see http://ihcp.jrc.ec.europa.eu/glossary/q-sars-
quantitative-structure-activity-relationships  
77 See generally Committee on Toxicity Testing and Assessment of 
Environmental Agents (2007), National Research Council, “Toxicity Testing in 
the Twenty-First Century: A Vision and a Strategy”. In a brief accessible 
summary, the US National Academy of Sciences (http://dels.nas.edu/dels/ 
rpt_briefs/Toxicity_Testing_final.pdf) writes: “The report envisions a new 
toxicity-testing system that relies mainly on understanding ‘toxicity pathways’ 
– the cellular response pathways that can result in adverse health effects when 
sufficiently perturbed. Such a system would evaluate biologically significant 
alterations without relying on studies of whole animals.” See also “Toxicity 
Testing in the 21st Century: Better Results, Less Use of Animals”, 25 The 
Environmental Forum 46, Mar/Apr 2008. 
78 See Elliott & Elliott (2009, p. 74). 
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that REACH proponents in Europe believe that requiring the data to be 
generated is good in and of itself (especially in terms of increasing 
awareness in industry), whether or not government considers it for 
purposes of regulating. 
If it were correct that current and emerging science allows us to 
predict in advance with a higher degree of confidence than in the past 
which chemical substances are likely to be ‘bad actors’, and to focus 
greater regulatory scrutiny on those, then the extensive efforts to test 
all substances, even those that are highly unlikely to prove hazardous, 
could be seen as costly ‘dead-weight losses’ unnecessary expenses that 
do not contribute to protecting health and safety. In Europe, views are 
mixed. Defenders of REACH assert that compiling and submitting 
comprehensive test data on the safety of substances promotes public 
confidence,79 even if government resources are insufficient to actually 
review all the dossiers that have been submitted.  
Spill-over effects not only multiply the benefits of harmonisation; 
they also multiply the costs of agreeing to an inefficient duplicative 
system. Thus, for industry on both sides of the Atlantic, the calculus 
was not merely whether the benefits of harmonisation in TTIP were 
greater than the extra costs of trading up, as envisioned by Vogel, but 
whether the benefits exceed costs when both positive and negative 
spill-overs from TTIP to anticipated future regulatory systems around 
the world are taken into account. 
9. What really matters: SHEC equivalence and market 
access 
The stated rationale for giving up on the possibilities of incremental 
harmonisation or regulatory convergence before the negotiations even 
began, boils down to the idea that REACH and TSCA are “very 
different” (in the words of the industry joint position paper) or “too 
different with regard to some fundamental principles” (in the words of 
the EU negotiation position). 
But that observation, while true, avoids or by-passes the relevant 
question. Negotiations over a free trade agreement always begin from 
the starting point that regulatory systems on the two sides are different. 
The proper question is whether the differences in regulatory processes 
                                                          
79 The mid-term review of REACH (CSES, 2012) finds practically no empirical 
support for this greater confidence. Pelkmans, Schrefler & Gubbels (2013) reach 
the same conclusion.  
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are so ‘fundamental’ that they cannot reasonably be bridged. It seems 
never to have occurred to the TTIP negotiators that, even though 
processes and ‘fundamental principles’ of regulation may differ, the 
actual outcomes of these divergent processes are substantially similar in 
some areas, or at the very least ‘adequate’ to protect the public, in cases 
when substances ARE regulated by both sides. The main difference 
between the US and Europe seems to be that Europe often regulates on 
a precautionary basis but the US holds off for more definitive science 
that will stand up in court if challenged.80  
Empirical studies of the actual results of chemical regulation in 
the US and the EU suggest that despite assertions about ideological and 
rhetorical differences, such as the precautionary principle versus risk 
assessment as philosophies for regulating chemicals, the actual results 
of regulation in some area are not very different between the US and 
EU,81 at least for many substances that are regulated in both. Merely as 
an illustration of this similarity, we compared the chronic oral and 
drinking water limits for the top 30 chemicals by volume released to 
the environment in EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory. Table 13.1 below 
shows that for those substances for which both the EU and US had 
exposure limits, 75% (12 of 16) differed by less than a factor of 3. Only 
one (xylenes) differed by more than a single order of magnitude (10x). 
From a toxicological standpoint, differences this small at low levels 
such as those involved here are insignificant.  
In every case, differences in the actual stringency of regulation 
were inconsequential, despite the fundamental differences in the 
processes, systems and philosophies that had been used to reach the 
results. It is important to note, however, that only about half of the 
substances (16 of 30) were regulated by both sides; in some instances 
the US regulated but the EU did not, but in more cases in this small 
sample, the EU regulated but the US did not. Of course, we are reluctant 
to draw any broad general conclusions from this small sample. What is 
important for our purposes is that there were some areas of overlap 
where duplication could be eliminated. 
                                                          
80 For criticism and suggestions for improvement of the current European 
approach to the use of science in risk regulation, see Schrefler & Pelkmans 
(2014). See also Charnley & Elliott (2002), who argue that broader availability 
of judicial review by private parties challenging government regulation makes 
regulating based on suggestive but not yet definitive science more difficult in 
the US. 
81 See Renn & Elliott (2011).  
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Table 13.1 Exposure limits of chemicals: US-EU regulatory comparison 
Substancea 
Difference < 3x 
US EU value 
Zinc 3E-1 SE-1 CRb 
        
Arsenic 0.01 0.01 DWc 
Lead 0.015 0.01 DW 
Copper 1.3 2 DW 
Nitrate 10 (as N) 50 (as NO3) DW 
Barium 2 0.7 DW 
Toluene 8E-2 2.23E-1 CR 
Toluene 1 0.7 DW 
Chromium VI 3.E-3 5E-3 CR 
Total chomium 0.1 0.05 DW 
Nickel 2E-2 5E-2 CR 
Chlorine 4 5 DW 
  Difference > 3x 
Substance US EU value 
Arsenic 3E-4 1E-3 CR 
Barium 2E-1 2E-2 CR 
Styrene 0.1 0.02 DW 
Xylenes 10 0.5 DW 
a. Listed in order of total volume released to the environment in the US 
reported in EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (highest to lowest) for which 
comparisons were possible because regulated in both the US and the EU. 
b. CR = chronic oral exposure limit in mg/kg-day. 
c. DW = drinking water limit in mg/L. 
Source: Authors’own compilation. 
It is true that drinking water is not typically shipped across the 
Atlantic, but what these examples suggest is that despite differences in 
legal procedures, when the two sides regulate a chemical, sometimes 
they regulate it with similar stringency. On reflection, these conclusions 
are not surprising. The science is the same on both sides of the Atlantic, 
and regulators in the US and the EU are both trying conscientiously to 
protect public health and the environment with an adequate margin of 
safety to the best of their ability and judgment. It is not surprising that 
sometimes they would reach similar outcomes. 
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Admittedly, this is not the whole story, as some substances may 
be regulated in the EU but not the US or vice versa. European 
opposition to TSCA centres around the perception that many risky 
substances are not tackled in the US (but this does require a much 
broader inspection than TSCA alone; see Box 13.1). As noted, a precise 
and verifiable survey of these divergences seems not to be available and 
is much needed. But where both sides have ‘tackled’ a high-volume 
substance, regulatory limits in this small sample turn out to be 
remarkably similar. This suggests that the TTIP negotiators were wise 
to focus on expanding technical and scientific assessments, which have 
tended to come out very close to one another in the past. 
The relevant case for trade negotiations, however, is whether, 
when one side has regulated something, the other partner should have 
enough confidence that it is willing to accept those results without 
duplicating its own regulatory processes. The absence of significant 
differences in this example where both sides have addressed high-
volume substances, should give confidence that in at least some 
instances, as former Ambassador Eizenstat (2103) put it, “we should 
have confidence in the 21st century that the regulatory standards in 
both the EU and US are adequate to protect our publics and should be 
accepted …” 
International negotiations often begin this way with each side 
insisting that its system is best. The more productive question is 
whether the other side’s system is good enough, given one’s SHEC 
objectives.82 For trade negotiations such as TTIP to succeed, both sides 
must move beyond familiar national legal procedures for regulating 
chemicals, to ask whether the actual results are comparable and 
acceptable in terms of protecting against risky chemicals, despite 
differences in the legal procedures that lead up to them. Ultimately, this 
is about the SHEC objectives, the societal benefits the citizens and 
workers care about. Comparability includes, however, both what 
substances need to be regulated and how stringently they are regulated 
once regulation is put in place.   
                                                          
82 See Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, 
1 May 2012, §1 www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200327/pdf/DCPD-
201200327.pdf: “[i]n meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, … 
environmental, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can 
identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be 
adopted in the absence of such cooperation.” 
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Perhaps the particular high-volume chemicals in water in Table 
13.1 are an exception. We really don’t know objectively how much 
convergence in outcomes actually exists despite differences in 
regulatory processes. But even if areas of similar regulatory outcomes 
are ‘islands of convergence in a vast sea of difference’, they show that 
in some areas greater harmonisation for mutual benefit should be 
possible. Plus the size of the islands of convergence would be expected 
to grow over time as TSCA reform is implemented and greater 
collaboration occurs between the US and the EU at the scientific and 
technical level. 
The challenge for a ‘living’ TTIP is to create a process that will i) 
gradually identify other islands in which regulatory outcomes are 
similar, or at least, ‘good enough’ to protect the public, and ii) provide 
a mechanism to eliminate needless duplication and inconsistency in 
those islands, however large or narrow they may be. 
10. A proposal: Unilateral recognition under TTIP  
To date, those seeking convergence of regulatory systems have tended 
to focus on ‘mutual recognition’, the idea that each side will accept the 
other’s regulation as adequate.83 This approach is particularly 
problematic when one side has regulated a substance but the other has 
not. Would the European side be required to accept a US EPA decision 
not to regulate because risks were assessed to be very low? That is not 
likely to happen, at least not any time soon, as many Europeans 
apparently still perceive Americans as swimming ‘in a toxic soup of 
poisonous chemicals’ (as Europe itself presumably also must have been 
before REACH was enacted in 2006). It remains surprising why so few 
Europeans seem to wonder why US citizens would accept that, not to 
speak of workers, but we refer to the discussion in section 4.  
There are, however, other approaches to achieving greater 
regulatory convergence that may be more promising, particularly 
                                                          
83 For a classic statement of the case for mutual recognition, see Eizenstat, supra 
note 42. For the many forms of mutual recognition, including MRAs, see 
Jacques Pelkmans & Anabela Correia de Brito, Study on Mutual Recognition 
Agreements, OECD, Paris, forthcoming (2015). A survey of how mutual 
recognition works in the goods and services markets in the EU is found in 
Jacques Pelkmans (2012), “Mutual recognition: economic and regulatory logic 
in goods and services”, in T. Eger and H-B. Schaefer (eds), Research Handbook on 
the economics of EU law, Cheltenham: E. Elgar.  
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when one side or the other is particularly ‘dug in’ about the superiority 
of its system, as some groups and some governments in Europe appear 
to be about REACH, and the US appears to be about risk-based 
regulation. 
An option that one of us has proposed is called ‘optional 
asymmetric recognition’84 Under such a system, a regulated party 
would be given the option to opt-into the regulatory system for a 
chemical that is perceived by the TTIP negotiating parties as more 
stringent, such as REACH. Thereby, the costs of duplicative regulatory 
processes in the second country could be avoided in at least some 
instances in which “the game was not worth the candle”. It is even 
possible to trade asymmetric recognition in one area, where one side is 
perceived as more stringent, for asymmetric recognition in another 
area, where the other sides’ regulations are perceived as more stringent. 
(This is actually the usual situation in negotiations, in which it is rare to 
trade like for like; rather, the path to a successful negotiation generally 
involves trading away something that one values less but the other 
sides values more.) 
If a company decided that the potential ‘over-regulation’ under 
REACH was not worth arguing about, the company could decide to 
have the REACH restrictions become legally binding in the US, and 
thereby avoid the costs of going through a duplicative regulatory 
process in the US. These conditions are most likely to be satisfied when 
(1) the costs of going through duplicative regulation are relatively high, 
but (2) the marginal costs of accepting over-regulation are relatively 
low, such as because the company expects to sell the same product 
everywhere anyway. For example, assume that a pesticide is already 
registered in the EU, and the producer intends to sell exactly the same 
formulation in the US. If we know that EU regulation is more stringent, 
what is the value in requiring the company to re-register the product in 
the US? The same would be true for anti-microbials, or additives for 
cosmetics. Companies should have the option of accepting a more 
stringent regulatory result as the de facto international standard. In this 
way, a de facto harmonised standard may develop internationally from 
the bottom up, rather than top down, as many countries gradually defer 
to a single regulation as adequate to protect their publics. In practice, 
many companies selling products internationally already, adopt a 
                                                          
84 The discussion of “optional asymmetric recognition” is based on a 
presentation by Donald Elliott to the European Risk Forum in Brussels, 11 June 
2013. 
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single design standard for their products worldwide rather than 
making different products for different markets depending on vagaries 
of local regulations. 
But optional asymmetric recognition would not work in the 
other direction: EPA’s failure to regulate something, or having less 
stringent regulation than under REACH, would have no legal 
consequences. Thus, optional asymmetric (or, unilateral) recognition 
differs from mutual recognition in that it is a one-way street, and that it 
is optional, not automatic. But optional asymmetric recognition has the 
advantage that some of the gains from eliminating duplicative 
regulatory burdens can be achieved in a situation where only one side 
trusts the other to regulate adequately albeit perhaps too stringently. 
Thus, if the US side believes that EU regulation under REACH may be 
too stringent in some instances, but the EU believes that US regulation 
is not stringent enough in some instances, mutual recognition is a non-
starter. Yet, there still may be some situations in which some gains are 
still possible through asymmetric (i.e. unilateral) recognition of the 
other side’s regulation as adequate and these potential gains should not 
be left on the table in TTIP negotiations. Gains from optional 
asymmetric recognition would generally occur when the costs of 
duplicative regulation are greater than the excess costs of what is 
perceived to be ‘more stringent than necessary’ regulation. It may seem 
intuitive that there would be few such situations, but that is not 
necessarily the case if companies are manufacturing and selling into 
multi-national markets, as they often are for chemicals. If a company is 
selling in both the US and the EU, and is already regulated in the EU, 
requiring the company to go through a duplicative regulatory process 
in the US when it would be willing to carry over EU regulation into the 
US, is a pure and costly deadweight loss. Moreover, to maintain public 
confidence, the most stringent standard by a major trading partner may 
well become the de facto regulatory standard worldwide. Why not 
negotiate an agreement that US companies may opt in to REACH 
regulation in the US when they do not object to doing so?  
11. Conclusions 
As Otto von Bismarck famously stated in the remark that we quote in 
the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, “Politics is the art of the 
possible.” From that standpoint, the TTIP negotiators were probably 
wise to focus on the modest but important goals of eliminating tariffs, 
sharing datasets, standardising labelling and expanding sharing the 
technical work of assessing priority chemicals at the scientific level. 
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While proponents of harmonisation of regulatory systems, such as 
Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, admonish us that “we should have 
confidence in the 21st century that the regulatory standards in both the 
EU and US are adequate to protect our publics and should be 
accepted”,85 regrettably, that mutual confidence that he asserts 
“should” be taken for granted, does not yet exist. The difference 
between the EU and the US over whether regulation should be 
precautionary, or based on more mature, demonstrated science 
continues to be a fundamental divide at this time. Perhaps greater 
confidence will come later in the 21st century after a period of working 
together at the technical and scientific level.  
One critical focus we strongly advocate is to establish 
authoritatively in what areas the level of SHEC protection for 
substances which are regulated on both sides is similar. Establishing 
this is, as we have shown, a major task in and by itself. In areas where 
that similarity is found, it would open possibilities for much greater 
ambition in TTIP for chemicals. Unfortunately, but also surprisingly, 
the knowledge about the areas and substances which are regulated in 
some form (be it by precisely identified regulation by agencies or in 
annexes of a range of laws, or otherwise, including judicial review and 
the chilling effect of liability suits) is rather imperfect, in particular in 
the US. Knowing the possibilities for liability cases in the US and 
realising that chemical substances are regulated outside TSCA (under 
other laws and statutes, and by federal agencies) far more often than 
under TSCA, the European perception that protection against risky 
chemicals in the US is often lousy or even absent, is almost certainly 
profoundly mistaken. We recommend that TTIP should include a trans-
Atlantic body that is assigned with assessing objectively the actual 
outcomes (i.e. levels of protection against risky chemicals) of divergent 
regulatory processes and identifying those areas where differences in 
the level of protection are not material, that means, equivalent. These 
findings should lay the foundation for greater but well-targeted 
ambition in lowering the costs of TBTs, so high in transatlantic 
chemicals trade. Getting US and EU negotiators (and the governments 
behind them) out of their trenches may well hold significant promises 
for economic gains, without affecting in any way the achieved 
protection against risky chemicals.  
                                                          
85 Stuart E. Eizenstat, A new transatlantic partnership (April 2013) (italics 
supplied), http://esharp.eu/essay/23-a-new-transatlantic-partnership/, 
quoted supra page 26. 
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However, apart from this very long run perspective, we also 
discuss at some length the EU suggestions done in November 2014 and 
some of the background issues behind those. We regard them as 
modest, given what TTIP stands for from its start, but useful. However, 
chemicals trade suffering from the second-highest TBTs over the North 
Atlantic, the EU suggestions are expected to do little in reducing TBT 
costs in the short to medium run. Nevertheless, the EU suggestions, 
modest as they are, might have become more problematic because of 
the somewhat defensive EP TTIP resolution of 8 July 2015 although the 
authors are not convinced that this is necessarily the case. Seen in this 
political climate, what might be regarded (e.g. by the authors) as a 
modest proposal for chemicals in TTIP – never mind, the US position 
on chemicals about which little is known - may well be the maximum 
possible for a while to come.  This is regrettable but a political fact of 
life. It renders the main message in our chapter even more crucial: in 
the final analysis, what really matters is where the US and the US do 
protect citizens and workers against risky chemicals and, if both do this 
in an equivalent manner, how can trading costs be sliced without ever 
touching SHEC objectives? Finally, we suggest an easy and relatively 
simple solution to facilitate market access and reduce the costs of 
duplication for companies selling in both the EU and US markets, in 
case the substance is regulated on both sides. Called (asymmetric) 
unilateral recognition, it would allow a company to opt-in into the most 
stringent of the two regulatory regimes for substance z, thereby having 
to comply only once, and get automatic recognition, hence market 
access, in the less stringently regulated market (for this substance). For 
those substances, costs could be cut considerably. Many chemical 
companies including SMEs do indeed sell in both Europe and the US 
and would benefit directly without setting up TTIP harmonisation. By 
definition, it would imply a race-to-the-top for these substances.  
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14. TTIP AND ENERGY 
PAOLO NATALI, CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
AND GERGELY MOLNAR 
1. Introduction 
Despite accounting for a significant share of global trade1 and the 
resulting interdependencies from it, energy governance remains 
largely fragmented and there is no global framework or agreement 
defining the rules of energy trade. While the GATT/WTO Agreements 
do not specifically deal with energy trade and the Energy Charter 
Treaty (Box 14.1) failed to establish an effective agreement on cross-
border trade, countries tend to frame energy trade into bilateral 
cooperation schemes – as energy is considered an area of high strategic 
relevance, having a strong impact on national security and sovereignty, 
which can also open the door to protectionism.  
Box 14.1 Energy Charter Treaty 
The Energy Charter Treaty aims to promote international cooperation in 
the energy sector. Entering into force in April 1998, the Treaty’s 
provisions focus on four broad areas: 1) the protection of foreign 
investment, based on the extension of national treatment, or most-
favoured nation treatment and protection against key non-commercial 
risks; 2) non-discriminatory conditions for trade in energy materials, 
products and energy-related equipment based on WTO rules, and 
provisions to ensure reliable cross-border energy transit flows through 
pipelines, grids and other means of transportation; 3) the resolution of 
disputes between participating states, and – in the case of investment – 
between investors and host states; and 4) the promotion of energy 
efficiency.  
                                                          
1 According to the World Bank the trade value in fuels is about 14.33% of global 
trade: (http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/WLD/Year/ 
LTST/Summary). 
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Members of the Energy Charter Conference, i.e. the ECT’s 
membership base, are from the European Economic Area, EU candidate 
and Neighbourhood countries, the Russian Federation and other 
countries from the former Soviet Union as well as Japan, Australia, 
Mongolia and Afghanistan. The Russian Parliament refused the 
ratification of the ECT, as the ECT’s Transit Protocol would require 
Russia to apply the principles of freedom of transit and non-
discriminatory pricing to its oil and gas pipeline systems. In April 2004, 
the Russian Duma decided to remove the Transit Protocol from its 
agenda.  
The Treaty remains open for accession by all countries committed to the 
Charter’s principles. In an effort to enlarge its geographical scope, the 
International Energy Charter initiative has been launched in May 2015 
in The Hague. 
It is often suggested that the emergence of the US as a new 
energy superpower as a consequence of the shale revolution and the 
EU’s desire to reduce its energy import dependence on Russia in the 
wake of deteriorating EU-Russia relations, would not only increase the 
value of transatlantic energy trade but also deepen EU-US cooperation 
in this field, and possibly in foreign and security policy. Therefore, 
perhaps not surprisingly, the EU would like to include a distinct 
‘energy and raw materials’ chapter into the TTIP (European 
Commission, 2013a; European Commission, 2015).  
On the other hand, to date, the US has pursued its ‘energy 
security’ or ‘oil independence’ approach since the mid-1970s. Oil and 
gas policy has been a result of the US fear of oil dependence, mainly on 
the Persian Gulf, and later of the fear of similar dependence on 
imported gas (see, for example, Yergin (2006)). Seen from this 
perspective, it is not obvious why energy should be included in TTIP. 
Energy is indeed rather special and faces rather uncommon trade and 
other barriers, some of which in the past seem to have served rather 
well the national interest of the US. Such US barriers include an export 
ban on US crude oil and a licencing regime for Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) trade for those countries with which the US does not have a free 
trade agreement. To date US negotiators seem unconvinced of the value 
of an energy chapter and argue that energy is already sufficiently 
covered in other chapters of the TTIP. Notably, they hold that once TTIP 
is concluded, natural gas exports from the US to the EU would be 
sufficiently facilitated, should there be a market in Europe. This is 
because under the Natural Gas Act, LNG exports to countries with 
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which the US has free trade agreements that require “national 
treatment” for trade in natural gas are automatically considered in the 
public interest. Applications to export gas to such countries must be 
approved without modification or delay. However, LNG exports 
destined to non-FTA countries, with which the US does not have a free 
trade agreement, are subject to a project-based licencing system. Hence, 
they need the approval not only of the FERC (for environmental issues) 
but also of the Department of Energy (to ensure that these exports do 
not harm ‘the public interest’) (Chadbourne, 2014; Energy.gov, n.d.). 
The primary motivation for the EU to include a chapter on 
energy into the TTIP seems to be to set a benchmark not only in terms 
of transparency, non-discrimination and competition rules but also of 
an open international market for trade of ‘environmental goods and 
services and climate-friendly products and technologies’. At first sight, 
one might think this is the predictable EU reflex on spreading its rules, 
often referred to as ‘Europeanisation’. This tactical move to make TTIP 
more palatable inside the EU given the concessions that it might need 
to make might play a role. But when reading the “Initial EU position 
paper” (European Commission, 2013a), it is easy to see that the target 
is not so much the TTIP in itself but other trade agreements that might 
appear as spin-offs. The EU would like to anchor energy in what might 
become a template or part of the template for future agreements.  
This chapter will analyse how the market dynamics unleashed 
by the US energy revolutions might shape the transatlantic energy 
agenda, in particular in TTIP, and what potential economic and 
political benefits it could yield. The concluding section will identify the 
future transatlantic energy agenda. 
2. The TTIP energy market context  
2.1 The US shale revolution 
For many years there has been transatlantic trade of coal and oil 
products. This trade has been stable, i.e. diesel and petrol with a value 
amounting to around €298 billion between 2004 and 2014.2 There was 
no export of crude oil from the US, to a large extent because of the 1975 
export ban, although the type of crude which could have been 
exported, i.e. light sweet, would not have been available in sufficient 
quantity to do so. With the shale revolution this has changed. In the 
                                                          
2 Eurostat, International trade, EU trade since 1988 by SITC [DS-018995]. 
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aftermath of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, in December 1975 the US 
passed the Energy Policy and Energy Conservation Act, a ban on most 
US oil exports. A few exceptions exist such as crude from Alaska’s Cook 
Inlet and North Slope and heavy oil from certain California fields. 
Article 605 of NAFTA restricts the US ability to limit its crude oil and 
petrochemical exports to Canada (and vice versa). While Mexico is not 
part of Article 605, there are also exceptions for re-exporting foreign oil 
and for small swaps with Mexico.  
Similarly, all US natural gas exports are subject to certain 
limitations. Those destined to non-FTA countries, with which the US 
does not have a free trade agreement, are subject to a project-based 
licencing system and need the approval of both FERC (for 
environmental issues) and the Department of Energy (to ensure that 
these exports do not harm ‘the public interest’).  
This situation remained relatively stable as long as the US was 
facing increasing import dependency for both oil and natural gas. The 
US shale gas and shale oil revolution has fundamentally reversed this 
situation. Coupling hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling 
resulted in a tremendous increase in shale gas production in the US. 
The same techniques have also generated a comparable revolution in 
oil. As a result, the US became the world’s largest natural gas producer 
in 2012 and the largest oil producer in 2013. As shown in Figure 14.1, 
both crude oil and natural gas imports into the US declined over the 
last decade, and this trend is more than likely to continue in the future.  
This technological breakthrough in the North American 
upstream energy, i.e. production, sector over the last decade has 
affected almost all segments of the energy markets, not only in North 
America but globally. The sudden abundance of natural gas within 
North America transformed the continent from a net importer to a one 
in need of finding export markets. Export markets are seen as 
potentially constituting a safety valve, in order to release domestic 
production internationally, thus reducing oversupply and the 
subsequent severely depressed domestic price. Natural gas is literally 
‘trapped inside’ the region until export licences are granted and LNG 
export terminals are built. 
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Figure 14.1 US oil and gas imports (2004-14) 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from US Energy Information 
Agency. 
With production increasing from 0.6 mb/d in 2008 to 4.7 mb/d 
in 2014, the situation for shale oil is shaping up in a similar fashion, 
despite it being more complicated owing to crude quality issues. Crude 
oil is legally ‘trapped’ until the long-lasting export ban is lifted. 
Legislation hindering the free flow of oil, the world’s most easily 
transportable energy source, widens the gap between the US oil prices 
and other international oil price benchmarks. For instance, in 2014 the 
spread between Brent and WTI (West Texas Intermediate) reached 
$12/barrel (Reuters, 2015). Hence, the US refining sector is 
experiencing high margins and utilisation rates thanks to the cheaper 
feedstock and whilst European refining is losing ground in a more and 
more severe way. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
since 2008 crude processing capacity in the EU has contracted by 
around 8% with 15 refineries closing and three reducing their output 
(IEA, 2014). While the recent fall in crude oil prices improved the 
competitiveness of the European refinery sector, the longer-term 
outlook remains less optimistic, not least because of tightening 
regulations in the EU and the rising competitiveness of the US refinery 
complex ICIS (2015). Moreover, one should note that the US is facing 
an oversupply of light sweet crude oil (particularly desirable as a 
feedstock for gasoline refining) as US refineries are more suitable to 
heavy crude oil (EIA, 2015c).  
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In addition, coal consumption for electricity generation in the US 
has fallen significantly as natural gas has become more cost 
competitive. US coal can freely move out of North America to flood 
other regions and in particular Europe (see Figure 14.2). This trend is 
reinforced by the fact that US coal prices dropped to their lowest level 
in six years in the first quarter of 2015.3  
Figure 14.2 EU-28 solid fuel imports from the US (thousand tonnes) 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from Eurostat. 
In order to understand the energy politics of TTIP, one must 
understand the changes in market dynamics in the US. The result of the 
interplay of technological breakthroughs, regulation and market 
dynamics has had enormous implications within the US and 
worldwide (Morse, 2014). For the US and its North American 
neighbours the shale gas revolution has indisputably been the main 
energy event of the last decade. Since 2008, it has changed the original 
shape of natural gas flows within the domestic pipeline system. The 
system was originally intended to bring gas from the 
production/import centres of the Gulf of Mexico and Canada into the 
main consumption areas, especially the north-east. The emergence of 
the main shale geographic areas – referred to as ‘plays’ – has somewhat 
reversed this picture: while Eagle Ford, in Texas, is relatively close to 
                                                          
3 Central Appalachian coal prices, the benchmark dropped to $52.75/short 
tonne; see EIA (2015b). 
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Henry Hub and thus still pushes gas in the same original directions, the 
Marcellus shale play stretches from Maryland to upstate New York, 
thus sitting right in the backyard of the big cities of the north-east, 
which are the main consumption centres. Such is the abundance of gas 
that reverse flows from Marcellus to the south-east are becoming a 
reality.  
The physical change in flows has brought about a corresponding 
change in local pricing, and hereof positioning by all players in order 
to secure transportation capacities in different and previously ancillary 
pipelines, reverse flows and the like (Hamilton & Santa Maria, 2014). 
The traditional domestic price differentials, measured in terms of a 
positive “basis” from the reference Henry Hub, have reduced 
dramatically4 and no longer justify transport from Texas, hence 
effectively becoming negative (EIA, 2013b). 
The abundance of gas traded at Henry Hub itself has brought 
down the price by around four times, i.e. from $11.27/MMBtu5 in May 
2008 to $2.85/MMBtu in May 2015. Many early entrants in domestic 
shale gas production have been struggling with financing their projects 
due to this depressed price situation. LNG imports have become 
virtually non-existent6 and the low prices are here to stay until LNG 
export terminals come on stream to work as a safety valve to the 
system. The first LNG exports from the contiguous US are scheduled 
for the end of 2015. However, exports might impact domestic gas prices 
only when they reach a more significant level, but this is not going to 
happen at least for two or three years.7 
                                                          
4 Spot prices, in $/MMBtu, on 27 August 2014: Henry Hub 3.99, New York 2.79. 
NGI Daily Gas Price Index. 
5 Millions of British thermal units. 
6 LNG imports into the US are expected to be 0.17 Bcf/d in both 2014 and 2015, 
a very tiny volume when compared to a domestic consumption expected to 
average 72.6 Bcf/d during 2014. See EIA (2014), section on “Natural Gas”. 
7 “Many of the latecomers frantically snatched up shale leases during the 
buying spree of 2009-12. But lots of these parcels of land have proved 
disappointing and now look to have been overpriced. The influx of the 
supermajors has contributed to another problem, too: a gas glut, exacerbated 
by inadequate pipeline infrastructure, that has kept US benchmark Henry Hub 
spot prices largely below $4 per MMBtu since 2011. Companies are being forced 
to redirect their efforts to areas rich in more profitable crude oil and natural gas 
liquids (NGLs).” See Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). 
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Moreover, in recent years the global LNG market has 
experienced two phases: with European8 NBP (National Balancing 
Point) prices typically hovering around the $8-10/MMBtu mark, and 
US (Henry Hub)9 prices plunging below $5/MMBtu after the first 
batches of shale gas production came to market, there has been a 
period, roughly corresponding with 2013, during which Asian prices 
above $15/MMBtu would certainly justify US exports to Asia. Note 
that during that period and up to now, not a single load of LNG landed 
from the contiguous US in Asia, because the pre-shale gas revolution 
market did not need export capacity, and building new LNG export 
terminals takes time.  
Several changes in market fundamentals in 2014 have brought 
Asian prices down and in the first months of 2015 even below those of 
Europe’s average import price) (see Figure 14.3).  
Figure 14.3 Regional gas price dynamics: The disappearing ‘Asian premium’ 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), World Bank and EIA. 
The main reasons behind this are slowing Chinese economic 
growth and its increasing interest in piped gas, weather conditions in 
the Pacific-Asian region (cold summer followed by a mild winter), 
                                                          
8 UK National Balancing Point, i.e. UK import price. 
9 US hub price. 
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nuclear restarts in South Korea, Japan’s drive for energy efficiency to 
diminish the Fukushima effect, the appearance of new supply sources 
(start of the PNG LNG10 export plant in May 2014) and finally the new 
low-price oil era.  
All in all, this means that we are entering uncharted territory in 
a second phase in which, theoretically at least, a hypothetical US LNG 
tanker could be better off in Europe than in Asia, especially if liquefied 
in the Gulf of Mexico or the East Coast, thanks to the lower cost of 
logistics.  
Whatever the views on future fundamentals and therefore on 
possible LNG flows, it is safe to say that they will swing between one 
and the other of these two phases. At current technology and logistics 
levels, US exports to Europe are commercially viable roughly when the 
NBP-Henry Hub spread is higher than $5/MMBtu. A spread of $7-
8/MMBtu would be required to justify exports from the Gulf of Mexico 
or East Coast to Asia. It is straightforward to observe that if US export 
terminals had been in operation, in the first phase Asia would have 
competed with Europe as a destination for LNG, while in the second 
(current) phase, export volumes would have reached European shores. 
Hence, flows will be directed by commercial logic, regardless of the 
TTIP or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But these agreements send 
a strong signal to the main market players and project investors that 
there is political will to ease LNG flows, if they are commercially viable.  
Hence, Europe could secure transatlantic trade. However, in the 
US this would require US LNG export terminals to be in put place along 
with legislation providing clarity about the expected or maximum 
export capacity. For that matter, to allow the EU to fully benefit from 
the global LNG market, the interconnectivity of Europe’s internal gas 
market would need to be improved and regasification capacity in 
north-east and south-east Europe increased (see Figure 14.4).  
If this happens, the TTIP commitment to market-opening as well 
as discipline on restrictions such as the lifting of licencing regimes or 
export bans (in the case of oil) will facilitate the flow of goods and 
services. This will be facilitated if common rules can be agreed upon. 
Whether LNG flows towards the EU will become commercially viable 
is a different matter, and much will depend on whether European gas 
prices will be able to compete with those proposed by Asian buyers.  
                                                          
10 Papua New Guinea LNG plant, with a 6.9 MTPA capacity. The plant started 
its first LNG shipments in May 2014.  
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Figure 14.4 Existing, constructed and planned LNG import plants in Europe 
 
Note: bcma = billion cubic metres/annum. 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from Gas Infrastructure 
Europe (GIE). 
All in all, the picture looks favourable on a systemic level, but 
with a number of specific unsolved issues related to market dynamics 
and, most notably, the consolidation of the shale industry over time. 
The main player, the US government, needs to decide whether to grant 
export licences and, if so, how many, and whether to let the market 
decide or to try to control the flows and therefore domestic prices and 
production levels. This choice will be more political than economic, not 
because there will not be an economic gain or loss from it, but because 
such gain or loss will be due to the interplay of too many actors on a 
systemic level to be foreseen today. In broad terms, opinions in the US 
are divided between the supporters of the protectionist view, that is, 
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modulating the newly found reserves so that they, in a protectionist 
manner, power the domestic economy for the longest possible time; 
and those who instead argue that maximising US exports would act as 
a multiplier through the overall economy, hence generating more 
wealth over time than simply earmarking indigenous reserves for 
domestic use. It is easy to see how the two camps advocate opposite 
trade measures: the former supports protectionism, the latter free trade. 
But the choice cannot ignore the systemic dynamics, including those at 
the global level.  
2.2 The EU’s quest for energy diversification 
Europe is in a different position than the US. The energy mix is not 
radically different from that of its transatlantic counterpart, but the 
forces at play suggest a likely divergence in the foreseeable future. 
Europe is import dependent and will remain so in the future, even if 
there is a question of how great this import dependence will be. Rapidly 
depleting domestic gas reserves and sustained gas demand (highly 
dependent on the effectiveness of measures taken to phase out coal) 
suggest that the EU’s gas import dependence will further increase in 
the future, although there is controversy on how much.11  
Prior to the shale revolution, the shape of Europe’s import 
patterns for natural gas would have looked different to those of North 
America, which would have increased its reliance primarily on LNG. 
But the geological and political situation is now such that even if 
indigenous European shale gas might end up being produced, it is 
unlikely to trigger a proper revolution of the energy sector as was the 
case in North America.12 And if anything, the relationship with its main 
supplier, Russia, is evolving in a way that suggests diversification out 
of gas might be in order (Egenhofer, Genoese & Dimitrova, 2014). 
Currently, the EU produces about 34% of its internal natural gas 
demand, and it imports the balance from a handful of countries: Russia, 
Norway, Algeria and (LNG from) Qatar. Most natural gas supply is 
entrenched in long-term contracts, often indexed to oil. The majority of 
                                                          
11 For instance, according to BP (2014) the EU will need to import 49% more 
natural gas by 2035. Similarly, European Commission (2013b) considers that 
the EU will import by 32 more Mtoe of natural gas by 2030 than it did in 2005. 
Honoré (2014) also suggests an increase of EU gas imports during this period. 
12 For a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for arguing a different trajectory 
in European shale gas compared to North America, see Sandrea (2014). 
490  NATALI, EGENHOFER & MOLNAR 
 
these contracts will be due for renegotiation or renewal within the next 
10-15 years, and increased liquidity at the hubs suggests that more and 
more gas is being traded on a short-term basis.13  
2.3 Cheap coal  
Another aspect of the transatlantic relationship when it comes to 
energy is the effect of cheap US natural gas on global coal flows. As a 
consequence of low natural gas prices, the US is experiencing a 
significant switch from coal to gas in power generation, and a very 
limited switch from fuel oil to gas in home heating. The diminishing 
need for coal, heightened by the planned phase-out of older coal plants 
through performance regulation, has generated an export trend of 
cheap coal to Asia and Europe. 
The share of coal used for electricity generation has been 
shrinking in the US for the last few years – even if it still accounts for 
39% of the country’s power mix in 2014. The European Union, however, 
experienced a sort of ‘coal renaissance’ between 2010 and 2012 as the 
share of coal increased in the EU’s power mix from 24% to almost 28%, 
although in 2013 the share of coal started to decrease in Europe 
(Eurostat data).  
Indeed, due to structural design problems and their exacerbation 
by the world financial crisis and the so-called ‘euro crisis’, the 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) as the EU’s main climate policy 
instrument has not been able to drive the phase-out of coal in Europe. 
The severity of the recession has led to a fall in economic activity and 
therefore to large emissions reductions. In addition, world coal prices 
have fallen so that the relative competitiveness of coal has increased. 
Without introducing a supply mechanism in the EU ETS, such as the 
proposed Market Stability Reserve, it might take until the mid-2020s at 
the earliest before a high enough carbon price would re-emerge to make 
gas more competitive. Many doubt, however, whether the ETS will be 
a suitable tool for supporting investment signals for low-carbon 
generation capacity. On top of this, the present coal oversupply in the 
US makes this fuel even cheaper than it used to be, providing a 
competitive substitute to gas in power generation.  
However, there is a range of other policy measures on both sides 
influencing the electricity mix, in particular pollutants emissions 
control policies such as the EU ETS and the EU Industrial Emissions 
                                                          
13 For a comprehensive analysis, see Stern (2014). 
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Directive (IED) and the U.S. Clean Power Plan. Inside the EU, other 
such measures have been initiated by EU member states, such as the 
withdrawal of the German nuclear programme after the Fukushima 
accident in March 2011, and the renewables support measures to phase 
out coal-fired plants in the UK, the Netherlands and possibly in 
Germany.14 These EU, US and national regulatory developments 
influence the power mix and are supplemented by exogenous changes, 
which markets have experienced as a result of other factors: among 
these are Asian economic growth, the 2008-09 financial crisis and 
subsequent economic downturn (which took place at different paces in 
different parts of the world economy), and resource developments 
across the globe. All of these elements influence the natural gas market 
to a great extent. 
Nevertheless, the reality in Europe is that coal is still a strategic 
resource in a number of EU member states for an array of reasons: it 
was the only source of power for the Polish economy until very 
recently; it is needed to complete the German power mix after the 
government’s decision to phase out its nuclear power generation; it is 
defended by trade unions in Spain on employment grounds. Hence, a 
phase-out will be uneven across member states at best.  
3. The opportunities the TTIP could unlock in the 
long run 
Like the other sectors included in TTIP, the potential for improvement 
in energy trade lies in the area of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which 
would lead to immediate mutual benefits. The removal of barriers to 
LNG exports from the US would benefit the sector, with LNG exports 
opening an alternative source of supply to develop over time in order 
to find an alternative to the cheaper, potentially less secure, Russian 
gas.  
The impact of the removal of barriers can be increased further by 
common rules. For example, harmonising regulation related to the 
                                                          
14 The UK introduced a carbon price to bolster the existing (too low) EU carbon 
price and is developing the legislative framework for the implementation of the 
Emissions Performance Standard for new fossil fuel plants as an annual limit 
on carbon emissions from new fossil fuel plants equivalent to 450g/kWh. The 
Netherlands under its national Energy Agreement of 2013, a settlement 
negotiated by the stakeholders, will phase out the technically least efficient 
capacity, which typically is coal. The German government is also considering 
additional regulation to deal with least efficient generation. 
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limitation of carbon emissions – even if not a realistic proposition at the 
moment and possibly for the foreseeable future – would create a level 
playing field that could at least partially create some clarity in a 
complicated field, which is currently being tackled in very different 
ways such as cap-and-trade, emissions standards or subsidies. 
Transatlantic coordination could prove useful in the long run in this 
respect, especially now that an alignment seems possible on the need 
for binding carbon reduction commitments, which the US had resisted 
for a long time. One could imagine the gradual linking of transatlantic 
cap-and-trade systems (Egenhofer, 2005) building on the experiences of 
existing systems such as the ETS or the one in California (and which is 
now gradually linked with the systems of the Canadian provinces of 
Quebec and Ontario). This would not only send a signal that the 
transatlantic region is ready to factor a high CO2 price into its value 
chains but could also address sensitive issues such as ‘carbon leakage’ 
(Gros & Egenhofer, 2011) towards Asia. A high price of carbon in 
Europe would mean fewer outlets for its outflow of unused coal while 
a high carbon price in the US would mean a higher price of energy, 
which is actually going counter to the centrepiece of the shale 
revolution. Whether this happens will depend on many factors, not 
least the politics in the two regions, and currently there seems to be 
little immediate prospect. But the issue will not only not go away but 
become more important.  
3.1 US authorisation of LNG export terminals 
Although market projections suggest that American LNG will flow 
towards Europe and Asia, the current geopolitical situation suggests 
that non-economic factors might arise, if not dominate and justify some 
form of eastbound flow towards European LNG regasification 
terminals. In absence of a TTIP section providing energy cooperation 
and disciplines, the issue is left with the US regulator having to decide 
how many export terminals, and therefore how much export capacity, 
will be available. Moreover, leaving aside LNG could be interpreted by 
certain market players and project investors as a sign of lacking political 
will to ease LNG flows.  
3.2 Regulatory harmonisation over the longer term 
A further range of NTBs is caused by environmental regulations on 
both shores, especially where regulatory divergence results in certain 
plant or fuels being allowed in one region and not in the other. In this 
respect the most relevant area is pollutants emissions, and their indirect 
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impact on fuels through regulation that implies the phase-out of some 
types of electricity generation plants. In 2011 the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) introduced emissions standards for toxic air 
pollutants such as mercury, acid gases and sulphur dioxide.  
In September 2013 the EPA reintroduced CO2 performance 
standards for new power stations and in June 2014 it issued a proposal 
on the performance standards for existing power plants. In the 
proposed framework, the EPA would issue guidelines about the 
appropriate standards, but US states would be responsible for 
establishing and eventually implementing the performance standards 
once they have been approved by the EPA. Each state will have 
individual goals set by the EPA (a state-specific future carbon intensity 
of covered existing fossil‐fuel‐fired power plants in that state) and they 
will be free to choose the means to achieve the interim and then the final 
goal. All in all, the EPA expects that the Clean Power Plan would 
reduce nationwide CO2 emissions from the power sector by around 
30% from 2005 levels by 2030 (EPA, 2014). 
In the EU, the Industrial Emissions Directive sets out a pathway 
for the reduction of pollutants emissions, but the carbon emissions are 
only regulated through the 2007-09 Climate Package, which sets a 20% 
overall emissions reduction target. Industrial and power sector 
emissions are regulated by the EU ETS (Ellerman, Convery & de 
Perthuis, 2010). On 23-24 October 2014 the European Council decided 
on a new set of targets for 2030 (“2030 Framework for climate and 
energy policy”), including a 40% greenhouse gas reduction, a 
minimum 27% renewables and a minimum 27% efficiency target. The 
EU ETS is also set to be strengthened, as the linear reduction factor of 
the EU-wide carbon cap will increase from the current 1.74% per year 
to 2.2% from 2021. In addition, the European Commission is trying to 
address the oversupply of carbon allowances, which has led to a fall of 
the allowances to less than €10/tonne of CO2. One strategy is changing 
the allocation time path. The other is establishing a supply side 
mechanism, e.g. the so-called ‘Market Stability Reserve’ (MSR) to adjust 
the auctioning volume by ‘parking’ allowances intended to be 
auctioned in a reserve and releasing them from the reserve to the 
market to maintain the total amount of allowances in circulation in a 
given year within a prescribed band. 
Should the US Clean Power Plan go ahead and the EU ETS not 
quickly manage to effectively address the current glut in emission 
allowances, an imbalance could be created whereby coal power plants 
would be forced to shut down faster in the US than in the EU, hence 
494  NATALI, EGENHOFER & MOLNAR 
 
reinforcing the existing ‘coal leakage’. Whether this will be the case or 
will also depend on member states’ policies, such as those in the UK or 
the Netherlands, which are considering national measures emissions 
performance standards similar to those of the US, could potentially 
polarise the coal leakage problem towards some European countries 
and not others.  
Hence, regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US in the 
elaboration of emissions performance standards could effectively 
address the issue of coal leakage. On the other hand, the US could ask 
the EU to put its house in order. If not, the lack of a cap-and-trade 
carbon emissions system in the US, combined with the lower natural 
gas prices, will favour a sizeable medium-term switch from coal to gas 
in power generation, which will not be matched in Europe. Currently, 
there is no short-term scenario where the ratio between gas and coal 
prices would change so that gas increases market share in the EU power 
sector. 
4. Bringing it all together  
Several changes in the structure of trade across the Atlantic might either 
benefit or harm various aspects of energy policy on both shores, 
typically enshrined in the triangular model for energy policy that 
combines the objectives of security of supply, competitiveness and 
sustainability. 
4.1 Security of supply 
North American LNG could serve European interests in starting, or at 
the very least introducing, diversification away from Russian imports 
of piped natural gas, not least because of supply security reasons. 
Whether this is an economically viable proposition depends on both the 
kind of security premium Europe is willing to pay and relative prices. 
As pointed out earlier, the 2013 scenario of prices of $18/MMBtu in 
Asia and $10/MMBtu in Europe would not justify Europe-bound flows 
(unless locked in long-term agreements); but the current scenario, 
where these prices are roughly equal and the spread with Henry Hub 
is around $5/MMBtu would create a strong case for it.15 The 
                                                          
15 It should be noted that the reason is not absolute cost, but arbitrage. The 
estimated cost of liquefaction and transport for US LNG to Europe is around 
$4/MMBtu, to Asia $5/MMBtu. Spot price differentials of more than 
$4/MMBtu between Henry Hub and NBP are not infrequent, and in a two-
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fundamentals of this market strongly suggest that prices in the next 
decade will reflect one of these two scenarios, perhaps switching 
several times between the two. European policy-makers might want to 
stop looking only to the east and to the south and perhaps turn their 
eye to the west as well. The politics and transatlantic commitments 
between authorities will need to be right in order to convince the 
market to create binding transatlantic ties. LNG imports from the US 
have the potential of being much more than the odd spot cargo. In the 
longer run, exports may well reduce the Asia/Europe price disparity. 
The other side of the coin is that for North America, shale gas can 
have the same security value as it would have for Europe – in fact, as 
has been seen, there is advocacy in favour of protectionism. Moreover, 
and in this case joined with oil, energy independence for the US means 
having more options in foreign policy, as dependence eases. This is also 
true for Europe. Commercial links grow fastest once they are 
embedded in an agreement such as TTIP. However, one should note 
that the extent to which such an agreement would facilitate natural gas 
trade will depend on two aspects. First, it will depend on the exact 
wording of the agreement, i.e. whether it would be fully inclusive or 
whether exclusions exist. The second aspect is how the LNG export 
licensing system will evolve in the US, i.e. the regime of planning 
permission for the export terminals (issued by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission). This is not a TTIP issue, however. The value 
of the aforementioned optionality is increasing the more the 
geopolitical situation gets complicated around the regions, which have 
traditionally exported to the EU.  
4.2 Competitiveness 
America is enjoying low natural gas and electricity prices that are at 
least in part enabled by the absence of LNG export capacity, while 
Europe struggles with higher gas prices and uncertainties from some 
of its traditional external suppliers. The argument for enabling 
transatlantic trade in natural gas is therefore in some respect similar to 
the arguments related to crude oil. But this also means that, inside the 
US, there are vested interests in industry and the energy sector pushing 
against it. While Russian gas is cheaper than LNG in monetary terms, 
member states seem to place different values on enhanced 
                                                          
country, NTB-free model that would suffice to justify Europe-bound flows. But 
as long as the Asian price remains much higher, markets will choose it as 
preferred destination. See Medlock III (2012). 
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diversification and having more supply options. Ultimately, the 
political choice for Europe is what price it is willing to pay for 
diversification and to increase optionality (such in the case of Poland 
and Lithuania, which opted for regasification facilities, or the EU’s push 
to establish a Southern Gas Corridor). This political choice may well 
cause controversy: some member states are keener to diversify energy 
sources away from Russia than others.  
4.3 Sustainability 
When it comes to environmental policy, transatlantic cooperation is 
virtually non-existent despite the huge impact it could have on global 
climate change policy. Cooperation could range from a common ETS to 
the regulation of product standards and elaboration of support 
schemes for renewables subsidies. Each partner has its own 
environmental policies; carbon emissions reduction, the phasing out of 
polluting plants, steering the electricity mix, cleaning the transport 
sector, promoting greener ‘infant industries’. Of all these policies, the 
ones that the TTIP might potentially address would possibly be a 
common emissions performance standard, carbon tax or trading 
system.  
5. Towards a future agenda: Include other energy 
commodities 
While the debate seems mature for the inclusion of natural gas as part 
of transatlantic trade talks, other energy commodities and policies 
would equally benefit from becoming part of the transatlantic trade 
agenda. 
5.1 Oil independence in a single country 
Oil is the foremost of these. As has been mentioned before, in the US, 
the shale oil revolution is expected to follow a very similar pattern as 
that of gas a few years before, with the main reserves located between 
Canada, North Dakota and Texas. Gas is dependent on the availability 
of pipelines for its transport, like water flows from the aqueduct under 
the streets of a town and finally into the pipes of a household, and this 
structure defines the volumes that can be shipped and the route options 
that can be chosen. Oil incurs fewer such issues, as it is ultimately more 
easily transportable than gas. Yet the debate over the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline is a relevant example of how the old pipeline 
system is called to task: by making more oil transportable via pipeline, 
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many argue Keystone XL would reduce the need for oil to find 
alternative and less secure means of transportation, and more 
specifically limit the scope for railway congestion and accidents 
involving cargo trains bringing crude and products to market from 
North Dakota and Canada.  
Availability of indigenous shale oil in North America means that 
the US, which used to be a net importer, is now becoming less and less 
dependent on external suppliers. However, the export ban on crude oil 
means all domestically produced crude has to be processed in the US 
refining system. From a transatlantic perspective, there would be scope 
for lifting such a ban and opening an eastbound trade route towards 
Europe. The crude export ban creates a domestic glut, with downward 
pressure on pricing, which on the one hand represents a disincentive 
for producers, and on the other hand marks domestic crude for 
exclusive use as feedstock for domestic refineries, boosting the latter’s 
profitability, thus making American oil products, e.g. in the 
petrochemical industry, more competitive abroad and reinforcing the 
US’s position as the world largest petroleum product exporter. 
For this reason, the US refining industry is resisting this potential 
change: not only has it reinforced its traditional export route for diesel, 
but it has also contributed to the inversion of a traditional gasoline 
import trend from Europe into the US. Losing the competitive 
advantage in producing gasoline, which somewhat balanced the US 
supremacy in diesel, Europe remains a net importer of all energy 
commodities, and is left with a struggling refining industry. Swamped 
with refined products and having lost its supremacy on the gasoline 
side, many European majors are now facing increasing pressure to 
downsize their refining and retail business as a result. 
With some small exceptions, the bulk of crude will still have to 
be processed in the US, whose policy-makers worry that the newly 
found advantage of increasing self-sufficiency could be threatened if 
the ban were lifted.16 But holding that lifting the ban would 
automatically realign refining margins across the Atlantic is not correct: 
transportation costs and current contractual structures would still be 
such that the region where crude is produced would retain a 
competitive advantage over the relatively resource-scarce region, in 
this case Europe. But modest trade flows, and therefore realignment in 
margins, might occur. How this will occur is a crude quality issue and 
                                                          
16 This reluctance on the US side is also the gist of the most recent debate on 
inserting an energy chapter in the TTIP. See EUobserver (2014). 
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uncertainty on crude exports is freezing US refining investment. There 
will be winners and losers inside the US refining system, given the 
distorted light/heavy crude differential and depending on whether one 
is running a complex or simple refinery, which differs by region in the 
US. This is why the US debate on the ban is difficult. 
5.2 Biofuels 
Global trade in biofuels has expanded in recent years, the two main 
commodities traded being ethanol and biodiesel. The US has been the 
world’s largest producer of ethanol since the early 2000s but, being also 
the largest consumer, it has only become a net exporter in 2011. In 2014 
US ethanol exports amounted to around 20 million barrels (EIA, 2015d). 
Brazil, Jamaica and El Salvador are its main import sources. The US was 
a net exporter of biodiesel between 2007 and 2012, only to become a net 
importer in 2013, with imports amounting to 8.152 and 5.059 millions 
of barrels in 2013 and 2014 respectively (EIA, 2015a).  
These trends for both fuels are mainly steered by government 
policy, in particular subsidies on domestic ethanol production (in the 
form of tax credits) as well as the price support for sugar production. 
On the other hand, to some extent the ethanol demand faces a technical 
ceiling in the amount of ethanol that can be blended with gasoline. The 
current US biofuel policy is based on the Renewable Fuels Standards. 
Enacted by the Energy Policy Act in 2005 and expanded by the 2007 
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), the Renewable Fuels 
Standards requires adding continually increasing volumes of 
renewable sources into the country’s fuel supply – growing from nearly 
13 billion gallons in 2011 to 36 billion gallons by 2022 (EIA, 2013a). In 
addition, the EISA authorised $500 million annually for the 2008-15 
ﬁscal years for the production of advanced biofuels with at least an 80% 
reduction in life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions relative to current 
fuels. The use of biofuels is also encouraged through tax benefits. For 
instance, on 1 January 2012 the US eliminated the $0.54-per-gallon 
import tariff it used to impose on ethanol imports. The $0.45-per-gallon 
tax credit to blenders has also been removed. 
In the EU, on the other hand, demand for biofuels is growing 
strongly, due to organic demand growth, as well as to the fact that the 
2007-09 Climate and Energy Package includes a 10% renewable target 
for the transport sector by 2020, and the Fuel Quality Directive implies 
a 6% reduction in GHG emissions in the sector. The former obviously 
implies the introduction of liquid biofuels, while the latter is an 
additional incentive in that direction. According to the National 
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Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) submitted to the European 
Commission, member states intend to collectively exceed the 10% 
target. The NREAPs also indicated that the 10% target would be met by 
8.5% conventional biofuels, 1% second generation biofuels and 1% 
renewable electricity, most of which would be used in rail. The 
contribution of hydrogen is expected to be negligible (ePURE, 2014). 
There is no biofuel target agreed within the 2030 Framework for 
Climate and Energy Policies (European Commission, 2014a).  
Europe does not produce enough biofuels to satisfy demand and 
therefore large volumes are imported, especially biodiesel. The source 
of these imports depends mainly on technical requirements for 
compliance with the fuel quality Directive (see below). Indeed, to 
qualify for both the renewables energy and fuel quality Directives, 
biofuels consumed in the EU must comply and demonstrate 
compliance with strict sustainability criteria. They set rigorous 
requirements on the minimum level of greenhouse gas emissions 
savings (provide at least 35% GHG emissions savings compared to 
fossil fuels, a threshold set to rise to 50% as of 2017, and to 60% as of 
2018), appropriate land use (raw material must not be grown on land 
with high-carbon stocks) as well as monitoring requirements for any 
potential adverse effect. Moreover, the European Commission is duty-
bound to report on food availability, compliance with land-use rights 
and with international labour conventions. The technical requirements 
for compliance amount to ‘methods of production’ and not to ‘like 
products’ (the fuels themselves), the basis for trade liberalisation in the 
WTO ever since GATT was started. They therefore qualify as technical 
barriers to trade, and for many WTO partners these are very sensitive, 
if not regarded as quasi-protectionism. The TTIP could address this.  
5.3 The EU’s fuel quality Directive 
A third area for potential barriers to be removed relates to the text of 
the EU’s fuel quality Directive of 2009. In particular, the fuel quality 
Directive ranks transport fuels by carbon intensity and is intended to 
put the more carbon intensive at a disadvantage, hence promoting the 
‘cleaner’ ones, in particular by discriminating between the qualities of 
the source crudes. This implies that fuels produced from Canadian tar 
sands or US unconventional oil would face entry barriers into the EU’s 
transport fuel market. In practice, however, the text has never been 
translated into enforceable standards. Furthermore, not having been 
included in the EU discussions on the renewal of the climate targets to 
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2030, the scope of the fuel quality Directive expires in 2020, while it is 
not clear what regime will be in place from 2020 onwards. 
A similar argument exists in relation to biofuels trade, but in this 
case the US and the EU are playing on the same side, using technical 
standards to discriminate against imports, mainly from Latin America, 
and thereby indirectly supporting domestic production. However, 
such technical barriers also limit the possibility of trading between each 
other, and in particular hamper the potential for US ethanol and 
biodiesel exports to the EU. Even inside the EU, however, the camps 
are divided between those who would prefer the fuel quality Directive 
to effectively become a barrier, hence promoting domestic production 
of biofuels (a segment which has a lot in common with agriculture, 
traditionally a protectionist stronghold) as opposed to their penetration 
into the fuel mix if there is a positive environmental effect. The TTIP 
could start that debate. 
6. Conclusions 
There are potential gains in facilitating trade in energy products across 
the Atlantic, possibly to an even larger extent than there is in sectors 
currently included in the scope of the TTIP. The benefits can be divided 
into direct gains and policy gains, and the action required to unlock 
these benefits relates to NTBs, in line with the nature and hard core of 
the TTIP itself. 
It is fair to say that LNG exports to Europe will depend on 
regional pricing, which however is in flux right now. Europe would 
have to want LNG for this pattern to be put in place. Quite the opposite 
could be said of crude oil flows, as US grades would likely flow to 
Europe in the event the 1975 export ban were lifted,17 thus improving 
EU refining margins and perhaps reducing the new westbound 
gasoline trend, possibly to the point of restoring the traditional pattern 
of European exports to the US. New players entering the distressed EU 
refining industry with different goals than the vertically integrated 
incumbents might also change the picture in favour of a resurrection of 
European refining and possibly, in the end, even eroding the US 
advantage in the diesel segment, and the corresponding trade flows. 
                                                          
17 To a small extent, they already are: since 2014, some US Gulf Coast producers 
have been able to sell Eagle Ford light crude for export to European buyers, 
bypassing it through a splitter and self-classifying it as a product, thus 
circumventing the ban. 
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A gradual convergence in regulatory norms and practice would 
accelerate this trend. For example, successful conclusion of the debate 
over the fuel quality Directive, with the adoption of European 
limitations, would also impact this trend. The failure of this piece of 
legislation, or the more unlikely adoption of something similar in North 
America, could maintain the status quo. That aside, the fuel quality 
Directive could represent a piece of a broader process of regulatory 
harmonisation that has the potential to create mutual advantages; the 
introduction of a common framework for the limitation of pollutants, 
including greenhouse gases, could be another one, even if prospects 
seems remote. The fuel quality Directive is also a double-edged sword 
in that it works as a protectionist measure against EU imports of 
biofuels from the US. It seems fair to suggest that the effectiveness of 
this Directive is sacrificed as a bargaining chip for the EU, in order to 
achieve the inclusion of energy in the TTIP in the form of an opening 
for export of oil and gas from the US. 
Most of these policy improvements are more grounded in 
politics than they are in trade: improving transatlantic security and 
tackling environmental issues together, if not sharing the burden on the 
competitiveness of the energy sector at large, would be an undisputable 
improvement. Granted, the US cannot be asked to give up its 
competitive advantage for the sake of transatlantic cooperation. But the 
US should not fear removing NTBs in the refining and biofuels sectors, 
although losers would need to be addressed. On a systemic level, trade 
in a commodity benefits the factor that is specific to the export sector; it 
triggers a shift of all other factors towards production that is intensive 
in that factor; and therefore, it ultimately works to the benefit of the 
economy which is most abundant in that factor. The US, now rich in 
hydrocarbons, has no reason to fear for its competitiveness in a free 
trade Atlantic community. 
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15. GAINS FROM CONVERGENCE IN 
US AND EU AUTO 
REGULATIONS UNDER TTIP* 
CAROLINE FREUND AND SARAH OLIVER** 
1. Introduction 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aims at 
harmonising regulations across the European Union and the United 
States. The European Commission states TTIP’s objective as achieving 
“greater regulatory compatibility between the EU and the US, and 
paving the way for setting global standards”. The US Trade 
Representative says: “T-TIP can set high standards and pioneer new 
rules for the global trading system.”1  
This chapter focuses on the gains that both partners could reap 
from regulatory coherence in the automobile industry, using the trade 
effects of the 1958 Agreement – the most comprehensive agreement on 
technical prescriptions for automobiles to date – as an event study. The 
1958 Agreement establishes a set of uniform standards for vehicles and 
                                                          
* The editors are grateful to the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
for permission to republish this paper, which was originally published as 
Freund & Oliver (2015). 
© Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved. 
** We are grateful to Lucian Cernat, Bill Cline, Bernard Hoekman, Gary 
Hufbauer, Brad Jensen, Robert Lawrence, Jeff Schott, Jennifer Thomas, Charles 
Ulthus, and participants at the Standards, Regulation and Trans-Atlantic Trade 
Conference at the European University Institute, Florence, 10 October 2014, for 
helpful comments. Partial support for this study was provided by the Italian 
Trade Commission. 
1 “Member States Endorse EU-US Trade and Investment Negotiations”, 
European Commission Memo, 14 June 2013; Dan Mullaney, “Five Things You 
Should Know about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,” 
USTR Tradewinds Blog, November 2013.  
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their components relating to safety, environment, energy and anti-theft 
requirements. The European Union, as well as Japan and Korea among 
others, are parties to the agreement. The United States, however, has its 
own safety standards and is not a contracting party to the 1958 
Agreement.  
Given the feasibility of regulatory harmonisation (as evidenced 
by the 1958 Agreement), the auto industry stands out as a critical test 
case in the TTIP for improving regulatory coherence between the 
United States and the European Union. Both maintain vastly different 
regulations as well as different ways of administering them. Despite 
disparities in regulations and hence production requirements, we show 
that these regulatory regimes are not significantly different in terms of 
the safety outcomes they deliver.  
The regulatory divergence distorts the market, raising 
production costs, encouraging price discrimination across markets and 
limiting the available import varieties. To measure the trade loss from 
having two sets of regulations, the chapter examines how the 1958 
Agreement affects trade, using a difference-in-differences approach. 
The advantage of our methodology is that it uses an actual case of 
regulatory harmonisation (accession to the 1958 Agreement) in the 
same industry to estimate the effect of regulatory convergence. Because 
of variation in dates of members’ accession, we can control for exporter-
year specific effects, importer-year effects, country-pair effects, as well 
as other bilateral time-varying events such as EU accession or voluntary 
export restraints. In contrast, other studies have estimated trade gains 
from regulatory harmonisation using an ad-valorem tariff equivalent 
of regulatory differences. Regulatory convergence could have very 
different effects from tariffs because adhering to two distinct regulatory 
frameworks affects a company’s production structure, lowering both 
variable and fixed costs. 
We find that joining the 1958 Agreement boosts auto trade by 
more than 20%. This effect is significantly higher than effects estimated 
using tariff equivalents and almost as large as the additional increase 
from joining the European Union. The results are robust to different 
periods, different samples, and controlling for EU accession, high 
market share exporters, and for voluntary export restraints that were in 
effect over the period, as well as potential endogeneity of the 
agreement. We further show that foreign direct investment has not 
already segmented markets to such a degree that it would limit the 
medium-run trade gains from regulatory convergence. 
GAINS FROM CONVERGENCE IN US AND EU AUTO REGULATIONS  507 
 
Achieving regulatory harmonisation or mutual recognition of 
regulations now would help US and EU producers benefit from scale 
economies and compete in the global marketplace, while providing 
consumers with more varieties within a market and equivalent safety 
at lower prices. More broadly, the TTIP agreement is about both market 
integration and first-mover advantage. Simply put, by harmonising 
regulations in some industries or agreeing to recognise each other’s 
regulations, replication in production could be avoided, generating real 
productivity gains. Moreover, as the largest combined market for many 
products, the rest of the world will be very likely to follow similar rules. 
2. The equivalence of regulations 
Regulatory standards ensure that products are safe for consumers and 
do not excessively damage the environment. The EU and US safety and 
environmental regulations are both relatively high and well enforced, 
but have different requirements. This section focuses on safety 
regulations because although environmental standards also differ, they 
are less distortionary from an economic perspective. While there are 
barriers to harmonising environmental regulations, notably in the 
driving pattern required during testing (including distance, speed, and 
whether the car is allowed to warm up before testing begins), there is 
also room from a manufacturing perspective to create one model for 
both markets that adheres to the most stringent emissions regulation. 
For example, the European Union is moving toward a greenhouse gas 
emissions standard of 95 grams/kilometre (60.6 miles per gallon 
equivalent) for 95% of vehicles by 2020 and the United States is moving 
toward an average level of 163 grams/mile (54.5 miles per gallon 
equivalent) by 2025. It may be in the producer’s interest to make one 
car for both markets that meets the 60.6 miles per gallon threshold.2 A 
clear hierarchy in these regulations favours low emissions. As a result, 
environmental regulations can create a race to the top, where an 
automobile that meets the highest standard on various emissions tests 
is marketable in both economies. In contrast, safety requirements are 
more complex and often incompatible in the sense that one car cannot 
meet both regulations simultaneously. 
The US and EU models of the 2014 Ford Fusion have 80% of the 
same parts, which is higher than the industry average for overlapping 
                                                          
2 See Canis & Lattanzio (2014) for a detailed analysis of the differences between 
US and EU emissions standards.  
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parts,3 yet a fifth of the Fusion’s parts need to be manufactured 
separately for the two markets. Some of the parts are different because 
of testing regulations, while other differences lie in specific parts. For 
example, both markets require crash testing but the tests are distinct, in 
both speed of the car and rigidness of the barrier. US standards are 
tougher because cars must satisfy certain criteria even accounting for 
passengers not wearing seatbelts. Other parts that are different are 
individually small, such as the colour of the tail light or the presence of 
side lights (only the United States requires them) – but these add up.  
To demonstrate the technical differences in a single part, Table 
15.1 shows the differences in regulatory standards between US and EU 
lighting systems for automobiles, in particular side turn signal lamps. 
The first column lists the technical regulation in the European Union, 
column 2 is the corresponding US regulation, and column 3 explains 
the differences, if any, between the two regulations. In many cases, an 
EU manufacturer can clearly comply with US regulations, such as the 
height of the front lights, which has a lower minimum in the European 
Union. In other cases, there is no overlap, such as the front light colour. 
This extensive table only addresses one specific light system.  
Table 15.1 Differences in regulations in EU and US side turn-signal lamps* 
Property EU (UN 
Regulations)** 
US 
(FMVSS/SAE 
Standards)§ 
Comparison 
Applicability  Optional, option 
of AM/RM1/ 
RM2 category 
lamps 
Optional Identical for applicability 
The EU permits the use 
of variable intensity rear 
end outline marker 
lamps, while the US 
prohibits their use 
Number 4–8 2x Front 
2x Rear 
No. of side marker lamps 
can range from 4–8 in the 
EU, but must be 4 (2x 
rear and 2x front) in the 
US 
Colour Front: White  
Rear: Red 
Front: Amber 
Rear: Red 
Colour must be white at 
the front and red at the 
rear in the EU, while the 
colour must be amber at 
                                                          
3 Justin Berkowitz, “Free Trade Cars: Why a U.S.-Europe Free-Trade Agreement 
is a Good Idea,” Car and Driver, August 2013. 
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the front and red at the 
rear in the US 
Position 
Height Front: Upper 
edge not lower 
than upper edge 
of wind-screen 
Rear: At 
maximum height 
possible  
As near the 
top as 
practicable  
Minimum height at front 
is lower in the EU 
Identical for the rear 
Width Outer: ≤400 mm 
and as close as 
possible to the 
extreme outer 
edge of the 
vehicle  
Indicate the 
overall width 
of the vehicle 
and symmetric 
about the 
vertical centre 
line 
Widths are more 
prescriptive in the EU, 
while the US is more 
subjective  
Length — Front: On the 
front Rear: On 
the rear Other: 
Any other 
location to 
ensure that 
overall width 
of vehicle is 
indicated 
Lengths are not defined 
in the EU, while the US 
provides subjective 
length definitions  
Other Distances must be 
≥200 mm 
vertically from 
position lamps 
— Minimum vertical 
distance from position 
lamps are prescribed in 
the EU, while the US 
does not define these 
minimum distances 
Geometric 
visibility 
H: O80° V: D20° 
to U5° 
— Geometric visibility 
ranges are prescribed in 
the EU, while the US 
does not define 
geometric visibility 
ranges 
Photometric 
visibility 
H: 0° to O20° V: 
D10° to U5° 
H: I45° to 
O45°† V: D10°$ 
to U10° 
Smaller horizontal and 
upward photometric 
visibility angles required 
in the EU 
Photometric 
Minima∆ 
≥4 cd @ H: 0°,  
V: 0°  
Front: ≥0.62 cd 
Rear: ≥0.25 cd 
Photometric minima are 
greater in the reference 
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≥0.4 cd @ H: 
O20°,  
V: D/U 5°  
axis for all lamps in the 
EU Absolute 
photometric minima for 
all lamps in the EU are 
smaller than photometric 
minima for front end-
outline marker lamps 
and greater than 
photometric minima for 
rear end-outline marker 
lamps 
Photometric 
Maxima∆ 
AM: ≥140 cd @ H: 
0°, V: 0° ≥14 cd @ 
H: O20°, V: D/U 
5° RM1: ≥17 cd @ 
H: 0°, V: 0° ≥1.7 
cd @ H: O20°, V: 
D/U 5° RM2: ≥42 
cd @ H: 0°, V: 0° 
≥4.2 cd @ H: 
O20°, V: D/U 5°  
Front: - Rear: 
≥15 cd 
Front photometric 
maxima are prescribed 
in the EU, while the US 
does not define front 
photometric maxima 
Rear photometric 
maxima are greater in 
the reference axis for all 
lamps in the EU 
Absolute rear 
photometric minima for 
all lamps in the EU are 
smaller than photometric 
minima for rear end-
outline marker lamps 
* Current EU regulations and US end-outline marker lamps [clearance lamps] (R48: 
UN Regulation No. 48; F108: FMVSS Standard No. 108; R7: UN Regulation No. 7; 
SAE Standard No. J2042) 
** Applicable for vehicles that are between 1.8–2.1 m in length  
§ Applicable for vehicles that are ≤2302 mm in width  
† May be reduced to D0° if lamp is mounted at locations other than the front or rear 
$ May be reduced to D5° when lamp is mounted below 750 mm  
∆ UN: for single function lamps tested at voltage supplies of 6.75v, 13.5v and 28v; 
US: for non-reflecting single function lamps with photometric measurements made 
at ≥1.2m 
Directional nomenclature: I, inboard; O, outboard; D, downward; U, upward; B, 
backward; F, forward; L, left; R, right. Applicable for right hand traffic lamps only, 
reverse left and right directions for left hand traffic lamps. H, horizontal 
(longitudinal) plane about a polar axis in a spherical coordinate system centred on 
the illuminating surface of the lamp; V, vertical (latitudinal) plane perpendicular to 
a polar axis in a spherical coordinate system centred on the illuminating surface of 
the lamp 
Source: European Commission (2015, Table 33). 
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Ultimately, what matters is the outcome of the requirements: Are 
passengers safe in vehicles meeting European or US regulations? To 
answer this question, we compare auto fatality data across countries. 
Figure 15.1a shows fatalities per 100,000 vehicles across EU countries. 
Figure 15.1b shows the same across US states. The EU rates are very 
similar to US rates, with 15.8 fatalities per 100,000 vehicles in the 
European Union versus 13.6 fatalities in the United States. Figure 15.1c 
shows fatality rates and GDP per capita of the individual EU countries 
and US states, indicating that rates vary far more with stage of 
development than with auto regulations, which are largely the same 
within Europe and the United States. This suggests that country-
specific variables, such as age of the fleet on the road, quality of roads, 
terrain, weather, and enforcement of laws are far more important in 
safety than regulation of the vehicles. 
To test whether fatalities per motor vehicle are fewer in the 
United States or the European Union, we regress the fatality rate on an 
indicator variable for the European Union—this variable takes the 
value 1 for EU members and zero otherwise. If the United States and 
the European Union have different safety regulations, the EU dummy 
should be negative and significant if the European Union is safer, and 
positive and significant if the European Union is more dangerous. The 
results, reported in Table 15.2, show no significant difference across EU 
countries and US states. Next, we control for GDP per capita. The point 
estimate on “In GDP” is negative and highly significant; suggesting 
that a 10% increase in GDP per capita saves 2 to 3 lives per 100,000 
vehicles. The third column measures fatalities in logs and results 
remain similar, though in this case the interpretation is slightly 
different. The results show that a 1% increase in per capita income 
reduces fatalities by more than 1%. In both specifications, per capita 
income explains more than 50% of the variation in fatality rates across 
countries. The coefficient on the EU variable remains insignificant in all 
specifications, and is very small when income is included in the 
regression, suggesting that auto safety in EU countries is not 
statistically different from US states. 
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Figure 15.1 Auto fatalities per 100,000 vehicles, US and EU, 2013 
a. Fatalities in the US (per 100,000 motor vehicles) 
 
b. Fatalities in the EU (per 100,000 motor vehicles) 
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c. Fatality rates and GDP per capita in individual EU countries and 
US states (per 100,000 motor vehicles) 
 
Data sources: World Health Organization Global Health Observatory Data 
Repository, 2010 (http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A997); authors' 
calculations using data from US National Highway and Traffic Safety 
Administration, 2012, FARS database (www.nhtsa.gov/FARS), and US Census 
Bureau, 2012 (www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2010s/index.html). 
Table 15.2 Fatalities US versus EU regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Fatality rate per 
100,000 vehicles 
Fatality rate per 
100,000 vehicles ln fatality rate 
EU dummy 2.192 
[2.393] 
–0.190 
[1.609] 
–0.156 
[0.102] 
ln GDP per 
capita 
 –22.673*** 
[4.020] 
–1.373*** 
[0.217] 
Observations 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.017 0.554 0.544 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data sources: World Health Organization Global Health Observatory Data 
Repository, 2010 (http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A997); authors’ 
calculations using data from US National Highway and Traffic Safety 
Administration, 2012 FARS database, (www.nhtsa.gov/FARS) and US Census 
Bureau, 2012, (www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2010s/index.html). 
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3. Economic benefits: Evidence from the 1958 
Agreement 
The economic argument against different regulations is that instead of 
making one model for both markets, car producers make two separate 
models. Returns to scale are underutilised, some processes are 
duplicated, producers can price discriminate, and inventory cannot be 
reallocated across markets. As a result, consumers face higher average 
prices and less variety. 
Regulatory barriers are especially burdensome for small 
producers or in small markets. Some models are not sold in markets 
where there is demand because sunk costs of adjusting the models to 
those markets are too high. For example, while the Canadian market 
adheres to US regulations, demand for subcompact and compact cars 
is higher in Canada than in the United States (representing 65% and 
41% of market share, respectively). European manufacturers are unable 
to take advantage of this demand for smaller cars in Canada, because 
as Canadian car sales were less than 5% of US auto sales in 2014, the 
sunk cost of adjusting a subcompact European car to US regulations (in 
order to sell in the Canadian market) is higher than the relative gains in 
the Canadian market.1  
Regulatory differences also affect consumers: When there is 
demand for the same car in both markets, consumers may not be able 
to take advantage of price differentials across markets due to the cost 
of recertification in the new market. This allows producers to price 
discriminate, selling a Mercedes for the profit-maximising price in each 
market, which leads to higher average prices.2  
Regulatory differences also impede market integration, 
preventing companies from selling new products in both markets. For 
example, if a specific new technology is approved under European 
regulations, such as Mercedes-Benz LED Intelligent Light System, but 
not under US regulations, the new technology is not available for sale 
                                                          
1 Canadian light vehicle sales in 2014 were 0.55 million units (0.23 million 
passenger cars and 0.32 million light trucks); US light vehicle sales in 2014 were 
16.8 million units (7.7 million passenger cars and 9.1 million light trucks). 
Sources: Desrosiers Automotive Reports (www.desrosiers.ca/pdfs/sales.pdf) 
and WardsAuto Reports (http://wardsauto.com/public-data). 
2. The welfare consequences of price discrimination can be positive if poor 
consumers receive a lower price, which may be socially optimal. See Bradford 
&Lawrence (2004) for a detailed analysis of the welfare effects from removing 
price differentials across markets.  
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in the United States. US consumers thus cannot enjoy the new 
technology because markets are not integrated.  
Increased integration of markets promotes rapid innovation. 
Previous work on auto emissions regulations shows that convergence 
of regulation leads to increased technology transfer and motivates 
export-oriented car industries in smaller countries to adopt higher 
emissions regulations to converge with the US and EU markets, 
creating a race to the top. Using data on automobile emissions 
regulations between 1992 and 2007, Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Eric 
Neumayer and Richard Perkins (2015) find that technological 
developments, measured as cross-border patents, are more likely to 
flow between countries where regulatory standards are similar, rather 
than the level of regulations themselves. Perkins & Neumayer (2012) 
find that small and developing countries with export-oriented auto 
industries are more likely to have stricter auto emissions regulations 
and their auto sectors receive higher levels of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The authors argue that export-oriented firms whose 
main target markets include countries with higher emissions 
standards have an incentive to raise standards in their home markets 
since these firms already have the infrastructure in place to produce 
higher-standard vehicles and therefore would be more competitive 
than strictly domestic producers. Better regulatory coherence will also 
promote research and development because instead of spending on 
adapting models to different regulatory regimes, companies will 
channel resources toward finding safer and more fuel efficient 
technologies. 
While an increasing number of countries have adopted the UN 
Regulations associated with the 1958 Agreement, some such as Chile 
(and some small countries) follow US regulations. Regulatory 
convergence will not only help the US and EU markets but also may 
draw smaller countries into their standardised framework, thus 
spreading the high standards.  
3.1 Quantifying the Gains from Integration of 
Regulations 
To estimate the gains from having a single market, we use data on trade 
to evaluate the effect of becoming a contracting party to the 1958 
Agreement. Along with its subsequent revisions in 1967 and 1995, the 
1958 Agreement has gone a long way towards completely harmonising 
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regulatory standards.3 Individual governments and governing bodies 
(such as the European Union) that are parties to the agreement verify 
that automobiles meet the regulations before they are certified for sale 
to consumers. The agreement was made under the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and originally allowed 
participation only by UNECE members, but since 1995 has accepted 
non-European members, such as Japan (1998) and South Korea (2004). 
Table 15.3 lists the countries that are currently contracting parties to the 
1958 agreement, by order of accession date. 
Table 15.3 Members of the 1958 Agreement (as of February 2014) 
Country Date of 
accession 
Country Date of 
accession 
Belgium 1959 Estonia 1995 
France 1959 Belarus 1995 
Sweden 1959 Turkey 1996 
Hungary 1960 Ireland 1998 
Netherlands 1960 European Union 1998 
Spain 1961 Japan 1998 
United Kingdom 1963 Latvia 1999 
Italy 1963 Bulgaria 2000 
Germany 1966 Australia 2000 
Austria 1971 Ukraine 2000 
Luxembourg 1971 Serbia 2001 
Switzerland 1973 South Africa 2001 
Norway 1975 Azerbaijan 2002 
Finland 1976 New Zealand 2002 
Denmark 1976 Lithuania 2002 
Romania 1977 Cyprus 2004 
Poland 1979 Malta 2004 
Portugal 1980 South Korea 2004 
Russia 1987 Thailand 2006 
Croatia 1991 Montenegro 2006 
Macedonia 1991 Malaysia 2006 
                                                          
3 There is also a 1998 Agreement, which is more limited in scope than the 1958 
Agreement and calls for the establishment of global technical regulations (GTR) 
but does not include legally binding global regulations or provide for mutual 
recognition, as the 1958 Agreement does. The United States is a contracting 
member of the 1998 Agreement, along with the European Union, Japan, Canada 
and a host of other countries. 
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Slovenia 1991 Tunisia 2008 
Greece 1992 Albania 2011 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1992 Kazakhstan 2011 
Czech Republic 1993 Egypt 2013 
Slovakia 1993   
Data source: UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/main/wp29/wp29regs/updates/E
CE-TRANS-WP.29-343-Rev.22.pdf). 
The variation in accession dates helps to isolate the effect on auto 
trade of signing the 1958 Agreement. Figure 15.2 shows the average and 
median of the log of real exports versus time relative to accession year. 
Year 0 is the year a country joined the agreement, year 1 is the year 
after, year -1 is the year before and so forth. The figure shows that after 
joining the agreement countries tend to increase exports with members, 
from a similar starting level. The graph is in logs indicating that 
member exports doubled around accession and exports of non-
members remained unchanged. Figure 15.3 shows that joining the 
agreement leads to a shift in exports to other agreement members. Both 
show a clear effect of the agreement on trade flows between contracting 
parties. 
Figure 15.2 Export expansion relative to accession to 1958 Agreement 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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Figure 15.3 Export share to 1958 Agreement members relative to accession 
year 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
3.2 Estimating the Magnitude of the UN58 Effect 
To estimate the size of the effect, controlling for supply and demand 
shocks to trade, we use a difference-in-differences approach. The 
difference-in-difference approach allows for a near experimental 
research design.  While ideally we would like to randomly assign some 
countries the same regulatory standards and then observe what 
happens to auto trade, this type of experimental research design is 
obviously not feasible.  This methodology is as close as you can get to 
experimental design using data. It compares trade growth between a 
new member and an existing member to trade growth between the new 
member and an otherwise similar country that is not a member.  
In particular, we use the following regression equation on 
exports from country i to country j in year t (exportsijt): 
 ln (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗𝑡 + +𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝑈𝑁58𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,  (1) 
where US58 is a dummy for two countries being members of the 
1958 agreement, γit is an exporter-year fixed effect, γjt is an importer-
year fixed effect, and γij is an country-pair fixed effect, and the final 
term is the error. When Greece joined the agreement in 1992 the UN58 
variable switched from 0 to 1, on bilateral trade flows with another 
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agreement member. The variable remains 1 when trade is between 
Greece and other agreement members for all subsequent years that 
Greece is a member of the agreement.  
We also include a dummy for the European Union to ensure that 
UN58 does not pick up EU effects, as a number of countries that joined 
the 1958 Agreement also joined the European Union over the period. 
The EU dummy is one for the year of accession and all years after for 
trade between the new member and other EU members, and zero 
otherwise.4  
Data are from UN Comtrade for trade in passenger cars (SITC 
7321) and include total value of bilateral exports for all country pairs. 
Data are drawn as mirror import data, which is better reported, and 
range from 1970 to 2013, over which period 41 countries acceded to the 
agreement. Because of the large number of fixed effects, we cannot 
estimate the regression on the full sample. We include all exporters that 
exported an aggregate of $1 million in automobiles in at least one year 
of the sample, and all importers that imported at least $1 million in one 
year. These countries account for on average 97% of total auto trade 
over the period.5 Errors are clustered at the country-pair level, 
consistent with our variable of interest.6 
The advantage of this approach is that importer-year fixed effects 
control for demand shocks, for example, because of a rise in income or 
a change in most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs. Exporter-year fixed 
effects pick up supply shocks, such as a productivity boost. The 
country-pair fixed effect controls for average trade between two 
countries and picks up non-time-varying factors, such as distance, 
common language, and other static linkages, such as the pair’s 
membership in the European Union over the whole period. The 
variable of interest, UN58, picks up the long-run effect on annual 
bilateral trade flows between members from signing the agreement. 
                                                          
4 During the sample period, the following countries became EU members: 
United Kingdom and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 
1986, Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, a group of 10 mainly Eastern 
European countries in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.  
5. This yields 35 exporters, listed in appendix Table 15.A1, and 69 importers. In 
the robustness section we also split the period and drop countries with less than 
$100,000 exports or imports in any year, which yields 77 exporters and 142 
importers. 
6. In the robustness section, we also cluster errors at the reporter (importer) 
level, and results remain robust. 
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The results are reported in Table 15.4. The first column reports 
results with only the UN58 variable, the coefficient of 0.21 implies a 
trade effect of the agreement of 23% (exp(.21)-1). The next column 
repeats the exercise including the EU dummy in the regression and the 
result remains unchanged.  
Table 15.4 Effect of the 1958 Agreement on auto trade 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: ln(exportsij) 
UN58 0.205* 
[0.118] 
0.197* 
[0.118] 
0.388*** 
[0.138] 
0.456*** 
[0.148] 
0.448*** 
[0.148] 
EU  0.662*** 
[0.134] 
0.626*** 
[0.134] 
0.613*** 
[0.134] 
0.691*** 
[0.154] 
Left-
Right*UN58 
  –0.393** 
[0.156] 
–0.368** 
[0.156] 
–0.368** 
[0.156] 
Share*UN58    –1.737* 
[0.977] 
–1.663* 
[0.982] 
Share*EU     –2.238* 
[1.296] 
Observation
s 
50,467 50,467 50,467 50,467 50,467 
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Trade effect 
(percent) 
23 22 47 58 57 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets clustered at the exporter-importer level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The effect on auto trade of joining the 1958 Agreement is large 
and significant but smaller than the effect of EU accession. The EU 
membership effect is more important in this sector because the auto 
sector relies on distribution and service, and over our sample period 
relatively high tariffs and other regulations were limiting cross-border 
auto trade. The EU coefficient found here is comparable to estimates of 
the gains to trade associated with EU membership in manufacturing 
sectors.7  
                                                          
7 Freund & Portugal-Perez (2013) find a 52% increase in imports associated with 
EU membership, while Baldwin & Taglioni (2006) find a smaller effect (27%) 
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A potential concern about our methodology is that joining the 
1958 Agreement might be endogenous. Countries that have increasing 
auto trade with agreement members might be more likely to join the 
agreement. This could overestimate the effect of the agreement on 
trade. To some extent the exporter-year and importer-year effects 
should pick this up, as they control for countries that become 
increasingly involved in auto trade over time. But if the effect is group-
specific they may not.  
In the absence of a good instrument for joining the agreement, 
we exploit an additional feature of the data to control for potential 
endogeneity. In 10 countries in the 1958 Agreement, people drive on 
the left side of the road.8 For trade between these countries and the rest, 
the agreement should be less effective because inventory cannot be 
redeployed across markets and two separate models still need to be 
created. It is impossible for regulations to be the same when an 
important feature such as the steering side of the car is different, which 
results in differences in dashboards, mirrors, pedals, stick shift, etc. We 
thus create a dummy for trade between a left-hand driving country and 
a right-hand driving country. We interact this dummy with the UN58 
variable and include the interaction in the regression (country-pair 
fixed effects eliminate the need to include the dummy itself). If the 
effect of the agreement is about trends among members, we expect the 
interaction effect to be insignificant. If it is about regulatory 
convergence, we expect the variable to be negative and significant, 
indicating that these country pairs do not experience the full effect of 
the agreement. The result is shown in the third column of Table 15.4. 
The negative and significant effect of the interaction shows that the 
agreement has no effect on trade between left-hand and right-hand 
driving countries. In addition, controlling for the mixed pairs, the 
overall effect of the agreement is larger and closer to the EU effect. This 
strongly suggests that we are picking up the effect of the agreement and 
not general trends in the group. 
                                                          
over the period 1980–2004. Using auto data over the same period (1980–2004), 
we find no significant effect of EU membership on auto exports, but this is not 
surprising considering new EU members over this period were not major auto 
producers. The UN58 effect remains robust and highly significant in this period 
with a coefficient of 0.34. 
8 These are the United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan, Australia, South Africa, New 
Zealand, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand and Malaysia. 
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The results suggest that the boost in trade from joining the 1958 
Agreement has been at least 20%. But using the effects of the agreement 
to predict what would happen to the United States may be problematic 
because the United States is a relatively large exporter, accounting for 
8% of auto exports on average to the sample group over the period. If 
small exporters are affected differently from large exporters then the 
results might not transfer. Indeed, a standard trade model would 
suggest larger effects on small exporters if the agreement is largely 
about fixed costs, as these producers can now access more markets. We 
next interact average market share over the period with the UN58 
effect. Average market share is defined as a country’s total exports of 
autos in a given year relative to the world total, averaged over the 
whole period. We use average market share because market share in 
any year is endogenous to the agreement. If the effect is larger for small 
exporters we expect the coefficient to be negative. Interacting market 
share with the UN58 dummy variable also enables us to estimate the 
effect on trade for a relatively large exporter like the United States. 
The results are reported in column 4. Larger exporters experience 
a smaller boost to exports from regulatory convergence, but the overall 
effect is still positive for all exporters. Figure 15.4 shows how the effect 
varies with average market share over the period. Exports of a country 
with a market share of 8% like the United States would increase by 
about 35% with other countries that drive on the right side of the road. 
The largest exporters, Germany and Japan, still receive a 7% boost from 
membership. 
Figure 15.4 Trade effect by average market share 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The results above offer strong evidence that regulatory 
harmonisation has strong positive effects on trade. We subject the 
results to further robustness tests, including more conservative 
treatment of errors, alternative time periods, controlling for trade 
policies, and a placebo test. All results remain robust.9 
3.3 Comparison with other estimates 
Using the 1958 Agreement as an example produces larger effects on 
trade than results based on tariff equivalents. Ecorys (2009) estimates 
trade gains associated with EU and US auto regulatory convergence of 
about 10%. After designing and collecting data from a business survey 
of 5,500 NAFTA and EU member firms, Ecorys constructed an index 
ranking restrictiveness of nontariff regulations for bilateral trade 
between countries, ranging from 0 (completely open) to 100 
(completely closed), for 23 sectors. The individual responses are 
aggregated by sector country-pair, and added to a gravity model, 
which predicts trade after controlling for GDP of trading partners and 
the distance between them, using data from 2008. The gravity model 
was run individually for each of the sectors to generate a set of tariff 
equivalents. In the auto sector, Ecorys finds a 25.5% increase in costs of 
US exports to the European Union, and a 26.8% increase in costs of EU 
exports to the United States. That is, they estimate that regulations 
affect trade in the same way as an ad valorem tariff of about 25%. 
Using this tariff equivalent, Ecorys then uses computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) analysis to predict the medium-run increase in 
exports between the United States and European Union following a 
reduction in non-tariff measures between the two countries through 
2018. In an ambitious scenario, where all automotive regulations are 
eliminated, EU exports increase by 10.7% a year, while US exports 
increase 9.1%. A limited scenario, which sees only half of non-tariff 
regulations eliminated, still has a positive impact on EU exports (4.3% 
increase per year) and US exports (5.3% per year).10 Following the 
model, this export increase corresponds to an increase in sector output 
of 0.7% per year for the United States and a 2.2% increase for the 
European Union, which translates into an increase in national income 
of $2.1 billion and $15.6 billion for the two markets, respectively. In 
                                                          
9 For details, see this chapter’s original complete text in Freund & Oliver (2015). 
10 For the entire economy, Ecorys predicts a 6.1% increase in US exports versus 
a 2.1% increase for the European Union following the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers.  
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comparison, our model cannot be used like a CGE model to predict 
changes in output or income, but given the much larger export boost 
we estimate from regulatory convergence, the Ecorys’ predictions 
likely represent the minimum increases in output and income. Our 
estimates, which are based on an actual harmonisation event, may be 
larger than theirs for a number of reasons. The most important are that 
1) the restrictiveness index from survey evidence is likely to be very 
noisy and not necessarily linked to the production costs associated with 
regulatory differences. Perceived regulations may not affect trade in a 
monotonic way as their model assumes. For example, a small 
regulatory difference in one sector may affect production costs more 
than a large regulatory difference in another sector because of the 
production process. 2) Using a gravity equation to turn the survey into 
a tariff equivalent forces regulatory barriers to affect trade in a very 
restrictive way, as an iceberg cost that affects trade in the same way 
across sectors, when regulatory differences affect production structure, 
returns to scale, and variable and fixed costs.  
In contrast, our estimate is the long-run trade effect of 
harmonisation, as estimated from an actual agreement. As these are 
historical effects, the actual effect could still differ if modern supply 
chains have reduced the importance of trade restrictions. The short- to 
medium-run effects might be significantly smaller if foreign investment 
has already adjusted to segment the US and EU markets. To the extent 
these investments are irreversible in the short run, production will take 
some time to adjust to changes in the regulatory system. In light of this, 
the next section looks at production chains across markets and the 
trends in FDI in the auto sector between the United States and 
European Union.  
4. Foreign direct investment and industry trends 
FDI in both directions is substantial. FDI stocks between the United 
States and European Union in the transportation sector have steadily 
increased over time in both directions, with an increase in both US 
direct investment in the European Union and EU investment in the 
United States. In particular, European investment has increased in 
recent years, while US FDI stock in the European Union has declined 
since 2007 (Figure 15.5). For European carmakers, particularly German 
firms Volkswagen and BMW, revenue from US sales has also steadily 
increased over the past 10 years (Figure 15.6).  
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Figure 15.5 Foreign direct investment position in transportation equipment, 
1982-2013 
 
Source: Authors’ configuration based on data from US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, International Data, Direct Investment and MNE (www.bea.gov). 
Figure 15.6 EU manufacturers' revenue from US operations, 2004-13 
 
Source: Authors’ configuration based on data from Bloomberg. 
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US and European manufacturers use different supply chains for 
cars produced for the US consumer. The 1992 American Automotive 
Labeling Act (AALA) requires all automobiles sold in the United States 
to be labelled with the percent of US and Canadian content that makes 
up each type of automobile sold in the United States, in order to 
encourage US consumers to buy cars with high levels of US content. 
Figure 15.7 shows the average share of US and Canadian content of the 
‘big three’ US automakers (Chrysler, GM and Ford). In 2007, the big 
three produced car models that contained 70% US or Canadian content 
on average. By 2015 models, that share had declined in all three 
companies, as production shifted to Mexico. So, while US carmakers’ 
production for US consumption has shifted away from the United 
States, there has been little movement outside NAFTA.  
Figure 15.7 Average share of US and Canadian content, by company, 2007-
2015 models  
 
* Chrysler 2015 average includes Fiat models, following the merging of the two 
companies in 2014. 
Source: Data from the 1992 American Automotive Labeling Act.  
The AALA data show that compared with US or Japanese 
automobile manufacturers, European firms still tend to produce the 
majority of their parts in the European Union for cars sold in the United 
States. Table 15.5 compares the US content of the top-five models sold 
in the United States in 2014, separated into US, EU, and other non-US 
manufacturers. Of the top-five European cars sold, only Volkswagen 
has a significant share of its content from outside of Germany and 
produces cars for the US market in both Germany and Mexico. 
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Table 15.5 US content of top-selling US, EU and other non-US car models, 
2014 
Model Models 
sold  
US/ 
Canadian 
content 
(%) 
Other 
contenta 
(%) 
Final 
assembly 
location(s) 
Engine 
source(s) 
Trans-
mission 
source(s) 
United States 
Ford F-
Series 
753,851 75  US US US 
Chevrolet 
Silverado 
529,755 40 51, 
Mexico 
US, 
Mexico 
US US 
Dodge Ram 
1500-3500 
439,789 66 23, 
Mexico 
US, 
Mexico 
Mexico, 
Italy 
US 
Ford Fusion 306,860 75 15, 
Mexico 
Mexico Romania, 
UK, 
Spain, 
Mexico 
US, UK 
Ford Escape 306,212 60  US Mexico, 
Spain, 
UK 
US 
Europe 
Volkswagen 
Jetta  
141,354 6–12 37-41, 
Mexico, 
up to 26, 
Germany 
Mexico Mexico Japan, 
Argentina, 
Germany 
BMW 3 
Series  
100,902 5 60-65, 
Germany 
Germany Germany Germany 
Passat 
Volkswagen 
96,649 40–45 21, 
Mexico; 
26-41, 
Germany 
US Germany
, Mexico 
Germany, 
Argentina, 
Japan 
Mercedes-
Benz “C” 
Class 
75,066 0 73, 
Germany 
Germany Germany Germany 
Mercedes-
Benz “E” 
Class 
66,403 0 73, 
Germany 
Germany Germany Germany 
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Other non-US 
Toyota 
Camry 
428,606 75 20, Japan US US, Japan US, Japan 
Honda 
Accord 
388,374 70 15, Japan US US, Japan US, Japan 
Toyota 
Corolla 
339,498 60 30, Japan China, 
US 
US Japan 
Nissan 
Altima 
335,644 60 15, Japan US US Japan 
Honda Cr-V 335,019 70 15, Japan US, 
China, 
Mexico 
US US, Japan 
a To be included in the other content category, an individual country must produce 
at least 15% of the parts included in the car model. 
Data sources: 1992 American Automotive Labeling Act, National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration 
(www.nhtsa.gov/Laws+&+Regulations/Part+583+American+ 
Automobile+Labeling+Act+(AALA)+Reports) and Bloomberg 
(www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-auto-sales). 
The high share of US content among Japanese firms relative to 
European carmakers is related to historical restrictions on Japanese car 
imports and a volatile yen. As trade tensions between Japan and the 
United States flared, the Japanese government agreed to VERs on the 
number of Japanese cars that could be exported to the United States, 
while European carmakers had no similar legislation in place. VERs 
were in effect from 1981 to 1994. Additionally, in 1985, the United States 
and Japan realigned exchange rates in the Plaza Accord. The significant 
appreciation of the yen removed the cost advantage of producing in 
Japan for export to the United States and led to a less stable yen/dollar 
exchange rate. The three biggest Japanese carmakers opened factories 
in the United States to get around VERs, (Honda in 1980, Nissan in 
1983, and Toyota in 1986) and continued producing in the United States 
to some extent because of the exchange rate adjustment. In contrast, 
VW closed its only US plant in the United States in 1988 and did not 
open another US plant until 2011.11 
Although the differences in regulations require separate car 
models for the US markets, European firms still choose to produce cars 
                                                          
11 Schaede (2010); James Healy, “‘Transplant’ Auto Factories in USA Turn 30 
This Year,” USA Today, 3 April 2012; Andrew Pollack, “Japan to End Restraints 
on Auto Exports to US”, New York Times, 29 March 1994. 
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bound for the US market through EU supply chains perhaps because of 
fewer historical restrictions on trade (and indeed Korean-made cars 
also tend to have lower levels of US content than Japanese-made ones). 
If regulations were mutually recognised, pre-existing supply chains, 
which currently produce two versions of the same model of cars sold 
in both markets, would become more efficient as they would be able to 
halve the number of different models they produce along these supply 
chains.  
While European cars sold in the United States are largely 
European-made, what about US cars sold in Europe? The European 
Union does not have similar content-reporting regulations in place, 
making it difficult to determine precisely the European content of US 
branded cars sold in Europe. However, one way of determining if US 
auto firms are any more reliant on production in Europe than EU auto 
firms are on production in the United States is to compare sales of 
multinationals outside of their home countries, which is likely to move 
with foreign production, and exports. The higher the ratio of exports to 
sales, the more foreign affiliates rely on imports from the parent 
company for sales, rather than producing cars in the market they sell 
in.  
Table 15.6 uses US Bureau of Economic Analysis data on 
multinationals operating in the United States and US companies abroad 
to calculate the ratio of exports to sales in 2012, the most recent year for 
which data are available. These BEA data are for both US affiliates 
operating abroad and foreign affiliates operating in the United States 
and report total sales in transport equipment for both groups (NAICS 
366). For European parents and their US affiliates, exports are of all 
transport equipment and wholesale trade in motor vehicles and motor 
vehicle parts and supplies. This matches closely data from Comtrade 
on transportation exports from the European Union to the United 
States. However, these data are not available for US parents and their 
European affiliates. To calculate the ratio of exports to sales in this case, 
we instead use Comtrade data on total EU-27 exports of transport 
equipment to the United States (SITC 73).  
Despite exports to total sales of just one-third of European sales, 
local content data reveal that European cars are still made of largely EU 
content. This may be because final assembly is often the most cost-
effective stage of production to move. As a result these ratios may offer 
a good sense of relative differences across markets but may be less 
useful as an indication of home-country content. 
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Table 15.6 Ratio of exports to total sales, 2012 
 Exports by parent to 
affiliate company 
($ million)  
Total sales 
by affiliate  
($ million) 
Exports/ 
total sales 
All transportation equipment  
European parent, US 
affiliate 
56,860 165,066 0.34 
US parent, European 
affiliate 
28,837a 166,788 0.17 
a Total EU imports of transportation equipment from the United States (SITC 
code 73). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis and 
UN Comtrade Database. 
The ratio of exports to total sales is higher in Europe than in the 
United States. This suggests that US car sales in Europe have relatively 
higher levels of foreign content than European cars have non-European 
content in the United States. The estimates from the model of large 
long-run trade gains from regulatory harmonisation, significantly 
larger than from tariff reductions, therefore may be more delayed in the 
United States than Europe, because the United States produces vehicles 
in Europe with less US content compared with the EU content of 
European vehicles for the US market. European producers are therefore 
likely to adjust more rapidly to a new integrated terrain than US 
producers, where production is separated.  
Beyond the firms with production abroad, firms that do not 
currently export to the United States, such as French motor company 
Renault, could increase variety in the US market without incurring the 
costs associated with building cars to US specification. As noted earlier, 
the market for compact and subcompact cars in the United States is 
very small, but if firms that produce such vehicles following EU 
regulations can sell in North America, they will be able to reach the US 
and Canadian consumers who prefer smaller cars without incurring the 
high costs of modifying the car models. Since regulations provide 
similar levels of safety, and harmonised regulations bring trade gains, 
the United States and European Union should work towards making 
US and European cars available in both markets without having to 
make separate versions of each model.  
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5. Policy proposal 
Considering the large gains from harmonisation, one proposal for the 
US and EU automotive sector is for the United States to join the 1958 
Agreement. However, this approach has high logistic and legal costs. 
In addition to the technical differences in regulations, such as the turn 
signal light example in Table 15.1, EU and US regulations on vehicle 
safety certification also differ in implementation. The United States 
operates under a self-certification system for vehicle regulations. The 
National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues 
safety regulations for US vehicles, but calls on automakers to certify 
that their new vehicles conform to these safety regulations. Firms are 
responsible for both testing of new vehicles and liable for any penalties 
associated with vehicles that are found not in compliance with NHTSA 
regulations. On the other hand, under the 1958 Agreement, the 
European Union operates under a type-approval system, where firms 
submit samples of new cars to government testing facilities, which 
formally approve these new models. Once approved by any 
government in the European Union, that car model is considered to 
have met the safety regulations of all EU members and can be sold in 
all EU countries (Canis & Lattanzio, 2014).  
As demand for vehicles shifts away from the US market, there is 
less of an incentive to produce models specifically designed to meet US 
safety regulations and approval systems. However, logistically, it 
would likely be infeasible to switch from a self-certification to a type-
approval system, as the United States would need to establish a new 
government entity to handle auto safety regulations, rewrite laws to 
regulate changes in liability for faulty vehicles and parts, and build new 
infrastructure for safety testing.  
An alternative approach would be to leave established 
regulatory systems in place in both the United States and the European 
Union but have both countries accept the other’s regulations as valid in 
their own market. Such a policy could be adopted either for all vehicle 
regulations or for a range of particular components. Currently, few 
cases of such mutual recognition are in place, but it is not without 
precedent, and this approach is gaining ground. New Zealand, which 
signed on to the 1958 Agreement in 2002, also imports vehicles certified 
under US regulations.12 Mexico allows sales of vehicles with either 
                                                          
12 New Zealand Transport Agency, “Guide to importing a vehicle” 
(www.nzta.govt.nz/vehicle/importing). 
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Mexican or European certification.13 Additionally, free trade 
agreements have facilitated some of this mutual recognition. The 
Korea-US Free Trade Agreement allows Korea to import 25,000 vehicles 
per automaker that meet US regulations, without having to also meet 
Korean regulations (Schott, 2010). Canada is moving toward mutual 
recognition of EU and US regulations. While Canadian regulations 
generally mirror US regulations, the Canada-European Union 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, signed in October 
2014, lists 17 UNECE safety regulations that are considered an 
allowable alternative to current Canadian regulations (Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Development Canada, 2013). 
There is evidence that both the United States and the European 
Union would accept such of agreement. In September 2009, the 
European Communities brought a proposal to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to supplement the existing text of the December 
2008 Negotiating Group on Market Access, in order to reconcile type-
approval (1958 Agreement) and self-certification (US regulations) 
frameworks in the auto industry.14 The proposal recognised both 
systems as valid auto regulatory frameworks and allows for three paths 
for potential signatories: 1) members with type-approval systems 
already in place must sign the 1958 Agreement; 2) members with self-
certification systems may join the 1958 Agreement, then nominate a 
national regulatory body to deliver type-approval of automobiles 
produced in that member state; and 3) members with self-certification 
systems may maintain them while recognising UN Regulations as 
equally valid as their own regulations in their market (Negotiating 
Group on Market Access, 2009a).  
The proposal also presents a method for documenting member 
country adoptions of mutually recognised equivalent regulations for 
EU and US technical requirements. Each member is required to certify 
that it will accept a particular EU regulation as equivalent to a US 
regulation. For each requirement, the United States must document 
each safety requirement that is considered equivalent to the EU 
requirement in order for a car that meets either regulation to be sold. 
                                                          
13 Jeremy Cato, “Mexico accepts European vehicle standards, why doesn’t 
Canada?” Globe and Mail, 5 November 2014. 
14 The 2008 negotiations provide a framework for proposing and adopting 
regulatory harmonisation in the automotive sector but does not itself propose 
steps for convergence.  
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At the same time, the European Union must recognise that the same US 
regulation is equivalent to the EU regulation to sell a car that meets 
either requirement in the market.  
For example, the United States requires that the colours of the 
front and rear end-outline marker lamps be amber and red, 
respectively.15 The corresponding EU requirement is white and red, 
respectively. If both the United States and the European Union 
recognised each other’s regulations, firms from both countries would 
be able to sell cars with either type of lights in both markets and not 
have to change the colours.  
The US response to the WTO framework was positive. The 
United States circulated a response outlining a procedure for 
transparently reporting changes in regulation and conformity 
assessment procedures, noting transparency was particularly 
necessary when countries were adopting another member’s 
regulations. This communication also added that when members 
propose to adopt a technical regulation, they should also consider the 
costs of complying with this regulation and consider any already 
available alternatives that fulfil the same objective. A revised version of 
the proposal, circulated in December 2009, incorporated these US 
proposed changes (Negotiating Group on Market Access, 2009b).  
While this proposal has not moved forward in the WTO, there is 
potential for a similar bilateral proposal of mutual recognition either 
within the TTIP framework or in an auto sector-specific agreement.  
From an economic perspective, assuming the safety and 
environmental outcomes of the regulations are the same, 
harmonisation and mutual recognition have similar economic results. 
In both cases, inventory can be redeployed. In both cases, only one 
model needs to be created for both markets. In both cases, models with 
low demand in a foreign market can still be exported without costly 
adjustments. Mutual recognition will be much easier to achieve in this 
case, especially with respect to the approval system, because shifting 
from government to self-approval or vice versa would require the trade 
agreement to impinge on legal systems, which are part of national 
sovereignty. For members the main economic concern with mutual 
recognition is that if one system is significantly cheaper to use than the 
                                                          
15 Outline marker lamps are placed on the front and rear of the vehicle to 
indicate the overall width of the vehicle.  
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other, it could draw investment away from the region with the more 
costly regulation.  
Mutual recognition also has important implications for outside 
producers. If the agreement extends only to the European Union and 
the United States, outside producers will still be required to produce 
for two different systems. For example, if Korea-manufactured 
automobiles that meet EU regulations are not eligible for the mutual 
recognition agreement, then Korean producers will still be required to 
produce separate models for each market. This will put them at a cost 
disadvantage relative to US and EU producers. Not extending mutual 
recognition will also prevent the ‘global standard-setting’ that the US 
and EU governments have used to motivate the agreement. It is 
therefore important that a mutual recognition agreement is extended to 
outside producers as well. Of course, they would not be permitted to 
follow their own unique regulations and be granted recognition 
privileges, but provided they adhere to either US or EU regulations, 
automobiles produced outside the TTIP area should be subject to the 
same restrictions as US- or EU-produced vehicles.  
Mutual recognition, particularly with enhanced technical 
harmonisation, would require time to achieve. Kenneth Feith, Daniel 
Malone, and John Creamer (2014) offer a starting point of trust and 
cooperation, where US and EU regulators considering new 
technologies keep each other informed and work together on the 
rulemaking process and commit to bridging the type-approval and self-
certification systems, and build in steps towards mutual recognition. 
6. Conclusion 
Regulatory convergence or mutual recognition of regulations between 
the European Union and the United States would bring larger welfare 
gains than tariff reduction. The gains are in efficiency, variety, and 
innovation. We estimate that harmonisation of auto regulations would 
increase US-EU auto trade by at least 20%. These gains can be achieved 
through the TTIP, which also aims at setting rules for global trade. To 
maximise auto market integration, greater harmonisation would be 
preferable, with the United States becoming a contracting member of 
the 1958 Agreement. However, recognising differences in legal systems 
and approval systems implies that the greatest benefit at the least cost 
is likely to come from the harmonisation of technical regulations, where 
overlap already exists, and the mutual recognition of regulations and 
approval methods across countries. This approach allows firms to 
streamline production and offers increased variety for consumers 
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without implicitly favouring either the existing EU or US systems. We 
also recommend that outside producers are extended the same 
treatment, provided they adhere to the US or the EU system.  
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Appendix 
Table 15.A1 List of exporters 
Argentina United Kingdom 
Belgium India 
Belgium-Luxembourg Italy 
Brazil Japan 
Canada South Korea 
China Mexico 
Germany Netherlands 
Spain Portugal 
France Thailand 
United States Finland 
Australia Hungary 
Romania Morocco 
Austria Poland 
Sweden Russia 
South Africa Serbia/Montenegro 
Indonesia Slovak Republic 
Turkey Slovenia 
Czech Republic  
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